Showing posts with label Justice Wecht. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Justice Wecht. Show all posts

Tuesday, May 21, 2024

Pennsylvania Supreme Court's Latest Pronouncement on Service of Process Issues (And Another Great Dissenting Opinion by Justice Wecht)



In the case of Ferraro v. Patterson-Erie, No. 1 WAP 2023 (Pa. April 25, 2024) (Op. by Donohue, J.), the court addressed a statute of limitations argument related to service of process issues in a slip and fall case.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff slipped and fell at a Burger King and, thereafter, filed a negligence lawsuit against the operators of the restaurant.

The Plaintiff filed her Complaint within the two (2) year statute of limitations.

However, the Plaintiff encountered difficulties with serving the Complaint on the Defendants due to issues with the Sheriff’s service and the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Plaintiff eventually served the Complaint through a private process server. She later reinstated the Complaint and then served it through the Sheriff.  However, this service by the Sheriff occurred after the statute of limitations had elapsed.

The Defendants argued that the action was barred by the statute of limitations because the Plaintiff did not make a good faith effort to serve them in a timely manner.

The trial court had denied the Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in this regard. The Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s decision.

On appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the decision of the Superior Court was reversed.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the Plaintiff failed to meet her burden of demonstrating that she made a good faith effort in diligently and timely serving process on the Defendants.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court found that the Defendants’ informal receipt of actual notice was irrelevant.

The court emphasized that the Plaintiffs are not permitted to opt out of the Rules of Civil Procedure regarding service in order to give notice of the commencement of a lawsuit by way of informal means. The court noted that, if attempts at service of process were viewed as optional for giving such notice of the filing of a lawsuit, then no Plaintiff would be required to rely upon the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure to complete service of process in a proper manner.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  

The Dissenting Opinion by Justice Wecht, in which Justice Mundy joined, can be viewed HERE.  Justice Wecht's Dissenting Opinion provides an excellent and thorough overview of the jurisprudence in Pennsylvania on the service of process law.  Justice Wecht also proposes ways to provide clarity on this area of law going forward.


Source: Justia.com Daily Opinions Summaries (April 26, 2024).




Pennsylvania Supreme Court Holds that Party Can Secure BOTH Treble Damages AND Punitive Damages in UTPCPL Claim


In the case of Dwyer v. Ameriprise Financial, No. 2 WAP 2023 (Pa. April 25, 2024) (Op. by Wecht, J.)(Brobson, J., Concurring and Dissenting), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a court may, under the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL), award both punitive damages and treble damages.

This case involved Plaintiffs who sued Ameriprise Financial for negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation relative to a life insurance policy. The Plaintiffs alleged that the carrier misrepresented to them that their quarterly premium payments would remain the same for the life of the policy. In reality, if the Plaintiff’s premium payment had remained the same, the policy allegedly would have lapsed for insufficient funds in 2020.

The trial court found Ameriprise guilty of violating Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law and award compensatory damages. The trial court declined to award treble damages under the UTPCPL under a rationale that such damages would be duplicative of the punitive damages that were awarded by the jury on the common law claims.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court had affirmed this decision.

Going up to the appellate ladder to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, that Court reversed and held that treble damages under the UTPCPL are a separate remedy available to the Plaintiffs and must be considered by the trial court without regard to a punitive damages award on related common law claims.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that nullifying the availability of a statutory award because of a common law award is not a permissible exercise of discretion by the trial court.

Accordingly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the order of the Superior Court and remanded the case back down to the trial court for reconsideration of the appropriate amount of damages under the UTPCPL.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of the Majority decision written by Justice Wecht may click this LINK.  

Justice Brobson Concurring and Dissenting Opinion can be viewed HERE

I send thanks to Attorney Kenneth Newman of the Pittsburgh office of the Thomas Thomas & Hafer law firm for bringing this case to my attention.


Source of image::  Photo by Giorgio Trovato on www.unsplash.com.

Thursday, September 28, 2023

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Addresses Issues of Indemnification and Contribution in Context of Medical Malpractice Claim


In the case of McLaughlin v. Nahata, No. 7 WAP 2022 (Pa. July 28, 2023) (Op. by Brobson, J.)(Wecht, J., Concurring), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, found that a hospital and a dialysis clinic were determined to be vicariously liable for the negligence of the doctors, and Pennsylvania law permitted the hospital to seek contribution from the dialysis clinic.
However, the Court was evenly divided on the question as to whether the hospital could also seek indemnification from the dialysis clinic.

Given the decision on contribution and the inability to reach a decision on the indemnity issue, the Superior Court decision was affirmed.

In this case, the issue presented to the court was whether, as a matter of law, the hospital could seek contribution and/or indemnity from a dialysis clinic for negligence allegedly committed by the doctor employees of the dialysis clinic.

The trial court and the Superior Court had both previously concluded that, although the judicial principles for contribution and indemnity did not apply cleanly to these particular circumstances, equitable principles of law permitted the hospitals to seek both contribution and indemnity from the dialysis clinic. As noted above, the Supreme Court agreed on the issue of indemnification but split on the issue of contribution.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of the Majority decision may click this LINK.


Justice Wecht's Concurring Opinion can be viewed HERE.


The Supreme Court's Per Curiam Order can be viewed HERE.


Source: “Justia Daily Opinion Summaries” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (July 29, 2023).

Source of image:  Photo by Camilo Jiminez on www.unsplash.com.

Thursday, April 13, 2023

ARTICLE: Pa. Supreme Court Completes U-Turn on Validity of Household Exclusion

Below is a copy of my recent article which was published in the March 30, 2023 edition of the Pennsylvania Law Weekly and which is republished here with permission: 


Pa. Supreme Court Completes U-Turn on Validity of Household Exclusion

March 30, 2023

By Daniel E. Cummins



Back in 2019, in the case of Gallagher v. GEICO Indemnity, 201 A.3d 131, 138 (Pa. 2019), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that the household exclusion, found in automobile insurance policies, violated Pennsylvania’s Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law and was, therefore, not enforceable under any circumstance.

With its Gallagher decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court threw open the door for injured parties to seek uninsured (UM) and underinsured (UIM) motorists benefits coverage in a wide variety of new circumstances. The decision reversed 20 years of precedent and resulted in expensive litigation on the issue in many pending cases. Plaintiffs also revived old cases in which the household exclusion had been previously applied against them to preclude coverage. A class action lawsuit in this regard even developed.

Also, other injured parties began to pursue new uninsured and underinsured motorists claims which, prior to the Gallagher decision, might not have been paid out by insurance companies due to an application of the household exclusion. It is certainly possible that some of those claims were simply paid out by some carriers due to the complete eradication of the household exclusion by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Gallagher. Other carriers still attempted to assert the household exclusion and these cases were litigated with mixed results in the federal and state courts.

But not all justices on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed with the Gallagher decision. In his dissenting opinion in Gallagher and again in his concurring opinion in Donovan, Pennsylvania’s “Great Dissenter,” Justice David N. Wecht, described the Gallagher decision as a “mistake” and noted that “the enormity of the court’s blunder quickly became apparent as state and federal courts struggled to apply (and make sense of) Gallagher’s reasoning.” See Donovan v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance, 256 A.3d 1145, 1163 (Pa. 2021).

Now, in a recent spate of decisions, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has retreated from its unduly expansive decision in Gallagher in which the court had noted that it had eradicated the household exclusion across the board. In the end, like a driver making a surreptitious U-turn and hoping no one was watching, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has backpedaled on the issue.

As a result, the household exclusion has recovered from the death knell sounded by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in the Gallagher decision and now instead remains a valid exclusion in Pennsylvania in most circumstances.

The Household Exclusion

Most automobile insurance policies contain a household exclusion. The basic premise of the household exclusion is that an insured is only permitted to recover uninsured (UM) or underinsured (UIM) motorist benefits under coverage that they have paid for by way of payment of premiums. In other words, the exclusion upholds the principle that you can’t get something for nothing.

More specifically, the household exclusion typically applies to a scenario where an insured in a household owns multiple motor vehicles. After that insured in involved in an accident, that injured party sues the driver who caused the accident and then turns to his or her own automobile insurance policy covering the vehicle that was involved in the accident for UIM benefits. That insured then also attempts to also recover UM/UIM benefits under another automobile insurance policy or policies issued by the same or different insurance companies that cover other vehicles in the same household which vehicles were not involved in the accident.

The household exclusion works to prevent the carriers covering the other noninvolved vehicles in the household from having to pay out UIM benefits to the injured party. The rationale is that the carrier that issued the policy on the other vehicle in the household was not paid a premium to provide coverage for injuries that resulted when the injured party was occupying a different vehicle from the same household.

‘Seismic’ Change in the Law

In what was called a “seismic” change in the law, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held in Gallagher v. GEICO Indemnity, 201 A.3d 131, 138 (Pa. 2019), that the household exclusion, which the court noted was allegedly “buried in an amendment” to the policy, was invalid and unenforceable. In the Gallagher decision, the Supreme Court deviated from decades of precedent upholding the validity of the household exclusion and instead ruled that the household exclusion violated Pennsylvania’s Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law and was, therefore, not enforceable.

More specifically, in Gallagher, the Supreme Court wrote “we hold that the household vehicle exclusion violates the MVFRL; therefore, these exclusions are unenforceable as a matter of law.” The exclusion was found to be in violation of the MVFRL the household exclusion was viewed by the court as impermissibly operating as a de facto waiver of stacked UM or UIM coverage when the MVFRL required insurance companies to actually secure written waivers of UIM coverage from its insureds.

In the Gallagher decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not limit its decision to the facts before it. As such, the decision was read as an eradication by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court of the household exclusion across the board. See Gallagher, 201 A.3d at 139 n. 8. (“As in every case, we are deciding the discrete issue before the court and holding that the household vehicle exclusion is unenforceable because it violates the MVFRL.”).

In so ruling, the majority in Gallagher, in seemingly regrettable language, noted, “We recognize that this decision may disrupt the insurance industry’s current practices; however, we are confident that the industry can and will employ its considerable resources to minimize the impact of our holding.”

Expressing his disagreement with the majority opinion in Gallagher and foreshadowing his own later majority opinion in the Mione case, Wecht issued a strong dissenting opinion in the Gallagher decision.

Wecht noted that the majority in Gallagher “upended the court’s well-established precedent” that had upheld the household exclusion. Wecht scoffed at the fact the “majority’s parting wisdom to Pennsylvania insurers is simply that they should use their ‘considerable resources’ to mitigate the damage that the court inflicted” in the Gallagher decision.

Wecht confirmed that the Gallagher decision was rife with incomplete and flimsy logic regarding an alleged de facto waiver of coverage and noted that the decision would only serve to result in an increase of the cost of automobile accident insurance which was “the very outcome that the General Assembly sought to avoid when it enacted the MVFRL.”

In his later concurring opinion in the Donovan case, a chagrined Wecht confirmed that “Gallagher was a mistake, but we must all live with it now.”

Wecht also cautioned his fellow jurists on the Supreme Court that unfortunate decisions like Gallagher would leave the court unnecessarily “destined to remain in the exclusion-umpiring business for the foreseeable future.”

As wisely predicted by Wecht his dissenting opinions in Gallagher and again in his concurring opinion in Donovan, the Gallagher decision unfortunately threw automobile law in Pennsylvania into a tizzy and resulted in expensive litigation on the issue, including a class action.

While most federal courts obediently followed the Gallagher decision as the new, expansive law of the land that eradicated the household exclusion in Pennsylvania, some state trial court and Superior Court judges instead chose to more specifically apply the elements of the doctrine of stare decisis. Those other more astute judges who applied the doctrine of stare decisis, thereby limited the Gallagher decision to its specific facts and otherwise ruled that the household exclusion remained enforceable in certain circumstances distinguishable from those facts presented in the Gallagher case.

In an apparent move not to run afoul of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Gallagher, certain Pennsylvania Superior Court panels listed their post-Gallagher decisions upholding the household exclusion as “nonprecedential.” See Erie Insurance Exchange v. Colebank, No. 1244 WDA 2021 (Pa. Super. 2022); see also Erie Insurane Exchange v. Sutherland, No. 1113 WDA 2020 (Pa. Super. 2021).

However, in Erie Insurance Exchange v. Mione, 253 A.3d 754 (Pa. Super. 2021), the case that would eventually work its way up to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the Pennsylvania Superior Court published its decision in which it distinguished the Gallagher decision and upheld the insurance company’s application of a household exclusion. But, before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would decide the Mione case, it would first reaffirm its finding that the household exclusion was unenforceable in another decision.

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Decision Reaffirms That Household Exclusion Is Invalid

In Donovan v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance, 256 A.3d 1145 (Pa. 2021), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court doubled down on its finding that the household exclusion was invalid by reaffirming its previous decision in Gallagher v. GEICO and again ruling that plaintiffs need not worry about the household exclusion provision as it was invalid as violative of Pennsylvania’s MVFRL and, therefore, unenforceable.

In Donovan, while still ruling that the household exclusion was invalid, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court attempted to quietly began its retreat from its overly expansive “blunder” of a decision in Gallagher without acknowledging it was doing so. See Donovan, 256 A.3d at 1163 (Wecht, J., Concurring)

More specifically, although the majority in Gallagher had both almost gleefully presented its decision as eradicating the household exclusion across the board and told the insurance industry to use its considerable resources to figure it out, in Donovan, the court instead attempted to say (with a straight face) that it had instead only ruled in Gallagher that the household exclusion was only “unenforceable as applied to the facts of Gallagher.”

Regardless of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s refusal to acknowledge its reluctant retreat from its expansive language in Gallagher relative to the household exclusion and all of the confusion and litigation that came from the Gallagher decision as a result, the court still came to the same conclusion as to the invalidity of the household exclusion in the Donovan case. More specifically, the Supreme Court in Donovan noted that, while the household exclusion was found to be unenforceable in Gallagher where the insured did not execute a waiver of stacking, the exclusion was also unenforceable under the facts of Donovan as well where the waiver signed by the insured was found to be deficient and, therefore, invalid.

In the end, the Donovan court again stated that, in either case, the household exclusion cannot operate as a de facto waiver of stacked coverage where the MVFRL requires insurance companies to secure written waivers of stacking from its insureds. Wecht concurred in the Donovan result but felt compelled to again note that the “flimsy” de facto waiver rationale behind the majority’s decisions on the household exclusion “ignore binding precedent” and was “at odds with the text of the MVFRL.”
 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court Reverses Course

In the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s most recent pronouncement on the issue in the case of Erie Insurance Exchange v. Mione, No. 89 MAP 2021 (Pa. Feb. 15, 2023), the court unanimously fell into line behind an opinion written by Justice David N. Wecht and held that the household exclusion is indeed valid and enforceable in certain circumstances.

Most notably, in the Mione case, the Supreme Court unanimously rejected the plaintiff’s arguments that the high court’s 2019 ruling in Gallagher v. Geico should be interpreted to broadly invalidate all household exclusions in all cases across the board in Pennsylvania. In Mione, the court wrote, “We reiterate today that the holding in Gallagher was based upon the unique facts before us in that case, and that the decision there should be construed narrowly.”

Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had definitively stated otherwise in the Gallagher decision, Wecht confirmed in the Mione decision that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court “continues to reject the view that household vehicle exclusions are ipso facto unenforceable.”

In the case of Erie Insurance Exchange v. Mione, the court addressed the enforceability of two household vehicle exclusions in a pair of automobile insurance policies. The distinguishing fact in this case was that the vehicle that the injured party was operating at the time of the accident did not even have UM or UIM coverage. As such, there was no stacking issue implicated and, therefore, there was no need to conduct the analysis of whether any valid stacking waivers had been secured from the insured in writing. Thus, there was no danger of the household exclusion even acting as a de facto waiver of stacked coverage in this case.

In the end, whereas the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had previously repeatedly and broadly ruled that household exclusions are unenforceable, that court now held that household exclusions do indeed remain enforceable under Pennsylvania law in certain circumstances.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Mione ultimately concluded that the lower courts along this case’s rise up the appellate ladder had correctly distinguished the Gallagher decision on the facts and had correctly enforced the household exclusions as contained in the insured’s automobile insurance policies. In the Mione decision, the injured party was precluded from obtaining UIM benefits that the injured party had not paid for and the goal of the MVFRL of containing rising automobile insurance costs was thereby furthered.

Implications of the ‘Mione’ Decision

The most important implication of the Mione decision is the confirmation that the household exclusion remains valid and enforceable in Pennsylvania in certain circumstances. Given that the exclusion may no longer be considered to have been eradicated across the board by the unfortunately worded Gallagher opinion, going forward, order has been restored by the Mione decision and each household exclusion case will again have to be considered against the more recent appellate precedent on the issue.

Also, prior to the Mione decision, it appeared almost certain that the regular use exclusion found in automobile accident cases was also on its way to being eradicated as a matter of course by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court under an argument that the regular use exclusion also allegedly acted as a de facto waiver of coverage. This was so based upon the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s penchant for engaging in exclusion-umpiring and for legislating new law through its application of the “flimsy” de facto waiver rationale.

However, with Mione and the question of whether the de facto waiver rationale was of any continuing validity, the eradication of the regular use exclusion is no longer a certainty.

It remains to be seen how the Supreme Court will address the validity of that exclusion. That issue is currently pending before the court in the case of Rush v. Erie Insurance Exchange and a decision is expected to be handed down in that matter sometime later this year in what will hopefully be a tightly worded opinion providing clear appellate guidance limited to the facts before the court.


Daniel E. Cummins is the managing partner of the Clarks Summit law firm of Cummins Law, a civil litigation practice. He also conducts mediations of civil litigation matters through Cummins Mediation Services. Cummins is also the sole creator and writer of the Tort Talk Blog (www.TortTalk.com), which is designed to provide continuing updates on important cases and trends in Pennsylvania civil litigation law. He can be reached at dancummins@CumminsLaw.net.

Tuesday, December 27, 2022

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Addresses Tolling Provision Found in MCARE Act


The Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed MCARE’s tolling provision recently in the case of Reibenstein v. Barrax, No. 32 MAP 2021 (Pa. Dec. 12, 2022) (Op. by Wecht, J.) (Sallie, Mundy, J. and Dougherty, J., concurring/dissenting).

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff in this medical malpractice action had brought her claims against the Defendant after the two (2) year statute of limitations had expired.

The court noted that the Plaintiff’s death certificate indisputably and correctly noted the medical cause of the decedent’s death.

In this decision, the court made a distinction between a reference to a decedent's manner of death and a decedent's cause of death.  In the context of the operation of the statute of limitations as stated under the MCARE Act, the court noted that the issue involved the legal cause of death and the medical cause of death.

The Court noted that MCARE provides a two year statute of limitations in death actions with the statute beginning to run at the time of the decedent's death.  The Act provides that the statute of limitations will be tolled where there is an affirmative misrepresentation or fraudulent concealment of the cause of death.    

Here, the Plaintiff brought their claims against one of the medical defendants after the two year period had run.  The Court noted that the decedent's death certificate undisputedly and correctly noted the medical cause of the decedent's death.

The trial court had ruled that the phrase “cause of death” referred specifically and only to the direct medical cause of death.  Accordingly, the trial court granted summary judgment to the Defendant doctor under §513(d) of the Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error Act (MCARE Act).

The Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed the trial court decision and interpreted the “cause of death” on the death certificate more broadly to cover considerations associated with the manner of death, that is, the legal cause.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the decision by the Superior Court and held that MCARE’s tolling provision could not support the breadth of the reading suggested by the Pennsylvania Superior Court.

The court in this matter essentially ruled that the reference to the “cause of death” refers only to the medical meaning of the phrase and not the legal interpretation.

This decision is otherwise notable in that Pennsylvania Supreme Court majority determined that the tolling provision under the MCARE Act for instances when the decedent’s cause of death has been allegedly concealed refers only to the medical cause of death.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of the Majority Opinion by Justice Wecht in this decision may click this LINK.

The Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by Justice Dougherty may be viewed HERE.

The Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by Justice Sallie Mundy may be viewed HERE.


Source of image:  Photo by Manasvita on Unsplash.com.

Wednesday, January 5, 2022

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Rules That a Plaintiff Can Rely on Both Concrete Evidence and Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur to Prove Negligence in the Same Case


In the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision of Lageman v. Zepp, No. 21 MAP 2021 (Pa. Dec. 22, 2021) (Op. by Wecht, J.), the Court thoroughly addressed the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and its continuing validity in Pennsylvania.

The court noted that the American law translation of that phrase is “the thing speaks for itself.”

Justice Wecht noted in his Opinion that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has been recognized in Pennsylvania as allowing for a category of circumstantial evidence which may suffice to establish negligence where more specific and concrete evidence of the events leading up to the injury eludes even diligent investigation. 

In essence, the doctrine was noted to recognize that one may conclude by the exercise of common sense that an injury could not have occurred under certain circumstances but for the negligence of another person even where that negligence cannot be concretely proven. 

Justice Wecht opened his engaging Opinion with the example of a Plaintiff walking on a public street and passing a Defendant’s shop at which point a barrel of flour fell upon the Plaintiff from a window above, resulting in serious injuries to the pedestrian Plaintiff.  The Court noted that this set of facts represented a classic example of when the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should be applied.

This Lageman case arose out of a medical malpractice action. The issue before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was whether the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is precluded in a case where the Plaintiff has allegedly introduced enough “direct” evidence of the Defendant's negligence such that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not the only avenue towards a finding of liability.   In other words, whether the two (2) approaches to satisfying the Plaintiff’s evidentiary burden of proof are mutually exclusive. 

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that these avenues of satisfying the Plaintiff's burden of proof are not mutually exclusive and that, therefore, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may still apply even in a case where a Plaintiff has also produced direct evidence of negligence on the part of a Defendant.

In so ruling, the Majority of the Court noted that it has long been the law of Pennsylvania that a Plaintiff has no obligation to choose one theory of liability to the exclusion of another. The Court reasoned that permitting a Plaintiff to present direct evidence while simultaneously invoking the res ipsa loquitur doctrine will only disadvantage a Defendant as to whom the claims becomes more facially meritorious as more competent evidence emerges.

The Court did note that, a Plaintiff must still make out a prima facie case to support a res ipsa loquitur jury instruction. In other words, a Plaintiff must prove that he or she has been injured by a casualty of a sort that normally would not have occurred but for negligence on the part of a Defendant.

In this regard, the Court noted that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur would obviously apply in the case of where a surgeon leaves a sponge in a patient and sews up the patient at the end of a surgery, an injury would seemingly not occur in the absence of negligence. 

Where, however, a jury is presented with two (2) versions of the event through conflicting evidence and may decide, based upon that evidence, what, in fact, occurred to lead to the injury, then perhaps the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur would not be applicable. 

Anyone wishing to review a copy of the Majority decision written by Justice Wecht may click this LINK.  The Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by Chief Justice Baer can be viewed HERE.  The Dissenting Opinion by Justice Saylor can be viewed HERE.


I send thanks to Attorney Dale G. Larrimore of the Philadelphia law firm of Larrimore & Farnish, LLP for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Karolina Grabowska from www.pexels.com.

Tuesday, March 9, 2021

Catch-All Provision of UTPCPL Provides for Strict Liability



In the case of Gregg v Ameriprise Fin., Inc., No.29WAP2019 (Pa. Feb 17, 2021), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in a Majority Opinion written by Justice David N. Wecht, ruled that the catch-all provision of the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law provided for a strict liability cause of action. 

The court noted that the plain language of the statute imposes liability on commercial vendors who engage in conduct that has the potential to deceive and which creates a likelihood of confusion or misunderstanding. The Court found that the legislature did not require either carelessness or intent when a cause of action is based upon an allegation of deceptive conduct.

As such, the Court ruled that, under the plain meaning of the statute, deceptive conduct during a consumer transaction that creates a likelihood of confusion or misunderstanding and upon which the consumer relies to his or her financial detriment, does not depend upon the actor’s state of mind. The Court found that, without a state of mind requirement, the catch-all provision of the statute may be fairly characterized as describing a strict liability offense.

The dissenting Justices would have created a negligence standard on this issue.


Anyone wishing to review a copy of the Majority’s Opinion in this case may click this LINK. The Dissenting Opinion may be viewed HERE.


I send thanks to Attorney Lee Applebaum of the Philadelphia law firm of Fineman Krekstein & Harris, as well as the writer of the excellent Pennsylvania and New Jersey Bad Faith Case Law Blog for bringing this decision to my attention.

Tuesday, February 9, 2021

ARTICLE: The Defense of the Sudden Emergency Doctrine in Pa.

This article of mine was published on February 4, 2021 by the Pennsylvania Law Weekly and is republished here with permission.


The Defense of the Sudden Emergency Doctrine in Pa.


By Daniel E. Cummins | February 04, 2021

Daniel E. Cummins of Cummins Law.


In its recent decision in the case of Graham v. Check, No. 42 WAP 2019 (Pa. Dec. 22, 2020)(Op. By Wecht, J.), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court provided guidance for when a jury should be instructed on the still viable sudden emergency doctrine in a motor vehicle accident case.

While some commentators darted out in front of the decision to sound the death knell for the doctrine in Pennsylvania, a fair reading of the Graham decision shows otherwise.

Validity of the Doctrine Reaffirmed

In his majority opinion in Graham v. Check, Justice David Wecht upheld the continuing validity of the sudden emergency doctrine by reaffirming that Pennsylvania law “recognizes that sometimes injurious accidents are not caused by carelessness, but because events conspire to create a situation so urgent and unexpected that the person alleged to be blameworthy had little or no practical opportunity to avert the harm.”

Wecht confirmed that when the evidence in a case suggests that a motorist was faced with a sudden emergency, “the presiding judge may instruct a jury that, should it determine that such an emergency contributed to the accident, it should assess the defendant’s performance commensurately.”

While further reviewing the continuing validity of the doctrine over multiple pages of commentary in his majority opinion, Wecht also reaffirmed that the burden of supporting the application of the sudden emergency doctrine lies with the party asserting it. Also reaffirmed was the rule that, if the emergency could have been avoided by the exercise of reasonable care by the motorist, then the doctrine should not be applied and instructed to the jury.

The sudden emergency doctrine has been on the books in Pennsylvania and applied in a wide variety of negligence cases over at least the past 137 years. See Brown v. French, 104 Pa. 604, 604 (1884) (Sudden emergency doctrine applied to the case of a captain of a steamer on the Ohio river suddenly faced with a person attempting to cross the river on a skiff immediately before the fatal impact). Now, in its decision handed down at the end of 2020, the majority in the Graham v. Check decision leaves no question that the sudden emergency doctrine remains valid law in Pennsylvania to be applied and argued in future cases where supported by the facts presented.

Court Limits Application of Doctrine in Crosswalk Cases

Although the court reaffirmed the sudden emergency doctrine as a valid topic of jury instruction in motor vehicle accident cases where a driver is faced with a sudden and unexpected emergency immediately prior to an accident, in Graham, the application of the doctrine was limited under the very specific circumstances at issue in that case, that being where a pedestrian plaintiff, wearing dark clothing under dark conditions, suddenly darts out in front of a motorist while the plaintiff is within a crosswalk.

In this regard, Wecht also acknowledged that “since the advent of the automobile, Pennsylvania law has also imposed a heightened standard of care upon drivers to exercise particular vigilance when it is reasonably foreseeable that a pedestrian will cross their path, particularly at intersections.” In his opinion, Wecht reiterated that, under the specific facts at issue in this case, the application of the sudden emergency doctrine is “counterposed” against the “bedrock principle that a driver bears a heightened duty relative to pedestrians crossing at intersections.

In this pedestrian versus motor vehicle accident case of Graham v. Check, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the trial court in this case erred in instructing the jury on the sudden emergency doctrine as evidence of darkness, an obstructed view for the motorist, and a lack of evidence of any overtly careless behavior and the fact that the pedestrian abruptly appeared in front of the driver moments before the impact all still did not serve to lay a proper foundation for the provision of that instruction to the jury due to the fact that a motorist has a heightened duty under Pennsylvania law to be on the lookout for pedestrians whenever approaching a crosswalk at an intersection.
 
It’s a Doctrine Not a Defense

As noted, some commentators, and even two dissenting justices in the Graham v. Check decision have attempted to portray the majority decision in Graham as holding that the sudden emergency doctrine is no longer a viable defense in Pennsylvania. A fair and proper reading of the majority’s opinion does not support this forced portrayal.

Granted, Wecht noted in his majority opinion in Graham that the sudden emergency doctrine “should not be understood as a ‘defense’ in the common sense, and the majority finds it ill-advised to use the word ‘defense’ in sudden emergency jury instructions in future cases, notwithstanding that the term features in the current suggested standard jury instruction.”

Wecht went on to explain that “properly understood, the doctrine of sudden emergency does not offer a defense,” but rather should be viewed as “one among the panoply of surrounding circumstances that a jury must take into account in assessing the reasonableness of each party’s actions or omissions” in a given accident. In other words, in terms of simple semantics and correct terminology, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that the sudden emergency doctrine should not be called a “defense,” but still remains a valid doctrine that a trial judge can instruct a jury upon in a negligence case where the facts lay a foundation for the provision of the instruction.

As such, after Graham, the courts below and the litigating attorneys should consider the application of the sudden emergency doctrine to be more narrow in the context of a case of a pedestrian struck while in a crosswalk given the motorist’s heightened duty of care in such situations. Otherwise, judges and attorneys remain free, as they have for nearly the past 140 years in Pennsylvania, to continue to apply, instruct upon and/or argue the law of sudden emergency doctrine in terms of a defense against a negligence action—just don’t call it a “defense” anymore.



Daniel E. Cummins is the managing partner of the Clarks Summit law firm of Cummins Law, a civil litigation practice. He also conducts mediations of civil litigation matters through Cummins Mediation Services. Cummins is also the sole creator and writer of the Tort Talk Blog (www.TortTalk.com), which is designed to provide continuing updates on important cases and trends in Pennsylvania civil litigation law. He can be reached at dancummins@CumminsLaw.net.


Friday, October 30, 2020

ARTICLE: Pennsylvania's Great Dissenter: Justice David N. Wecht

The below article of mine was published in the October 22, 2020 edition of the Pennsylvania Law Weekly and is republished here with permission.  Photos have been added here.



Pennsylvania's Great Dissenter: Justice David N. Wecht

By Daniel E. Cummins | October 22, 2020


On a national level, U.S. Supreme Court Justice John Marshall Harlan was known as “the Great Dissenter” in the history of jurisprudence. Justice Harlan was so designated, in part, given that he was the lone justice to dissent the 1896 decision in the case of Plessy v. Ferguson, one of the Supreme Court’s most notorious and damaging decisions. In arguing against his colleagues’ upholding of the constitutionality of segregation under the doctrine of “separate but equal,” Justice Harlan delivered what would become one of the greatest and most cited dissents in the history of the U.S. Supreme Court.

On a more local level, Justice David N. Wecht, of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, through a series of pointed and cogent dissenting opinions in which he parted ways from the majority, has established his mark as Pennsylvania’s Great Dissenter. In a number of notable dissenting opinions over the past few years. Wecht has established his allegiance to settled legal precedent and the rule of law and has exhibited his excellent legal analytical skills and writing ability.

Railing Against a Majority ‘Eager’ to Change the Law

One such case evidencing Wecht’s devotion to the rule of law and adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis can be seen in his dissenting opinion in the case of Erie Insuracne Exchange v. Bristol, 174 A.3d 578 (Pa. 2017) (Maj. Op. by Mundy, J.) (Wecht, J., Dissenting). In this case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the statute of limitations in an uninsured motorist case does not begin to run until there is an alleged breach of the insurance contract, i.e., the denial of a claim or a refusal to arbitrate by the carrier. This was a 6-1 decision with Wecht dissenting on procedural grounds.

The Bristol decision reversed the law set forth in the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s previous ruling in the separate case of Hopkins v. Erie, 65 A.3d 452 (Pa. Super. 2013). In Hopkins, the Superior Court had held that the statute of limitations in an uninsured motorist (UM) benefits claim begins to run on the date of the accident.

By holding under the Bristol case that the statute of limitations instead begins to run at the alleged breach of the UM contract by way of a denial of coverage or a refusal to arbitrate, the majority of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court offered protections to plaintiffs given that, in most cases, the statute of limitations on UM claims would never begin to run as automobile insurance carriers rarely ever deny coverage for UM claims or refuse to arbitrate for fear of exposure to bad faith allegations.

Wecht showed his penchant for proper judicial restraint and dissented from the majority’s opinion in Bristol based upon his conclusion that the issue of when the statute of limitations begins to run on an uninsured motorist claim was not even properly before the Court in that case. He noted that the “apparently eager” majority disregarded that procedural defect and was raring “to overturn more than thirty years of Superior Court precedent.” See Erie Insurance Exchange v. Bristol, 174 A.3d at 590.

Wecht noted in his dissenting opinion in Bristol that, in choosing to address a more expansive issue that was not even before the court, the majority was inexplicably allowing the injured party “to challenge the exact legal principle that he conceded in the lower courts.” Wecht confirmed in his dissenting opinion that a review of the record from the lower courts in this matter confirmed that the injured party “waived the issue that the majority resurrects and resolves on the merits.” Wecht confirmed that the injured party had not only waived the issue but had even conceded the issue in the court below in his response to the summary judgment motion that brought the question before the trial court in the first place. Moreover, Wecht confirmed that the injured party did not even include any arguments in his Superior Court brief regarding the issue of when the statute of limitations commenced.

In his dissent in Bristol, Wecht chastised the eager majority for taking the previous “extraordinary” step in the matter by issuing an order amending the court’s original grant of allocatur in order to adopt a wider question presented on appeal that covered the statute of limitations question exactly as the injured party had framed it, for the first time, in his petition for allowance of appeal.

As noted by Wecht, “Ironically, the issue that Bristol presented in his petition for allowance of Appeal—much like the arguments Bristol made in the courts below—had absolutely nothing to do with the commencement of the applicable statute of limitations.” Yet, according to Wecht, the majority “ventured that it ‘understands’ this issue to encompass a determination of the time at which a cause of action accrues …”

Wecht emphatically noted in his dissent that he did “not share in this creative ‘understanding’” devised by some of the other justices who wanted to review the statute of limitations issue. He further reiterated that, even if it was somehow understood that the question presented before the court could be deemed to cover the issue of when the statute of limitations began to run, the injured party had still failed to preserve the issue for appellate review in any event.

Wecht concluded his blistering dissent in Bristol, with these well-reasoned words to be heeded by the wary:

“For whatever reason, and to my puzzlement, today’s majority is willing to overlook the many procedural defects in this case, even though this court has considered those same defects to be inexcusable in numerous other appeals. Although the majority does not tell us why Bristol’s case warrants such special indulgences, what is clear is that the time has come for this court—either by rule or by decision—to commit to clear standards for determining whether a particular case warrants departure from our ordinary issue preservation doctrines. Absent such standards, the unpreserved issues that the court regularly declines to consider will continue to be indistinguishable from those that we idiosyncratically agree to resolve. In my view, such arbitrary and selective enforcement of our Rules of Appellate Procedure is ill-advised.” See Erie Insurance Exchange v. Bristol, 174 A.3d 578, 592 (2017).

Decrying Encroachments Upon Legislature’s Law-Making Duties

In a number of other cases, Wecht wielded his keyboard to write cogent dissenting opinions that decried the encroachment of the other Justices on the Bench upon the Pennsylvania Legislature’s law-making function.

For example, at the beginning of 2019, Wecht issued a dissenting opinion in the famous Gallagher v. GEICO case in which the majority attempted to eradicate the household exclusion across the board. Wecht decried what he saw as the other justices of the court “upending … well-established precedent” and supplanting its own judgment over that of the Legislature in this area of the law.

The case of Gallagher v. GEICO was not the only time the justice sparred with the other members of the court about their departures from precedent. In an Oct. 31, 2019, dissenting opinion in the case of Yanakos v. UPMC, 218 A.3d 1214 (Pa. 2019), Wecht again distanced himself from the ruling of the majority of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in another high-profile case involving medical malpractice issues. In that case the majority found the long-standing seven-year statute of repose passed by the Pennsylvania General Assembly was unconstitutional.

In his powerful dissenting opinion, Wecht stated that the majority’s standard for reviewing the issue was “contrary to our precedent” and “encroached” on the legislature. He further noted that he felt compelled to dissent from this decision since “it is not this court’s role to upend duly enacted legislation simply because we might sometimes deem it imperfect or unwise.”

In its more recent decision in the same case of Yanakos v. UPMC, 224 A.3d 1255 (Pa. Jan. 31, 2020), a majority of justices on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declined to reconsider its original decision in this case from 2019 in which the court struck down the statute of repose thereby allowing a wider avenue of recovery for Plaintiffs in a certain class of medical malpractice claims.

In his dissent to that decision, Wecht again aptly expressed his ardent disagreement with the majority’s refusal to reconsider its decision and wrote that “the filing before us illustrates that the decision in Yanakos was not just incorrect, but was confused as well. Confused about the law. Confused about procedure. Confused about insurance. Confused about the questions presented.”

Wecht also noted that not only did the appeal in Yanakos take on a life of its own after it reached the Pennsylvania Supreme Court but “this [Pennsylvania Supreme Court] breathed new life into it” by expanding the issue before the court. Wecht found that this expansion of the issue by the justices in the majority enabled those justices to address more expansive issues and issue a decision of a wider scope on matters that, in the words of Wecht’s dissent, the plaintiff “had never argued and that the lower courts had never considered.”

Wecht also indicated that he wanted a reconsideration of the decision in Yanakos because the decision by the majority in its Yanakos decision from 2019 ruling that the statute of repose was unconstitutional “ignored precedent, misinterpreted the remedies clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution, and incorrectly adopted (and then misapplied) the intermediate scrutiny test.”

In chastising the majority for refusing to allow for a reconsideration of the issues presented in Yanakos, Wecht went on to write, “Reargument is a fail-safe. It gives an appellate court the opportunity to admit that it made a mistake. This court should have taken advantage of that opportunity today.” For these reasons, Wecht dissented from the decision by the majority in its 2020 decision in Yanakos to preserve their previous decision by denying any reconsideration of the issue.

Taking A Stand Against a Freewheeling Majority

In its 2019 decision in the case of Sayles v. Allstate Insurance, 219 A.3d 1110 (Pa. 2019), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that standard language found in automobile insurance policies requiring insureds to attend independent medical examinations (IME) at the request of carriers in the first party medical benefits context conflicted with the law set forth in Pennsylvania’s Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law. The Supreme Court ruled that carriers must instead institute motions practice and petition the trial court for approval of a request to refer an insured to an IME.

Wecht noted in Sayles that, as the applicable law provided at the time, “nothing in the text of the MVFRL mandates that insurers invoke the judicial process in order to arrange for a medical examination of the insured that is authorized through prior contractual agreement.” As such, Wecht stated that he found himself “compelled to dissent.”

In his dissenting opinion in the Sayles case, Wecht noted that the decision by the majority in this case was not one that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court could “adopt and impose by judicial fiat.” Rather, according to Wecht, it was the job of the General Assembly to make such changes to the law and Wecht emphasized that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was “not empowered to re-write the MVFL in the meantime.”

In this regard, Wecht noted in his dissent Sayles that, as he has explained in previous opinions, he "disagree[s] respectfully with this court’s freewheeling and unwarranted invocation of ‘public policy’ in cases involving the MVFRL.”

Wecht noted that the basic questions presented before the court in the Sayles case was simply whether the insurance policy provisions at issue conflict with the MVFRL and are, therefore, not enforceable. He chastised the majority, noting that the majority’s “framing of that question euphemistically or vaguely as something rooted in “public policy,” rather than statutory interpretation, has created a misperception that jurists posses some inherent lordly authority to displace written agreements based upon our own idiosyncratic conceptions of what strikes us as desirable or undesirable “‘part of policy.’”

He also powerfully stated that the majority’s “resort to this ‘public policy’ device throughout our MVFRL jurisprudence has confused more than it has clarified. More importantly, it risks an appearance of jurisprudence that is arbitrary, unprincipled, and ultimately illegitimate. It should be abandoned.”

It is noted that Wecht had made a similar argument in his dissenting opinion in the case of Gallagher v. Geico, 201 A.3d 131, 142 n. 5 (Pa. 2019) (Wecht, J, Dissenting) in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court majority attempted to eradicate the household exclusion across the board and well beyond the facts before it. In that dissent, Wecht wrote that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Gallagher was “premised more upon a policy judgment than upon a discernible legal principle.”

At the end of his dissent in the Sayles decision, Wecht noted that the majority’s “novel interpretation of the MVFRL is yet another sign that this court has assumed a quasi-legislative or even legislature-supervising role in the automobile insurance arena.” In the end, Wecht felt that the majority’s decision in Sayles to render IME clauses in automobile insurance policies as unenforceable under public policy arguments “is not a judgment call that this court is authorized, or even well-equipped, to make.”

A review of the above dissenting opinions confirms that Justice Wecht’s reasoning, analysis of the law, and excellent writing ability establishes him as one of the great justices in the history of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. His decisions, both when he is in the majority of the court and when dissenting, confirm that he understands the role of the court in our society, including with respect to applying the law as it has been made by the Legislature and leaving law-making function to that separate branch of government. Whether he writes a majority opinion or a dissenting opinion, it is highly recommended that his decisions be read for, even if you disagree with his decision, your own writing may be improved by reading his writing.


Daniel E. Cummins is the managing partner of the Clarks Summit law firm of Cummins Law, a civil litigation practice. He also conducts mediations of civil litigation matters through Cummins Mediation Services. Cummins is also the sole creator and writer of the Tort Talk Blog (www.TortTalk.com), which is designed to provide continuing updates on important cases and trends in Pennsylvania civil litigation law. He can be reached at dancummins@CumminsLaw.net.

Monday, February 10, 2020

Justice Wecht Rips Pennsylvania Supreme Majority in His Dissent on Majority's Ruling Not To Reconsider Its Flawed MCARE Decision


In its recent decision in the case of Yanakos v. UPMC, No. 10 WAP 2018 (Pa. Jan. 31, 2020), a majority of Justices on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declined to reconsider its original decision in this case from late last year in which the Court struck down the statute of repose under MCARE thereby allowing a wider avenue of recovery for Plaintiffs. The decision struck down a seven year statute of limitations for a certain class of medical malpractice cases.

In his Dissent, Justice Wecht expressed his ardent disagreement with the majority's refusal to reconsider its decision and wrote that “[t]he filing before us illustrates that the decision in Yanakos was not just incorrect, but was confused as well. Confused about the law. Confused about procedure. Confused about insurance. Confused about the questions presented.”

Justice Wecht noted that not only did the appeal take on a life of its own after it reached the Pennsylvania Supreme Court but "this [Pennsylvania Supreme] breathed new life into it" by expanding the issue before the Court. 

This expansion of the issue by the Justices in the majority enabled those Justices to address more expansive issues and issue a decision of a wider scope on matters that, in the words of Justice Wecht's Dissent, the Plaintiff "had never argued and that the lower courts had never considered."

Justice Wecht also indicated that he wanted a reconsideration because the decision by the majority “ignored precedent, misinterpreted the remedies clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution, and incorrectly adopted (and then misapplied) the intermediate scrutiny test.” 

Justice Wecht noted that that the American Medical Association, the National Federation of Independent Business, the Pennsylvania Medical Society and even the majority caucuses in both the Pennsylvania House and Senate had joined the petition for reconsideration to no avail.

Justice Wecht went on to write, “Reargument is a fail-safe. It gives an appellate court the opportunity to admit that it made a mistake. This court should have taken advantage of that opportunity today.” For these reasons, Justice Wecht dissented from the decision by the majority to preserve their previous decision by denying any reconsideration of the issue.

The majority's refusal to allow for a reconsideration to be heard means that MCARE's statute of repose is no longer valid.

You can read Justice Wecht's compelling Dissenting Opinion on the majority's decision in Yanakos to refuse to allow for a reconsideration of its previous decision HERE. 

The Tort Talk post on the original Opinion previously issued by the Supreme Court in Yanakos, along with Justice Wecht's Dissenting Opinion to that original decision can be viewed HERE.

Source: "Pa. Justices Refuse to Reconsider Statute of Repose Ruling, Sparking Stinging Dissent From Wecht" by Max Mitchell of the Pennsylvania Law Weekly (Feb. 6, 2020).

Monday, October 10, 2016

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Finds that Federal Arbitration Act Trumps State Rule on Bifurcation in Nursing Home Death Case

In the case of Taylor v. Extendicare Health Facilities, Inc., No. 19 WAP 2015 (Pa. Sept. 28, 2016), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed a trial court's decision and the Superior Court's affirmance of the same, where the lower courts both ruled in favor of denying a nursing home's motion to bifurcate the wrongful death and survival actions in a case where the nursing home sought to compel arbitration of the survival claims pursuant to an arbitration agreement.

According to the Opinion, when the decedent entered the nursing home an alternative dispute resolution agreement was signed that called for the arbitration of matters arising regarding the decedent's stay at the facility.  Following the decedent's death, the Plaintiffs instead filed a wrongful death and survival action lawsuit.

The nursing home filed a motion to bifurcate the claims along with a motion to compel arbitration of the survival claims under the arbitration agreement.  The trial court denied the motion to bifurcate under Rule 213(b) and also held that it did not have the authority to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act.  The Superior Court affirmed.

With this latest decision in the matter, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed and held that the mandates of the Federal Arbitration Act, along with United States Supreme Court precedent, trumped the procedural mechanism found under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 213(b). The Majority reluctantly noted that the Federal Arbitration Act mandated that courts enforce arbitration clauses where appropriate.  As such, the decisions of the lower courts were reversed and the matter sent back to the trial court for further proceedings.

The Majority Opinion in Taylor written by Justice David Wecht can be read HERE.

The Concurring Opinion of Chief Justice Saylor, joined by Justice Baer, can be viewed HERE.

Justice Donohue's Dissenting Opinion can be viewed at this LINK.



For other Tort Talk posts on lower court cases on similar nursing home arbitration issues, click HERE