Trial Court Provides Lessons on Propriety of New Matter Pleading by Defendants

In the case of Cancilliere v. Custom Etch, Inc., No. 11163 of 2025, C.A. (C.P. Lawr. Co. May 4, 2026 Flannery, J.), the court addressed the propriety of allegations contained in a Defendant’s New Matter in a civil litigation case.

According to the Opinion, the civil litigation matter arose out a dispute relative to the application of a trust agreement.

After the Plaintiffs filed a Complaint and the Defendants filed an Answer and New Matter, the Plaintiffs filed Preliminary Objections to the Defendant’s New Matter asserting that the allegations contained within the New Matter were improper pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 1030 and that the allegations lacked the specificity required by Pa. R.C.P. 1019(a).

More specifcally, the Plaintiff initially asserted that the allegations contained within the Defendant’s New Matter were improper under Pa. R.C.P. 1030 as the allegations did not set forth affirmative defenses.

The court noted that, under Pa. R.C.P. 1030(a), it is provided that a Defendant may assert affirmative defenses in a New Matter in response to a Complaint. The court also noted, howerver, that Pa. R.C.P. 1030(a) additionally expressly provides “[a] party may set forth as new matter any other material facts which are not merely denials of the averments of the preceding pleading.” See Op. at p. 4.

The court read this portion of the Rule in to indicate that a responding party may assert new facts in a New Matter which were not previously pled in the Complaint.

The court additionally noted that a New Matter may include conclusions of law, such as an allegation that a Complaint failed to state a cause of action, but that, under Pennsylvania law, no responsive pleading by the Plaintiff is required in response to any conclusions of law contained in a New Matter. See Op. at p. 4.

Based upon the above, the court additionally noted that, when the allegations in a New Matter are either mere conclusions of law or merely a reiteration of the same facts that may have already been placed into issue in the Complaint of the Plaintiff or the Answer of the Defendant, then the Plaintiff is not required to provide a response to the same allegations in a New Matter. Rather, such allegations would be deemed to be denied, and the court is not otherwise required to strike those paragraphs in the New Matter in response to any Preliminary Objections that may be filed by a plaintiff.

The court reiterated that the inclusion of conclusions of law by a Defendant in a New Matter does not require the court to strike the same from the pleading as such pleadings are permissible.

The court did go on to note, however, that general assertions by a Defendant of affirmative defenses lacking any factual allegations in a New Matter do violate Pa. R.C.P. 1019(a) given that a Plaintiff would be unable to confirm or deny those paragraphs. Such general allegations within a New Matter can be attacked by Preliminary Objections. 

The court noted that a Defendant must pled facts to support the existence of an affirmative defense and, the failure to do so, will result in the court sustaining a Preliminary Objection for lack of specificity in violation of the requirements of Pa. R.C.P. 1019(a) with regards to pleadings.

The court also noted that, when a court sustains a Preliminary Objection for lack of specificity relative to a New Matter defense, the Defendant should generally be given an opportunity to amend its New Matter to comply with Pa. R.C.P. 1019.

Here, in this case, the court denied the Preliminary Objections given that while the Defendant’s allegations in the New Matter were insufficient to create a factual basis for potential affirmative defenses, in this case, the Defendants were not attempting to assert affirmative defenses in the New Matter but rather, were providing additional facts on the case presented as permitted by Pa. R.C.P. 1030.

The court also noted that its review of the factual allegations in the New Matter confirmed that the Plaintiff had the capability of either admitting or denying the Defendant's factual allegations.

With regards to the Plaintiff’s complaint that the New Matter contained legal conclusions, the court reiterated that the Plaintiff was not required to file a response to those types of allegations as they would be deemed to be denied.  The court reiterated that there is no legal basis for the court to strike those paragraphs simply because such allegations may have amounted to legal conclusions.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (June 4, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by G. Fring on www.pexels.com.

Court Allows Plaintiff's Expert To Testify in Medical Malpractice Case

In the case of Pratt v. Shahid, No. CV-23-00720 (C.P. Lyc. Co. April 14, 2026 Carlucci, J.), the court denied the Defendants’ Motion In Limine seeking to preclude the Plaintiff from introducing the testimony of a doctor in a medical malpractice case.

In this case, the court denied the Defendants’ request for an exclusion of the Plaintiff’s medical expert’s testimony given that the Plaintiff’s expert’s opinion was found to be supported by medical literature.

The court also noted that the Defendants’ challenge went to the Plaintiff’s expert’s conclusions rather than the methodology utilized by the expert. 

The court found that the Plaintiff’s expert’s methodology was not novel, as it was similar to the methodology used by the Defendants’ expert. The court further noted that, even if the Plaintiff’s methodology was considered to be novel, it was still generally accepted in the scientific community as supported by articles from scientific journals submitted by the Plaintiff.

In the end, the court ruled that, while the Plaintiff’s expert’s conclusions differed from those advanced by the Defendants’ expert, that difference is not a proper basis for excluding the testimony of the Plaintiff’s expert.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (May 28, 2026). 

Issues of Fact Preclude Entry of Summary Judgment in Case Challenging the Design of an Intersection

In the case of Leger v. Martin, No. 253 C.D. 2025 (Pa. Cmwlth. May 19, 2026 Cohn Jubelirer, J., Wolf, J., Leadbetter, J.) (Op. by Cohn Jubelirer, J.), the Commonwealth Court reversed a lower court’s entry of summary judgment granting a township summary judgment in a motor vehicle accident matter in which allegations were made that the intersection at issue was a dangerous intersection.

According to the Opinion, this matter arose out of a motor vehicle accident during which the Plaintiff commenced a left hand turn from a stop sign and was hit by a tractor trailer.

The Plaintiff sued various parties including the township. The Plaintiff alleged that the township was liable under a duty to design, construct, and maintain its roads in a safe condition for travelers, including having proper signage and intersection site triangles. The Plaintiff also asserted that the township placed and/or directed to be placed a stop sign at the intersection with insufficient sight distances. The Plaintiff otherwise noted that the stop sign created a dangerous condition of which the township had actual or constructive notice, making the township liable under exceptions to the governmental immunity provided under §8542 of the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act.

The trial court had granted the township’s Motion for Summary Judgment. 

The primary argument by the township on appeal was that the Plaintiff had not produced evidence showing that the stop sign had caused or contributed to his injuries, that the township had notice of any dangerous condition, or that the township owned the intersection because it was controlled by PennDOT.

On appeal, the Commonwealth Court concluded that the notice issue was for the jury and that summary judgment had, therefore, been improperly entered. The court pointed to evidence before it, including expert reports, indicating that the township would have been responsible for the initial design of the intersection and that the evidence established that reasonable minds could differ as to whether the alleged dangerous condition was apparent upon reasonable inspection before the subject crash.

Accordingly, the granting of summary judgment in favor of the township was reversed and the matter was remanded for further proceedings.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert, www.Law.com (June 9, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by Josiah Niklas on www.unsplash.com.

Appellate Court Finds that Plaintiff's Med Mal Claims Were Sufficiently Stated in Complaint

In its non-precedential decision in the case of Dasilva v. Abington Memorial Hospital, No. 1707 EDA 2025 (Pa. Super. June 2, 2026 Kunselman, J., Nichols, J., and Sullivan, J.) (Op. by Kunselman, J.), the court reversed a trial court’s decision in a medical malpractice case sustaining the Preliminary Objections of the Defendant hospital dismissing the Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint with prejudice.

The trial court had dismissed the Plaintiff’s Complaint due to the alleged insufficiency of the factual allegations in the Second Amended Complaint. Primarily, the Defendants asserted, in part, that the Plaintiff’s allegations of negligence and agency were vague and/or insufficiently specific.

On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court reinstated the medical malpractice action after finding that the Plaintiffs had plausibly alleged that the medical staff failed to properly monitor a patient who was experiencing a psychiatric episode by allowing the patient to leave the emergency room at which point he was then struck by a vehicle.

The appellate court concluded that the Plaintiffs had met the state’s fact-pleading standard by outlining key facts, including the Plaintiff’s mental state, the awareness of the hospital staff of the Plaintiff’s condition, and the alleged failure of the hospital staff to monitor or prevent the patient’s departure from the hospital.

The appellate court otherwise held that a Plaintiff need not identify any specific employees in the medical malpractice case in order to pursue vicarious liability claims against a hospital. The court noted that references contained in the Complaint to the emergency room staff were sufficiently specific to enable the Defendants to respond to the Complaint.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this non-precedential decision of the Pennsylvania Superior Court in the Dasilva may click this LINK.

Source: Article – “Abington Hospital Must Face Med Mal Claims Over Patient’s ER Escape, Pa. Appellate Court Says,” By Riley Brennan of The Legal Intelligencer (June 4, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by National Cancer Institute on www.unsplash.com.

Court Gives Detailed Opinion on Sanctions Applicable to Late Payment of Settlement Funds

In the case of Hill v. Riverside Healthcare and Rehabilitation Center, No. 2023-CV-3399 (C.P. Lacka. Co. May 22, 2026 Nealon, J.), the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas addressed a Petition filed by a Plaintiff seeking to impose sanctions against a Defendant under Pa. R.C.P. 229.1 for failing to deliver settlement funds in a timely fashion after an executed Release was produced by the Plaintiff.

According to the Opinion, this matter involved a professional liability action against a healthcare and rehab center.

In this matter, the Defendant facility owner at issue in this case eventually became insolvent and filed for bankruptcy.

During the course of this litigation, the parties agreed to participate in a settlement conference with a private mediator. Prior to the mediation, the Defendant’s attorney confirmed in writing that the parent and affiliate entities of the Defendant were insolvent and/or in bankruptcy proceedings and confirmed that the Defendant would not be able to satisfy the first $75,000.00 of any settlement but that any obligation thereafter would be covered by insurance.

After a mediation, the parties reached a settlement agreement for a net payment of $175,000.00. The total amount of the party’s settlement was actually $250,000.00 but the Plaintiff agreed to waive the Defendant’s payment of its $75,000.00 deductible with a net settlement payment of $175,000.00 to be funded entirely by the Defendant's insurance carrier.

The court’s Opinion in this matter emphasized that the insurance company’s adjuster agreed to the settlement without any indication of any coverage issue between the actual Defendant and its insurance company.

Thereafter, in this death case, the court granted the Plaintiff’s Petition for Court Approval of the Settlement. 

The Plaintiff then executed the settlement agreement and sent the signed Release, the court Order approving the settlement, and other closing documents to the Defendant’s counsel and requested payment.

The court point out that noticeably absent from the settlement agreement was any indication, or even a suggestion, that a coverage issue may exist between the Defendant and its insurance company or that any such coverage issue needed to be resolved before the Plaintiff would receive the settlement payment. 

After the closing documents were produced and the settlement check was not forthcoming, Plaintiff’s counsel wrote for the status of the settlement check.  Defense counsel indicated that there was some issue that the adjuster had to work out. There was no reference made to any insurance coverage issue during that interaction.

After several months then went by with no production of the settlement check, counsel for the Plaintiff filed the Motion at issue.

Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas reviewed Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 229.1 which governs the prompt delivery of settlement funds within twenty (20) days of the receipt of an executed Release by the Defendant. 

The Rule otherwise provides that, if court approval of the settlement is required, then the 20 day deadline under Rule 229.1 does not begin to run until the settlement is so approved.

Judge Nealon noted that, under Rule 229.1, if the Defendant fails to timely deliver settlement funds, the Plaintiff has the right to seek one of two possible remedies. First, a Plaintiff can seek to invalidate the settlement agreement and allow the matter to return to the trial list. Second, the Plaintiff can seek sanctions against the Defendant.

The court noted that, if a plaintiff opts to pursue sanctions against a defendant, Rule 229.1(e) directs the Plaintiff to (1) file an affidavit “attesting to non-payment,” to submit copies of “any document evidencing the terms of the settlement agreement,” and/or “the executed Release,” and “a receipt reflecting delivery of the executed Release,” (2) file certifications by counsel “of the applicable interest rate,” and “that the affidavit and accompanying documents have been served on the attorneys for all interested parties,” and (3) file “the form of order prescribed by subdivision (h)” for execution by the court.

The court also noted that under Rule 229.1(g), if the court determines that the Defendant has failed to deliver the settlement funds within twenty (20) days and there is no material dispute as to the terms of the settlement or the terms of the Release, the court “shall impose sanctions in the form of interests calculated at the rate equal to the prime rate as listed in the first edition of the Wall Street Journal published for each calendar year for which interest is awarded, plus one (1) percent, not compounded, running from the 21st day after the production of the executed Release to the date of delivery of the settlement funds, together with reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred in the preparation of the affidavit.

The court otherwise ruled that the fact that the insurance company’s noncompliance with the payment requirement may be attributable to a post-settlement assertion of a potential coverage issue did not warrant the denial of the Plaintiff’s request for sanctions.  Accordingly, the court granted the Plaintiff’s Motion and awarded sanctions pursuant to Rule 229.1.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source of image:  Photo by kaboom pics on www.pexels.com.

Law Allowing For Fines For Holding A Cell Phone While Driving Starts Tomorrow June 5th

A new Pennsylvania law that bans a driver from holding a cell phone while behind the wheel goes into effect tomorrow, June 5, 2026.

These fines are starting after a year of police officers issuing warning tickets in this regard.

Starting tomorrow, officers may issue tickets carrying a $50 fine, plus court costs and other fees.

Note that simply holding a phone, propping up a phone, or reaching for a phone can trigger a ticket.  You could even be issued a ticket for holding your phone at a red light or while stopped in traffic.

Drivers are permitted to use their phones to alert authorities in an emergency.

Also, drivers may still use hands-free technology to make phone calls, to use a GPS, or to listen to music.

It remains to be seen how a related violation of this statute may impact a personal injury motor vehicle accident matter.

Trial Court Rules that Plaintiff's Medical Malpractice Experts are Competent to Testify on Causation

In the case of Kenny v. Lackawanna Health and Rehab Center, No. 2021-CV-1360 (C.P. Lacka. Co. May 28, 2026 Nealon, J.), Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas addressed various Motions in Limine filed by a Defendant in a medical malpractice case.

The Defendants filed a Motion In Limine seeking to bar the decedent’s treating orthopedic surgeon and the Plaintiff’s skilled nursing care and nursing home administration expert from expressing opinions regarding the cause of the Defendant’s hip fracture.

The Defendant more specifically asserted that the decedent’s treating orthopedic surgeon failed to state his medical causation opinion with the requisite degree of medical certainty in his pre-trial reports. 

After reviewing the record before him, the court ruled that a review of all of the reports issued by the orthopedic surgeon confirmed that the doctor had articulated his medical causation opinion with the requisite degree of medical certainty. The court noted that any objection regarding the particular terminology used by the expert in his reports went to the weight of the evidence rather than the admissibility of the expert testimony. As such, this Motion In Limine was denied.

With regards to the Plaintiff’s nursing expert and the defense argument that this expert should be precluded from testifying regarding causation on the grounds that the expert lacked the required education, training or experience in orthopedics, the court noted that the most recent law in Pennsylvania is that a registered nurse is competent to testify concerning the relevant nursing standard of care as well as on the issue of medical causation. Accordingly, the court overruled the Defendant’s argument that the nursing expert is incompetent to testify as to causation.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.