Impact of Waivers Executed By Decedent in Wrongful Death Claims Revisited by Superior Court

In its recent decision in the case of Valentino v. Philadelphia Triathlon, LLC, No. 3049 EDA 2013 (Pa. Super. Dec. 30, 2015 Ford Elliot, P.J.E., Olson, and Wecht, JJ.) (Opinion by Ford Elliot, P.J.E.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court addressed issues surrounding waiver or release forms as applied to wrongful death claims.  

This matter arose out an incident during which the Plaintiff’s decedent participated in a triathlon in Philadelphia.  The decedent signed a waiver form when he signed up to participate in the event.

During the event, the decedent never completed the swimming portion of the competition and his body was recovered from the Schuylkill River the day after the incident.  

Wrongful death and survival claims were pursued by the decedent’s widow.   The case was eventually concluded at the trial court level by way of the entry of a summary judgment based upon the waiver executed by the decedent. The Plaintiff’s estate appealed.  

On appeal, the Superior Court reviewed Pennsylvania law with respect to punitive damages claims and found that the trial court properly dismissed such claims at the Preliminary Objections stage given that the Plaintiff had alleged facts supporting claims for ordinary negligence.   Given that there were no facts to support a claim of outrageous behavior or conscious disregard for the risks confronted by triathlon participants, the appellate court ruled that the trial court properly dismissed the Plaintiff’s allegations of outrageous conduct and, therefore, had also properly struck the claim for punitive damages.  

On the waiver/release issue, upon which the trial court had granted summary judgment, it was noted that only the Plaintiff’s decedent had signed a release or waiver form when entering the competition.  

On appeal, the Plaintiffs initially argued, in part, that a Plaintiff cannot contractually waive liability for reckless or intentional conduct and that, as a result, any waiver executed in this case was invalid.  

The Pennsylvania Superior Court noted that, since it had already determined in this matter that the Plaintiff did not state valid claims involving reckless or intentional conduct, the Plaintiff’s contention in this regard could not serve to disturb the trial court’s ruling.  

The Plaintiff also asserted that, pursuant to the prior appellate court decision in the case of Pisano v. Extendicare Homes, Inc., 77 A.3d 651 (Pa. Super. 2013), appeal denied, 86 A.3d 233 (Pa. Super. 2014), cert. denied, 134 S.Ct. 2890 (2014), a decedent’s waiver is ineffective as to third-party wrongful death claims. 

The appellate court found that the Plaintiff’s argument regarding the Pisano case to be dispositive.  The court determined that the Plaintiff’s widow could maintain a wrongful death cause of action and is not bound by the decedent’s release given that the Plaintiff pursuing the case was not a signatory of that waiver form.  

Similar to the finding in the Pisano case, the court ruled that a waiver form was not binding on the representative of the decedent’s estate as wrongful death claims are not considered to be derivative of the decedent’s rights under Pennsylvania law.   Rather, the right of action belongs to the statutory wrongful death claim claimants, not the decedent.

In the court in this Valentino case went on to note, as explained in the Pisano decision, that, in Pennsylvania, survival and wrongful death actions are separate and distinct and that wrongful death lawsuits are not merely derivative of the rights of the decedent.  

Accordingly, following the Pisano case, the Valentino court concluded that the decedent’s release agreement/waiver form signed when entering the competition did not bind the Plaintiff’s widow/representative of his estate and did not preclude her from bringing a wrongful death action.  

Rather, as confirmed by Pisano, the wrongful death action is an independent cause of action, created by statute, and is not to be considered to be derivative of the decedent’s rights at the time of death.   The release agreement/waiver form was noted to only be between the decedent and the competition and was found to have no effect on the decedent’s non-signatory heirs, including the Plaintiff’s decedent’s widow, who brought this lawsuit.  

As such, the underlying claim was allowed to proceed.

 

Anyone wishes to review the majority Opinion of Superior Court Judges Ford Elliot and Wecht, may click this LINK.

The dissenting Opinion of Judge Olson can be viewed HERE. 

 I send thanks to Attorney James Beck of the Philadelphia office of Reed Smith for bringing this case to my attention.   

Judge Williamson of Monroe County Keeps Nursing Home Personal Injury Case in Court in Light of 'Unconsionable' Arbitration Clause

In the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas case of Santiago v. Whitestone Health Care Group, LLC, No. 5281 Civil 2015 (C.P. Monroe Co. Williamson, J.), Judge David J. Williamson of the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas addressed various issues surrounding an arbitration agreement in a lawsuit between a decedent’s family and a nursing home facility.  

The central issue before the court is whether the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the matter due to an arbitration agreement entered into by the parties when the decedent moved into the nursing home.  The court denied the Defendant’s Preliminary Objections and rejected the argument that the trial court lacked jurisdiction.  

Judge David J. Williamson
Monroe County

In so ruling, Judge Williamson noted that arbitration clauses in contracts are not applicable to wrongful death actions. 

As such, the court found that the Defendants failed to show that either the patient/decedent signed the arbitration agreement or that an agency relationship existed between the patient/decedent and the person who signed the arbitration agreement, who was the decedent’s daughter.  

Judge Williamson stated that there can be no “knowing waiver” of a right to a jury trial by a patient who is unable to review and sign such a document such as the decedent herein who presumably was not competent to sign the document.  

Rather, for an agent to sign and bind the patient, the agent must have the authority to do so by righting or by acts or by conduct clearly implying an agency relationship.  Finding that the Defendant’s failed to present any such evidence that the daughter was authorized to bind her mother to the arbitration agreement and the resulting waiving of a right to a jury trial, the court found that the Defendants failed to meet their burden of proof on the issue of an agency relationship.  

Judge Williamson reiterated that the arbitration agreement cannot apply to the wrongful death claim and also ruled that the survival claim should not be severed.  

The court therefore found that the Defendants were barred from enforcing the arbitration agreement given that the matter before the court involved both wrongful death and survival claims.   See Op. at 3-4 citing Taylor v. Extendicare Health Facilities, Inc., 1313 A.3d 317 (Pa. Super. 2015), allocator granted, 122 A.3d 1036 (Pa. 2015).  

Judge Williamson reasoned that the Pennsylvania courts have ruled that a wrongful death action, under Pennsylvania statutory law, is a matter in which the trial court maintains jurisdiction even in the face of a valid binding arbitration agreement because a wrongful death claim accrues after the decedent’s death with beneficiaries who are not a party to arbitration agreement.   Here, Judge Williamson stated that even if the Defendants argue that the decedent’s daughter is a beneficiary who signed the arbitration agreement, the daughter was not a party to the arbitration agreement as she allegedly signed on behalf of the patient/decedent.  

Judge Williamson also noted that Pennsylvania cases have upheld a finding that a survival action should not be severed from a wrongful death action for purposes of arbitrating the survival action alone.   Accordingly, the court found that the arbitration agreement had no binding effect in this case on either the wrongful death or the survival action.

Lastly, the court found that the arbitration agreement before it was unconscionable in that it was unreasonably favorable to the drafter of the agreement.  

For these reasons, the court overruled the Defendant’s Preliminary Objections and allowed the case to remain within the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas as opposed to arbitration.  

 

Anyone desiring a copy of this decision may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.  I send thanks to Attorney David A. Miller, Esquire of the Frackville, Pennsylvania office of Michael J. O’Connor and Associates, LLC for bringing this case to my attention.  

 

 

 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Finds that Federal Arbitration Act Trumps State Rule on Bifurcation in Nursing Home Death Case

In the case of Taylor v. Extendicare Health Facilities, Inc., No. 19 WAP 2015 (Pa. Sept. 28, 2016), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed a trial court's decision and the Superior Court's affirmance of the same, where the lower courts both ruled in favor of denying a nursing home's motion to bifurcate the wrongful death and survival actions in a case where the nursing home sought to compel arbitration of the survival claims pursuant to an arbitration agreement.

According to the Opinion, when the decedent entered the nursing home an alternative dispute resolution agreement was signed that called for the arbitration of matters arising regarding the decedent's stay at the facility.  Following the decedent's death, the Plaintiffs instead filed a wrongful death and survival action lawsuit.

The nursing home filed a motion to bifurcate the claims along with a motion to compel arbitration of the survival claims under the arbitration agreement.  The trial court denied the motion to bifurcate under Rule 213(b) and also held that it did not have the authority to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act.  The Superior Court affirmed.

With this latest decision in the matter, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed and held that the mandates of the Federal Arbitration Act, along with United States Supreme Court precedent, trumped the procedural mechanism found under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 213(b). The Majority reluctantly noted that the Federal Arbitration Act mandated that courts enforce arbitration clauses where appropriate.  As such, the decisions of the lower courts were reversed and the matter sent back to the trial court for further proceedings.

The Majority Opinion in Taylor written by Justice David Wecht can be read HERE.

The Concurring Opinion of Chief Justice Saylor, joined by Justice Baer, can be viewed HERE.

Justice Donohue's Dissenting Opinion can be viewed at this LINK.



For other Tort Talk posts on lower court cases on similar nursing home arbitration issues, click HERE