Showing posts with label Underinsured Motorists Claims. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Underinsured Motorists Claims. Show all posts

Tuesday, September 15, 2026

Superior Court Finds That UIM Claim Fails Under Terms of an Umbrella Policy


In the case of Mathews v. Ace Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 638 EDA 2025 (Pa. Super. Sept. 4, 2026 Stevens, P.J.E., Stabile, J., Lane, J.) (Op. by Stevens, P.J.E.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court addressed the issue of whether an umbrella policy applied to provide underinsured (UIM) motorist benefits to a Plaintiff.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff suffered severe injuries as a result of being hit by a car while crossing the street.  The Opinion noted that the driver involved was underinsured.

According to the Opinion, there was an insurance policy issued to the Plaintiff’s employer that entitled the Plaintiff to UM/UIM benefits.However, the Plaintiff was denied any excess benefits under his employer’s umbrella policy. 

The Plaintiff brought suit for breach of contract and for a declaratory judgment on the issue of UIM coverage under the umbrella policy.

The trial court had entered judgment on the pleadings in favor of the umbrella carrier.  On appeal, the Superior Court affirmed.

The Superior Court noted that the plain and express terms of the umbrella policy, including exclusions, limited the umbrella coverage to third-party claims only.

The Superior Court rejected the Plaintiff’s efforts to argue that the policy language was ambiguous. The Plaintiff had attempted to argue that the umbrella policy contained an endorsement indicating that coverage for bodily injury would follow the terms of any underlying insurance.

However, as noted, other language in the umbrella policy specifically limited the umbrella insurance coverage to third party claims.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: Pa. Super. Blog (pasuperblog.substack.com) by Attorney Jon Bruno of Bruno Litigation, LLC in Pittsburgh, PA.

Source of image:  Jean-Phillipe Delberghe on www.unsplash.com.
 

Thursday, August 27, 2026

Judge Mannion of Federal Middle District Court Rules in Favor of Consolidated Discovery in Post-Koken UIM Claim


In the case of Alers v. Progressive Preferred Ins. Co., No. 3:25-CV-01371-MEM (M.D. Pa. Aug. 7, 2026 Mannion, J.), Judge Malachy E. Mannion denied a Defendant’s Motion to Sever and Stay Discovery in a post-Koken breach of contract and statutory bad faith case arising out of a motor vehicle accident.

In this case, the Defendant UIM carrier sought to sever and stay all bad faith discovery from the breach of contract claim. The Defendant carrier argued that, through the bad faith claim, the Plaintiff was seeking in discovery the production of privileged information and the carrier’s opinion work product which would prejudice the Defendant carrier in relationship to the ongoing UIM claim.

The court addressed the request for severance under F.R.C.P. 21.

Judge Malachy E. Mannion
Pa. Middle District

In reviewing the applicable factors under this analysis, Judge Mannion found that the claims raised in both the breach of contract claim and the bad faith claim were intertwined. The court also concluded that severance would not promote judicial economy. The court additionally found that there would be no prejudice to the Defendant if the Motion to Severe was denied. 

In terms of any discovery issues with regards to allegedly privileged insurance company documents, the court noted that such concerns could be addressed through incamera review of discovery materials in response to any Motion to Compel rather than through severance or bifurcation or any stay Orders, which would only serve to prolong consideration of various discovery issues.

Overall, the court found that the Defendant carrier had not met its burden in establishing that severance of the claims or stay of discovery with respect to the bad faith claim were warranted. As such, the Defendant’s Motion was denied and this Post-Koken federal court case involving UIM breach of contract and bad faith claims was allowed to proceed through discovery in a consolidated fashion.

Anyone wishing to review this case may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Jesse B. Hallinan and Attorney Thomas W. Munley of the Scranton law firm of Minora, Krowiak, Munley & Batyko for bringing this case to my attention.



This decision has been added to the Post-Koken Scorecard on the Tort Talk Blog.  The Post-Koken Scorecard is a compilation of many of the Post-Koken decisions handed down by the Pennsylvania state and federal courts since 2009.  The list does not reference all of the cases but is still a comprehensive compilation.

That Scorecard can always be freely accessed by going to www.TortTalk.com, scrolling down the right hand column of the blog to "Post-Koken Scorecard" and clicking on the date under that title.  For now, here is a quick LINK to the Post-Koken Scorecard on the Tort Talk Blog compiled by Daniel E. Cummins, Esquire.



Wednesday, July 22, 2026

Carrier Prevails on Declaratory Judgment Action Regarding Validity of Rejection of UIM Coverage By Insured


In the case of Huggins v. Progressive Adv. Ins. Co., No. 965 MDA 2025 (Pa. Super. June 18, 2026 Bowes, J., Dubow, J., and Neuman, J.) (Op. by Bowes, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed a trial court’s dismissal of a Plaintiff’s declaratory judgment action against Progressive in which the Plaintiff had sought UIM benefits.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff had a single policy with Progressive Insurance which was a motorcycle insurance policy. The Plaintiff had electronically executed the policy and signed a letter rejecting UIM protection.

After the Plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident while operating his motorcycle, he settled the third party claim against the tortfeasor. He then pursued a UIM claim under his motorcycle policy with Progressive. That claim was denied by Progressive based upon the fact that the Plaintiff had previously signed a letter rejecting UIM coverage.

The Plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment action, asserting an entitlement to UIM coverage. According to the Plaintiff, the rejection was invalid because the form he executed did not include the associated policy number.  The Plaintiff made this argument even though he only had one policy with Progressive.

As noted above, the trial court had ruled in favor of the insurance company. The trial court determined that there was no question that the UIM rejection form pertained to the only policy that the Plaintiff had with Progressive. The trial court found that the Plaintiff had declined UIM coverage in accordance with the provisions set forth in 75 Pa. C.S.A. §1731 of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law. The trial court therefore granted summary judgment in favor of Progressive and dismissed the Plaintiff’s Complaint with prejudice.

As noted, on appeal, the Superior Court affirmed.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney David Friedman of the King of Prussia office of Forry Ullman for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Valentin Sarte on www.pexels.com.

Trial Court Finds No Bad Faith in Carrier's Handling of Regular Use Exclusion Dispute in UIM Case


In the case of Erie Insurance Exchange v. Hallam, No. 2021-CV-7526 (C.P. Wash. Co. June 24, 2026 Lucas, J.), the court granted the carrier’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the Plaintiff’s bad faith claim relative to the regular use exclusion.

At the time of the accident, the Plaintiff was injured while in an accident while driving a salt truck for his employer.  In addition to other recoveries, the Plaintiff sought to recover UIM benefits under an Erie Insurance policy that covered one of his personal vehicles at home.

According to the Opinion, the insurance company commenced this action seeking to enforce the “regular use” exclusion found in its personal automobile insurance policy issued to the Defendant. Erie asserted that the Plaintiff had regular access to a work vehicle,i.e. a vehicle that was not covered under the Erie policy.  The Plaintiff was allegedly injured while driving that work vehicle. As such, Erie was seeking a ruling that it did not have to pay UIM benefits to the insured.

The insured argued that, at the time he made a claim for his personal UIM benefits, Erie knew that its interpretation of its “regular use” exclusion had been rejected by the Pennsylvania Superior Court. More specifically, the Plaintiff argued that, as of that time, the Superior Court had determined in the case of Rush v. Erie Insurance Exchange that Erie’s “regular use” exclusion was invalid and therefore, unenforceable.

The insured otherwise argued that, in any event, he was not regularly using the work vehicle that he was injured in. Rather, he asserted that the use of the work vehicle was incidental. 

As such, the insured asserted a breach of contract a statutory bad faith claim against the carrier in a counterclaim. In response, Erie filed a summary judgment motion.

Erie argued that, further up the appellate ladder, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had more recently ruled in Rush v. Erie Insurance Exchange that the regular use exclusion was still valid in at least certain circumstances, which circumstances applied in this case.

Erie argued that there can be no bad faith where the carrier correctly applies a policy exclusion.  Erie asserted that, despite conflicting decisions in recent years on the validity of the regular use exclusion, Erie argued that it had reasonably relied upon existing legal precedent on the regular use exclusion to deny UIM benefits to the insured.

The Plaintiff countered by arguing that, at the time Erie denied coverage, the law was that the exclusion was “invalid.” The Plaintiff asserts that Erie had no good faith basis to disregard the Superior Court’s ruling and to deny coverage when it did so in this matter.

In this decision, the trial court noted that, in order to show bad faith on the part of an insurance company, an insured must show that the carrier breached its duty of good faith through some motive of self-interest or ill-will. The court also noted that bad faith must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. The insured must additionally show that the carrier did not have a reasonable basis for denying benefits under the policy, and that the carrier knew or recklessly disregarded its lack of a reasonable basis in denying the claim.

The trial court in this case noted that the carrier had remained in regular communication with the insured regarding the status of the claim. It was also noted that the carrier had informed the insured’s attorney that Erie was requesting a reconsideration of the Rush decision. In light of this, Erie requested that no further action be taken until a decision was made on that request by the appellate courts.

The court also noted that the insured in this case did not go so far as to argue that Erie lacked a bona fide belief that it had a good chance of ultimately succeeding in having the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declare that the “regular use” exclusion was valid under Pennsylvania law.

The court emphasized that, in this case, the insured did not offer any evidence to demonstrate that Erie’s manner in handling the claim was anything other than an attempt to enforce a written exclusion in the contract. 

The court went on to find that, where an insurer has no duty to provide coverage, there can be no bad faith. 

Here, the insured argued that Erie failed to take enough steps to limit the enforceability of the Superior Court decision in Rush while the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania considered whether or not to accept the case for review and then decide the case.  In essence, the insured argued that Erie should have paid him UIM benefits even though Erie had otherwise appealed the Superior Court decision in Rush to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

The trial court in this matter found that this fact, alone, did not amount to potentially clear and convincing evidence of a dishonest purpose, a lack of a reasonable basis to deny benefits, or a knowing or reckless disregard of a reasonable basis to deny coverage on the part of the carrier.

The trial court also noted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in Rush made clear that the Superior Court decision in Rush deviated from well-established precedent that had continually upheld the validity of the regular use exclusion.

Accordingly, the trial court in this case found that the insured did not produce evidence to establish any bad faith on the part of the carrier. As such, Erie’s Motion for Summary Judgment was granted and the Plaintiff’s bad faith clam was dismissed.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Joseph Hudock of the Pittsburgh office of the law firm of Summers, McDonnell, Hudock, Guthrie & Rauch, P.C. for bringing this interesting case to my attention.


Source of image:  Photo by Jay Brand at www.pexels.com.

Friday, July 10, 2026

Federal Court Rejects Plaintiff's Request to Remand UIM Breach of Contract/Bad Faith Claim Back to State Court


In the case of Victoria-Melo v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. Of America, No. 5:25-CV-07282-JMG (E.D. Pa. May 14, 2026 Gallagher, J.), the court denied a Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand a UIM/Bad Faith suit back to state court.

The insurance company had removed the case to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction and alleging that the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000.00.

The Plaintiff responded by asserting that the Defendants had failed to establish the amount in controversy. The Plaintiffs also argued that the action presented unsettled issues of Pennsylvania insurance law that would be better resolved by the state courts.

After reviewing the matter before it, the court concluded that diversity jurisdiction existed and that abstention was not warranted.

In so ruling on the issue of whether the exercise jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act, the federal court considered the factors set forth by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in the Reifer case. 

As part of this analysis, the court found that this case did not present the type of unsettled or novel issues of state law that would weigh in favor of abstention. 

One issue in this regard in this case is that the Plaintiff contended that the applicability of Pennsylvania’s Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law to an insurance policy issued outside of Pennsylvania presented as an unresolved legal question. 

The court disagreed and pointed to Pennsylvania cases that had addressed the issue previously. As such, this case was found to involve the routine application of established statutory language and insurance principles to the case at hand.

As such, the Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand was denied.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Court's companion Order can be viewed HERE.


I send thanks to Attorney Candace M. Edgar of the Camp Hill, PA office of Marshall Dennehey for bringing this case to my attention.

Thursday, July 2, 2026

Superior Court Finds That Having Lunch At Mom's House Doesn't Make You a Resident of that House When You Have Your Own Apartment


In the case of Lanunziata v. Penn. Nat’l Mut. Cas. Ins., No. 2026 Pa. Super. 97 (Pa. Super. May 13, 2026 Bowes, J., Dubow, J., and Neuman, J.) (Op. by Dubow, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the entry of summary judgment in favor of an insurance company in a declaratory judgment action in which the child of the insured was seeking UIM benefits under his parent’s automobile policy following an accident.

According to the Opinion, under the policy in question, an insured included the named insured and any family member.  A family member was defined, in part, as a resident of the insured's household. 

Here, the record before the court confirmed that the child had moved out of his parents’ home several years before the incident and spent a majority of his time in his own apartment.

After reviewing the case law on the issue of "residency" in this context, the Superior Court rejected the claim that the Plaintiff was a resident of his parents’ home.  The Plaintiff asserted that he ate lunch at his parents' house on a regular basis, had his mail delivered there, and had left a few personal items at his parents’ home.

The Court noted that the Plaintiff had graduated from college in 2016 and had leased an apartment in 2019 and had no intention of returning to his parents' home to live. 

The Court found that the evidence confirmed that the quantity of contacts and time that the Plaintiff spent in his own apartment greatly outweighed his contacts with his parents home.

As such, the Superior Court affirmed the entry of summary judgment in favor of the carrier on the coverage question presented.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “Court Summaries” by Timothy L. Clawges of The Pennsylvania Bar News (June 15, 2026).

Tuesday, March 24, 2026

Judge Nealon of Lackawanna County Rules in Favor of Consolidation of Post-Koken UIM and Third Party Claims

Lackawanna County Courthouse

On the heels of Lackawanna County Judge Mark Powell's decision in favor of the consolidation of claims in Post-Koken automobile accident cases that was summarized in yeasterday's Tort Talk Blog post comes the decision of Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas in the case of Bello v. Smith and Progressive Ins. Co., No. 2024-CV-6105 (C.P. Lacka. Co. March 6, 2026 Nealon, J.).

In Bello, Judge Nealon addressed Preliminary Objections filed by a UIM carrier in a post-Koken matter involving combined third party claims against a tortfeasor and UIM claims against the Plaintiff’s own insurance carrier. This case also involved the additional fact that the tortfeasor Defendant was allegedly operating his vehicle under the influence at the time of the accident.

The UIM carrier filed Preliminary Objections under Pa. R.C.P. 1028(a)(5) asserting the “misjoinder of a cause of action,” and arguing that the tort and UIM claims should be severed for pre-trial and trial purposes.

Here, Judge Terrence R. Nealon, of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas reviewed the current status of Pennsylvania law on issue of the joinder of third party tortfeasor claims and UIM claims under a single caption, much of which prior case law was developed through his own judicial Opinions, to come to conclusion that the Preliminary Objections should be denied and the cases allowed to proceed, at least through the pleadings and discovery phases, in a consolidated basis.

Of note, the Court also referenced, on multiple occasions, the Pennsylvania Bar Quarterly article written by Daniel E. Cummins entitled "Hurricane Koken Rages On:  Uncertainty Continues in Motor Vehicle Accident Litigation In The Stormy Post-Koken Era," 90 Pa. B.A.Q., 108, 111 & n. 15-19 (July 2019). 

Judge Terrence R. Nealon
Lackawanna County 


In support of this decision, Judge Nealon noted that the damages that might be recoverable both the tortfeasor and the UIM carrier present common questions of law and fact and involve the same evidence and issues.

One additional issue involved in this matter was the fact that there were claims for punitive damages asserted against the tortfeasor Defendant due to the DUI allegations and other allegations.  The court acknowledged would be irrelevant to the compensatory damages determination given that the UIM coverage barred the recovery of any punitive damages under that policy.

Relative to the allegations that the tortfeasor Defendant was operating his vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and controlled substances, the court noted that such evidence “could unfairly prejudice the UIM insurer by inflaming the jurors’ emotions and influence the compensatory damages award.”

Judge Nealon noted that, while, in such instances, bifurcation of the compensatory damages and punitive damages claims for trial may be warranted, that decision should be left to be made later by the assigned trial judge after discovery has been completed and the case has been certified for trial.

However, after review copious case law in support of the same, the court ruled that, in the meantime, no legitimate basis existed for severing the tort and UIM claims for purposes of discovery and pre-trial matters.

Accordingly, the court overruled the UIM carrier’s Preliminary Objection asserting a misjoinder of a cause of action under Rule 1028(a)(5).  With this decision, the court denied the request to sever the tort claim from the UIM claims.

Judge Nealon did note that his decision was without prejudice to the right of any Defendant to later seek a bifurcation of the claims for compensatory damages and punitive damages for trial.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Monday, March 23, 2026

Judge Powell of Lackawanna County Rules in Favor of Consolidation of Post-Koken UIM and Third Party Claims


In his decision in the post-Koken case of Roth v. Gonzalez, No. 2025-CV-06170 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Feb. 19, 2026 Powell, J.), Judge Mark Powell of the Lackawanna County Cour of Common Pleas overruled the UIM carrier’s Preliminary Objections seeking to sever the Plaintiffs’ claims against the tortfeasors for negligence from the Plaintiffs’ claims against the UIM carrier for UIM benefits.

The court also overruled the tortfeasor’s Preliminary Objections seeking to strike the Plaintiff’s claims for punitive damages under an argument that there were no facts to support the claims for reckless, willful, or wanton misconduct that was asserted against a tortfeasor Defendant.

Relative to the Motion to Sever the negligence claims from the UIM claims, the court noted that the consolidation of such claims for discovery and pre-trial preparation will promote convenience and avoid duplicate depositions and other forms of discovery.

Judge Mark Powell
Lackawanna County 


Relative to the third party Defendant’s Preliminary Objections on the allegations of recklessness and the claims for punitive damages, the court found that sufficient facts were pled under which the jury could conceivably conclude that the Defendant allegedly demonstrated a careless disregard for the safety of the traveling public.

Judge Powell also noted that, with regards to the concern of the UIM carrier about the possible references to “insurance” during the course of the trial, and the prejudice that may result therefrom, the court noted that the mere mentioning of insurance, in and of itself, does not preclude the joinder of the claims as the trial court judge still has the ability to address evidentiary issues and may deal with any references to insurance at trial in a manner that the trial judge deems appropriate.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.



Tuesday, February 17, 2026

Pennsylvania Federal Court Rules that Insurance Information Is Not Admissible at Post-Koken Trial on UIM Claims


In the case of Saeli v. Geico Adv. Ins. Co., No. 1:24-CV-00025-RAL (W.D. Pa. Jan. 28, 2026 Lanzillo, Chief Mag. J.), the Chief Magistrate Judge for the Western District Federal Court of Pennsylvania addressed a Motion In Limine filed a UIM carrier in a post-Koken case seeking to preclude the Plaintiff from introducing any evidence or testimony regarding the amount of the tortfeasor’s liability limits, the UIM limits, or any premiums paid.

The court ruled that, since the probative value of such evidence, if any, is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and confusion on the issues presented, the UIM carrier’s Motion was granted.

The court additionally found that the evidence at issue is irrelevant to the issues presented in the trial. The court noted that the central issue in the case was the extent of the damages sustained by the Plaintiff. As such, the court found that the amount of the tortfeasor’s liability limits, the UIM limits, and the premiums paid were irrelevant to such issues.

The court noted that, while the tortfeasor’s liability coverage will have to be credited to the UIM carrier, the court noted that this is a simple mathematical calculation that the court could accomplish by molding the verdict after the verdict is handed down the jury and without the need to involve the jury.

The court felt that requesting a jury to apply the liability limit against the UIM benefits coverage would unnecessarily complicate the issues before the jury and could risk prejudice to Geico.

Magistrate Judge Lanzillo included in his Opinion a review of other Pennsylvania federal court decisions on the issue and noted that all but one had held the evidence of coverage limits and premiums paid provided no benefit to the jury in determining the issue of damages in post-Koken cases and that, even if such evidence was minimally relevant, its probative value was substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice to the Defendant. See Op. at 4.

It is noted that the court additionally indicated that the Plaintiff did not file a Response to Geico’s Motion In Limine by the time of the deadline set by the court.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney Joseph Hudock of the Pittsburgh office of the Summers, McDonnell, Hudock, Guthrie & Rauch, P.C. law firm for bringing this case decision to my attention.


Please note that the Post-Koken scorecard on the Tort Talk blog will be updated with this decision.

The post-Koken scorecard on the Tort Talk blog is always freely available for research. You can access the scorecard by going to www.TortTalk.coom and scrolling a bit down the hand column to the label for Post-Koken Scorecard and clicking on the date under that.

Source of image:  Photo by Scott Greer on www. unsplash.com.




Wednesday, February 4, 2026

Accidental Shooting From One Vehicle To Another Found To Involve "Use" of a Motor Vehicle


In the case of Allmerica Financial Benefit Ins. Co. v. Hunt, No. 2:24-CV-02767 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 15, 2025 Weilheimer, J.), the court denied Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by two (2) UIM carriers in a case in which the two (2) automobile insurance companies were attempting to avoid having to pay underinsured motorists (UIM) coverage after an accidental shooting while the vehicle was at a red light.

This matter arose out of an accidental shooting that occurred between two drivers at a red light. One driver was attempting to unload a gun he had taken out of his glove compartment. The gun accidentally went off and struck an individual in the adjacent car, resulting in fatal injuries to that person.

The family of the decedent recovered the liability limits from the tortfeasor’s coverage and then turned to seek UIM coverage.

The UIM carrier filed suit, arguing that the shooting did not result from the “use” of a vehicle as required under the terms of that policy.

The court held that the policy language contained in the UIM policies conflicted with Pennsylvania’s Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL) because it attempted to impose a stricter, proximate cause standard for UIM coverage instead of Pennsylvania’s broader standard of review.

The court wrote that, in close or doubtful insurance coverage cases, the law requires judges to err on the side of the insured.

The court additionally noted that, while insurers should not be considered to always be on the hook in terms of coverage because of their perceived ability to bear the cost of paying on the policy, public policy dictates that when there is a “tie” on the positions put forth by the UIM carrier and the insured on a coverage dispute, the court should err in favor of finding coverage.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Court's companion Order can be viewed HERE.


Source: Article – “Pa Federal Judge Rules Auto Insurers Can’t Dodge UIM Coverage In Fatal Stoplight Shooting Case,” By Tristin Hoffman of the Legal Intelligencer (Jan. 2,2 026).

Monday, July 28, 2025

Article: The Appellate Ladder Looks Inviting For Plaintiffs

The below article of mine appeared in the July 24, 2025 edition of the Pennsylvania Law Weekly and is republished here with permission.



Expert Opinion

The Appellate Ladder Looks Inviting for Plaintiffs


July 24, 2025

By

Daniel E. Cummins


Recent decisions from the Pennsylvania Supreme confirm that plaintiffs continue to a pendulum shift in their favor. Over the past year, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was beginning to show signs of moderation relative to their previous line of trailblazing decisions that overturned years of precedent in a plaintiff-favorable manner.

However, with its recent decisions, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has again expanded the rights of injured parties to recover and have even telegraphed to the plaintiffs bar how to secure additional victories in the future.

Recent Decisions by Pa. Supreme Court to Expand Ability to Recover

For nearly the past decade, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has issued one decision after another in favor of plaintiffs' causes. The plaintiffs bar has been repeatedly successful in convincing the court to overturn decades-long precedent that previously favored defendants.

For example, in Cagey v. PennDOT, 179 A.3d 458 (Pa. 2018), the plaintiffs bar convinced the Pennsylvania Supreme Court overruled the then-12-year-old Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court decision in Fagan v. Department of Transportation, 946 A.2d 1123 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006), to hold that PennDOT should only be immune from suit in guide rail claims in limited circumstances. Prior to Cagey, PennDOT was largely protected from any liability exposure relative to accidents involving guide rails. This decision expanded the ability of parties injured in highway accidents to include PennDOT in the lawsuit in the effort to seek an additional compensation.

In 2018, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court also expanded the ability of injured parties to seek recoveries by handing down another significant reversal of long-standing precedent. In the case of Balentine v. Chester Water Authority, 191 A.3d 799 (Pa. 2018), the Supreme Court liberalized the ability of injured parties to seek recoveries from governmental agencies.

The Supreme Court in Balentine overturned 30 years of precedent with its holding that the involuntary movement of a vehicle can constitute an “operation” of a motor vehicle for purposes of the vehicle liability exception to governmental immunity under 42 Pa. C.S.A. Section 8542(b)(1). This ruling expanded the number of cases that would therefore fall within the scope of the exception to immunity. In other words, the ruling by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court allows more injured parties to seek a recovery against negligent governmental agencies.

A recent example of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court actually going too far in overturning long-standing defense-favorable precedent can be seen in the case of Gallagher v. GEICO, 201 A.3d 131 (Pa. 2019). In Gallagher, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court overturned 20 years of precedent and held that the household exclusion found under automobile insurance policies was completely unenforceable as a matter of law across the board.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reiterated its plaintiffs-friendly stance on the household exclusion in the case of Donovan v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance, 256 A.3d 1145 (Pa. 2021). In Donovan, the court reaffirmed its previous decision in Gallagher v. GEICO and again held that plaintiffs need not worry about the household exclusion provision as it was invalid and, therefore, unenforceable.

The Gallagher decision threw the lower state and federal courts into a tizzy of conflicting decisions on whether the household exclusion should still be found to be enforceable under different factual scenarios.

Thereafter, without overtly acknowledging that the Gallagher decision went too far, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court walked back Gallagher’s complete eradication of the enforceability of the household exclusion in the case of Erie Insurance Exchange v. Mione, 289 A.3d 524 (Pa. 2023). In Mione, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court limited the Gallagher decision to its facts and agreed that the household exclusion did indeed remain valid and enforceable in at least certain circumstances.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court also recently expanded the right of injured parties to recover in arbitration matters. In 2022, the court promulgated a new Rule that amended Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1311.1, which applies to appeals from courthouse arbitration proceedings. Under the new Rule 1311.1, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court increased the maximum limit on the amount of money that a plaintiff can recover in money damages at trial on appeal from an arbitration award.

Under the old rule, that limit was set at $25,000. Under the new rule, the maximum limit has been changed to “an amount equal to the jurisdictional limit for compulsory arbitration of the judicial district in which the action was filed.” In most counties in Pennsylvania, the arbitration jurisdictional limit is $50,000. As such, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court essentially doubled the amount of money injured parties can potentially recover at trials following an appeal from an arbitration.

Recent Decisions That Limited Certain Defenses

In recent years, in addition to expanding avenues of recoveries for injured parties, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has also benefited plaintiffs by limiting the scope of a wide variety of defenses in civil litigation matters.

In the case of Graham v. Check, 243 A.3d 153 (Pa. 2020), the plaintiffs were successful in convincing the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to limit the application of the sudden emergency doctrine. With this decision by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, it is likely that the application of the sudden emergency doctrine will no longer be automatically applied in dart-out pedestrian cases, particularly where a plaintiff darts out within a crosswalk.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has also limited venue defenses by liberalizing the rules governing where a plaintiff may file their lawsuit.

In another the limitation of venue defenses, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in the case of Fox v. Smith, 263 A.3d 555 (Pa. 2021), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that, given that the internet is available essentially everywhere, an internet defamation case may be filed anywhere in Pennsylvania, thereby allowing the plaintiffs to file such claims in the most liberal courts in Pennsylvania if they deem that appropriate.

Back in 2022, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court undid a 20-year-old Rule of Civil Procedure and approved plaintiffs-favorable amendments to the medical malpractice venue rules. Under the new medical malpractice litigation venue rules, plaintiffs now have wider options in terms of where they can file their medical malpractice lawsuits.

Hints at Moderation

In three recent decisions, all of which were expected to result in plaintiffs-favorable rulings, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court somewhat surprisingly went the other way.

As noted above, in the case of Erie Insurance Exchange v. Mione, 289 A.3d 525 (Pa. Feb. 15, 2023), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court limited its previous decision in Gallagher v. GEICO on the household exclusion to the facts of that case. The court in Mione instead held that the household exclusion could still be enforced under limited circumstances.

Another example of a recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision that seemed to signal moderation was the case of first impression of Franks v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance, ___ A.3d ___ No. 42 MAP 2022 (Pa. April 19, 2023) (Op. by Mundy, J.). In Franks, the court addressed issues of the stacking of UIM coverage in the automobile insurance personal injury actions. The court ruled that an insurance company is not required to secure another written waiver of stacked coverage from an insured in certain circumstances and rejected the plaintiff’s argument to the contrary.

Also, in a 2024 decision that was surprising to some, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the continuing validity of the regular use exclusion in the case of Rush v. Erie Insurance Exchange, ___ A.3d ___, 77 MAP 2023 (Pa. 2024).

Not So Fast

Despite hints at moderation, other recent cases again confirm that the overall orientation of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is to favor plaintiff’s causes in most civil litigation matters.

This is confirmed, in part, by the court’s decision in the case of Brown v. City of Oil City, 294 A.3d 413 (Pa. 2023). With this decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court greatly expanded the ability of plaintiffs to bring lawsuits against construction contractors for personal injuries sustained at a construction site. The court in Brown allowed such claims to be brought even if the contractor had completed his or her work on the property years before.

Also, in its recent decision in the case of Steets v. Celebration Fireworks (Workers' Compensation Appeals Board), No. 3 MAP 2024 (Pa. May 30, 2025), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court overturned decades of precedent regarding whether specific loss benefits are payable after an employee’s death from causes related to a work injury. In this decision, the Supreme Court created new law and cleared the way for the estates of those individuals who died from work-related injuries to collect specific loss benefits.

Then, just last month, in the case of Jakmian v. City of Philadelphia, No. 266 EAL 2024 (Pa. June 11, 2025), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied an allowance of an appeal in a civil litigation matter, but Justice Kevin Dougherty issued a concurring opinion that invited plaintiffs to attempt to bring issues regarding the analysis of an exception to sovereign immunity back up the appellate ladder again so that the court could properly review the law on this topic.

In Jakmian, the plaintiff suffered injuries on a Philadelphia street after the front tire of her bicycle became stuck in a SEPTA trolley track that had been out of use for decades. The claims presented raised issues related to applicability of the real estate exception to the Sovereign Immunity Act.

In his concurring opinion, Dougherty seemed to signal that, if the issue were properly before the court, he would have ruled in a fashion that favored the injured party. However, he felt “constrained to agree that an allowance of an appeal is not warranted here.” Yet, Dougherty also wrote “nevertheless, I note my future willingness to explore the issues implicated herein if they arise in a more appropriate case.”

In the end, a review of recent jurisprudence in Pennsylvania confirms that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is not only routinely ruling in favor of plaintiff’s causes but also seemingly inviting the plaintiffs bar to bring more issues up the appellate ladder for the court to consider. Now’s the time for the plaintiffs bar to get whatever important issues they can up to the Supreme Court as often as they can so as to make “good” law. Now is also the time for the defense bar and the carriers to resolve as many of those cases before they reach the Pennsylvania Supreme Court so as to avoid the creation of “bad” law.


Daniel E. Cummins is the managing attorney at Cummins Law where he focuses his practice on motor vehicle and trucking liability cases, products liability matters, and premises liability cases. He also serves as a mediator for the Federal Middle District Court and for Cummins Mediation. He is additionally the sole creator and writer of the Tort Talk Blog at www.TortTalkcom.


Reprinted with permission from the July 24, 2025 edition of the "The Pennsylvania Law Weekly © 2024 ALM Global Properties, LLC. All rights reserved. Further duplication without permission is prohibited, contact 877-256-2472 or asset-and-logo-licensing@alm.com.

Thursday, June 26, 2025

Trial Court Grants UIM Carrier's Motion to Sever and Stay a Companion Bad Faith Claim in a Post-Koken Case


In the case of Bixler v. Erie Insurance Exchange, AD No. 2024-CV-11155 (C.P. Butler Co. June 5, 2025 Streib, J.), the court issued an Order in a post-Koken case granting the UIM carrier’s Motion to Sever and Stay the bad faith claim from the UIM claim. The court did not issue any Opinion with this Order.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this Order may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney Joseph Hudock of the Pittsburgh office of the law firm of Summers, McDonnell, Hudock, Guthrie & Rauch, P.C. for bringing this case to my attention.

Monday, June 16, 2025

Federal Western District Court Puts the Brakes on Evidence of Certain Insurance Matters in a Post-Koken Case


In the Post-Koken federal court case of Binotto v. Geico, No. 3:22-CV-210 (W.D. Pa. May 30, 2025 Haines, J.), the court granted the Defendant UIM carrier’s Motion In Limine to preclude evidence of the UIM limits or premium paid at the trial of a post-Koken matter. 

The court addressed the argument of whether such evidence is relevant in a post-Koken trial. Included in that assessment was whether or not the probative value of such evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or confusing of the issues presented. In this regard, the court cited to Federal Rules of Evidence 401, 402, and 403.

The court in this Binotto matter stated that its research revealed that the courts in Pennsylvania are split on this issue. This court noted that it was choosing to follow the case of Lucca v. Geico Ins. Co., 2016 WL 3632717 (E.D. Pa. July, 2016) and its progeny. 

Relying upon that case law, the Binotto court held that the “limits and premiums of Geico’s insurance policy offered no benefit to fact finder’s determinations of the value of Plaintiffs’ injuries.”

As such, the court ruled that evidence of the carrier’s policy limits and premiums paid were irrelevant. 

The court additionally held that, even if such evidence was somehow found to be relevant to the injury and damages assessments, any probative value of such evidence was substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice to the Defendant carrier.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney Joseph A. Hudock, Jr. of the Pittsburgh office of the law firm of Summers, McDonnell, Hudock, Guthrie & Rauch, P.C. for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Instawalli on www.pexels.com.

Friday, April 18, 2025

Federal Court Addresses Whether Nationwide's "One Product" Policy is a New Policy or a Renewal Policy


In the case of McGuire v. Nationwide Aff. Ins. Co. of America, No. 2:23-CV-01347-NR (W.D. Pa. March 6, 2025 Ranjam, J.), the court denied the carrier’s Motion for Reconsideration of the court’s previous decision relative to a UM/UIM coverage issue.

With this decision denying the carrier’s Motion for Reconsideration, the court maintained its previous position on whether Nationwide’s “One Product” policy was a new policy or a renewal of a prior policy.

In the court’s eyes, several of the “clarifications” in the One Product policy amounted to changes that reduced the amount of coverage from the prior policy. In light of this, the court ruled that the One Product policy could not be considered to be a “renewal” policy.

Rather, the court found that the purchase of a One Product policy amounted to the purchase of a new policy and that, therefore, under Pennsylvania law, Nationwide was required, as with any other purchase of UM or UIM coverage, to provide its insureds with a new stacking waiver form to execute under 75 Pa. C.S.A. §1738(c).

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney Scott Cooper of the Harrisburg law firm Schmidt Kramer for bringing this decision to my attention.

Thursday, March 27, 2025

Superior Court Addresses When Auto Insurance Carrier Must Present Insured With New UIM Coverage Selection Forms


In the case of Goodville Mut. Cas. Co. v. McNear, No. 861 MDA 2023 (Pa. Super. Feb. 26, 2025 Nichols, J., King, J., and Sullivan, J.), the court affirmed a trial court decision that an insurance company was not obligated to obtain new UIM coverage selection forms whenever an insured added vehicles to their policy.

According to the Opinion, back in 2012, the insured initially signed an election form for less than full UIM coverage. More specifically, the insured selected benefits of $50,000.00 per person, $100,000.00 per accident stacked across three (3) vehicles covered by the policy.

The insured then renewed their policy ever six (6) months and, between 2012 and 2018, the added and removed vehicles, with policy covering as many as four (4) and as few as two (2) vehicles.

The carrier did not obtain new limited UIM election forms whenever the insureds added vehicles to the policy. The court also noted that the insureds never affirmatively requested any changes to their benefits.

By the year 2018, the insured’s policy again covered three (3) vehicles. In 2018, one of the insureds was involved in an accident.

The insureds covered the policy limits from the tortfeasor’s vehicle. The insured then filed a UIM claim. The carrier paid the UIM benefits of $50,000.00 stacked on the three (3) vehicles covered on the policy.

The insured disputed the amount paid and asserted that the addition of vehicles to their policy constituted “new purchases” coverage which required the carrier to obtain new UIM elections each time. The Plaintiffs attempted to assert that, because the carrier failed to obtain new UIM election forms, the carrier should be forced to pay full UIM benefits up to the bodily injury limits of their policy, i.e., $250,000.00 stacked across three (3) vehicles, or $750,000.00.

The carrier rejected that claim and commenced this declaratory judgment action. 

As noted, the Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s decision rejecting the Plaintiff’s arguments. The Pennsylvania Superior Court noted that 75 Pa. C.S.A. §1734 requires only that the carrier “issue” UIM coverage in the amount selected by a named insured in writing signed by a named insured.

The court also noted that 75 Pa. C.S.A. §1791 permits the carrier to rely upon the elections and notices regarding the availability of UIM benefits at the time of the application for original coverage.

Here, because it was undisputed that the insured had completed a “sign-down” form selecting limited UIM coverage, and given that neither named insured on the policy affirmatively reflected any change, in writing, to the UIM coverage, and given that the insureds did not object to any alleged defects in the §1791 notices they received at the time the insured applied for the coverage, the appellate court ruled that the original “sign-down” form remained effective at the time the Plaintiff was involved in the subject accident.

The court additionally noted that, pursuant to §1791, the insurance company was under no obligation to provide additional notices regarding the limited UIM benefits the insured had originally selected. In the end, the court ruled that, once the insured elected limited UIM benefits when applying for the original policy, the insurance company was entitled to presume that the insured selection remained effective until affirmatively changed by a named insured.

Accordingly, the Superior Court affirmed the entry of a declaratory judgment in favor of the carrier.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert, www.Law.com (March 18, 2025).

Thursday, February 20, 2025

Venue of UIM Case Transferred Due To Terms of Forum Selection Clause in Policy


In the case of Winner v. Progressive Adv. Ins. Co., March Term, 2023, No. 1654 (C.P. Phila. Co. Nov. 15, 2024 Bright, J.), the trial court issued a Rule 1925 Opinion addressed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court relative to an appeal when trial court decisions in response to a Motion to Transfer UIM and Bad Faith Claims from Philadelphia County to Chester County.

In its Opinion, the trial court asserted that it did not commit error in transferring the UIM and bad faith claims from the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas to the Chester County Court of Common Pleas based upon an unambiguous forum selection clause contained in the automobile insurance policy at issue.

The trial court also asserted that it did not err in deciding the Preliminary Objections at issue without ruling on discovery motions which, according to the trial court, had become moot.

The trial court also requested that the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law Claim be remanded to the trial court for further consideration.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (Jan. 23, 2025).

Thursday, January 30, 2025

Summary Judgment Entered for UIM Carrier Where Plaintiff Did Not Fall Under Definition of a "Covered" Person


In the non-precedential decision in the case of Miller v. USAA General Ind. Co., No. 23-1934 (3d Cir. Jan. 2025 Chagares, C.J., Chung, J., and Fisher, J.) (Op. by Fisher, J.), the court affirmed summary judgment that had been granted by Judge Christopher C. Conner of the Federal Middle District Court in favor of the carrier in a UIM case.

According to the Opinion, a UIM Plaintiff sought coverage under a policy that was issued to the grandmother of the Claimant’s daughter. Both the Claimant and the daughter were living with the grandmother at the time of the accident.

The grandmother was the only named insured on the policy. The Claimant and the grandmother were not related by blood, marriage, or adoption.

The Claimant argued that her daughter was a named insured because she was listed as an “operator” on the declarations page for the applicable policy and that, therefore, the Claimant also qualified as an insured under that policy.

The Claimant additionally argued that the limitation of UIM coverage to the named insured and family members of the named insured, as defined by the policy, violated the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law and the related stacking provisions. In this case, the Claimant invoked the case of Gallagher v. Geico and its precedent.

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the Claimant’s arguments. The Third Circuit confirmed that the Claimant did not qualify as an insured under the policy and that, therefore, no UIM benefits were owed to the Claimant.

The Court noted that the issue in this case was not whether the named insured had waived UIM benefits.  Rather, the issue, and the finding, was that the Plaintiff was simply not a "covered" person under the terms of the policy.   

Moreover, the court found that, since the Claimant was not even an insured under the policy, no duty of good faith was owed to her by the carrier.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Christopher W. Woodward of the Camphill office of Marshall Dennehey for bringing this case to my attention.

Monday, January 20, 2025

Federal Court Judge Wolson Allows Plaintiff to Secure Claims Evaluation Documentation From UIM Carrier in Discovery


In the case of Long v. Progressive Adv. Ins. Co., No. 2:24-CV-01735-JDW (E.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 2024 Wolson, J.), the court addressed a Motion to Compel filed by a Plaintiff against a UIM carrier.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident and brought a UIM claim against Progressive.

During the course of the matter, Plaintiff’s counsel sent a demand package to Progressive requesting the tendering of the limits. The court noted that the Defendant had not yet evaluated the Plaintiff’s claim but did so thereafter.

It was noted that, when Progressive produced a claim evaluation documentation in discovery, the carrier had redacted information from the document, including the value it had placed on the Plaintiff’s claim as well as with respect to the analysis with the specific elements of the Plaintiff’s claim. Progressive redacted the documents on work product grounds.

The Plaintiff filed a Motion to Compel the Defendant carrier to produce an unredacted document.

The court granted the Plaintiff’s Motion after finding that the Defendant carrier had failed to meet its burden of showing that it had created the information, which had been redacted, in anticipation of litigation.

The court noted that the UIM carrier had a duty to investigate and evaluate the Plaintiff’s UIM claim and, based on the court's review of the record before it, the carrier had not yet investigated and evaluated the claims presented by the time it created the claim evaluation document.

Although the court acknowledged that the demand letter from Plaintiff’s counsel could have prompted the Defendant to conduct the evaluation or to complete it quicker, the court found that the Defendant had a separate, business-related (i.e, not litigation-related) obligation to perform the evaluation.

Judge Wolson additionally noted that the demand letter did not demand any more than what Progressive had offered or more than the policy limits. The demand letter also did not threaten a bad faith claim. Accordingly, the court found that there were no circumstances to suggest that the evaluation by the carrier was prepared in anticipation of litigation.

Judge Wolson noted held that there was no per se rule that every document created by an insurance company after receiving a demand letter from an insured qualified as a document protected by the work product doctrine. The court ruled in this fashion after finding that a demand letter did not absolve an insurance company of its obligation to evaluate a claim.

Accordingly, the court rejected the carrier’s assertion of the work product privilege over a claim evaluation document where the carrier had a legal obligation to evaluate an insured’s claim and had not yet evaluated the claim when the insured sent a demand letter. 

In essence, the court in this matter felt that this demonstrated that the evaluation was prepared in the ordinary course of business, rather than in anticipation of litigation.

Accordingly, the court granted the Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel discovery.

It is noted that the court began its Opinion by indicating “[i]insurance companies evaluate claims as part of their business, and their claims evaluations often result in demands from policyholders and then litigation. In discovery, that reality poses a challenge: “litigants (and then judges) must decide when an insurance company created a claim evaluation document in the course of its business and when it did so in anticipation of litigation. The first category of documents is discoverable, but the latter is work product that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b) protects.”

Judge Wolson noted that the work product doctrine, which is codified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3) protects materials prepared in anticipation of litigation from discovery unless certain exceptions apply. The court noted that the work product immunity shelters an attorney’s mental processes, providing a privileged area for the attorney to analyze and prepare his client’s case.

The court also noted that a party claiming work product protection bears the burden of showing that the materials in question were prepared in the course of preparation for possible litigation.

The court reiterated that, because insurance companies evaluate claims made by their insureds in the ordinary course of their business, and outside of any possible litigation in the future, discovery disputes involving insurance company claims file often present problems for the parties in the court.

As noted, under the circumstances presented in this case, Judge Wolson found that claim evaluation documentation prepared by the carrier did not amount to a document that was prepared in preparation for litigation.  The Judge found, after an in camera review, that the document, in the Judge's eyes, revealed claims handling matters and not litigation analysis.  As such, the Plaintiff's Motion to Compel was granted.  

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “The Legal Intelligencer Federal Case Alert.” www.Law.com (Jan. 9, 2025).

Friday, January 3, 2025

Seismic Change Caused By Superior Court Decision That Allows Plaintiffs To Recover Liability and UIM Coverage From the Same Policy


The year 2025 is starting off with a Pennsylvania Superior Court decision that will cause a change of seismic propotions in automobile UM/UIM litigation going forward.

In the case of Erie Insurance Exchange v. Baluch, No. 2025 Pa. Super. 2 (Pa. Super. Jan. 2, 2025 Panella, P.J.E., Lane, J., and Stevens, P.J.E.)(Op. by Panella, P.J.E.), the Pennsylvania has ruled that, in certain circumstances a Plaintiff can recover both liability and UIM coverage from the same policy.

The appellate court framed the issue in this case as whether an insured is entitled to stacked UIM benefits although another household policy excludes vehicles that are insured under the policy from the definition of “underinsured motor vehicles.”

According to the Opinion, in April 2022, the Plaintiff, while riding as a passenger on a motorcycle, suffered serious bodily injury from a single vehicle motorcycle accident.

Two insurance policies issued by Erie were relevant to this case. The Plaintiff’s stepfather and mother were named insureds on a policy that covered the motorcycle and other vehicles (“Policy 1”). As a member of her parent’s household, the Plaintiff was an insured of Policy 1. Policy 1 provided $100,000 per person in liability coverage and $100,000 per person in uninsured motorist (“UM”) and UIM coverage.

The Plaintiff also had a separate policy for her personal vehicle (“Policy 2”). Policy 2 provided $100,000 in UM/UIM coverage.

The Superior Court noted that, “[i]mportantly,” under both Policy 1 and Policy 2 the insureds had selected stacking UIM coverage.

According to the Opinion, Erie paid out to the Plaintiff the $100,000 liability coverage from Policy 1 and $100,000 in UM/UIM coverage from Policy 2. However, Erie denied the Plaintiff’s claim seeking $100,000 in UM/UIM coverage from Policy 1 through stacking.

Under Policy 1, vehicles that are insured under the policy were excluded by the language of the policy from the definition of “underinsured motor vehicle.”  It is this exclusion that Erie relied upon to deny the Plaintiff UIM benefits from Policy 1.

The Superior Court disagreed with the carrier’s position, as well as the trial court’s position, that the resolution of the issue presented was controlled by Wolgemuth v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 535 A.2d 1145 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc) and Newkirk v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 564 A.2d 1263 (Pa. Super. 1989).

The Superior Court noted that the Wolgemuth and Newkirk decisions stand for the proposition that liability coverage and primary underinsured motorist (“UIM”) coverage cannot come from the same, single policy. The Superior Court in this Erie Insurance v. Baluch case emphasized that the Wogelmuth and Newkirk cases addressed only a single insurance policy, not any issues of stacked coverage between two or more policies.

The Superior Court distinguished this Erie Insurance v. Baluch case by noting that this Baluch case involved secondary UIM coverage on another vehicle in the household that was stacked on top of the primary UIM coverage from a separate policy that actually covered the vehicle/motorcycle that was involved in the accident.

The Superior Court reasoned that when an insured has their own motor vehicle insurance policy that provides stacked UIM coverage, under Pennsylvania’s Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law, they are entitled to stack UIM coverage from other household policies unless they expressly choose to waive stacked coverage. See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1738(a).

In this regard, the Superior Court cited favorably to the case of Gallagher v. GEICO, 201 A.3d 131 (Pa. 2019) and related cases as precedent that prevents an automobile insurance carrier from having policy language that acts as a de facto waiver of stacked coverage where the MVFRL requires carriers to secure written waivers of stacked coverage from its insureds.

Here, the Superior Court found that the insured Plaintiff elected and paid for stacked UIM coverage under her own separate policy. As such, Erie Insurance Exchange’s limited definition of “underinsured motor vehicle,” in the eyes of this Superior Court panel, acted as a disguised waiver of UIM coverage and the Court therefore found the exclusionary language under the policy to be invalid as conflicting with the requirements of the MVFRL relative to UIM coverage.

Accordingly, the Superior Court ruled that, because Erie’s policy provision prevented the Plaintiff from recovering stacked UIM benefits for which she paid, and given that the trial court had erred in concluding that the present case was controlled by Wolgemuth and Newkirk, the Superior Court reversed the trial court’s decision and entered a ruling in favor of the Plaintiff.

In the end, the Superior Court reasoned that, under Pennsylvania law, an injured party should be entitled to receive the coverage for which they paid. Here, the Plaintiff paid for stacked coverage and, in the eyes of this panel, was entitled to such coverage.

Anyone wishing to review this Opinion may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Scott Cooper, Esq. of the Harrisburg, PA law firm of Schmidt Kramer, as well as Adam T. Wolfe, Esq. and Ally Sholley, Esq. of the Enola, PA law firm of Shollenberger, Januzzi & Wolfe for bringing this notable decision to my attention.

Thursday, October 24, 2024

Berks County Trial Court Judge Denies Motions to Bifurcate Post-Koken Case


In the case of Sekulski v. Walker and Erie Ins. Exch., No. 19-14211 (C.P. Berks Co. Sept. 17, 2024 Nevius, J.), the Berks County Court of Common Pleas denied the Motion to Sever filed by both the third party Defendant and the UIM carrier Defendant in a Post-Koken motor vehicle accident case.

The court ruled that the third party tort liability claim would be tried jointly with the Plaintiff’s first party claim for underinsured motorist benefits, with Erie Insurance identified as a real party and interest to those proceedings.

In its detailed Order, the court noted that the Plaintiff’s claim against all Defendants arose from the same factual background and involved common questions of law and fact. 

As such, the court noted that judicial economy favored one trial of all claims. The court was also influenced by the fact that a severance of the case into two separate matters or trial would result in an undue hardship and burden on the Plaintiffs who would be required to present their case twice at a presumed substantial cost and with additional delays.

The court also noted a concern with the likelihood of possible inconsistent verdicts.

The court also rejected the tortfeasor Defendant’s argument that having a UIM carrier as a Co-Defendant would prejudice that Defendant in light of the anticipated repeated references to insurance at the trial in front of the jury.  Judge Nevius noted that there would be no reference to the tortfeasor’s liability insurance.   The court additionally noted that it could craft jury instructions to address any concerns about possible prejudice in this regard.

Judge Nevius additionally noted that this decision did not address the bifurcation of any potential bad faith claims given that it did not appear that any such claims were at issue in this matter.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney Peter F. Schuchman and Attorney Julia Adams of the Wyomissing, PA office of Kozloff Stoudt for bringing this case to my attention.