Showing posts with label Judge Nealon. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Judge Nealon. Show all posts

Thursday, November 19, 2026

Court Addresses a Plaintiff's Motion to Seal the Court Records Pertaining to a Settlement


When it comes to request to seal court records regarding a settlement, such motions are typically filed by Defendants.  Here's a decision on the issue in a case where the Plaintiff filed the Motion to Seal.

In the case of Kenny v. Lackawanna Health and Rehab Center, No. 2021-CV-1360 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Oct. 30, 2026, Nealon, J.), the court addressed a Plaintiff’s Motion to Seal a Settlement Petition and Order.

According to the Opinion, the estate administrator in this survival action filed a Motion seeking to seal the Petition to Approve the Settlement and the forthcoming Order in this professional liability action against a skilled nursing and senior care facility.

According to the Petition filed, the administrator of the Plaintiff’s estate indicated that the sole beneficiary of the settlement was an elderly person who resides alone and who did not wish to be exposed to unwanted solicitation, exploitation, or fraud if the terms and the amount of the settlement were not sealed and safeguarded from public access and publicity.

According to the Opinion, the administrator of the estate emphasized that he was not requesting the sealing of the remainder of the court record but was only seeking to seal the settlement petition and the accompanying Order.

Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas reviewed the law on this issue and found that, to warrant the sealing of the public judicial records reflecting the terms of a settlement and the identity of the recipient of the settlement proceeds, a petitioner must overcome the presumption of openness with respect to court records, and the common law right of public access to judicial records, by demonstrating that the requested sealing of the court records was necessary to prevent “a clearly defined and serious injury” to the Petitioner.

After a review of the record before the court, the court ruled that, since the administrator in this case had not demonstrated good cause for the granting of a court-sanctioned secrecy relevant to the parties' settlement filings, the request to seal the administrator’s settlement petition and the resultant Order was denied.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Monday, November 16, 2026

Court Addresses Permissible Claims Where Employees Private Medical Information is Improperly Accessed or Disclosed


In the case of S.S. v. Thomas Jefferson Univ., No. 2024-CV-5812 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Sept. 29, 2026 Nealon, J.), the court addressed various Preliminary Objections filed in an employee medical-privacy suit filed against a hospital system.

According to the Opinion, this lawsuit the Plaintiff alleged that a Pennsylvania healthcare system allowed employees’ sensitive medical information to be improperly accessed and disclosed.

In addressing the Preliminary Objections by way of a detailed Order many pages in length, Judge Terrence R. Nealon overruled many of the Preliminary Objections, including those seeking the dismissal of the lawsuit.

The trial court ruled, in part, that the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act’s (HIPAA) lack of a private right of action does not necessarily foreclose state law negligence in privacy claims.

In the end, the court allowed several of the Plaintiff’s claims to move forward, including claims for invasion of privacy, civil conspiracy, and vicarious liability. The court found that the Complaint plausibly alleged that co-workers of the Plaintiff had improperly accessed and disseminated sensitive medical information through the health system’s computer networks.

In so ruling, it appeared that the trial court was attempting to follow a 2018 State Supreme Court ruling in the case of Dittman v. UPMC finding that employers have a duty to protect the private information of its employees.

The trial court otherwise rejected the defense argument that federal statute and state regulations preempted the field and provided no right of a private cause of action for an employer’s disclosure of an employee’s private health information. 

Rather, the court found that Pennsylvania law recognizes that an employer has a legal duty to exercise reasonable care to safe guard its employees’ sensitive personal information stored by the employer on an internet accessible computer system.

The court otherwise noted that the Plaintiff’s Complaint contained allegations suggesting that the employees may have been acting both inside and outside the scope of their employment, making it to early to determine whether the Defendants could be held vicariously liable.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


On November 5, 2026, the same trial Court issued an Order denying the Defendant's Motion For Reconsideration on the same issues.  That Order can be viewed HERE.


Source: Article – “Employee Medical – Privacy Suit Against Pa. Hospital System Moves Forward, Judge Rules,” By Riley Brennan of The Legal Intelligencer (Oct. 21, 2026).

Friday, November 13, 2026

Court Reviews Standard To Confirm Competency of an Expert


In the case of Sona v. Curcio, No. 2024-CV-1194 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Oct. 16, 2026, Nealon, J.), the court denied a pre-trial motion by the Defendant seeking to preclude an accident reconstruction expert for the Plaintiff from testifying at trial in this motor vehicle accident case. The court additionally denied a related Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the defendant.

According to the Opinion, this matter arose out of a motor vehicle accident that occurred as the defendant-driver was making a right hand turn.

The accident occurred in an area where there was one lane in each direction and a center turning lane.   

The Plaintiff alleged that, as she was traveling in the travel lane, the defendant allegedly made a right hand turn from a center turning lane and across the front of the plaintiff’s vehicle.

The defendant driver denied the Plaintiff’s allegations and asserted that he was traveling in front of and in the same lane as the Plaintiff leading up to the accident.  The defendant driver asserted that the Plaintiff’s vehicle hit his vehicle as the defendant made his right hand turn.

In a pre-trial motion in limine presented to the Court for a decision here, the Defendant asserted that the Plaintiff’s accident reconstruction expert’s Opinion was not competent as it was allegedly not based on facts in evidence. After a review of the record, the court disagreed and ruled that the Plaintiff’s liability expert would be allowed to testify at trial.

Relative to the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the defendant, the court found that issues of fact precluded the entry of judgment. As such, that Motion was denied as well.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Thursday, October 15, 2026

Court Rules That Party Not Entitled to Unsealing of Juvenile Delinquency Records of a Witness


In the case of M.M., a minor v. Lion Tamer, LLC, No. 2025-CV-4113 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Sept. 18, 2026 Nealon, J.), the court addressed a Motion by the Defendant seeking to unseal the records relating to the juvenile delinquency proceedings involving a minor identified as “B.S.”

According to the Opinion, this case arose out of a premises liability incident. The Defendant operates an indoor trampoline park. The minor female Plaintiff, M.M., was allegedly lured into a foam pit by a 13 year old teenage boy during which the minor was allegedly sexually assaulted.

The court noted that the Plaintiff did not take any position on the Defendant’s Motion to Unseal Records regarding the juvenile delinquencies proceedings involving a minor identified as B.S.

In reviewing the Motion, the court referred to §6307(a) of the Juvenile Act. 42 Pa. C.S.A. §6307(a).

The court additionally also reviewed Rule 160(A) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Juvenile Court Procedure. Pa. R.J.C.P. 160(A).

The Defendant sought access to B.S.’s juvenile records as a party having a legitimate interest in the proceedings. In making the Motion, the Defendant conceded that it could not find any case law directly on point specifically involving a Defendant in a civil case seeking to have a juvenile criminal record unsealed. 

However, Judge Nealon uncovered relevant case law both at the appellate and trial court level. Based upon the case law found, Judge Nealon ruled that the Defendant could not be deemed a party “having a legitimate interest in the proceedings” under the above-referenced Rules as that language has been construed as referring to parties having a legitimate interest in the juvenile court proceedings.

Judge Nealon also noted that, while Subsection (b) of §6307 of the Juvenile Act was added after certain case law and permitted disclosure of limited information from juvenile delinquent proceedings for certain violent criminal conduct committed when the juvenile at issue was 14 years old or older, the individual in this case was only 13 at the time of the incident. As such, the court found that §6307(b) could not serve as a basis for unsealing the requested juvenile records.

Overall, the court in this case decided that based upon the limited record before it as submitted by the parties, the requested juvenile records of B.S. were protected from public access by the above-cited Rules. Accordingly, the Defendant’s Motion to Unseal the Juvenile Delinquency Documents was denied.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Monday, October 5, 2026

Allegations of Recklessness Allowed to Proceed in MVA Case


In the case of Bolus v. Lake, No. 2025-CV-4637 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Sept. 16, 2026 Nealon, J.), the court addressed Preliminary Objections asserted against allegations of recklessness and a corresponding demand for punitive damages.

This matter arose out of a motor vehicle incident.

Relative to the allegations of recklessness and punitive damages, the court followed the trend of cases allowing for the pleading of such claims in the absence of any supporting facts so long as a claim of negligence is asserted.

The court noted that recklessness can be generally alleged under the terms of Pa. R.C.P. 1019(b). 

The court additionally noted that a demand for punitive damages is not governed the “material facts” pleading requirement in Pa. R.C.P. 1019(a) due to the fact that a claim for punitive damages is merely an element of damages incidental to an underlying cause of action, rather than a cause of action itself.

The court otherwise overruled the Preliminary Objections asserting the inclusion of “scandalous or impertinent matter” relative to the allegations regarding the “No Kings Day” rally that was going on at the time and place of the incident. The court found that some of the “No Kings Day” protest allegations in the pro se Plaintiff’s pleading were relevant to the Defendant motorist’s state of mind and the accompanying claim for punitive damages.  The Plaintiff had alleged that the Defendant allegedly obstructed the Plaintiff’s path of travel in a reckless fashion at the time of the accident.

The court did otherwise sustain certain other Preliminary Objections to certain other language contained in the Complaint.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Wednesday, September 23, 2026

Trial Court Limits Effort By Two Attorneys in Same Firm To Question Multiple Witnesses at Depositions


In the case of Mercado v. UGI Utilities, Inc., No. 2022-CV-5250 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Sept. 15, 2026 Nealon, J.), the court addressed the issue of whether multiple, independent interrogations of the same witness at a deposition by separate Plaintiffs’ lawyers in the same firm is permitted.

This appears to be an issue of first impression in terms of any court decision.

According to the Opinion, two lawyers in the same law firm commenced consolidated actions on behalf of three Plaintiffs as a result of a single motor vehicle accident allegedly caused by the eruption of a gas pipeline underneath a roadway. For more than three years, those attorneys in the same law firm jointly represented all three Plaintiffs.

Shortly before the first set of discovery depositions began, as an apparent strategy, those lawyers withdrew their appearances for particular Plaintiffs in certain actions and then proceeded to conduct separate examinations of the deponents, thereby prompting objections by defense counsel. The defense attorneys challenged the propriety of independent interrogations by those attorneys and their redundant questioning that prolonged the depositions.

In anticipation of a next round of depositions, the Defendants filed a Motion for a Protective Order seeking to limit the Plaintiffs “to having only one attorney question each witness that is deposed in the matter.”

Judge Terrence R. Nealon
Lackawanna County


In his ruling, Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas undertook a detailed analysis of the issue presented.

Judge Nealon generally noted that the Plaintiffs in this matter had identical interests in the consolidated cases. The court noted that both Pa. R.C.P. 223(2) and Pa. R.E. 611(a)(2)-(3) provide trial judges with the discretion to limit the number of attorneys who may represent the same group of parties.  Those Rules also allow a trial court judge to exercise reasonable control over the mode of examining witnesses in order to protect the witnesses from harassment and to avoid the wasting of time.

In his review of other cases that peripherally addressed the issue presented, the court noted that it has been recognized that it is an abuse of discretion to permit attorneys to effectively “tag team” a witness with duplicative participation and interrogation while those attorneys are representing the same interests.

Judge Nealon noted that, for example, under the deposition protocol requested by the Plaintiffs in this matter, a law firm representing a tortfeasor Defendant and a vicariously liable employer in cases of uncontested agency would be entitled to have a second defense lawyer in their firm represent the employer and then have both attorneys conduct independent and separate examination of witnesses even though the tortfeasor and the employer have identical interests. The court noted that allowing such a practice would protract depositions needlessly and cause recurring objections against the repetitive questioning, as was happening in the case before the court here.

Judge Nealon ultimately held that, in light of the two lawyers’ joint representation of all three Plaintiffs for more than three years, and given the complete commonality of interests among the Plaintiffs in the consolidated cases, the Defendant’s Motion for a Protective Order would be granted. 

Under the Court's Order, the Plaintiffs were directed to designate a single attorney to examine each deponent on behalf of all of the Plaintiffs during future depositions.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source of image: Photo by Werner Pfennig on www.pexels.com.

Thursday, September 3, 2026

Court Addresses Requirements to Secure Class Certification


In the case McNair v. Pennsylvania-American Water Co., NO. 2024-CV-5834 (C.P. Lacka. Co. July 21, 2026 Nealon, J.), the court addressed a Motion seeking certification of a class comprised of property owners and/or residents of a lake community with respect to claims asserted against a water utility company regarding allegations of public and private nuisance related to the utility allegedly providing water containing excessive levels of manganese for several years.

The court reviewed the law of class certifications under Pa. R.C.P. 1702(2) and 1708(a)(1), and denied the Motion given that the property owners were not able to establish that common questions of law or fact predominate over the multitude of individual issues presented.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source of image:  Photo by Steven A. Johnson on www.pexels.com.

Wednesday, August 19, 2026

Judge Nealon of Lackawanna County Reviews the Law on Wrongful Discharge Claim Under Medical Marijuana Act


In the case of Mauger v. Scranton Hospital Company, LLC, No. 2023-CV-2381 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Aug. 5, 2026 Nealon, J.), Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas issued a detailed Opinion outlining the law surrounding a cause of action for wrongful discharge as a tort claim.

This matter arose out a situation involving a hospital nurse who filed suit against his former hospital employer asserting a single cause of action for wrongful discharge.

Judge Nealon's Opinion provides a thorough review of the law regarding an employee's use of medical marijuana any impact of the need for such medication on that person's employment status. 

The Plaintiff cited to the Medical Marijuana Act, which, in part, prohibits an employer from discharging or otherwise discriminating or retaliating against an employee based upon the employee’s status as a certified medical marijuana user. The Plaintiff alleged that he was terminated by the hospital based upon a drug screen test that was positive for marijuana that was due to his prescribed use of medical marijuana.

The Plaintiff was later reinstated by the hospital following the filing of a union grievance. However, the Plaintiff subsequent resigned from his position allegedly due to the constant micromanagement and correction by a supervisor.  The Plaintiff later filed suit for wrongful discharge.

The issues in this matter came before the court on a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the hospital.

Given the presence of various issues of fact before the court, the hospital’s Motion for Summary Judgment was denied with respect to the nurse’s wrongful discharge claim.

However, the court did grant the hospital’s Motion for Summary Judgment relative to claims of a hostile work environment, and relative to claims of constructive discharge.

The court otherwise also granted the hospital's Motion for Summary Judgment relative to the nurse’s claims for punitive damages and for counsel fees.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source of image:  Photo by Budding on www.unsplash.com.

Thursday, July 9, 2026

Post-Trial Rulings By Trial Court in MVA Case Affirmed on Appeal


In their non-precedential decision in the case of Major v. Five Star Equipment, Inc., No. 735 MDA 2025 (Pa. Super. June 30, 2026 Panella, P.J.E., King, J., and Lane, J.) (Mem. Op. by King, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the post-trial rulings issued by Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas related to a motor vehicle versus pedestrian accident case.

According to the Opinion, at a bifurcated trial, the jury attributed 75% of the responsibility for the happening of the accident to the Plaintiff and 25% to the Defendant.

On appeal, the Plaintiff challenged portions of the verdict slip and related jury instructions. The Plaintiff also asserted that the trial court had erred prior to trial in granting partial summary judgment on behalf of the Defendant and dismissing the Plaintiff’s claim for recklessness and in excluding post-accident evidence regarding the Defendant driver’s competence. The Plaintiff also argued that the trial court abused its discretion in bifurcating the trial.

Here, the court had bifurcated the trial based upon the fact that, after the parties were given a trial date with a certain number of trial days based on what the parties had advised the Court as to how much trial time was needed, the parties listed additional witnesses which led the court to conclude that it was highly unlikely that the parties would finish the trial within the allocated time period requested. As such, the court bifurcated the trial to avoid unnecessary cost and to facilitate the interests of judicial economy. The trial was bifurcated into liability and damages phases.

The appellate court rejected the Plaintiff’s argument that they were entitled to a new trial on the basis that the trial court had incorrectly bifurcated the case. The appellate court emphasized that the decision whether or not to bifurcate a case is entrusted to the broad discretion of the trial court, which is considered to be in the best position to evaluate the necessity for bifurcation.

Here, after consultation with the parties, the trial court had scheduled five (5) days for trial based upon the parties estimation as to the amount of time they believed the trial would take. Later, at a pre-trial conference, the parties then indicated that they intended to call eleven (11) lay witnesses and nine (9) expert witnesses to testify. The parties further estimated that one of the four days scheduled for trial would be taken up by the jury selection process, the court’s introductory instructions, and counsel’s opening statements.

The trial court had determined that it was highly unlikely that the remaining four (4) days of trial would be sufficient time for all of their testimony, closing arguments, jury instructions and deliberations. The trial court had expressed a concern that it would be forced to declare a mistrial if the trial is not completed within the allotted time. The appellate court agreed with the trial court’s conclusion that the interest of judicial economy and conveniens supported the bifurcation of the case. The appellate court was not swayed by the Plaintiff’s argument that the trial actually ended up only taking three (3) days to complete.

On appeal, the appellate court otherwise agreed with the trial court that the Plaintiff had waived her claim of error with regards to the Verdict slip.  The appellate court otherwise agreed with the trial court that separate questions as to each theory of negligence asserted against the Defendant company were unnecessary given that the trial court’s jury instructions specified and explained all of the theories of negligence involved in the case. The appellate court found that the trial court had repeatedly instructed the jury that, if they found negligence on any of the grounds described during the jury instructions, the jury must find that the Defendant company was negligent.

With regards to the trial court having issued a partial summary judgment against the Plaintiff’s claims of recklessness, the appellate court reviewed the law of punitive damages and, after a review of the trial record, found that the Plaintiff failed to produce any evidence to support the claims of recklessness. As such, the appellate court stated that the trial court did not err in dismissing the Plaintiff’s punitive damages claims whether in terms of the direct actions of the Defendant company or on the basis of vicarious liability.

Based upon the above reasons, the appellate court affirmed all of the trial court’s post-trial rulings.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


To view the Tort Talk post on Judge Nealon's trial court Opinion and for access to a Link to that Opinion, please click HERE.

Monday, July 6, 2026

Claims Regarding Duty to Provide Safe Drinking Water Flow Through Summary Judgment Motion


In the case of McNair v. Pennsylvania-America Water Co., No. 2024-CV-5834 (C.P. Lacka. Co. June 11, 2026 Nealon, J.), Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas addressed a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by a water company in a class action suit by residents of a Monroe County lake community in which the Plaintiffs had asserted claims of public nuisance under the safe drinking water statute, private nuisance, and breach of implied contract for failing to provide clean, safe, and reliable water surface to their company.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiffs asserted that the drinking water supplied by the utility company was chronically tainted with excessive levels of manganese that adversely affected the color, case, smell, and safety of the water.

The utility company filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on several grounds.

Relative to the request for the dismissal of certain nuisance claims based upon the statute of limitations, the court ruled that there were issues of fact under the discovery rule to the statute of limitations that prevented the entry of summary judgment in that regard.

Judge Terrence R. Nealon
Lackawanna County


Judge Nealon also found that the record before the court confirmed that the Plaintiff’s claims for breach of the utility’s implied duty to provide safe drinking water should be allowed to proceed to the jury.

Relative to the utility’s argument that the Plaintiff’s claims failed due to the Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust their administrative remedies, the court found that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies only applies where the available administrative remedy is adequate and complete with respect to the alleged harm sustained and the specific relief requested. 

Here, the court found that, given that the resident’s public nuisance claims sought to recover compensatory and punitive damages for the diminution of the value of their property, the loss of the use and enjoyment of the land, and the inconvenience, discomfort and annoyance that they have endured, the circumstances did not meet the elements of the doctrine given that the appropriate state administrative agency had no authority to award damages. 

As such, the court found that residents were not required to first exhaust their available administrative procedures before filing suit in a court of law.

In the end, the court denied the utility’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.



Source of top image:  Photo by Wallace Chuck on www.pexels.com.

Tuesday, June 30, 2026

Medical Malpractice Case Transferred Under Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens

In the case of Gearhart v. Geisinger Health, No. 2025-CV-44 (C.P. Lacka. Co. June 5, 2026 Nealon, J.), Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas granted the Defendants’ Motion to Transfer Venue of this case from Lackawanna County to Mifflin County under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.  

According to the Opinion in this medical malpractice case, Mifflin County Plaintiffs commenced a suit against a Mifflin County podiatrist and nurse practitioner, a Union County physician assistant, a Mifflin County hospital, and their employer and corporate parent, which were both headquartered in Montour County. 


After reviewing the evidence presented to the court, Judge Nealon noted that a trial of this matter in Lackawanna County, which is more than 130 miles from the sites of the primary treatment locations and associated evidence would be unduly burdensome for the individual Defendants and would impose considerable hardships relating to their professional and family responsibilities.  


The court also held that Mifflin County would provide far easier access to material witnesses possessing pertinent information and other sources of proof regarding the claimed negligence and damages.  


Accordingly, based upon a totality of the circumstances, the court found Lackawanna County was an oppressive forum for the continued litigation of the malpractice action.  Consequently, the court granted the Defendants’ Motion to Transfer the Case to the Court of Common Pleas of Mifflin County under Pa. R.C.P. 1006(d)(1).  


Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Monday, June 29, 2026

Article: Remedies for Late Payment of Settlement Funds

The below article of mine recently appeared in the June 18, 2026 edition of the Pennsylvania Law Weekly and is republished here with permission.


Remedies for Late Payment of Settlement Funds

June 18, 2026

By

Daniel E. Cummins


In most instances, once a civil litigation matter is settled, the defendant’s liability insurance carrier promptly issues payment. In this regard, the carrier has an interest in both protecting its insured in this regard and in closing out another file. However, in rare instances, a settlement payment may be delayed for an inordinate period of time for one reason or another.

When a settlement payment is delayed, plaintiffs have options to compel the production of the settlement payment or to secure sanctions against the defendant relative to the delay. Most settlement agreements themselves outline when payment is due. And, whether or not there is such a provision in a release regarding the timing of a payment, plaintiffs also have the benefit of the mandate under Pa.R.C.P. 229.1, which requires that the settlement payment be “delivered … within 20 calendar days from the defendant’s receipt of an executed release.”

In terms of the status of Pennsylvania law in this regard, it is often said by many that, if one needs a thorough overview of the current status of a particular area of the law, one should look for a decision on the issue written by Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas. This advice holds true with Nealon’s recent opinion in the case of Hill v. Riverside Healthcare and Rehabilitation Center, No. 2023-CV-3399 (C.P. Lacka. Co. May 22, 2026 Nealon, J.), in which Nealon addressed the topic of remedies available to a plaintiff under Pa.R.C.P. 229.1 where a defendant fails to produce a settlement payment in a timely fashion after the receipt of an executed release.

According to the opinion, this matter involved a professional liability action against the health care and rehab center. The plaintiff’s decedent’s had been a patient at the defendant’s facility. The defendant facility owner at issue in this case eventually became insolvent and filed for bankruptcy.

During the course of this litigation, the parties agreed to participate in a settlement conference with a private mediator. Prior to the mediation, the defendant’s attorney confirmed in writing that the parent and affiliate entities of the defendant were insolvent and in bankruptcy proceedings. Defense counsel also confirmed that, as such, the defendant would not be able to satisfy the first $75,000 of any settlement as that represented the amount of the defendant’s deductible, but that any obligation above that amount would be covered by the defendant’s liability insurance policy.

As a result of the mediation, the parties reached a settlement agreement for a net payment of $175,000. The total amount of the party’s settlement was actually $250,000 but the plaintiff agreed to waive the defendant’s payment of its $75,000 deductible. The net settlement payment of $175,000 was to be paid entirely by the defendant’s liability insurance carrier.

The court’s opinion emphasized that the insurance company’s adjuster had agreed to the settlement without any indication of any coverage issues existing between the defendant and its insurance company.

After the settlement, the plaintiff proceeded to court on a petition for court approval of the settlement in this death case. The court granted the Plaintiff’s petition and approved the settlement. The parties then executed the settlement agreement.

Plaintiff’s counsel then sent the signed release, the court order approving the settlement and other closing documents to the defendant’s counsel and requested the settlement payment.

In his opinion in this Hill case, Nealon emphasized that noticeably absent from the settlement agreement was any indication or even a suggestion that a coverage issue may exist between the defendant and its insurance company. Nor was there any reference that any such coverage issue needed to be resolved before the plaintiff would receive the settlement payment.

Thereafter, when plaintiff’s counsel wrote for the status of the settlement check, defense counsel indicated that there was some issue that the adjuster had to work out. Again, there was no reference made to any insurance coverage issues.

The opinion of the court noted facts that showed that the plaintiff’s attorney showed great patience and was more than accommodating in his repeated efforts to secure the production of the settlement check over the next several months. After several months then went by with no production of the settlement check, counsel for the plaintiff filed a motion under Pa.R.C.P. 229.1 relative to the defendant’s failure to produce the settlement check in a timely fashion after the production of the executed release.

Judge Nealon reviewed Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 229.1 which governs the prompt delivery of settlement funds within 20 days of the receipt of an executed release by the defendant.

The rule otherwise provides that, if court approval of the settlement is required, the mandated 20-day time period under Rule 229.1 does not become operative until the settlement is so approved.

Nealon noted that, under Rule 229.1, if a defendant fails to timely deliver settlement funds, a plaintiff has the right to seek either of two remedies. First, a plaintiff can seek to invalidate the settlement agreement and request that the matter return to the trial list. Second, a plaintiff can seek certain sanctions against the defendant.

The court in Hill noted that, if the plaintiff opt to pursue sanctions against the defendant, Rule 229.1(e) directs the plaintiff to file an affidavit “attesting to nonpayment,” and to submit six items for the court’s review with the affidavit. Among the documents to be submitted with the affidavit are a copy of “any document evidencing the terms of the settlement agreement,” a copy of “the executed release,” a copy of “a receipt reflecting delivery of the executed release,” a certification by counsel “the applicable interest rate,” and “that the affidavit and accompanying documents have been served on the attorneys for all interested parties.” Lastly, also attached to the affidavit should be “the form of order prescribed by subdivision (h)” of Pa.R.C.P. 229.1 for execution by the court.

Nealon additionally noted that the type of sanctions allowed in this instance are spelled out under Pa.R.C.P. 229.1. More specifically, under Rule 229.1(g), if the court determines that a defendant has failed to deliver the settlement funds within 20 days and there is no material dispute as to the terms of the settlement or the terms of the release, the court “shall impose sanctions in the form of interests calculated at the rate equal to the prime rate as listed in the First Edition of the Wall Street Journal published for each calendar year for which interest is awarded, plus 1%, not compounded, running from the 21st day to the date of delivery of the settlement funds, together with reasonable attorney fees incurred in the preparation of the affidavit.”

Nealon otherwise ruled in the Hill case that the fact that the insurance company’s noncompliance with the payment requirement may be attributable to a post-settlement assertion of a potential coverage issue did not warrant the denial of the plaintiff’s request for sanctions relative to the failure of the carrier to produce the settlement check within 20 days of the production of the executed release.
Conclusion

The Hill decision written by Judge Nealon provides thorough guidance on the steps to take in securing sanctions relative to a late payment of settlement funds required by an executed release.

As evidenced by plaintiff’s counsel’s actions in the Hill case, it is advisable for the plaintiff to show some patience while repeatedly requesting, in writing, the settlement payment once the mandated 20-day time period has expired for the timely production of the check. By showing some patience and creating a written record of repeated requests for the production of the check, the plaintiff will be able to bolster their request for sanctions as opposed to the case where a plaintiff runs to the courthouse on a motion for sanctions on the 21st day after the release was received by the defense counsel.

Daniel E. Cummins is the managing partner at Cummins Law in Clarks Summit, Pennsylvania. Contact him at dancummins@cumminslaw.net.




Reprinted with permission from the June 18, 2026 edition of the "The Pennsylvania Law Weekly © 2026 ALM Global Properties, LLC. All rights reserved. Further duplication without permission is prohibited, contact 877-256-2472 or asset-and-logo-licensing@alm.com.

Friday, June 5, 2026

Court Gives Detailed Opinion on Sanctions Applicable to Late Payment of Settlement Funds


In the case of Hill v. Riverside Healthcare and Rehabilitation Center, No. 2023-CV-3399 (C.P. Lacka. Co. May 22, 2026 Nealon, J.), the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas addressed a Petition filed by a Plaintiff seeking to impose sanctions against a Defendant under Pa. R.C.P. 229.1 for failing to deliver settlement funds in a timely fashion after an executed Release was produced by the Plaintiff.

According to the Opinion, this matter involved a professional liability action against a healthcare and rehab center.

In this matter, the Defendant facility owner at issue in this case eventually became insolvent and filed for bankruptcy.

During the course of this litigation, the parties agreed to participate in a settlement conference with a private mediator. Prior to the mediation, the Defendant’s attorney confirmed in writing that the parent and affiliate entities of the Defendant were insolvent and/or in bankruptcy proceedings and confirmed that the Defendant would not be able to satisfy the first $75,000.00 of any settlement but that any obligation thereafter would be covered by insurance.

After a mediation, the parties reached a settlement agreement for a net payment of $175,000.00. The total amount of the party’s settlement was actually $250,000.00 but the Plaintiff agreed to waive the Defendant’s payment of its $75,000.00 deductible with a net settlement payment of $175,000.00 to be funded entirely by the Defendant's insurance carrier.

The court’s Opinion in this matter emphasized that the insurance company’s adjuster agreed to the settlement without any indication of any coverage issue between the actual Defendant and its insurance company.

Thereafter, in this death case, the court granted the Plaintiff’s Petition for Court Approval of the Settlement. 

The Plaintiff then executed the settlement agreement and sent the signed Release, the court Order approving the settlement, and other closing documents to the Defendant’s counsel and requested payment.

The court point out that noticeably absent from the settlement agreement was any indication, or even a suggestion, that a coverage issue may exist between the Defendant and its insurance company or that any such coverage issue needed to be resolved before the Plaintiff would receive the settlement payment. 

After the closing documents were produced and the settlement check was not forthcoming, Plaintiff’s counsel wrote for the status of the settlement check.  Defense counsel indicated that there was some issue that the adjuster had to work out. There was no reference made to any insurance coverage issue during that interaction.

After several months then went by with no production of the settlement check, counsel for the Plaintiff filed the Motion at issue.

Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas reviewed Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 229.1 which governs the prompt delivery of settlement funds within twenty (20) days of the receipt of an executed Release by the Defendant. 

The Rule otherwise provides that, if court approval of the settlement is required, then the 20 day deadline under Rule 229.1 does not begin to run until the settlement is so approved.

Judge Nealon noted that, under Rule 229.1, if the Defendant fails to timely deliver settlement funds, the Plaintiff has the right to seek one of two possible remedies. First, a Plaintiff can seek to invalidate the settlement agreement and allow the matter to return to the trial list. Second, the Plaintiff can seek sanctions against the Defendant.

The court noted that, if a plaintiff opts to pursue sanctions against a defendant, Rule 229.1(e) directs the Plaintiff to (1) file an affidavit “attesting to non-payment,” to submit copies of “any document evidencing the terms of the settlement agreement,” and/or “the executed Release,” and “a receipt reflecting delivery of the executed Release,” (2) file certifications by counsel “of the applicable interest rate,” and “that the affidavit and accompanying documents have been served on the attorneys for all interested parties,” and (3) file “the form of order prescribed by subdivision (h)” for execution by the court.

The court also noted that under Rule 229.1(g), if the court determines that the Defendant has failed to deliver the settlement funds within twenty (20) days and there is no material dispute as to the terms of the settlement or the terms of the Release, the court “shall impose sanctions in the form of interests calculated at the rate equal to the prime rate as listed in the first edition of the Wall Street Journal published for each calendar year for which interest is awarded, plus one (1) percent, not compounded, running from the 21st day after the production of the executed Release to the date of delivery of the settlement funds, together with reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred in the preparation of the affidavit.

The court otherwise ruled that the fact that the insurance company’s noncompliance with the payment requirement may be attributable to a post-settlement assertion of a potential coverage issue did not warrant the denial of the Plaintiff’s request for sanctions.  Accordingly, the court granted the Plaintiff’s Motion and awarded sanctions pursuant to Rule 229.1.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source of image:  Photo by kaboom pics on www.pexels.com.

Tuesday, June 2, 2026

Trial Court Rules that Plaintiff's Medical Malpractice Experts are Competent to Testify on Causation


In the case of Kenny v. Lackawanna Health and Rehab Center, No. 2021-CV-1360 (C.P. Lacka. Co. May 28, 2026 Nealon, J.), Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas addressed various Motions in Limine filed by a Defendant in a medical malpractice case.

The Defendants filed a Motion In Limine seeking to bar the decedent’s treating orthopedic surgeon and the Plaintiff’s skilled nursing care and nursing home administration expert from expressing opinions regarding the cause of the Defendant’s hip fracture.

The Defendant more specifically asserted that the decedent’s treating orthopedic surgeon failed to state his medical causation opinion with the requisite degree of medical certainty in his pre-trial reports. 

After reviewing the record before him, the court ruled that a review of all of the reports issued by the orthopedic surgeon confirmed that the doctor had articulated his medical causation opinion with the requisite degree of medical certainty. The court noted that any objection regarding the particular terminology used by the expert in his reports went to the weight of the evidence rather than the admissibility of the expert testimony. As such, this Motion In Limine was denied.

With regards to the Plaintiff’s nursing expert and the defense argument that this expert should be precluded from testifying regarding causation on the grounds that the expert lacked the required education, training or experience in orthopedics, the court noted that the most recent law in Pennsylvania is that a registered nurse is competent to testify concerning the relevant nursing standard of care as well as on the issue of medical causation. Accordingly, the court overruled the Defendant’s argument that the nursing expert is incompetent to testify as to causation.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Friday, April 24, 2026

Plaintiff Found To Have Made Good Faith Efforts To Complete Service of Process in Medical Malpractice Case


In the case of Francis v. Xu, No. 2025-CV-3745 (C.P. Lacka. Co. April 16, 2026 Nealon, J.), the court addressed Preliminary Objections filed by a Defendant-physician in a medical malpractice matter seeking to dismiss the claims asserted against the physician on the grounds that the Plaintiffs failed to effectuate service of original process in a timely fashion or with good faith upon the Defendant-physician prior to the expiration of the two (2) year statute of limitations. 

Judge Terrence R. Nealon, writing for the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas, agreed that, in order to toll the statute of limitations, a plaintiff must indeed make a good faith effort to timely serve initial process on a Defendant. The court also agreed that, if a plaintiff fails to do so, the lawsuit is subject to dismissal where either (a) the plaintiff has demonstrated an intent to stall the judicial machinery, or (b) the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the Rules regarding service of original process has prejudiced the defendant.

After reviewing the record before him, Judge Nealon found that the Plaintiff in this matter made repeated attempts to serve the Defendant at issue at multiple locations while expeditiously and repeatedly reinstating the Complaint along the way.

Accordingly, the court found that service of process upon the Defendant physician resulted from the Plaintiff’s repeated efforts to diligently and timely serve the doctor. The court also found that the Defendant doctor did not identify any prejudice that she allegedly suffered due to any delay in serving initial process.

As such, the doctor’s Preliminary Objections asserting untimely service of original process were overruled.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Friday, March 27, 2026

Appellate Court Upholds Ruling That Contracts Regarding Gambling Debts Are Void


In its non-precedential decision in the case of Dhaduk v. Patel, No. 576 MDA 2025 (Pa. Super. March 16, 2026 Kunselman, J., McLaughlin, J., and Lane, J.) (Mem. Op. by McLaughlin, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court sustained a trial court decision by Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas granting demurrers against a Plaintiff’s claims in a case arising out of a neurologist and his wife who sued an internist seeking to recover $700,000.00 for gambling losses that allegedly occurred at a Florida casino. 

The Plaintiffs alleged that the neurologist agreed to play blackjack on behalf of the internist with the express understanding that the internist would be responsible for any resultant gambling losses suffered by the neurologist in the process.

The Plaintiffs claim that the internist had not reimbursed the neurologist for $200,000.00 for chips that the neurologist purchased and lost and for an additional $500,000.00 that the neurologist obtained from his casino line of credit and ultimately lost playing black jack.

The Defendant internist filed demurrers against the Plaintiff’s claim of breach of contract, promissory estoppel, fraud, and unjust enrichment.

The Superior Court agreed with the trial court’s decision that a Pennsylvania statute held that gambling debts between private individuals were uncollectable and that any related contracts regarding gambling are void. The Superior Court upheld Judge Nealon’s ruling and agreed that Pennsylvania law precluded the recovery of the debt.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this non-precedential decision may click this LINK.


Source: Article – “Court: Pair Can’t Recoup $700K Loan Friend Used For Gambling,” By Jim Lockwood of The Scranton Times (March 20, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by Dusan Kipic on www.unsplash.com.  

Tuesday, March 24, 2026

Judge Nealon of Lackawanna County Rules in Favor of Consolidation of Post-Koken UIM and Third Party Claims

Lackawanna County Courthouse

On the heels of Lackawanna County Judge Mark Powell's decision in favor of the consolidation of claims in Post-Koken automobile accident cases that was summarized in yeasterday's Tort Talk Blog post comes the decision of Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas in the case of Bello v. Smith and Progressive Ins. Co., No. 2024-CV-6105 (C.P. Lacka. Co. March 6, 2026 Nealon, J.).

In Bello, Judge Nealon addressed Preliminary Objections filed by a UIM carrier in a post-Koken matter involving combined third party claims against a tortfeasor and UIM claims against the Plaintiff’s own insurance carrier. This case also involved the additional fact that the tortfeasor Defendant was allegedly operating his vehicle under the influence at the time of the accident.

The UIM carrier filed Preliminary Objections under Pa. R.C.P. 1028(a)(5) asserting the “misjoinder of a cause of action,” and arguing that the tort and UIM claims should be severed for pre-trial and trial purposes.

Here, Judge Terrence R. Nealon, of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas reviewed the current status of Pennsylvania law on issue of the joinder of third party tortfeasor claims and UIM claims under a single caption, much of which prior case law was developed through his own judicial Opinions, to come to conclusion that the Preliminary Objections should be denied and the cases allowed to proceed, at least through the pleadings and discovery phases, in a consolidated basis.

Of note, the Court also referenced, on multiple occasions, the Pennsylvania Bar Quarterly article written by Daniel E. Cummins entitled "Hurricane Koken Rages On:  Uncertainty Continues in Motor Vehicle Accident Litigation In The Stormy Post-Koken Era," 90 Pa. B.A.Q., 108, 111 & n. 15-19 (July 2019). 

Judge Terrence R. Nealon
Lackawanna County 


In support of this decision, Judge Nealon noted that the damages that might be recoverable both the tortfeasor and the UIM carrier present common questions of law and fact and involve the same evidence and issues.

One additional issue involved in this matter was the fact that there were claims for punitive damages asserted against the tortfeasor Defendant due to the DUI allegations and other allegations.  The court acknowledged would be irrelevant to the compensatory damages determination given that the UIM coverage barred the recovery of any punitive damages under that policy.

Relative to the allegations that the tortfeasor Defendant was operating his vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and controlled substances, the court noted that such evidence “could unfairly prejudice the UIM insurer by inflaming the jurors’ emotions and influence the compensatory damages award.”

Judge Nealon noted that, while, in such instances, bifurcation of the compensatory damages and punitive damages claims for trial may be warranted, that decision should be left to be made later by the assigned trial judge after discovery has been completed and the case has been certified for trial.

However, after review copious case law in support of the same, the court ruled that, in the meantime, no legitimate basis existed for severing the tort and UIM claims for purposes of discovery and pre-trial matters.

Accordingly, the court overruled the UIM carrier’s Preliminary Objection asserting a misjoinder of a cause of action under Rule 1028(a)(5).  With this decision, the court denied the request to sever the tort claim from the UIM claims.

Judge Nealon did note that his decision was without prejudice to the right of any Defendant to later seek a bifurcation of the claims for compensatory damages and punitive damages for trial.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Monday, February 9, 2026

Link to Copy of Hagedorn Decision Reviewed in Yesterday's Tort Talk Post.


Yesterday's Tort Talk blog post reviewed the case of Hagedorn v. Rick’s Backhoe Service, Inc., No. 2018-CV-3723 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Jan. 9, 2026 Nealon, J.), which involved a decision on a Motion for Bifurcation.  The Link to the post was not complete.

Here is the LINK to the above decision.  Sorry for any inconvenience.

Thank you for reading Tort Talk.

Motion To Bifurcate Motor Vehicle Accident Lawsuit Involving Bad Injuries Denied


In the case of Hagedorn v. Rick’s Backhoe Service, Inc., No. 2018-CV-3723 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Jan. 9, 2026 Nealon, J.), the court denied a Defendant’s Motion to Bifurcate the liability and damages issues presented in a motor vehicle accident case.

According to the Opinion, this matter arose out of a motor vehicle accident during which the Plaintiff was operating a motorcycle.  The Plaintiff and the Defendant driver allegedly engaged in road rage in a construction zone and that, during the interaction, the Defendant driver negligently and recklessly struck the Plaintiff’s motorcycle, resulting in the accident.

In seeking to bifurcate the liability and damages issues presented, the Defendants asserted that they were proceeding on a strong liability defense. 

The Defendants also asserted that, given the severity of the injuries sustained by the Plaintiff, there was a strong likelihood that the jury’s decision on liability would be tainted by sympathy for the Plaintiff if the jury was to hear the damages evidence and the severity of the damages alleged. 

The defense further argued that the bifurcation would expedite the action by allowing for a clear presentation of the negligence issues to the jury without confusing the issues relative to the injuries and damages claims presented.

In opposition, the Plaintiff asserted, in part, that the testimony of the treating physicians would explain, in part, the mechanics of the Plaintiff’s injuries which could also provide relevant context on how the collision actually occurred and what the forces involved were. The Plaintiff additionally asserted that a bifurcation of the trial would not serve the interests of judicial economy as it would cause a lengthier trial and additional expenses.

Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas reviewed the Motion to Bifurcate under the standard of review set forth in Pa. R.C.P. 213(b). 

In reviewing the law, Judge Nealon noted that appellate decisions indicated that cases should only be bifurcated where the separation of the issues would facilitate the orderly presentation of evidence and would support judicial economy. Bifurcation is typically only granted where the issues of liability and damages are “totally independent.” See Op. at 4 [citation omitted].

Here, the court found that bifurcation of the trial would not promote convenience or judicial economy. The court additionally found that the issues of liability and damages were not totally independent from one another based upon the information in the record before the court.

Judge Terrence R. Nealon
Lackawanna Co.


In this regard, Judge Nealon noted that the Plaintiff indicated that his treating physicians would testify regarding the mechanics of his injuries, which could provide context regarding the dynamics of the impact, which could bear on the issue of how the accident occurred. Judge Nealon also noted that proof of that nature indicates that certain evidence on liability and damages is intermingled. 

The court also noted that the defense had not established that bifurcation was necessary to actually avoid prejudice. In terms of any concern that the jury might be sympathetic towards the Plaintiff due to the nature of the Plaintiff’s injuries, the court noted that the jury would be furnished with instructions from the court admonishing the jury that they should not allow sympathy or emotion to influence their deliberations or verdict.

Judge Nealon additionally cited to Pennsylvania Supreme Court precedent confirming that the courts may assume that juries will follow judicial instructions faithfully.

Based upon its review of the matter, the court found that bifurcation of the liability and damages issues into separate trials pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 213(b) was not proper in this matter. Accordingly, the Motion was denied.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Wednesday, January 14, 2026

Civil Trial Stayed Pending Resolution of Companion Criminal Case


In the case of Estate of Dugan v. Hotton, No. 2023-CV-4957 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Jan. 6, 2026 Nealon, J.), the court granted a Defendant’s Motion to Stay a civil jury trial in a wrongful death action arising out of a motor vehicle accident pending the resolution of the Defendant’s companion criminal court proceedings under charges of driving under the influence.

In so ruling, the court reviewed the applicable six-factor balancing test adopted by the Pennsylvania Superior Court in the case of Kessee v. Dougherty, 230 A.3d 1128 (Pa. Super. 2020). After reviewing those 6-factors, the court deemed it appropriate to enter the stay.

Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas, who decided this issue, handed down a very detailed Opinion outlining the current status of the law in this regard.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Defense counsel in this case is Daniel E. Cummins, Esq.

Source of image: Photo by Cottonbro Studios on www.pexels.com.