Showing posts with label Preliminary Objection - Impertinent Matter. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Preliminary Objection - Impertinent Matter. Show all posts

Tuesday, March 19, 2024

Judge Nealon of Lackawanna County Gives Guidance on Complaint Drafting


In the case of Baigis v. Thomas-Cooper, No. 2023-CV-2324 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Feb. 16, 2024 Nealon, J.), Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas continued the trend of trial courts and appellate courts overruling Preliminary Objections in the form of demurrers to claims of reckless conduct in motor vehicle accident matters where negligence has been alleged.

The rationale of these decisions remains that, under the express terms of Pa. R.C.P. 1019(a), a condition of the mind, such as an allegation of recklessness, may be averred generally in the pleadings.  As such, the demurrer by the Defendant to the claims of recklessness in this Baigis case was overruled.

In reviewing this issue, the court in Baigis referred to the analysis of the prior jurisprudence in this regard as set forth in “Pleading for Clarity: Appellate Guidance Needed to Settle the Issue of the Proper Pleading of Recklessness in Personal Injury Matters,” by Daniel E. Cummins, 93 Pa. B.A.Q. 32 (Jan 2022).

In another part of the decision, the court also overruled the demurrer asserted by the Defendants against a separate claim for punitive damages asserted by the Plaintiff.   While the court overruled the Defendant’s demurrer against the Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages, the court did sustain an alternative objection to the Plaintiff’s listing of the punitive damages claims as separate counts in the Complaint. 

The court pointed to previous precedent confirming that a request for punitive damages does not constitute a cause of action in and of itself, but rather, is merely an incidental claim relative to a separate cause of action. Judge Nealon also noted that the appellate courts have otherwise stated that “no independent action exists for a claim of punitive damages since punitive damages is only an element of damages.”

This decision is also notable for the fact that the court ruled that since the mere issuance of a summary offense citation to a motorist as a result of a motor vehicle accident is not admissible in a civil action arising out of the same accident, a preliminary objection to the reference in the Complaint to the summary offense citations allegedly issued to the Defendant motorist should be sustained and such allegations stricken as impertinent matter under Pa. R.C.P. 1028(a)(2).

The court otherwise ruled that the Plaintiff’s separate allegations that the Defendant violated certain unidentified statutes, ordinances, or regulations would be sustained under Pa. R.C.P. 1028(a)(3) and Lackawanna County Local Rule 1019. The court did allow the Plaintiff to file an Amended Complaint in which the Plaintiff would have to provide specific citations for any alleged statutes, ordinances, or regulations allegedly violated by the Defendant.

Lastly, the court additionally sustained the Defendant’s Preliminary Objection under rule 1028(a)(3) to the Plaintiff’s bald allegations of actionable conduct “as shall be revealed in discovery.” The court found that these types of allegations were improper under the fact-pleading requirements of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.




Thursday, June 20, 2019

Interesting Defense Strategy Results in Striking of Certain Portions of Federal Court UIM Bad Faith Claim as Immaterial or Impertinent


In the case of Bacon v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., No. 1:18-CV-01686 (M.D. Pa. May 6, 2019 Kane, J.), the court addressed a motion by a UIM carrier to dismiss certain portions of a bad faith Complaint as immaterial and impertinent.  

The wrinkle in this case is that the carrier was making a more specific motion to only strike portions of the UIM bad faith Complaint as being immaterial and impertinent, as opposed to attempting to dismiss the entire Complaint.  

In this matter, the Plaintiff asserted that the carrier’s alleged refusal to pay full medical benefits and asserted that this refusal lead to certain consequences between the insured and third parties.  

The carrier focused its Motion to Dismiss on attempting to strike four (4) specific paragraphs of the Complaint.   The first two (2) paragraphs at issue raised the carrier’s advertisement directed to members of the military.  The Plaintiff alleged that, as a long-serving Army veteran, he relied upon these representations and warranties in the ad.  The Plaintiff alleged that carrier breached these representations and warranties.  

The court agreed to strike these two (2) paragraphs as being irrelevant on the issue of whether the carrier breached its duties under the policy itself and/or whether the carrier violated the bad faith statute.  

The court additionally found that the allegations pertaining to alleged warranties were prejudicial in that such allegations could lead the jury to believe that the carrier owed responsibilities to the Plaintiff outside of the scope of the insurance policy at issue.  

The court refused to strike two (2) other paragraphs raised in the defense motion.   In one of these paragraphs, the Plaintiff asserted allegations that the carrier had refused to pay a benefit due. In that paragraph, there are also grievances that were directed by the Plaintiff at third parties. The court found that the alleged refusal to pay the Plaintiff benefits due was enough to preserve this paragraph even though the other allegations pertaining the third parties may not have been actionable in this particular matter. 

With regards to the final paragraph at issue, the Plaintiff had asserted that the position taken by the carrier with respect to the payment of medical benefits resulted in certain ramifications to the Plaintiff.  The court noted that, while the paragraph had some language that focused on possible future conduct, the allegations within the paragraph alleged that the carrier had refused, in the past, to pay for certain medical treatment.   The court felt that these allegations could bear some  relationship to whether the Defendant breached a duty under the policy or imposed by the bad faith statute.  

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision, may click this LINK

I send thanks to Attorney Lee Applebaum of the Philadelphia law firm of Fineman, Krekstein & Harris.  Attorney Applebaum is also the writer of the excellent Pennsylvania and New Jersey Insurance Bad Faith Case Law blog.  






Monday, May 21, 2018

Recklessness Allegations Allowed To Stand in MVA Case Where Plaintiff Confirms No Punitive Sought



In the recent Northampton County Court of Common Pleas decision of Nolen v. Esken, No. C-48-CV-2018-0385 (C.P. North. Co. March 28, 2018 Beltrami, J.), the court overruled a Defendant’s Preliminary Objections to allegations of recklessness contained in a Plaintiff’s motor vehicle accident Complaint.  

According to the Opinion, in their Complaint, the Plaintiffs alleged recklessness on the grounds that the Defendant was speeding at the time of the accident, ran a red light, and collided with the Plaintiff’s vehicle.  

In Preliminary Objections, the Defendant moved to strike the allegations of recklessness and other related terms from the Plaintiffs’ Complaint, arguing that the Complaint failed to set forth facts to support such allegations.   The Defendant asserted this objection under Pa.R.C.P. 1028(a)(2), which allows for Preliminary Objections on the grounds of inclusion of impertinent matter in a Complaint.   

The court noted that, under Pennsylvania law, to be impertinent, the allegations must be immaterial to the proof of the cause of the action.  The court also noted that, only where an allegation is wholly irrelevant to the action and cannot influence the result will such allegations be deemed to be impertinent.   The court also noted that the right of a trial court to strike impertinent matters should be sparingly exercise under Pennsylvania law and utilized only when a party can show prejudice.   See Op. at 2. 

In response to the Preliminary Objections, Plaintiffs argued that they had not claimed punitive damages and have only alleged “recklessness” in their Complaint in order to attempt to preclude the Defendant from raising arguments of comparative negligence in the case.   The Plaintiff was relying upon the case of Krivijanski v. Union R. Co., 515 A.2d 933, 936 (Pa. Super. 1986), in which the Pennsylvania Superior Court held “that when willful or wanton misconduct is involved, comparative negligence should not be applied.”  

Judge Beltrami ruled that, given that the Plaintiffs were not seeking punitive damages, and given that the Plaintiffs stated reason for pleading “recklessness” and other related terms under the law of the Krivijanski holding, such allegations in this matter could indeed serve to influence the case and were, therefore, not impertinent.   

The court also felt that the Defendants would not be prejudice by the allegations given that the Plaintiff had not claimed punitive damages.  

I send thanks to Attorney Ed Shaughnessy of Shaughnessy Law Office in Easton, Pennsylvania for bringing this case to my attention.  

Anyone wishing to review this case may click this LINK.

Commentary:  Defense litigators should beware of allowing allegations of recklessness to stand without challenge, even where Plaintiff asserts that they are not claiming punitive damages, as such allegations may leave the door open for the Plaintiff to amend the Complaint later in the litigation to then include punitive damages.   Apparently, this potential prospect was not argued or considered in this particular case.