Showing posts with label Post-Koken. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Post-Koken. Show all posts

Thursday, August 27, 2026

Judge Mannion of Federal Middle District Court Rules in Favor of Consolidated Discovery in Post-Koken UIM Claim


In the case of Alers v. Progressive Preferred Ins. Co., No. 3:25-CV-01371-MEM (M.D. Pa. Aug. 7, 2026 Mannion, J.), Judge Malachy E. Mannion denied a Defendant’s Motion to Sever and Stay Discovery in a post-Koken breach of contract and statutory bad faith case arising out of a motor vehicle accident.

In this case, the Defendant UIM carrier sought to sever and stay all bad faith discovery from the breach of contract claim. The Defendant carrier argued that, through the bad faith claim, the Plaintiff was seeking in discovery the production of privileged information and the carrier’s opinion work product which would prejudice the Defendant carrier in relationship to the ongoing UIM claim.

The court addressed the request for severance under F.R.C.P. 21.

Judge Malachy E. Mannion
Pa. Middle District

In reviewing the applicable factors under this analysis, Judge Mannion found that the claims raised in both the breach of contract claim and the bad faith claim were intertwined. The court also concluded that severance would not promote judicial economy. The court additionally found that there would be no prejudice to the Defendant if the Motion to Severe was denied. 

In terms of any discovery issues with regards to allegedly privileged insurance company documents, the court noted that such concerns could be addressed through incamera review of discovery materials in response to any Motion to Compel rather than through severance or bifurcation or any stay Orders, which would only serve to prolong consideration of various discovery issues.

Overall, the court found that the Defendant carrier had not met its burden in establishing that severance of the claims or stay of discovery with respect to the bad faith claim were warranted. As such, the Defendant’s Motion was denied and this Post-Koken federal court case involving UIM breach of contract and bad faith claims was allowed to proceed through discovery in a consolidated fashion.

Anyone wishing to review this case may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Jesse B. Hallinan and Attorney Thomas W. Munley of the Scranton law firm of Minora, Krowiak, Munley & Batyko for bringing this case to my attention.



This decision has been added to the Post-Koken Scorecard on the Tort Talk Blog.  The Post-Koken Scorecard is a compilation of many of the Post-Koken decisions handed down by the Pennsylvania state and federal courts since 2009.  The list does not reference all of the cases but is still a comprehensive compilation.

That Scorecard can always be freely accessed by going to www.TortTalk.com, scrolling down the right hand column of the blog to "Post-Koken Scorecard" and clicking on the date under that title.  For now, here is a quick LINK to the Post-Koken Scorecard on the Tort Talk Blog compiled by Daniel E. Cummins, Esquire.



Tuesday, March 24, 2026

Judge Nealon of Lackawanna County Rules in Favor of Consolidation of Post-Koken UIM and Third Party Claims

Lackawanna County Courthouse

On the heels of Lackawanna County Judge Mark Powell's decision in favor of the consolidation of claims in Post-Koken automobile accident cases that was summarized in yeasterday's Tort Talk Blog post comes the decision of Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas in the case of Bello v. Smith and Progressive Ins. Co., No. 2024-CV-6105 (C.P. Lacka. Co. March 6, 2026 Nealon, J.).

In Bello, Judge Nealon addressed Preliminary Objections filed by a UIM carrier in a post-Koken matter involving combined third party claims against a tortfeasor and UIM claims against the Plaintiff’s own insurance carrier. This case also involved the additional fact that the tortfeasor Defendant was allegedly operating his vehicle under the influence at the time of the accident.

The UIM carrier filed Preliminary Objections under Pa. R.C.P. 1028(a)(5) asserting the “misjoinder of a cause of action,” and arguing that the tort and UIM claims should be severed for pre-trial and trial purposes.

Here, Judge Terrence R. Nealon, of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas reviewed the current status of Pennsylvania law on issue of the joinder of third party tortfeasor claims and UIM claims under a single caption, much of which prior case law was developed through his own judicial Opinions, to come to conclusion that the Preliminary Objections should be denied and the cases allowed to proceed, at least through the pleadings and discovery phases, in a consolidated basis.

Of note, the Court also referenced, on multiple occasions, the Pennsylvania Bar Quarterly article written by Daniel E. Cummins entitled "Hurricane Koken Rages On:  Uncertainty Continues in Motor Vehicle Accident Litigation In The Stormy Post-Koken Era," 90 Pa. B.A.Q., 108, 111 & n. 15-19 (July 2019). 

Judge Terrence R. Nealon
Lackawanna County 


In support of this decision, Judge Nealon noted that the damages that might be recoverable both the tortfeasor and the UIM carrier present common questions of law and fact and involve the same evidence and issues.

One additional issue involved in this matter was the fact that there were claims for punitive damages asserted against the tortfeasor Defendant due to the DUI allegations and other allegations.  The court acknowledged would be irrelevant to the compensatory damages determination given that the UIM coverage barred the recovery of any punitive damages under that policy.

Relative to the allegations that the tortfeasor Defendant was operating his vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and controlled substances, the court noted that such evidence “could unfairly prejudice the UIM insurer by inflaming the jurors’ emotions and influence the compensatory damages award.”

Judge Nealon noted that, while, in such instances, bifurcation of the compensatory damages and punitive damages claims for trial may be warranted, that decision should be left to be made later by the assigned trial judge after discovery has been completed and the case has been certified for trial.

However, after review copious case law in support of the same, the court ruled that, in the meantime, no legitimate basis existed for severing the tort and UIM claims for purposes of discovery and pre-trial matters.

Accordingly, the court overruled the UIM carrier’s Preliminary Objection asserting a misjoinder of a cause of action under Rule 1028(a)(5).  With this decision, the court denied the request to sever the tort claim from the UIM claims.

Judge Nealon did note that his decision was without prejudice to the right of any Defendant to later seek a bifurcation of the claims for compensatory damages and punitive damages for trial.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Monday, March 23, 2026

Judge Powell of Lackawanna County Rules in Favor of Consolidation of Post-Koken UIM and Third Party Claims


In his decision in the post-Koken case of Roth v. Gonzalez, No. 2025-CV-06170 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Feb. 19, 2026 Powell, J.), Judge Mark Powell of the Lackawanna County Cour of Common Pleas overruled the UIM carrier’s Preliminary Objections seeking to sever the Plaintiffs’ claims against the tortfeasors for negligence from the Plaintiffs’ claims against the UIM carrier for UIM benefits.

The court also overruled the tortfeasor’s Preliminary Objections seeking to strike the Plaintiff’s claims for punitive damages under an argument that there were no facts to support the claims for reckless, willful, or wanton misconduct that was asserted against a tortfeasor Defendant.

Relative to the Motion to Sever the negligence claims from the UIM claims, the court noted that the consolidation of such claims for discovery and pre-trial preparation will promote convenience and avoid duplicate depositions and other forms of discovery.

Judge Mark Powell
Lackawanna County 


Relative to the third party Defendant’s Preliminary Objections on the allegations of recklessness and the claims for punitive damages, the court found that sufficient facts were pled under which the jury could conceivably conclude that the Defendant allegedly demonstrated a careless disregard for the safety of the traveling public.

Judge Powell also noted that, with regards to the concern of the UIM carrier about the possible references to “insurance” during the course of the trial, and the prejudice that may result therefrom, the court noted that the mere mentioning of insurance, in and of itself, does not preclude the joinder of the claims as the trial court judge still has the ability to address evidentiary issues and may deal with any references to insurance at trial in a manner that the trial judge deems appropriate.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.



Tuesday, February 17, 2026

Pennsylvania Federal Court Rules that Insurance Information Is Not Admissible at Post-Koken Trial on UIM Claims


In the case of Saeli v. Geico Adv. Ins. Co., No. 1:24-CV-00025-RAL (W.D. Pa. Jan. 28, 2026 Lanzillo, Chief Mag. J.), the Chief Magistrate Judge for the Western District Federal Court of Pennsylvania addressed a Motion In Limine filed a UIM carrier in a post-Koken case seeking to preclude the Plaintiff from introducing any evidence or testimony regarding the amount of the tortfeasor’s liability limits, the UIM limits, or any premiums paid.

The court ruled that, since the probative value of such evidence, if any, is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and confusion on the issues presented, the UIM carrier’s Motion was granted.

The court additionally found that the evidence at issue is irrelevant to the issues presented in the trial. The court noted that the central issue in the case was the extent of the damages sustained by the Plaintiff. As such, the court found that the amount of the tortfeasor’s liability limits, the UIM limits, and the premiums paid were irrelevant to such issues.

The court noted that, while the tortfeasor’s liability coverage will have to be credited to the UIM carrier, the court noted that this is a simple mathematical calculation that the court could accomplish by molding the verdict after the verdict is handed down the jury and without the need to involve the jury.

The court felt that requesting a jury to apply the liability limit against the UIM benefits coverage would unnecessarily complicate the issues before the jury and could risk prejudice to Geico.

Magistrate Judge Lanzillo included in his Opinion a review of other Pennsylvania federal court decisions on the issue and noted that all but one had held the evidence of coverage limits and premiums paid provided no benefit to the jury in determining the issue of damages in post-Koken cases and that, even if such evidence was minimally relevant, its probative value was substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice to the Defendant. See Op. at 4.

It is noted that the court additionally indicated that the Plaintiff did not file a Response to Geico’s Motion In Limine by the time of the deadline set by the court.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney Joseph Hudock of the Pittsburgh office of the Summers, McDonnell, Hudock, Guthrie & Rauch, P.C. law firm for bringing this case decision to my attention.


Please note that the Post-Koken scorecard on the Tort Talk blog will be updated with this decision.

The post-Koken scorecard on the Tort Talk blog is always freely available for research. You can access the scorecard by going to www.TortTalk.coom and scrolling a bit down the hand column to the label for Post-Koken Scorecard and clicking on the date under that.

Source of image:  Photo by Scott Greer on www. unsplash.com.




Thursday, June 26, 2025

Trial Court Grants UIM Carrier's Motion to Sever and Stay a Companion Bad Faith Claim in a Post-Koken Case


In the case of Bixler v. Erie Insurance Exchange, AD No. 2024-CV-11155 (C.P. Butler Co. June 5, 2025 Streib, J.), the court issued an Order in a post-Koken case granting the UIM carrier’s Motion to Sever and Stay the bad faith claim from the UIM claim. The court did not issue any Opinion with this Order.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this Order may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney Joseph Hudock of the Pittsburgh office of the law firm of Summers, McDonnell, Hudock, Guthrie & Rauch, P.C. for bringing this case to my attention.

Monday, June 16, 2025

Federal Western District Court Puts the Brakes on Evidence of Certain Insurance Matters in a Post-Koken Case


In the Post-Koken federal court case of Binotto v. Geico, No. 3:22-CV-210 (W.D. Pa. May 30, 2025 Haines, J.), the court granted the Defendant UIM carrier’s Motion In Limine to preclude evidence of the UIM limits or premium paid at the trial of a post-Koken matter. 

The court addressed the argument of whether such evidence is relevant in a post-Koken trial. Included in that assessment was whether or not the probative value of such evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or confusing of the issues presented. In this regard, the court cited to Federal Rules of Evidence 401, 402, and 403.

The court in this Binotto matter stated that its research revealed that the courts in Pennsylvania are split on this issue. This court noted that it was choosing to follow the case of Lucca v. Geico Ins. Co., 2016 WL 3632717 (E.D. Pa. July, 2016) and its progeny. 

Relying upon that case law, the Binotto court held that the “limits and premiums of Geico’s insurance policy offered no benefit to fact finder’s determinations of the value of Plaintiffs’ injuries.”

As such, the court ruled that evidence of the carrier’s policy limits and premiums paid were irrelevant. 

The court additionally held that, even if such evidence was somehow found to be relevant to the injury and damages assessments, any probative value of such evidence was substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice to the Defendant carrier.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney Joseph A. Hudock, Jr. of the Pittsburgh office of the law firm of Summers, McDonnell, Hudock, Guthrie & Rauch, P.C. for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Instawalli on www.pexels.com.

Wednesday, May 21, 2025

Certain Insurance Information Ruled Inadmissible in a Post-Koken Auto Accident Lawsuit


In the case of Gilmore v. Erie Insurance Company, No. CV-2023-1140 (C.P. Wash. Co. April 23, 2025 Neuman, J.), in an Order without Opinion, the court granted a Defendant’s Motion In Limine filed in a post-Koken matter and thereby precluded the Plaintiff from introducing into evidence, any evidence or testimony regarding the amount of the tortfeasor’s liability limits, the amount of the premiums that the Plaintiff paid to his own UIM carrier, or that the Plaintiff’s UIM limits amounted to $300,000.00.

The rationale of the court was that the admission of such evidence would be overly prejudicial to the Defendant UIM carrier.

Again, there is no Opinion issued. This decision was by way of Order only.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney Joseph Hudock of the Pittsburgh law firm of Summers, McDonnell, Hudock, Guthrie & Rauch, P.C. for bringing this case to my attention.


Source of above image: Photo by Nikitaxnikitin on www.pexels.com.

Wednesday, November 13, 2024

Chester County Court Addresses Post-Koken Issues of Note


Levels of Coverage in Question

In the case of Crook v. Erie Insurance Exchange, No. 2014-00867-TT (C.P. Chester Co. June 14, 2024 Binder, J.), the court addressed various Preliminary Objections filed by a carrier in a Post-Koken uninsured (UM) motorist litigation.

Among the issues raised by the second level UIM carrier defendant in this case involving two (2) levels of UIM coverage was an argument that the claim against the second level UIM carrier was premature given that it was not clear as to whether or not the Plaintiff’s alleged damages would be fully covered by the first level of UM coverage.

The court emphasized that, while the second level of UM carrier was entitled to a credit for the policy limits under the first level UIM coverage, the Plaintiff was not required to exhaust the first level of UM coverage before pursuing the secondary coverage available from the second level UM carrier.

The court also addressed the separate issue of whether the Plaintiff properly also included a claim against the uninsured tortfeasor in this matter and whether that was an improper joinder.

The court reviewed cases on this issue involving permissive joinder of tort and UIM claims under Pa. R.C.P. 2229 and found that the same were indeed permitted. In this regard, Judge Binder elected to follow the approach enunciated by Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas in the case of Bingham v. Poswistilo, 24 Pa. D. & C. 5th 17 (C.P. Lacka. Co. 2011 Nealon, J.) and allowed the claims to proceed into discovery under the same caption.

Accordingly, the court overruled the objections to Joinder at this pre-trial stage of the case without prejudice to the rights of the parties to request a bifurcation at the trial of the tort and the UIM claims and/or to otherwise request limits on the disclosure of the identity or existence of insurance coverage at trial.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert” (Nov. 6, 2024).

Thursday, October 24, 2024

Berks County Trial Court Judge Denies Motions to Bifurcate Post-Koken Case


In the case of Sekulski v. Walker and Erie Ins. Exch., No. 19-14211 (C.P. Berks Co. Sept. 17, 2024 Nevius, J.), the Berks County Court of Common Pleas denied the Motion to Sever filed by both the third party Defendant and the UIM carrier Defendant in a Post-Koken motor vehicle accident case.

The court ruled that the third party tort liability claim would be tried jointly with the Plaintiff’s first party claim for underinsured motorist benefits, with Erie Insurance identified as a real party and interest to those proceedings.

In its detailed Order, the court noted that the Plaintiff’s claim against all Defendants arose from the same factual background and involved common questions of law and fact. 

As such, the court noted that judicial economy favored one trial of all claims. The court was also influenced by the fact that a severance of the case into two separate matters or trial would result in an undue hardship and burden on the Plaintiffs who would be required to present their case twice at a presumed substantial cost and with additional delays.

The court also noted a concern with the likelihood of possible inconsistent verdicts.

The court also rejected the tortfeasor Defendant’s argument that having a UIM carrier as a Co-Defendant would prejudice that Defendant in light of the anticipated repeated references to insurance at the trial in front of the jury.  Judge Nevius noted that there would be no reference to the tortfeasor’s liability insurance.   The court additionally noted that it could craft jury instructions to address any concerns about possible prejudice in this regard.

Judge Nevius additionally noted that this decision did not address the bifurcation of any potential bad faith claims given that it did not appear that any such claims were at issue in this matter.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney Peter F. Schuchman and Attorney Julia Adams of the Wyomissing, PA office of Kozloff Stoudt for bringing this case to my attention.

Wednesday, March 1, 2023

Post-Koken Scorecard and Facebook Discovery Scorecard Updated on Tort Talk

 

The Post-Koken Scorecard and the Facebook Discovery Scorecard on Tort Talk have been updated.

To view the Scorecards, please go to www.TortTalk.com and scroll down the right hand column and click on the date noted under the title to the Scorecards.

If you are willing, please forward to my attention a copy of any new judicial Opinions and/or Orders regarding any Post-Koken litigation issues or Facebook/Social Media Discovery issues you may come across for inclusion in the Scorecard.  

Thank you.



Thursday, January 26, 2023

Lackawanna County Court Denies Motion to Bifurcate a Post-Koken Auto Accident Case



In the case of Ives v. McLain, No. 20-CV-2658 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Jan. 10, 2023 Gibbons, J.), Judge James A. Gibbons of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas denied a Motion to Bifurcate filed by a third party Defendant in a post-Koken automobile accident litigation.

The tortfeasor Defendant asserted that it would be unfair for him to proceed to trial with a UIM carrier insurance company sitting at the same table as a Co-Defendant. 

The tortfeasor also asserted that the interest of judicial economy would be furthered by bifurcation, particularly if the Plaintiff were to secure a verdict less than the liability limits, which would thereby preclude the need for any trial on the Plaintiff’s UIM claim.

The court reviewed the law under Pa. R.C.P. 213(b) and denied the motion. The court found that all counsel are equipped to outline their respective positions to the jury in such a way to avoid any confusion or prejudice regarding the issues presented in this combined trial.

The court additionally indicated that the lay persons on the jury would be properly instructed by the court on the law applicable to negligence claims as well as breach of contract claims at trial.

As such, the court denied the tortfeasor’s Motion to Bifurcate.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Monday, November 14, 2022

Federal Court Addresses Right to Identify Insurance Carrier Defendant By Name at Post-Koken Trial; Also Compels Both Parties to Present Medical Experts as Live Witnesses


In the case of Whitlock v. Allstate Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 2:20-CV-00373-KSM (E.D. Pa. Oct. 13, 2022 Marston, J.), the court addressed various Motions In Limine.

At a pre-trial conference, Allstate requested to be referred to at the trial in the name of the non-party tortfeasor as opposed to as "Allstate."  This the court refused.    

Of note, the court ruled that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 411, regarding the admissibility of insurance evidence, applies only where negligence or other wrongful conduct is at issue. The court noted that this rule did not apply in a contract action involving an insurance company.

The court also found that evidence that the Defendant is an insurance company being sued under a policy of insurance was not unduly prejudicial under F.R.C.P. 403. The court noted that Pennsylvania law does not exclude insurance evidence under these circumstances.

As such, the court found that Allstate had not established a reason to use another name for the carrier at trial or that the carrier would be prejudiced by the use of its name at trial in front of the jury.    

In another notable ruling in this decision, the court stated that, before a witness’ recorded deposition testimony is admissible in lieu of live testimony, there must be an exceptional showing of reasons for the witness’ unavailability.

The court stated that the fact that medical witnesses are busy seeing other patients is not an exceptional circumstance. The Court stated that it is well known that doctors are almost always busy. The court stated that, to recognize a “busy witness” exception would expand the exception to swallow the rule favoring live testimony.

As such, the court compelled both parties to present their medical expert's testimonies live at trial instead of by way of video deposition.    

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Wednesday, June 1, 2022

A Post-Koken Decision in Favor of Severance Out of Westmoreland County



In the case of Levis v. Kilbert, No. 5576-Civil-2019 (C.P. West. Co. May 6, 2022 Hathaway, P.J.), the court issued an Order only in a post-Koken litigation addressing Preliminary Objections in which the court sustained the tortfeasor Defendant’s assertion of a misjoinder of actions in terms of the negligence claim against the tortfeasor and the breach of contract UIM claim against the carrier and ordered that the claims be severed into two (2) separate lawsuits.


I send thanks to Attorney Diana M. O’Connell of the Pittsburgh, PA law firm of Robb Leonard Mulvihill, LLP for brining this case to my attention.



According to the Tort Talk Post-Koken Scorecard that makes at least 25 County Courts in favor of the severance of Post-Koken claims and at least 24 County Courts in favor of the consolidation of Post-Koken cases.

We continue to await for appellate guidance on this issue.




Tuesday, October 5, 2021

Motion To Bifurcate Lackawanna County Post-Koken Trial Denied


In the case of Nebesky v. Pagnotti, No. 2019-CV-3170 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Sept 15, 2021 Gibbons, J.), the court addressed a Motion to Bifurcate the Trial in this post-Koken automobile accident litigation. After reviewing Pa. R.C.P. 213(b) and after noting that the parties had cited two (2) court decisions at the trial court level from around the Commonwealth, this court chose to deny the Motion to Bifurcate.

Judge Gibbons noted that he believed that the attorneys involved would be able to outline their respective positions on the third party negligence claims and the UIM breach of contract claims to the jury in such a way as to avoid any confusion or prejudice. The court additionally felt that any potential prejudice to the third party Defendant in having an insurance company as a Co-Defendant could be rooted out in Voir Dire.

Judge James A. Gibbons
Lackawanna County

The Court also noted that the jury would be properly instructed on the law applicable to the negligence claims as well as the breach of contract claims.

Judge Gibbons also noted that he wished to remain consistent with the prior decisions out of Lackawanna County denying Motions to Bifurcate in post-Koken matters.


Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Tuesday, December 29, 2020

THE 2020 TORT TALK TOP TEN

             






Here is the 2020 Tort Talk Top Ten--an annual listing of notable cases and important trends in Pennsylvania civil litigation law over the past year as highlighted in Tort Talk blog posts.

If you wish to view the actual Tort Talk post on any of the following cases or topics, or the actual Opinion, please go to TortTalk.com and type the name of the Plaintiff in the case in the Search Box in the upper right hand corner of the blog.  There should be a Link to the actual Opinion within the blog post itself.


10.    Trial Judges Should Stay on the Bench for Voir Dire



The Pennsylvania Supreme Court was positioned to answer the question of whether it was proper for a trial court judge to leave the bench for jury selection in its decision in the case of Trigg v. Children's Hospital of Pittsburgh of UPMC, No. 3 WAP 2019 (Pa. April 22, 2019) (Op. by Todd, J.)(Donohue, J., Concurring)(Wecht, J., Concurring).  

However, in its decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the issue had not been preserved for appeal and that the Superior Court had, therefore, improperly addressed the merits of the question presented.

While the Court found that the issue had been waived, several of the Justices wrote Concurring Opinions voicing their thoughts that a trial court judge should remain on the bench during the course of voir dire.


9.    Validity of Reservation of Rights Letters




In the case of Selective Way Ins. Co. v. MAK Services, 232 A.3d 672 (Pa. Super. April 24, 2020) (Bowes, J., Shogan, J., Strassburger, J.) (Op. by Bowes, J.)(Dissenting Op. by Strassburger, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court issued an important decision pertaining to the validity of reservation of rights letters issued by liability insurance carriers.

The court emphasized that, in order for a reservation of rights letter to be valid, it must be issued in a timely fashion and it must clearly state the reasons under the policy for the reservation of rights or for the challenge to coverage.  The court also noted that a best practice may be for the insurance company to send the reservation of rights on multiple occasions as the case evolves.

The court noted that, if a carrier fails to meet these recommendations with respect to a reservation of rights letter, the carrier may be estopped from denying coverage in the end.


8.    Still no Appellate Guidance for Post-Koken Cases



The original Post-Koken decision was handed down back in 2005 allowing automobile insurance companies to replace their arbitration clauses with the requirement that UM and UIM claims instead be pursued in a court of law.  Yet, since that time, essentially the only appellate court decision of note handed down was the Stepanovich v. McGraw decision by the Pennsylvania Superior Court back in 2013 in which that court suggested that it was permissible to conduct a trial of the claims against the tortfeasor and the UIM carrier before the same jury (the Pennsylvania Supreme Court inexplicably denied allocatur in the case).

To date, there remain splits of authority all across the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania on a wide variety of Post-Koken issues in terms of pleadings, discovery, and trial.  These varying county decisions can always be viewed on the Post-Koken Scorecard by scrolling down the right hand side of the Tort Talk blog and clicking on the date under "Post-Koken Scorecard."


7.    Courts Address Standards for Sealing a Settlement Agreement



In the case of A.A. v. Glicken, No. 2020 Pa. Super. 197 (Pa. Super. Aug. 14, 2020 Olson, J., Dubow, J., and McLaughlin, J.) (Op. by Olson, J.), the court upheld a Luzerne County trial judge’s decision not to seal a settlement agreement in a minor’s medical malpractice lawsuit. 

In so ruling, the appellate court rejected the Defendants’ argument that not sealing the settlement agreement would have a chilling effect on future settlements and would go against the parties’ interests in privacy. The appellate court found no abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying the Motion to Seal. 

The Superior Court also ruled that the Defendants did not overcome the common law presumption of openness in courts and the Defendant did not meet their burden of showing good cause for sealing the record. 

This issue was also addressed by Judge Terrence R. Nealon of Lackawanna County in the case of Moses Taylor Foundation v. Coverys, No. 19-CV-7423 (C.P. Lacka. Co. May 8, 2020 Nealon, J.), the court addressed a hospital's request to seal the record in a bad faith litigation. 

In the end, the court found that the secrecy interests cited by the hospital and the trust do not supersede the presumption in favor of open access to the judicial records so as to justify a court-sanctioned closure of the record.


6.    Split of Authority on Allegations of Recklessness



In 2020, the split of authority on the propriety of allegations of recklessness continued.  

Some more liberal trial court judges allowed allegations of recklessness to be pled with reckless abandon in any case whatsoever regardless of the facts presented under a rationale that an allegation of recklessness is an averment of a state of the mind and such averments are allowed to be generally pled under Pa.R.C.P. 1019.

Another line of courts emphasized that Pennsylvania is a fact-pleading stated and limited allegations of recklessness to those cases where outrageous facts were present.

Most Plaintiffs attorneys avoid any delays in the forward movement of their cases that may be caused by Preliminary Objections by agreeing to stipulate the claims of recklessness out where they are challenged so long as the Plaintiff retains the option to motion the claims back in if discovery reveals facts sufficient to support a punitive damages claim.


5.    Pennsylvania Superior Court Adopts Test for Staying a Civil Lawsuit While Criminal Charges are Pending against Defendant




In a case of first impression, the Pennsylvania Superior Court has ruled in Keesee v. Dougherty, 230 A.3d 1128 (Pa. Super. March 16, 2020 Bowes, J., Olson, J., Stabile, J.)(Op. by Olson, J.), that a trial court judge must reconsider her refusal to stay a civil lawsuit while a companion criminal case is pending.

The lawsuit in this matter was brought by a nonunion electrical contractor against an indicted union boss and other defendants.

With its ruling the Pennsylvania Superior Court adopted the six-factor test established by the federal courts for determining whether to stay a civil case pending resolution of a related criminal matter.  The court cited to the federal case of In re Adelphia Communications, No. 02-1781, 2003 WL 22358819 (E.D. Pa. 2003).


4.    Pennsylvania Supreme Court Upholds Artful Pleading to Avoid Liability Exclusion




In Erie Insurance Exchange v. Moore, No. 20 WAP 2018 (Pa. April 22, 2020)(Op. by Dougherty, J.)(Dissenting Op. by Mundy, L), the Court allowed artful pleading of negligence by a Plaintiff in a shooting case to avoid exclusions in a liability policy and thereby implicate a carrier’s duty to defend the matter.

This case arose out of the tortfeasor's shooting of the Plaintiff.  The Plaintiff asserted in his Complaint that the shooter had negligently, carelessly and recklessly caused the weapon to be fired.  The Court read the facts to indicate that the shooter had intended to shoot another person and, when the Plaintiff had intervened, the Plaintiff was shot by mistake during the scuffle with the shooter.


3.     Regular Use Exclusion is Under Attack

Over the past two years, the Plaintiff's bar has been successful in attacking the validity of the Household Exclusion in automobile insurance policies.

Energized, the Plaintiff's bar has now set its sights on attacking the Regular Use Exclusion using essentially the same argument that was utilized in the Gallagher v. GEICO case, i.e., that the exclusion acts as an improper de facto waiver of stacked coverage when the MVFRL requires that carriers secure written waivers of stacked coverage from its insureds.

While these attacks initially have not met with success, the Plaintiff's bar scored a chink in the armor with a victory in the Northampton County Common Pleas Court case of Rush v. Erie Insurance Exchange, No. C-48-CV–2919-01979 (C.P. Northampt. Co. June 29, 2019 Baratta, J.). In Rush, Judge Stephen G. Baratta of the Northampton County Common Pleas Court granted partial summary judgment to the injured party plaintiffs after holding, as a matter of first impression by any court in Pennsylvania, that Erie’s regular use exclusion was invalid under the MVFRL.

The recent cases on this issue can be viewed by going to www.TortTalk.com and scrolling down the right hand column until you get to the "Labels."  In alphabetical order under that, click on the label for "Regular Exclusion" to get to the Tort Talk blog posts on those cases.

Also, here is a LINK to my September 10, 2020 Pennsylvania Law Weekly article on the topic entitled "Can the Regular-Use Exclusion Withstand an Attack from the Plaintiffs Bar?"


2.   Lower Courts Continue to Debate Scope of Gallagher v. GEICO Household Exclusion Decision



In 2019, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court attempted to eradicate the Household Exclusion found in automobile insurance policies as an improper de facto waiver of stacked coverage.

In 2020, lower courts struggled with the application of the Gallagher v. GEICO decision to different factual scenarios than that presented in the case decided by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

While the Federal District Court judges largely followed the Gallagher v. GEICO decision as eradicating the Household Exclusion, several state court judges upheld the continuing validity of the Household Exclusion based upon the cases before them having different facts than those at issue in the Gallagher v. GEICO decision.

However, just last month, in the case of Erie Insurance Exchange v. Petrie, No. 261 EDA 2020 (Pa. Super. Nov. 18, 2020 Pellegrini, J., Nichols, J., Kunselman, J.)(Op. By Kunselman, J.), a panel of Pennsylvania Superior Court Judges held that the Gallagher v. GEICO decision was not limited to its facts and should be read as invalidating the Household Exclusion.

The recent cases on this issue can be viewed by going to www.TortTalk.com and scrolling down the right hand column until you get to the "Labels."  In alphabetical order under that, click on the label for "Household Exclusion" to get to the Tort Talk blog posts on those cases.


1.    COVID-19 Pandemic Impacts Civil Litigation in Pennsylvania (and across the world)



With the rise of the COVID-19 Pandemic in March of 2020, the courts shut down except for essential matters through September of 2020.  By then, most courts in Pennsylvania began to try to complete jury trials until the second surge compelled most courts to shut down trials again in December of 2020.  It remains to be seen when trials will get back on track in 2021.

The COVID-19 Pandemic also forced attorneys and judges to adapt and to adopt virtual meetings in order to keep cases moving forward.  The use of virtual meetings for depositions and court appointments became the norm, possibly impacting how cases will be handled in the future when the Pandemic goes away.

It is also anticipated that the impact of the Pandemic will be felt in the future in terms of a dip in claims given that there was a stay-at-home Order in effect in Pennsylvania for about two months in the Spring of 2020.






Thursday, December 17, 2020

ARTICLE: The Wheels Stopped Turning: An Unsettled Year All Around in MVA Law



This Year-End review article of mine on Motor Vehicle Accident Law in Pennsyvania was published by the Pennsylvania Law Weekly on December 17, 2020 and is republished here with permission.


The Wheels Stopped Turning: An Unsettled Year All Around in MVA Law

By Daniel E. Cummins | December 17, 2020


Daniel E. Cummins of Cummins Law.

While the wheels of motor vehicles stopped in large part for a time in 2020 as Americans cooped up at home and waited (and still wait) for the pandemic to subside, the wheels of justice kept turning in the form of notable decisions and developments in Pennsylvania motor vehicle accident law over the past year.

People Stopped Driving

Obviously, the rise of the COVID-19 pandemic was the news story of the year. In March and April of this year, the roads were mostly empty as people huddled up at home under unprecedented stay-at-home orders from the government.

Based on this drastic decrease in driving activity and the consequent dip in motor vehicle accidents, it is expected that there may be a reduction in auto accident claims in the future. However, the prospect of a downturn in auto accident claims and suits may be tempered by the fact that more limited tort claims may be pursued as a result as practitioners try to keep their numbers up. Whether the courts apply the serious injury threshold of the limited tort option to these cases will remain to be seen.

Law of Household Exclusion Unsettled

Back in 2019, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court handed down its decision in Gallagher v. Geico, 201 A.3d 131 (Pa. 2019), which represented a seismic shift in auto accident law as that court attempted to eradicate the household exclusion for the benefit of plaintiffs. In 2020, disagreement flowed out of the lower courts as to the application of that decision outside of the facts of the Gallagher case. Some courts followed the Gallagher v. Geico decision as eradicating the household exclusion and others did not, instead choosing to rule that that decision should be limited to its facts.

In the Pennsylvania federal courts, several judges followed the Gallagher v. Geico decision in opinions they handed down in 2020. In the Eastern District Court case of LM General Insurance v. LeBrum, No. 19-2144-KSM (E.D. Pa. July 1, 2020 Marston, J.) (Mem. Op.), the court followed the decision issued in Gallagher v. Geico in denying a motion to dismiss a declaratory judgment issue pertaining to whether the injured the plaintiff’s claims for UIM benefits were barred by a household exclusion.

The court in LeBrum reviewed a number of trial court decisions indicating that the Gallagher v. Geico decision by the Pennsylvania Superior Court should be viewed broadly as well as those other decisions that have indicated that the decision should be interpreted narrowly. The court in this case indicated that, at the motion to dismiss stage, it was not inclined to interpret Gallagher’s holding narrowly.

In addition to following Gallagher’s eradication of the household exclusion, the court in LeBrum also held that the Gallagher decision could be applied retroactively. With regards to a statute of limitations defense asserted by the carrier on the Gallagher v. Geico issue, the court agreed that a four-year statute of limitations would apply on any retroactive claims.

In another household exclusion case from this year, National General Insurance v. Sheldon, No. 1:19-CV-212 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 2020 Bissoon, J.), the carrier argued that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in the case of Gallagher v. Geico was distinguishable from the issues presented in this case in that Gallagher involved the same insurance company on both insurance policies at issue and this case did not.

After reviewing the cases which have been decided since Gallagher, the judge in this Sheldon case out of the Western District Court of Pennsylvania found that this distinction was of no consequence. The court held ultimately that the household exclusion was not valid in this case under essentially the same analysis as in the Gallagher decision, i.e., that the household exclusion is invalid as a de facto waiver of stacked coverage where Pennsylvania’s MVFRL requires that an insured provide a written waiver of such coverage.

The district court’s decision in the Sheldon case contradicted a household exclusion decision that had been handed down by the same court earlier in the year. In the case of Dunleavy v. Mid-Century Insurance, No. 2:19-CV-1304 (W.D. Pa. May 19, 2020 Ranjan, J.), Judge J. Nicholas Ranjan of the Pennsylvania Western Federal District Court held that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Gallagher v. Geico did not apply to invalidate a household exclusion in this case where the insured had expressly waived UIM coverage on a motorcycle insured with another carrier.

The above review confirms that there is a split of authority in the federal courts on the ongoing validity of the household exclusion. Meanwhile, in the state court system, several trial court judges limited Gallagher v. Geico to its facts and decided to uphold the household exclusion as a valid exclusion to support a denial of UIM coverage.

For example, in the Lehigh County case of Erie Insurance Exchange v. Mione, No. 2019-CV-2395 (C.P. Lehigh Co. June 26, 2020 Varricchio, J.), Judge Michele A. Varrichio of the Lehigh County Court of Common Pleas granted summary judgment in favor of the carrier and denied the injured party’s motion for judgment on the pleadings in a declaratory judgment action regarding the household exclusion. The court ruled that Erie Insurance did not need to provide underinsured motorist coverage to the plaintiff given the application of the exclusion.

The court in the Mione case analogized the facts before it to be more consistent with the facts in issue in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in Eichelman v. Nationwide Insurance, 711 A.2d 1006 (Pa. 1999). Following Eichelman the court in this matter ruled that, in the absence of a clearly expressed public policy, the clear and unambiguous language of the still valid household exclusion in the auto insurance policy must be given its plain meaning and application.

The court in Mione also emphasized that, giving effect to the household exclusion would further legislative policy behind Pennsylvania’s Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law [MVFRL] by holding the plaintiff to his voluntary choice of not purchasing UIM coverage under a separate motorcycle policy for the motorcycle involved in the accident.

The ongoing application of the household exclusion to preclude coverage was also found to be valid by Judge David J. Williamson in the Monroe County case of Erie Insurance Exchange v. King, No. 6937-CV-2019 (C.P. Monroe Co. Jan. 27, 2020 Williamson, J.). In the King case, the court applied a household exclusion despite the Gallagher case and ruled that the insurance company did not have to provide uninsured motorist benefits as a result.

In his opinion, Judge Williamson noted that, when one of the plaintiffs had purchased the policy with Erie Insurance, he had executed a waiver of stacked benefits and received a reduction in the premiums as a result. As such, the record confirmed to the court that the plaintiff had expressly waived the ability to stack his coverage over two or more separate policies.

Yet, there have been county court decisions in 2020 in which the court instead applied the Gallagher v. Geico decision and ruled that the household exclusion was invalid.

In the Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas case of Donegal Mutual Insurance v. Krautsack, No. CI-19-04904 (C.P. Lanc. Co. Aug. 28, 2020 Ashworth, J.), the court granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denied the carrier’s cross-motion for summary judgment relative to issues surrounding the application of a household exclusion.

Lancaster County Court Judge David L. Ashworth applied the Gallagher v. Geico decision literally and noted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court “unequivocally” held that household exclusions are unenforceable as a matter of law as the exclusion violated the requirements set forth in Pennsylvania’s MVFRL that a carrier secure a written waiver or rejection of stacked UIM coverage for such waiver or rejection to be valid.

In the separate case of Donegal Insurance v. Ricci-Lombardo, No. C-48-CV-2019-11724 (C.P. Northamt. Co. Oct. 22, 2020 Morganelli, J.), Judge John M. Morganelli of the Northampton County Common Pleas Court also ruled in favor of the insured in response to cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings in a declaratory judgment action brought by the carrier relative to the application of the household exclusion. The court followed the Gallagher decision and ruled that household exclusion could not be utilized by the carrier to act as a de facto waiver of stacked coverage.

It is anticipated that the lower courts will continue to see this issue again and again in the years ahead.

Regular Use Exclusion Is Under Attack

With their successes in their attack against the household exclusion through the Gallagher v. Geico decision, plaintiffs attorneys have been energized and have turned their sharp focus toward utilizing the rationale of the Gallagher decision to attack the regular use exclusion, i.e., that the regular use exclusion should be ruled invalid as a de facto waiver of stacked coverage when the MVFRL requires carriers to secure a written waiver of such coverage.

One such attack on this exclusion was rebuffed earlier this year in the case of Nationwide Affinity Insurance Company of America v. Fong, No. 2:19-CV-02119-CFK (E.D. Pa. April 28, 2020 Kenney, J.), in which that court upheld the carrier’s reliance upon the regular use exclusion.

In Nationwide v. Fong, Eastern Federal District Court Judge Chad F. Kenney held that the clear language of the regular use exclusion was not ambiguous and that the plain language of that exclusion clearly applied to bar coverage for any UIM coverage under the case presented.

The court in Nationwide v. Fong also noted that the claimants did not present any argument that the regular use exclusion was unenforceable on policy grounds. The court noted that the regular use exclusion had been previously upheld as valid by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in its holding in the case of Williams v. Geico, 32 A.3d 1195, 1209 (Pa. 2011), in which it was held, in part, that the regular use exclusion was not void as against public policy.

Judge Kenney also made a point in Nationwide v. Fong to emphasize that the current Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s separate decision with respect to the household exclusion in the case of Gallagher v. Geico “does not affect Williams’s precedent, as the facts of Gallagher are wholly distinguishable to the facts in the [Nationwide v. Fong] matter, as conceded by the [injured party].”

In essence, in his decision in Nationwide v. Fong, Kenney followed decades of precedent under which the regular use exclusion had been repeatedly upheld as valid.

Then came chink in the armor of the regular use exclusion. In June of this year, Judge Stephen G. Baratta of the Northampton County Common Pleas Court case of Rush v. Erie Insurance Exchange, No. C-48-CV–2919-01979 (C.P. Northampt. Co. June 29, 2019 Baratta, J.). granted partial summary judgment to the injured party plaintiffs after holding, as a matter of first impression by any court in Pennsylvania, that the carrier’s regular use exclusion was invalid under the MVFRL.

According to the opinion, the plaintiff in Rush was a police officer who was injured while driving a police vehicle that was regularly available for his use at work. After securing a recovery from the tortfeasor, the plaintiff was seeking a further recovery under his own UIM coverage under his personal automobile insurance policy. The carrier that issued that policy denied coverage in reliance upon the regular use exclusion contained in the personal policy. A declaratory judgment action was filed and the parties eventually filed cross-motions for summary judgment.

In Rush, Judge Baratta emphasized that the plaintiff had not executed any written UIM coverage or stacking waivers. The court went on to accept the plaintiffs’ de facto waiver of coverage argument, that is, the same argument raised in the Gallagher v. Geico context, and held the the regular use exclusion was similarly invalid.

The court in Rush also found that the regular use exclusion violated 75 Pa.C.S.A. Section 1734, which mandated the carrier to provide UIM coverage equal to the bodily injury coverage available absent a written waiver secured from the insured.

The Rush v. Erie Insurance decision is on its way up the appellate ladder for review by the Pennsylvania Superior Court. Whether that decision is a blip on the radar or the beginning of a split of authority on the regular use exclusion remains to be seen.

Another Notable Split of Authority

Another notable split of authority that dominated the court decisions in 2020 in Pennsylvania revolved around the extent to which recklessness could be pleaded in state court personal injury complaints.

In some more liberal decisions, such as those arising this year out of Philadelphia, Franklin, Northampton and Lackawanna counties, the trial court judges have relied upon dicta from the summary judgment decision in the case of Archibald v. Kemble, 971 A.2d 513 (Pa. Super. 2008), to rule, at the preliminary objections stage, that claims of recklessness, or reckless conduct, can be pleaded with reckless abandon in any personal injury case whatsoever regardless of the underlying facts at issue. Those trial court judges believe that a claim of recklessness is an allegation that pertains to the state of the mind of the tortfeasor and that such claims are permitted to be pled generally under Pa.R.C.P. 1019.

Over the past year, other trial court judges, such as those in Monroe and Susquehanna counties, have instead adhered to the long-established principle that Pennsylvania is a fact-pleading state and have required that plaintiffs to instead allege sufficient facts in support of claims of reckless conduct, i.e., those same types of outrageous facts necessary to support a claim for punitive damages.

In his decision in the case of Seber v. Kline, No. CI-20-03109 (C.P. Lanc. Co. July 1, 2020 Brown, J.) Judge Leonard G. Brown III of the Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas took a middle ground on the issue in a rear end accident case.

In Seber, Brown referred to the Archibald v. Kemble decision for the proposition that, under Pennsylvania tort law, recklessness is subsumed by and sounds in negligence. Brown noted that the Superior Court in Archibald stated that, “even though we hold [the plaintiff] must prove [the defendant] acted recklessly, the cause of action remains, sounding in negligence.”

Brown also separately acknowledged in his decision in the Seber case that recklessness may be pled generally under Pa. R.C.P. 1019(b) as a condition of the mind in some cases. However, Brown went on to note that there are “Two distinct types of recklessness. The first allows for punitive damages, and the second does not.”

The court noted that the first type of recklessness, which may support claims of punitive damages, involve cases where the actor knows, or has reason to know of facts which create a high degree of risk of harm to another, and the actor still deliberately proceeds to act, or fails to act, in conscious disregard of, or indifference in that that risk.

Brown noted that the second type of recklessness is “where the actor has such knowledge or reason to know the facts, but does not realize or appreciate the high degree of risk involved, although a reasonable man in his position would do so.”

Brown ruled that in this matter that the facts alleged by the plaintiff in a matter involving a standard rear-end accident were “legally insufficient to support a demand for punitive damages” and that simply pleading words such as ‘reckless,’ ‘wanton,’ or ‘willful’ did not change the result. More specifically, Brown ruled that “even when read in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, no facts averred in the complaint point to this being a case of more than mere negligence.”

Rather, the court found that the facts pled in this simple rear-end accident case are the same types of facts used to support a showing of mere negligence only. As such, the court granted the defendant’s preliminary objections to the claims of recklessness, gross negligence, and for punitive damages and struck them from the complaint without leave to amend.

It should be interesting to see how this pleadings issue continues to play out in the year ahead.

Uber Deemed to Be an Employer of Its Drivers

In the case of first impression of Lowman v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 235 A.3d 278 (Pa. July 24, 2020), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held, as a matter of first impression, that Uber “controlled and directed the performance of Lowman’s services as a driver-for-hire” and that Donald Lowman was not engaged in an independently established business.

As such, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court essentially found that the driver’s work for Uber was completed within employment with Uber and not as an independent contractor. Uber’s argument that the driver was acting in self-employment was rejected.

Some commentators note that this decision may have an impact in personal injury litigation in terms of whether a ride-sharing company can be sued in a motor vehicle accident case as an employer of the defendant driver.

Still Waiting for Post-’Koken’ Appellate Guidance

It has been 15 years since the Insurance Federation of Pennsylvania v. Koken, 889 A.2d 550 (Pa. 2005), decision was handed down and, to date, the only appellate decision handed down has been the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s decision seven years ago in Stepanovich v. McGraw and State Farm, 78 A.3d 1147 (Pa. Super. 2013), appeal denied 78 A.3d 1147 (Pa. 2014). In that case, the Superior Court suggested that, in some circumstances, it would not be improper to have a post-Koken trial involving both the third party defendant and a UIM carrier defendant in front of the same jury. Regrettably and inexplicably, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allocatur in that case and missed an opportunity to present much needed appellate guidance in this area of law.

Meanwhile, there remains an equal split of authority amongst county trial courts on the issue of whether post-Koken cases involving combined cases against third party defendants and UIM carrier defendants should remain consolidated or severed. According to the ‘Post-Koken Scorecard’ found on the Tort Talk Blog (www.TortTalk.com), at least 24 county courts have ruled in favor of the continued consolidation of these types of cases through discovery and at least 24 county courts have ruled in favor of the severance of such claims.

The Post-Koken Scorecard also confirms that, in those combined post-Koken cases that also include bad faith claims against the UIM carrier, at least 10 county courts have ruled in favor of the continued consolidation of these cases up to the time of trial, and at least 22 county courts have ruled in favor of severing out the bad faith claims. Of those courts that have followed the majority rule in favor of severing out the bad faith claims there remains a split of authority as to whether bad faith discovery should still be allowed to proceed while the underlying UIM claim is pending.

There is also a split of authority across Pennsylvania on the issue of whether a post-Koken trial involving both a third party tortfeasor defendant and a UIM carrier should be allowed to proceed in a consolidated fashion or instead be bifurcated. Moreover, the trial court judges continue to craft their own jury instructions for these types of cases.

The hope remains that some of these post-Koken cases that proceed to verdict will thereafter head up the appellate ladder and generate some much needed appellate guidance in 2021.

Here’s to also hoping that appellate guidance is forthcoming in the year ahead on all of the other issues reviewed above as well.

Daniel E. Cummins is the managing partner of the Clarks Summit law firm of Cummins Law, a civil litigation practice. He also conducts mediations of civil litigation matters through Cummins Mediation Services. Cummins is also the sole creator and writer of the Tort Talk Blog (www.TortTalk.com), which is designed to provide continuing updates on important cases and trends in Pennsylvania civil litigation law. He can be reached at dancummins@CumminsLaw.net.

Monday, November 16, 2020

First Party and UIM Bad Faith Claims Dismissed in Post-Koken Case; Leave to Amend Granted

 

In the case of Canfield v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., No. 20-2794 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 2, 2020 Pappert, J.), the court ruled that a Plaintiff could not recover  damages under Pennsylvania's MVFRL or on her bad faith claim  where the allegations in her Complaint suggested nothing more than an ordinary dispute with her carrier over the value of her claims in this post-Koken auto accident matter.

More specifically, the court found that the facts alleged regarding the dispute between the Plaintiff and the carrier over the value of the claim and the payment of first party benefits did not amount to allegations of wanton conduct as required for the relief requested by the Plaintiff relative to her first party medical benefits claims asserted under Section 1797 of the MVFRL.

The court's decision with respect to Section 1797 is also notable in that the court followed prior precedent holding that, unless the carrier's actions fall outside the ambit of Section 1797 and involves bad faith abuses not related to the challenge of the denial of first party medical benefits, the MVFRL preempts the statutory bad faith claim concerning the Plaintiff's request for PIP benefits.

With regards to any separate bad faith claims asserted by the Plaintiff in the Complaint, the court pointed out that the Plaintiff did not aver an unreasonable denial of UIM or first party medical benefits by the carrier, but rather only alleged a delay in the payment of the same and an allegedly unreasonable position taken by the carrier on the value of the case.  

The court found that, while the Plaintiff disagreed with the value put on the file by the carrier, she had not asserted facts in the Complaint to support an allegation that the carrier's evaluation was unreasonable and/or that the carrier knew that it was unreasonable, all as is required to move forward on a bad faith claim.  

The court noted that, to proceed on a bad faith UIM claim in this regard, the Plaintiff must allege more than that the carrier extended "low-ball offers."  The court reaffirmed the rule of law that a carrier is permitted to make low but reasonable offers of settlement without fear of being found in bad faith. 

In the end, the court granted the Plaintiff leave to amend the Complaint to try to assert valid claims with regards to the above issues.

Anyone wishing to review this Opinion may click this LINK.  The court's companion Order can be viewed HERE.


Source: "Digest of Recent Opinions - Most Viewed Opinions."  Pennsylvania Law Weekly (Nov. 3, 2020).

Monday, September 21, 2020

Post-Koken Decision Handed Down in Franklin County in Favor of Severance of Cases

 

In what appears to be the first Post-Koken decision of its kind out of Franklin County, the trial court in the case of Stanhope v. Stoner and GEICO, No. 2020-877 (C.P. Franklin Co. Sept. 14, 2020 Shank, J.), granted a UIM carrier's Preliminary Objections and Motion to Sever the UIM claims from the third party negligence claims asserted against the alleged tortfeasor defendant.

In issuring her decision, Judge Mary Beth Shank noted that there is still no appellate decisions on the issue of whether Post-Koken UIM and third party negligence claims should be consolidated or severed.

Notably, on pg. 3 of the decision, the court cited to the Post-Koken Scorecard on Tort Talk to note that approximately 48 out of the 67 Courts of Common Pleas have addressed this issue with rulings being almost equally split on the issue.  

The court in Stanhope came down on the side of severance, ruling that the two actions involved, one in tort and the other arising from GEICO's alleged contractual obligations to insure the Plaintiff, did not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence.

The court also noted that severance was advisable since it would be unduly prejudicial to the third party defendant to have elements of insurance evidence possibly being admitted and exposed during a jury trial.  The court noted that there is a valid concern that knowledge on the part of the jury of insurance coverages being involved may "motivate the jury to be reckless in awarding damages to be paid...."  See Op. at p. 4.

While the court acknowledged that the plaintiff's argument that judicial economy would be served by keeping the cases consolidated, the court found "severance to be the better reasoned approach" and that the "risk of prejudice to either defendant to outweigh the Court's desire for judicial efficiency."  See Op. at p. 5.

For these reasons, the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas came down on the side of ruling in favor of the severance of Post-Koken UIM and third party negligence cases.

Please click this LINK to view this Stanhope decision.

I send thanks to Attorney Joseph Hudock of the Pittsburgh law firm of Summers, McDonnell, Hudock, Guthrie & Rauch, P.C. for bringing this decision to my attention.

 Commentary:  The Stanhope decision tips the split of authority across the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in favor of severance.  There are at least 24 County Courts of Common Pleas that have ruled in favor of consolidation of these types of cases and 25 County Courts of Common Pleas ruling in favor of severance.  

In some of these Counties there are splits of authority within the Counties (such as in Philadelphia, Allegheny, and Lackawanna Counties). 

It is hard to believe that, 15 years after the original decision in the Koken case, there has still been no appellate decisions on this issue or many other recurring Post-Koken issues.


Post-Koken Decision Out of Philadelphia County in Favor of Consolidation of Claims


In the case of Little v. Bond and GEICO, June Term 2020, No. 1539 (C.P. Phila. Co. Sept. 8, 2020 New, J.), Judge Arnold L. New of the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas denied a UIM carrier's Preliminary Objections seeking to sever the third party negligence claims from the UIM claims under an improper joinder argument.  This decision is by Order only and no Opinion.

Please click this LINK to view the Order.

I send thanks to Attorney John Trotman of the Philadelphia law firm of Silverman, Trotman & Schneider for bringing this decision to my attention.

This is the latest Post-Koken decision seen out of Philadelphia County on this issue, where there is a split of authority amongst the trial court judges within that County on how to address that issue.

There also remains a split of authority across the Commonwealth with at least 24 Counties in favor of keeping these cases consolidated and 24 Counties ruling in favor of severance (in matters not also involving companion bad faith claims).

To date, there has been no appellate decision on this issue.

For more details, check out the Post-Koken Scorecard on www.TortTalk.com.  You can find the Scorecard on the blog by scrolling down the right hand column of the blog until you find "Post-Koken Scorecard."  Click on the date under that title and you will be taken to the Scorecard where you will find a compilation of Post-Koken cases broken down first by issue and then by Federal and County Courts in terms of decisions handed down.

I have been keeping the Scorecard updated since December of 2009.  I don't represent the Scorecard to be a complete listing of Post-Koken decisions since that time but it is comprehensive.

Hoping you can please copy me on any Post-Koken decisions you may generate or see in order that the Post-Koken Scorecard can be continually updated for the benefit of all.

Thanks for reading Tort Talk.