Lessons in Complaint Drafting From Judge Mark Powell of Lackawanna County

In the case of Hoagland v. PPL Electric Utilities Corp., No. 2024-CV-5799 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Sept. 1, 2026 Powell, J.), the court addressed several Preliminary Objections filed by the Defendant in a motor vehicle accident in which the Plaintiff was a passenger in a freightliner that crashed and struck a PPL utility pole.

The Plaintiff contended, in part, that the pole was placed dangerously close to the roadway and that PPL’s negligent and reckless conduct related to the placement of the pole allegedly caused or contributed to the Plaintiff’s fatal injuries.

The court sustained PPL’s objection to the Plaintiffs’ inclusion of a “John Doe maintenance company” as a Defendant. The court noted that, although the Plaintiffs alleged that they utilized reasonable diligence in attempting to identify the unidentified company, Pa.R.C.P. 2005 expressly provides that the Doe-Defendant procedure is not available in an action commenced by way of a Writ of Summons as was the case in this matter. The court additionally noted that the subsequent filing of a Complaint did not alter the result. As such, the claims asserted against the Joe Doe Defendant in this matter were dismissed.

Judge Powell otherwise rejected PPL’s contention that the Plaintiffs’ allegations describing the pole as “too close,” “dangerous,” and “unsafe” lacked sufficient specificity. The court noted that, when the Complaint was considered as a whole, the allegations were specific enough to allow the claims to proceed.

The court did otherwise, however, strike the Plaintiffs’ generalized references in the Complaint to unspecified statutes, ordinances, regulations, and industry standards. In this regard, the court granted the Plaintiffs twenty (20) days to identify, more specifically, any statute, ordinances, regulations, or industry standards that they are relying upon.

Judge Mark Powell
Lackawanna County

Judge Powell additionally followed the trend of allowing the Plaintiffs’ allegations of recklessness to remain in the case given that claims of negligence were asserted.

Also allowed to continue were the claims for punitive damages. The court noted that the Plaintiff had alleged that PPL knew the pole was dangerously close to the roadway, appreciated the risk it presented to motorists, and consciously disregarded that risk.

Judge Powell otherwise struck the Plaintiffs’ generalized allegations of negligent maintenance and repair because the Plaintiffs failed to identify any physical defect with the pole.

A separate negligent inspection theory was found to be viable because an inspection arguably could have disclosed that the pole’s proximity to the roadway allegedly presented an unsafe condition.

The court otherwise also concluded that the Plaintiffs plead a viable negligence claim under Tolerico v. Bonham, 650 A.2d 1192 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994), which recognizes a utility company’s duty to locate and maintain utility poles so as to avoid unreasonable and unnecessary dangers to motorists on roadways.

The court emphasized that the Tolerico case also established that a driver’s departure from the roadway does not necessarily constitute the sole or superseding cause of an ensuing collision with a utility pole.

Here, the court concluded that it could not determine from the pleading that the driver’s loss of control was so extraordinary or unforeseeable so as to relieve PPL of liability as a matter of law.

Accordingly, the question of whether the pole was dangerously located and whether its placement was a substantial factor in causing the death of the decedent remained a factual question for discovery and, if appropriate, trial.


Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

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Please Save the Date of November 12, 2026 for Lackawanna Pro Bono Gala

 

Trial Court Limits Effort By Two Attorneys in Same Firm To Question Multiple Witnesses at Depositions

In the case of Mercado v. UGI Utilities, Inc., No. 2022-CV-5250 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Sept. 15, 2026 Nealon, J.), the court addressed the issue of whether multiple, independent interrogations of the same witness at a deposition by separate Plaintiffs’ lawyers in the same firm is permitted.

This appears to be an issue of first impression in terms of any court decision.

According to the Opinion, two lawyers in the same law firm commenced consolidated actions on behalf of three Plaintiffs as a result of a single motor vehicle accident allegedly caused by the eruption of a gas pipeline underneath a roadway. For more than three years, those attorneys in the same law firm jointly represented all three Plaintiffs.

Shortly before the first set of discovery depositions began, as an apparent strategy, those lawyers withdrew their appearances for particular Plaintiffs in certain actions and then proceeded to conduct separate examinations of the deponents, thereby prompting objections by defense counsel. The defense attorneys challenged the propriety of independent interrogations by those attorneys and their redundant questioning that prolonged the depositions.

In anticipation of a next round of depositions, the Defendants filed a Motion for a Protective Order seeking to limit the Plaintiffs “to having only one attorney question each witness that is deposed in the matter.”

Judge Terrence R. Nealon
Lackawanna County

In his ruling, Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas undertook a detailed analysis of the issue presented.

Judge Nealon generally noted that the Plaintiffs in this matter had identical interests in the consolidated cases. The court noted that both Pa. R.C.P. 223(2) and Pa. R.E. 611(a)(2)-(3) provide trial judges with the discretion to limit the number of attorneys who may represent the same group of parties.  Those Rules also allow a trial court judge to exercise reasonable control over the mode of examining witnesses in order to protect the witnesses from harassment and to avoid the wasting of time.

In his review of other cases that peripherally addressed the issue presented, the court noted that it has been recognized that it is an abuse of discretion to permit attorneys to effectively “tag team” a witness with duplicative participation and interrogation while those attorneys are representing the same interests.

Judge Nealon noted that, for example, under the deposition protocol requested by the Plaintiffs in this matter, a law firm representing a tortfeasor Defendant and a vicariously liable employer in cases of uncontested agency would be entitled to have a second defense lawyer in their firm represent the employer and then have both attorneys conduct independent and separate examination of witnesses even though the tortfeasor and the employer have identical interests. The court noted that allowing such a practice would protract depositions needlessly and cause recurring objections against the repetitive questioning, as was happening in the case before the court here.

Judge Nealon ultimately held that, in light of the two lawyers’ joint representation of all three Plaintiffs for more than three years, and given the complete commonality of interests among the Plaintiffs in the consolidated cases, the Defendant’s Motion for a Protective Order would be granted. 

Under the Court's Order, the Plaintiffs were directed to designate a single attorney to examine each deponent on behalf of all of the Plaintiffs during future depositions.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

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Court Upholds Terms of Arbitration Agreement

In the case of Caplinger v. Power Home Solar, LLC, No. CI-24-01474 (C.P. Lanc. Co. Brown, J.), the court sustained a Defendant’s Preliminary Objections and held that a valid, enforceable Arbitration Agreement existed between the parties and covered the dispute in controversy.

As such, the court ruled that, under the terms of the agreement, the parties were bound to participate in a binding Arbitration as opposed to this litigation.

According to the Opinion, this matter arose out of a contractual dispute regarding the installation of solar panels on the Plaintiff’s property. During the course of the work, a fire originated in the area where the Defendants had performed the work. The Plaintiffs sued in negligence and breach of contract.

As noted above, based upon the contractual agreement, the court sustained the Defendant’s Preliminary Objections and dismissed the case after finding that the contract between the parties contained a valid Arbitration clause.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (July 9, 2026).

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Superior Court Applies a Statue of Repose in a Construction Case

In its non-precedential decision in the case of Trepanowski v. Hovnanian Enterprises, Inc., No. 841 EDA 2025 (Pa. Super. Aug. 28, 2026 Dubow, J., Kunselman, J., and Sullivan, J.) (Mem. Op. By Sullivan, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court addressed the law regarding a statute of repose.

In this matter, the Plaintiffs were pursuing a construction defect claim against various construction Defendants.

The trial court entered summary judgment against the Plaintiff’s finding that a statute of repose barred the Plaintiff’s claims. The trial court’s decision was affirmed on appeal.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff was raising claims relative to alleged defects in their property that began to allegedly be discovered after the Plaintiff’s moved into the home near the end of 2007. Work was performed on the home in 2011 as well as in 2021. The Plaintiffs filed their Complaint in 2023.

The Defendants raised various arguments stating that the construction project statue of repose served as an absolute bar to recovery given that more than twelve (12) years had elapsed between the issuance of the Certificate of Occupancy of the property and the initiation of the lawsuit. The Defendants also asserted other grounds based upon the statue of repose.

The Plaintiffs countered that the statute of repose did not bar their claim because their lawsuit was initiated within ten (10) years of the completion of the work on the home.

As stated, after its review of the matter before it, the Pennsylvania Superior Court ruled, in a non-precedential decision, that the trial court had properly entered summary judgment in favor of the Defendants and against the Plaintiffs.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this non-precedential decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Kenneth T. Newman of the Pittsburgh office of Thomas, Thomas & Hafer, LLP, for bringing this decision to my attention.

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Superior Court Finds That UIM Claim Fails Under Terms of an Umbrella Policy

In the case of Mathews v. Ace Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 638 EDA 2025 (Pa. Super. Sept. 4, 2026 Stevens, P.J.E., Stabile, J., Lane, J.) (Op. by Stevens, P.J.E.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court addressed the issue of whether an umbrella policy applied to provide underinsured (UIM) motorist benefits to a Plaintiff.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff suffered severe injuries as a result of being hit by a car while crossing the street.  The Opinion noted that the driver involved was underinsured.

According to the Opinion, there was an insurance policy issued to the Plaintiff’s employer that entitled the Plaintiff to UM/UIM benefits.However, the Plaintiff was denied any excess benefits under his employer’s umbrella policy. 

The Plaintiff brought suit for breach of contract and for a declaratory judgment on the issue of UIM coverage under the umbrella policy.

The trial court had entered judgment on the pleadings in favor of the umbrella carrier.  On appeal, the Superior Court affirmed.

The Superior Court noted that the plain and express terms of the umbrella policy, including exclusions, limited the umbrella coverage to third-party claims only.

The Superior Court rejected the Plaintiff’s efforts to argue that the policy language was ambiguous. The Plaintiff had attempted to argue that the umbrella policy contained an endorsement indicating that coverage for bodily injury would follow the terms of any underlying insurance.

However, as noted, other language in the umbrella policy specifically limited the umbrella insurance coverage to third party claims.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: Pa. Super. Blog (pasuperblog.substack.com) by Attorney Jon Bruno of Bruno Litigation, LLC in Pittsburgh, PA.

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