Superior Court Overturns Trial Court's Allowance of Amendment of Complaint During Trial To Add Claim of Punitive Damages

In the case of Bernavage v. Green Ridge Healthcare Group, LLC, No. 1576 MDA 2023 (Pa. Super. May 19, 2025 Bowes, J., Olson, J., and Stabile, J.)(Op. by Stabile, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the entry of a compensatory damages award by a jury after a medical malpractice trial but vacated the jury's award of punitive damages after finding that the trial court erred by allowing the Plaintiff to amend the Complaint during the trial to add the claim for punitive damages.

According to the Opinion, the underlying case involved two (2) trials, one under compensatory damages aspect of the case and a second, later trial limited to consideration of whether punitive damages should be awarded against the Defendants.

It was noted that, during the course of the first trial, the Plaintiffs moved for a directed verdict on the issues of negligence and recklessness. At that time, the Plaintiff also made a request to file an Amended Complaint to conform the evidence elicited at trial to the pleadings. The request for a directed verdict was denied but the Plaintiff was allowed to file an Amended Complaint to add allegations of recklessness and to include a claim for punitive damages. The court also severed the issues related to the punitive damages claim to be resolved at a second, later trial with a different jury.

After the jury in the first trial entered an award in favor of the Plaintiff, the pleadings were reopened by the trial court and the parties proceeded to conduct punitive damages discovery prior to the second trial.

There was then a second trial at which the jury entered an award of punitive damages.

Following the punitive damages trial, the Defendants filed various post-trial motions and, eventually, this appeal. A central issue on appeal was whether the trial court abused its discretion in allowing, in the middle of a trial and after the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations, the Plaintiff to amend the Complaint to add allegations of recklessness and the claim for punitive damages.

The Superior Court ruled that the amendment of the Complaint to allow for claims of recklessness was not barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The main rationale for the appellate court’s decision in this regard was that recklessness and gross negligence are not to be considered distinct causes of action separate and apart from claims of ordinary negligence.

However, the appellate court did find that the trial court’s decision, during the course of trial, to allow the Plaintiff to add a claim for punitive damages was improper as that resulted in an unfair surprise to the Defendants at that late hour of the case.

The appellate court noted that the record revealed that the Plaintiffs did not pursue a claim of recklessness during the course of discovery and only introduced the concept of recklessness for the first time during the course of the trial.

The Superior Court noted that the Plaintiff’s failure to develop the specific theory of recovery in the form of recklessness during the course of discovery was not, in this case, a mere technicality subject to being cured by an amendment of the Complaint to conform to the evidence at any point.  Rather, the Superior Court noted that the record in this case revealed that the Plaintiff had developed a theory of liability at trial that was substantively different from the theory developed by the Plaintiff during the course of discovery and as alleged in the original Complaint.

The Superior Court additionally noted that the Plaintiff had solicited the word “reckless” from witnesses during the course of a trial, which witnesses, in the eyes of the Superior Court, could not be expected to understand the legal significance of that term. The Superior Court noted that the witnesses’ use of the word “reckless” in their testimony was of no legal significance until the trial court subsequently permitted the Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint in which recklessness was then alleged for the first time.

Accordingly, the appellate court found that this matter did not involve simply an amendment of the pleadings in order to conform the Complaint to the evidence produced at trial. Rather, the Superior Court viewed this matter as involving an introduction of a new theory of recovery at a late date in the proceedings, which action was of the type that is frowned upon by the courts and which often results in a violation of the statute of limitations.

While the court found that the statute of limitations did not serve to bar the addition of a claim of recklessness under this set of facts and given that recklessness is only considered a state of mind in regards to a negligence claim, the Superior Court found that the unfair surprise to the opposing party from the late amendment served as grounds that should have compelled the trial court to deny permission to amend the Complaint. 

The Superior Court concluded that unfair surprise existed in this case “where a negligence Plaintiff, without explanation, withholds the precise theory of recovery until the latest possible time.” 

The court noted that, if, as the Plaintiff asserted, the facts of the Plaintiff’s original Complaint were sufficient to support a recklessness theory of recovery, then the Plaintiff should have developed that theory during the course of discovery. The Superior Court noted that, while it ascribed no motive to the Plaintiff in this case, it felt that, to reach a different conclusion, would be to invite negligence plaintiffs to withhold their theory of recovery, whether it is a negligence, gross negligence, or recklessness claim, until the last possible minute for the specific purpose of creating an unfair surprise to the opposing party. 

For these reasons, the Superior Court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the Plaintiff to amend their Complaint during the course of trial to add a claim for punitive damages.

As such, the Superior Court affirmed the jury’s verdict relative to the award of compensatory damages but vacated the second jury’s award of punitive damages. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Joseph T. (“Jody”) Healey of the Scranton, PA law firm of Cipriani &Werner for bringing this case to my attention.

Federal Court Applies Choice of Law Analysis

In the case of Karabec-Studer v. Avis Rent A Car System, LLC, No. 23-CV3828 (E.D. Pa. March 28, 2025 Kenney, J.), the Eastern District Federal Court completed a choice-of-law analysis in deciding a Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the Plaintiff’s claims for punitive damages under claims that the Defendant negligently rented a vehicle with issues.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff rented a car from Avis and was involved in a motor vehicle accident while traveling through Pennsylvania. The Plaintiff more specifically alleged that the Defendant negligently and recklessly rented them a car with inadequate tire tread. The Plaintiff rented the car in the state of Virginia. 

The Defendant moved for partial summary judgment on the punitive damages issues.

After reviewing the choice-of-law factors, the court concluded that Virginia’s punitive damages law, including that state's cap on damages would apply.

The court otherwise denied the Motion for Partial Summary Judgement after finding that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether or not the Defendants recklessly disregard the probability that their conduct would result in injury to the Plaintiffs. The court noted that the record indicated that the tire treads were below the Defendant’s standards as well as the legal limits regarding the same.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Court's companion Order can be viewed HERE.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Federal Case Alert, www.Law.com (April 24, 2025).

Trial Court Reaffirms that Plaintiffs May Plead Recklessness With Reckless Abandon

In the case of Kafley v. Breneiser, No. 24-CV-3508 (C.P. Lacka. Co. April 24, 2025 Gibbons, J.), the court overruled Preliminary Objections filed by the Defendant to claims of recklessness asserted in a rear-end motor vehicle accident case. 

President Judge James A. Gibbons
Lackawanna County

In this decision, President Judge James A. Gibbons of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas confirmed the current status of the law that allows Plaintiffs to plead recklessness in any given case so long as allegations of negligence are likewise asserted. 

In this regard, the court relied upon the Pennsylvania Superior Court decision of Monroe v. CBH2O, LP, 286 A.3d 785, 799 (Pa. Super. 2022).

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Discovery Sanctions Entered Against Defendant Who Was Not Cooperating With Discovery Requirements

In the case of Jones v. STR8 FROM US, LLC, No. 2:24-CV-05370-GJP (E.D. Pa. April 23, 2025 Pappert, J.), the court entered a sanctions Order against the defense in a motor vehicle accident matter where the Defendant driver refused to speak with his defense counsel that were hired by the Defendant’s insurance carrier, refused to respond to the discovery requests and deadlines, and refused the efforts to complete his deposition.

After discovery Orders were entered, the Plaintiffs moved for sanctions pursuant to F.R.C. 37(b) related to the Defendant’s continued failure to obey the court’s discovery Orders.

In assessing the justification of any discovery sanctions, the court applied what is known as the Poulis factors, which are a series of six (6) separate factors that a trial court should review and apply before granting an award for sanctions. In this regard, the court cited the case of Poulis v. State Farm, 647 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984).

Judge Pappert noted that Rule 37 authorizes courts to sanction conduct that obstructs the completion of discovery. After reviewing the matter before him, Judge Pappert granted sanctions and precluded the Defendant from testifying at trial or offering evidence concerning how the car accident involving the Plaintiff occurred and/or who was at fault. 

The court also noted that, after reviewing the Poulis factors, it was also appropriate to strike all of the Defendant’s affirmative defenses that did not pertain to the issues of causation or damages.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Court's companion Order can be viewed HERE.


Source: Article – “Judge Hobbles Trial Defense After Client Refuses To Cooperate With His Lawyers” By Riley Brennan of The Legal Intelligencer (April 24, 2025).

Quoted in National Article Analyzing Recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court Decision on a Medical Malpractice Decision of Note

Was recently quoted in an nationally circulated article entitled "Pa. Mental Health Rejection Suits Could Rise, Atty Says" by Y. Peter Kang that appeared in the national online publication of Law360.

The article reviewed a recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in the case of Matos v. Geisinger Medical Center in which that Court addressed the extent to which an injured party may pursue a medical malpractice claim against medical providers who rebuffed an individual who wished to voluntarily submit themselves for mental health treatment who then thereafter end up injuring another person or themselves.

The article is not freely accessible online. To the extent you may wish to read a portion of the article please do not hesitate to contact me at dancummins@cumminslaw.net.

The Tort Talk write up of this decision is forthcoming.

Eastern District Federal Court Transfers Personal Injury Case to Western District Federal Court

In the case of Seidman v. Hamilton Beach Brands, Inc., No. 2:24-CV-06033 (E.D. Pa. March 21, 2025 Weilheimer, J.), the Eastern District Federal Court granted a Defendant’s Motion to Transfer a products liability case filed by a Pittsburgh Plaintiff who treated for his injuries in Pittsburgh to the Western District Federal Court.

In this case, the Plaintiffs initially filed the lawsuit in state court venue that was within the Eastern District Federal Court venue. The Defendants removed the case to federal court. The court initially noted that the Eastern District Federal Court had venue and jurisdiction to review the Motion to Transfer given that the case had been properly removed to its attention.

Moving on to the merits of the Motion to Transfer, the court noted that, when a Plaintiff chooses to file a lawsuit outside of their home forum, the Plaintiff’s choice will receive less difference. The court noted that the facts of the matter had nothing to do with the Eastern District Federal Court. The court also noted that the convenience of counsel is not irrelevant factor in addressing whether or not to grant a Motion to Transfer.

The court also noted that jury duty should not be imposed upon the people of a community who have no relationship to the litigation.

For all of these reasons, the Eastern District Court granted the Motion to Transfer this matter to the Western District Court.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK. The Court's companion Order can be viewed LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

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