Showing posts with label Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act. Show all posts

Monday, October 12, 2026

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Upholds Statutory Cap on Tort Claims Against State


In the case Freilich v. SEPTA, No. 10 EAP 2024 (Pa. Oct. 1, 2026) (Op. by Todd, C.J.) (dissenting Op. by Donohue, J. and McCaffery, J.) (concurring Ops. by Dougherty, J. and Mundy, J.), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in a 5-2 decision, rejected arguments that the $250,000.00 cap on awards for tort claims against the state were unconstitutional.

More specifically, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the argument that the state’s Sovereign Immunity Act enforcing the cap violated the constitutional right to a trial by a jury.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff was injured when a SEPTA bus ran over her foot as she was walking in a crosswalk in downtown Philadelphia.  

This case arose out of a personal injury litigation in which a stipulated jury verdict totaling $7million dollars had been entered. The Plaintiff also sought an additional $892,979.00 in delay damages against the Defendants. The trial court later granted a $250,000.00 settlement with SEPTA, consistent with the statutory cap. The Plaintiff’s retained their right to challenge the validity of the cap up the appellate ladder.

In coming to its decision, the Court reasoned that the statutory cap did not limit the availability or parameters of a trial by jury. Rather, the cap limited an injury party’s ultimate recovery.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court otherwise rejected arguments from the Plaintiff that the cap violated the state’s remedies clause under its constitution. The Supreme Court upheld the statute legislature’s power to determine how lawsuits can be brought against the state and, therefore, control the limits of liability damages.

As noted, the Supreme Court ultimately upheld the statutory cap as being a valid part of Pennsylvania personal injury law relative to governmental agency defendants.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of the Majority Opinion for this decision may click this LINK. 

The Concurring Opinion by Chief Justice Todd can be viewed HERE.

The Concurring Opinion by Justice Dougherty can be viewed HERE.

The Concurring Opinin by Justice Wecht can be viewed HERE.

The Dissenting Opinion by Justice Donohue can be viewed HERE.


Source: Article – “Pennsylvania Supreme Court Upholds $250K Cap On Tort Claims Against State” By Cameryn Oakes of The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert (Oct. 1, 2026).

Monday, September 14, 2026

Trial Court Denies Motion for Summary Judgment That Was Based on Traffic Controls Exception to the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act


In the case of Haggerty v. City of Philadelphia, No. 230400850 (C.P. Phila. Co. May 27, 2026 Wright, J.), the trial court issued a Rule 1926 Opinion requesting the Superior Court to affirm the trial court’s decision denying the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act.

According to the Opinion, this matter involved an accident during which the decedent was operating a motorcycle southbound on Broad Street in Philadelphia when the tortfeasor Defendant exited a parking lot, crossed multiple lanes of traffic and attempted to reach the left-turn lanes on Broad Street and the collision occurred.

The Plaintiff filed suit against the city and the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation. Those Defendants joined in the tortfeasor driver and other Defendants.

After discovery was completed, the City of Philadelphia moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Plaintiff had failed to prove that it had notice of a dangerous traffic-control condition, failed to identify an appropriate remedial measure, and failed to show that PennDOT would accept any proposed controls at the intersection.

Reviewing the case before it, the trial court found that the Plaintiff had produced enough evidence to create factual disputes relative to all of the arguments raised by the Defendant. The court also noted that the Plaintiff had produced expert evidence in support of the claims presented.

 The trial court asserted in its Rule 1925 Opinion that it properly denied the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment in this motor vehicle accident case because the Plaintiff had produced sufficient evidence to create triable issues of fact under the traffic-control exception to the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act.

As such, the trial court requested the Superior Court to affirm the trial court’s denial of the city’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (July 23, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by Trev W. Adams on www.pexels.com.

Monday, July 27, 2026

A Dead End: Paved Pathway in Park is Not a Street Under the Streets Exception to Governmental Immunity


In the case of Gabra v. Borough of Prospect Park, No. 1343 C.D. 2024 (Pa. Cmwlth. June 18, 2026 Covey, J., Tsia, J., and Leavitt, S.J.) (Op. by Covey, J.), the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court addressed the issue of whether a pathway in a park fell within the Streets Exception to governmental immunity under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiffs filed a negligence Complaint after the Plaintiff’s decedent was struck and killed by a vehicle driven on a pathway in a park. According to the Opinion, the driver of the vehicle purposely drove his truck off of a roadway and into a park.  The road in question ended at a small, paved parking area and then narrowed significantly into a paved asphalt pathway leading to a pavilion and baseball fields.

It was additionally noted that the roadway had “No Outlet” and “No Parking This Side of the Street” signs in the area.

The accident occurred just after the end of the pathway and past the pavilion.

The Plaintiff’s Complaint invoked the Real Property, Utility Service, Streets, and Sidewalks Exceptions to governmental immunity afforded under the Act. Earlier in the litigation, the Real Property and Utility Service Exceptions theories of liability were stricken but the Streets and the Sidewalk theories were allowed to proceed.

On appeal, the appellate court addressed the issue of whether the paved pathway within the park could meet the definition of a street under the Streets Exception. 

In part, the court noted that the pathway was significantly narrower than the roadway that led to it. No evidence was presented by the Plaintiff that the pathway was wider than an alley or lane. 

There was additionally no evidence that the pathway afforded an exit at each end of the pathway   It was noted that the pathway ended just beyond the pavilion in the park. 

Nor was any evidence presented that the pathway was used for travel as a street or that the pathway connected one street to another.  Also, no evidence was presented by the Plaintiff to show that the pathway had been legally laid out or opened as a street.

The court otherwise noted that borough ordinances prohibited vehicular traffic in parks without permission. 

Other testimony showed that the pathway’s primary purpose was for use by employees of the borough and for short-term vehicle loading and unloading by youth clubs. As such, the court noted that the pathway was more akin to a driveway.

After a review of the facts against the applicable law, the Commonwealth Court held that, because the Plaintiffs had failed to establish that the pathway was a street, the court further held that the concrete base around the pavilion could not be deemed to be a sidewalk “within the rights-of-way of streets owned by the local agency” under 42 Pa. C.S.A. §8542(b)(7). 

Accordingly, the appellate court reversed the portions of the trial court Order denying summary judgment relative to the applicability of the Streets and Sidewalk Exceptions to governmental immunity.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert, www.Law.com (Jul 7, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by Azgan Mjeshtri on www.unsplash.com.

Monday, June 15, 2026

Issues of Fact Preclude Entry of Summary Judgment in Case Challenging the Design of an Intersection


In the case of Leger v. Martin, No. 253 C.D. 2025 (Pa. Cmwlth. May 19, 2026 Cohn Jubelirer, J., Wolf, J., Leadbetter, J.) (Op. by Cohn Jubelirer, J.), the Commonwealth Court reversed a lower court’s entry of summary judgment granting a township summary judgment in a motor vehicle accident matter in which allegations were made that the intersection at issue was a dangerous intersection.

According to the Opinion, this matter arose out of a motor vehicle accident during which the Plaintiff commenced a left hand turn from a stop sign and was hit by a tractor trailer.

The Plaintiff sued various parties including the township. The Plaintiff alleged that the township was liable under a duty to design, construct, and maintain its roads in a safe condition for travelers, including having proper signage and intersection site triangles. The Plaintiff also asserted that the township placed and/or directed to be placed a stop sign at the intersection with insufficient sight distances. The Plaintiff otherwise noted that the stop sign created a dangerous condition of which the township had actual or constructive notice, making the township liable under exceptions to the governmental immunity provided under §8542 of the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act.

The trial court had granted the township’s Motion for Summary Judgment. 

The primary argument by the township on appeal was that the Plaintiff had not produced evidence showing that the stop sign had caused or contributed to his injuries, that the township had notice of any dangerous condition, or that the township owned the intersection because it was controlled by PennDOT.

On appeal, the Commonwealth Court concluded that the notice issue was for the jury and that summary judgment had, therefore, been improperly entered. The court pointed to evidence before it, including expert reports, indicating that the township would have been responsible for the initial design of the intersection and that the evidence established that reasonable minds could differ as to whether the alleged dangerous condition was apparent upon reasonable inspection before the subject crash.

Accordingly, the granting of summary judgment in favor of the township was reversed and the matter was remanded for further proceedings.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert, www.Law.com (June 9, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by Josiah Niklas on www.unsplash.com.

Tuesday, May 5, 2026

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Rules that Sexual Abuse Exception To Governmental Immunity Only Applies to Minor Victims

Capitol Building
Pennsylvania Supreme Court

In the case of City of Philadelphia v. J.S. Sr., No. 34 EAP 2024 (Pa. March 26, 2026) (Op. by McCaffery, J.), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered the parameters of the sexual abuse exception to the general governmental immunity from tort claims as set forth in Section 8542(b)(9) of the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act.

This matter arose out of claims by an adult Plaintiff alleging that the Plaintiff was subjected to sexual abuse or assaults while the Plaintiff was incarcerated. The record before the court confirmed that the Plaintiff was not a minor at the time of the alleged abuse.

The more specific issue addressed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is whether this waiver of the immunity afforded to governmental agencies under the sexual abuse exception applies when the victim of the sexual abuse is an adult, or whether the waiver of immunity is limited to only those cases involving sexual abuse committed against a minor.

As noted in Justice Wecht's Concurring Opinion, "[t]he sexual-abuse exception to the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act applies to '[c]onduct which constitutes an offense enumerated under Section 5551(7).'  The offenses enumerated in Section 5551(7), in turn, require that 'the victim was under 18 years of age at the time of the offense.'"

In the end, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that the unambiguous language of Section 8542(b)(9) waives immunity in favor of political subdivisions or their employees only if the Plaintiff was a minor at the time of the sexual abuse.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of the Majority decision may click this LINK.  Justice Wecht's Concurring Opinion can be viewed HERE.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert, www.Law.com (April 14, 2026).



Source of image: Photo by Lacey Reapsome on www.unsplash.com.

Monday, January 26, 2026

Application of Sidewalk Exception to Governmental Immunity Statute Defeats Summary Judgment Motion

Jim Thorpe, PA

In the case of Hontz v. McFarland, No. 22-CV-2524 (C.P. Carbon Co. Dec. 5, 2025 Matika, J.), the trial court denied a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the Borough of Jim Thorpe after determining that the Borough was not immune from liability under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff tripped and fell over the base of a broken pole that was affixed to a sidewalk. Two days prior to the Plaintiff’s trip and fall, there was a motor vehicle accident during which a vehicle collided with the metal pole and broke it. This left a base of the sign protruding out of the sidewalk surface by 5-6 inches. 

In response to the Motion for Summary Judgment, the Plaintiff asserted that it was permitted to proceed against the Borough under the sidewalk exception to the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act. That exception is found at 42 Pa. C.S.A. §8542(b)(7).

Here, the court found that the Borough was not permitted to raise the defense of governmental immunity where the dangerous condition at issue was “of” the sidewalk where the defect was caused by the Borough’s failure after due notice to properly maintain or to repair the defect in question.

As such, the court denied the Borough’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source: “The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert” www.Law.com (Jan. 21, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by Mariya E. on www.pexels.com.

Friday, January 9, 2026

Judge Munley of Federal Middle District Court Addresses Scope of State Created Danger Claims


In the case of T.M. v. East Stroudsburg Area School District, No. 3:24-CV-1465 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 2025 Munley, J.), the court granted in part and denied in part a Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss a personal injury action arising out of allegations that the minor Plaintiff, who was a 6 year old boy with special education needs, allegedly sustained permanent injuries after being allegedly violently beaten by another student on a school bus.

According to the Opinion, the case involved, at a minimum, constitutional claims against the school district and certain school officials, as well as state law claims under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA). Included in the claims were state created danger federal claims.

As part of her decision, Judge Julia K. Munley rejected the defense argument that the Plaintiffs were required to allege “affirmative acts” on the part of the state actors to meet the legal standards required to proceed on a claim of a state created danger.

Judge Julia K. Munley
M.D. Pa.

Rather, Judge Munley agreed with the Plaintiff’s argument that an awareness of a risk, coupled with acts of omission or failures to act, could render the Plaintiff more vulnerable to harm. The court therefore held that such circumstances could constitute “affirmative misuse of state authority” sufficient to establish a state created danger claim, assuming the other elements of that cause of action are also met. In so ruling, the court rejected the Defendants’ argument that affirmative action is required to support a claim of a state created danger.

The court also addressed the vehicle exception to governmental immunity under the PSTCA. The court rejected the Defendants’ argument that the Plaintiff’s injury must stem from the actual operation of a vehicle in motion. To the contrary, the court ruled that the exception applies even where a state actor is in actual physical control of the vehicle when the harm occurs, such as even when a parked vehicle is involved. Accordingly, the court ruled that the exception could apply regardless of whether the vehicle was in motion.

Judge Munley additionally rejected the defense argument that pain and suffering damages were not available to the 6 year old minor Plaintiff under the PSTCA. The Defendants argued that the minor’s injuries did not amount to a permanent loss of bodily function or disfigurement. In this case, the Plaintiff sustained a concussion, facial contusions and lacerations, and severe PTSD.

Judge Munley found that such injuries did in fact support a request for pain and suffering damages under the PSTCA.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Court's companion Order can be viewed HERE


I send thanks to Attorney Robert T. Moran of the Moran Law Group, LLC in Scranton, PA for bringing this case to my attention.

Wednesday, November 19, 2025

Summary Judgment Denied in Case Involving Trip and Fall on Jogging Trail

In the case of Sember v. Lackawanna Heritage Valley Auth., No. 2024-CV-3255 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Oct. 22, 2025 Powell, J.), the court addressed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by the Defendants claiming immunity under the Recreational Use of Land and Water Act relative to a trip and fall incident that occurred while the Plaintiff was jogging on the Lackawanna Heritage Trail.

The City of Scranton, which was a Co-Defendant, additionally asserted that it was entitled to immunity under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act.

Both Defendants asserted that they were entitled to immunity under the Recreational Use of Land and Water Act given that the trail was on recreational land that was open to the public without charge. 

The Defendants asserted that the Act provided that owners owe no duty to recreational uses to maintain safety or to warn of dangers, including with respect to paved and unpaved trails. The Defendants claimed that the Lackawanna Heritage Valley Authority and the City of Scranton both constituted owners under the Act. 

Here, however, the Plaintiff alleged a man-made hazard, that is, a raised concrete base, and also asserted that the Defendants knew of that condition but failed to repair it or warn the persons entering the land about the condition. 

Judge Mark Powell
Lackawanna County


As such, Judge Mark Powell of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas held that there were issues of fact and that it could not determine from the pleadings alone whether the RULWA applied at this early stage of the litigation.  The court more specifically found that factual development was required to assess whether the condition at issue was part of the trial’s recreational use or an artificial structure beyond the protection of the Act.

Relative to The City’s claim of governmental immunity under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, the City asserted that it was immune because the trail was maintained by the Lackawanna Heritage Valley Authority and was not under The City’s “care, custody, or control.” The City of Scranton also argued that the Plaintiff’s claim did not fall under any of the exceptions to the grant of immunity.

The court found that the record was insufficient to determine the extent of each Defendant's control or whether the defect constituted a dangerous condition of real property that might trigger an exception to immunity. In light of these questions of fact, the court denied the Motion for these additional reasons.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: Lackawanna Jurist (Oct. 31, 2025).

Thursday, September 25, 2025

Court Punts On Summary Judgment in Football Stadium Trip and Fall Case


In the case of DeLuca v. Scranton School District, No. 2021-CV-3506 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Aug. 19, 2025 Powell, J.), the court denied Motions for Summary Judgment filed by the Scranton School District and Scranton Preparatory School relative to a trip and fall action brought by the Plaintiff after the Plaintiff tripped on an alleged uneven slab of sidewalk at the Scranton Memorial Stadium during a football game.

According to the Opinion, the stadium is owned by the Scranton School District and was leased to the Scranton Preparatory School under an oral agreement.

The Plaintiff alleged negligence against both Defendants.

The Scranton School District argued that it was immune from liability under the Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act given that it allegedly lacked notice of the defect and given that the Plaintiff had not suffered a “permanent injury” as required by law to proceed with such a claim in this context.

The court found that the Plaintiff had produced liability and medical expert evidence on the claim presented such that issues of fact precluded the entry of summary judgment.

More specifically, on the liability issues, the Plaintiff produced an expert who asserted that the walkway’s 1.5 inch uneven slab not only constituted a trip hazard, but had also existed for years and allegedly remained unaddressed despite safety inspections.

Regarding the Plaintiff’s injuries, the Plaintiff’s medical experts reported ongoing hand dysfunction and other chronic conditions. The court noted that genuine issues of fact existed for a jury to decide on the alleged permanence of the Plaintiff’s injuries.

The Co-Defendant, Scranton Prep, asserted that it did not bear any responsibility for maintaining the stadium given that it was a lessee without possession or control premises. The court found issues of fact regarding control and responsibility over the premises. As such, summary judgment was denied in this regard as well.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: Lackawanna Jurist (Aug. 29, 2025).

Monday, September 22, 2025

Trial Court Sheds Light On Why It Granted Summary Judgment in Allegedly Defective Street Light Case


In the case of Medina v. Zorrilla, June Term, 2023, No. 1233 (C.P. Phila. Co. June 9, 2025 Bright, J.), the court issued a Rule 1925 Opinion in a case of a pedestrian hit by a vehicle at an intersection with allegedly deficient street lighting.

The trial court assserted in its Opinion that its Order granting summary judgment in favor of the City Defendants should be affirmed where the Plaintiff did not offer up any evidence that the City had notice of an allegedly defective streetlight.  The trial court also noted that there was no evidence that the City had negligently maintained the streetlight.

The Plaintiff asserted that he had provided adequate evidence to support a claim under the Trees, Traffic Controls and Street Lighting exception to the municipal immunity afforded under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, 42 Pa. C.S.A. §8542(b).

The trial court disagreed. The court noted that the Plaintiff never provided that any evidence that the City had notice, actual or constructive, regarding the alleged defect or malfunctioning of the streetlight where the accident happened. 

There was also no evidence in the record to suggest that, even if the City had notice, there would have been sufficient time to repair the allegedly defective streetlight before the accident happened.

The court did confirm that, once the City installed a streetlight in the area in question, it did have a duty to maintain it. However, the court found that there was no evidence in the record to show that the City failed to properly to maintain the streetlight in question.

Relative to any liability expert evidence offered by the Plaintiff, the court noted that the test completed on the streetlight by the Plaintiff’s expert were completed 1-2 years after the accident. Accordingly, the court stated that the test results did not shed any light onto the condition of the streetlight as of the day of the incident.

As such, the trial court requested the appellate court to affirm the trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendants.  

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Weekly Case Alert, www.Law.com (Aug. 28, 2025).



Monday, August 18, 2025

City Ruled Protected by the Immunity Afforded Under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act


In the case of Cruz v. City of Scranton, No 2024-CV-7644 (C.P. Lacka. Co. July 28, 2025 Moyle, J.), the court granted a Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in a case in which the Plaintiff sued the City of Scranton relative to the police department’s handling of the Plaintiff’s stolen motorcycle.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff reported that her motorcycle was stolen. The Scranton Police Department was later informed by the Reading Police Department that the motorcycle was located at an auto facility in Reading, PA.

According to the Opinion, the Scranton Police Department allegedly never notified the Plaintiff of the location of her motorcycle. The motorcycle was thereafter declared to be abandoned and accumulated impound fees. Thereafter, the Plaintiff received a bill from the auto company indicating that she owed over $15,000.00 for impound and storage fees.

In response to recieving this bill, the Plaintiff sued the City of Scranton for negligence.

The Defendant asserted immunity under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act found at 42 Pa. C.S.A. §8542.

While the court agreed that the City of Scranton Police Department was required by law to notify the Plaintiff regarding the recovery of the Plaintiff’s motorcycle by the Reading Police Department, the court ruled that the City of Scranton was granted immunity under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act.

The court rejected the Plaintiff’s attempt to assert that the case fell under the exception to immunity relative to the care, custody, or control of personal property exception. The court rejected the Plaintiff’s argument that the receipt of information regarding the status of the Plaintiff’s motorcycle constituted control over the Plaintiff’s personal property.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Paul Walker of the Clarks Summit, PA law firm of Walker Law LLC, for bringing this decision to my attention.

Wednesday, August 7, 2024

Vehicle Exception to Commonwealth Immunity Reviewed by Commonwealth Court


In the case of Brown-Boyd v. SEPTA, No. 1167 C.D. 2022 (Pa. Cmwlth. July 15, 2024 Wojcik, J., Wallace, J., Leavitt, S.J.) (Op. by Wallace, J.), the Commonwealth Court affirmed the trial court’s decision denying SEPTA's Motion for Summary Judgment which was based on an argument that SEPTA was immune from suit under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act.  

In this case, the Plaintiff prevailed in convincing both the trial court, and the Commonwealth Court on appeal, that the facts implicated the vehicle exception to the immunity provided by the Act.

The vehicle exception to the general rule of immunity for municipal defendants provides that a Commonwealth entity may be found liable for acts resulting in damages caused by the "operation of any motor vehicle in the possession of a Commonwealth party."  See 42 Pa.C.S.A. Section 8522(b)(1).

The appellate court here affirmed the trial court's finding that the defendant bus driver was “operating” a bus for purposes of the motor vehicle exception of the sovereign immunity statute when the bus driver stopped to allow the Plaintiff to exit and allegedly refused to lower the bus’s handicap ramp which allegedly resulted in the Plaintiff falling and being injured. 

The appellate court noted that, under established case law, the “operation” of a motor vehicle covers more than simply moving the vehicle. Instead, this term also covers a variety of activities as well as the decision-making processes related to moving a vehicle.

The court primarily relied upon the plain language of the statute and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s discussion of the statute in the case of Balentine v. Chester Water Auth., 191 A.3d 799 (Pa. 2018). 

The court noted that, under this legal authority, the “operation” of a vehicle under this exception would include both acts and failures to act, including the Defendant bus driver’s allegedly failure in this case to lower the handicap ramp for the benefit of the Plaintiff.  In the end, the court found that the Defendant bus driver was “operating” the bus when the bus driver stopped to allow the Plaintiff to exit and allegedly refused to lower the handicap ramp.

As such, the appellate court concluded that the trial court did not err in denying the Defendants’ summary judgment motion pursuant to the vehicle exception to the sovereign immunity law.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert,” ww.Law.com (July 31, 2024).

Thursday, June 13, 2024

Kickball Injury Claims Against School Kicked Out of Court

In the case of Turner v. Lower Merion School District, No. 657 C.D. 2023 (Pa.Cmwlth. May 10, 2024 Wojcik, J., Wallace, J., Leavitt, S.J.)(Op. by Wallace, J.), the court affirmed the trial court’s decision in a personal injury case arising out of a kickball game at a school.   

The Commonwealth Court held that the Plaintiff’s lawsuit did not fall within the real property exception to governmental immunity where the Plaintiff’s claims stemmed from an injury caused by personalty rather than realty. More specifically, the case involved a temporary kickball base that was not affixed to the ground and which slid out from under the high school student during a physical education class.   


As such, the Commonwealth Court affirmed the trial court's entry of a judgment on the pleadings in favor of the Defendant based upon governmental immunity and kicked the case out of court.


Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source:  Law.com, “The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert” (May 29, 2024)

Wednesday, November 1, 2023

Plaintiff Gets Railed Off From Recovery


In the case of Jakmian v. City of Philadelphia, Case ID: 201001469 (C.P. Phila. Co. Aug. 4, 2023 Schulman, J.), the court issued a Rule 1925 Opinion on a Plaintiff’s appeal from an Order of Nonsuit entered in favor of the Defendants, SEPTA and the City of Philadelphia in a case involving an incident that allegedly occurred when the front tire of the Plaintiff’s bicycle became stuck in a SEPTA trolley track located in Philadelphia, causing the Plaintiff to be thrown from her bicycle and suffer, among other injuries, a broken arm.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff testified that she was riding her bicycle on a route that she often traveled between her home and a local gym. The Plaintiff testified that there were trolley tracks that ran down the middle of the street. The Plaintiff was riding in the middle of tracks, such that there was one track to her right and one to her left.

The Plaintiff moved to her right to clear the roadway for a car that was allegedly tailgating her. As she did so, one of the tires of her bike allegedly got struck in the trolley track and caused the Plaintiff to be thrown from her bike and smashed into a parked vehicle.

The court noted that the Plaintiff took pictures of an opening between the rails where the tire of her bicycle allegedly got stuck. The court noted that the Plaintiff did not identify any defect in the rails themselves.

According to the Opinion, at the time of the accident, trolley service had not been in use in the area for at least thirty (30) years and that SEPTA had no plans to change back to utilizing trolley service in that area.

The court reviewed various cases involving the real estate exception to the Sovereign Immunity Act that related to trolley rail.

The court found that the Plaintiff did not produce any evidence to support a claim that the inactivity in and of itself rendered the trolley track to become a dangerous condition.

The trial court held that no relief was due to the Plaintiff where the Plaintiff had failed to offer any evidence to support a claim that inactive trolley tracks were a dangerous condition of real estate for bicyclists.

The court rejected the Plaintiff’s argument that the fact that SEPTA had paved over some tracks in other parts of the city supported her claims of negligence against SEPTA for failing to pave over the trolley tracks where the Plaintiff’s accident occurred. The court found that the Plaintiff failed offer any evidence, by expert witness or otherwise, to show why the existence of trolley tracks presented as a dangerous condition.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions.” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (Oct. 23, 2023).

Source of Image: Photo by Louis Droege on www.unsplashed.com  

Friday, January 27, 2023

ARTICLE: Pa. Supreme Court Decisions and Rule Changes Continue to Favor Plaintiff's Causes


This article of mine was recently published in the Pennsylvania Law Weekly on January 19, 2023 and is republished here with permission.




Pa. Supreme Court Decisions and Rule Changes Continue to Favor Plaintiff's Causes


By Daniel E. Cummins | January 19, 2023


For over the past five years or so, the plaintiffs bar has realized one important victory after another at the Pennsylvania Supreme Court level in terms of plaintiffs-friendly precedent and rule changes.

Like a well-oiled machine, after putting forth a sustained and organized effort to help to secure their favored candidates an election to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the plaintiffs bar has followed up by litigating issues important to plaintiffs up the appellate ladder to what has become the promised land for them in terms of repeated victories on issues important to injured parties.

With the pendulum of judicial thought at the Pennsylvania Supreme Court level having swung so far in the plaintiffs favor, it appears that the sky’s the limit for the plaintiffs bar to continue to alter the legal landscape in Pennsylvania for the benefit of injured parties for the foreseeable future, all of which is much to the dismay and chagrin of members of the defense bar.

Repeatedly Overturning Decades-Long Precedent

While the defense bar has realized some recent victories at the Pennsylvania Supreme Court level in terms of the overturning the scope of the long-arm jurisdiction statute, the limitation of discovery of peer review records in medical malpractice cases, and the limitation of attorney malpractice cases by the court’s adoption of the “occurrence” rule of liability, those victories have been blips on the radar as compared to the wealth of victories secured by plaintiffs. With this Pennsylvania Supreme Court and its judicial perspective, the plaintiffs bar has been repeatedly successful in convincing the court to overturn decades-long precedent that previously favored defendants.

For example, in Cagey v. PennDOT, 179 A.3d 458 (Pa. 2018), the plaintiffs bar convinced the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to overrule the long-followed and then 12-year-old Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court decision in Fagan v. Department of Transportation, 946 A.2d 1123 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2006), to hold that PennDOT should only be immune from suit in guide rail claims in limited circumstances. Under the prior Fagan decision there was essentially no liability on any claims against PennDOT relative to claims of negligence with respect to guide rails in state highway motor vehicle accident matters.

Ever since the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in the Cagey case, when PennDOT has installed a guide rail, sovereign immunity is waived if it is established by the plaintiff that the agency’s negligent installation and design created a dangerous condition that caused or contributed to the happening of a motor vehicle accident. This decision by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court kicked the door wide open for plaintiffs to again sue PennDOT in personal injury matters. While this decision is favorable for plaintiffs, the concern is that it will also continue to contribute to the ongoing increases of taxes and toll rates in order to pay for these additional personal injury lawsuits and awards against PennDOT.

In another reversal from a few years ago in the case of Balentine v. Chester Water Authority, 191 A.3d 799 (Pa. 2018), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court again assisted the plaintiffs bar in generating additional potential lawsuits by overturning 30 years of precedent with its holding that the involuntary movement of a vehicle can constitute an “operation” of a motor vehicle for purposes of the vehicle liability exception to governmental immunity under 42 Pa. C.S.A. Section 8542(b)(1).

In Balentine, the plaintiff’s decedent was working as a contractor on a water system project just off to the side of a roadway. A government inspector pulled up to the scene and parked his car and left it running. A third car struck the parked, stationary government inspector’s car and propelled that stationary vehicle into the decedent, resulting in fatal injuries.

The majority of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reviewed the law behind the Tort Claims Act and held that movement of a vehicle, whether voluntary or involuntary, is not required by the statutory language of the vehicle liability exception in order for that exception to apply. With this ruling in favor of the plaintiff, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court eradicated 30 years of precedent going the other way and thereby exposed governmental agencies to additional litigation and liability, the costs of which will likely be passed on to citizens in the form of higher taxes.

As another example, in 2019, the plaintiffs bar finally realized success at the Pennsylvania Supreme Court level in their sustained efforts to overturn the household exclusion found in automobile insurance policies. After 20 years of failed attempts to secure a decision finding that the exclusion was invalid and therefore unenforceable, the plaintiffs bar finally prevailed in convincing this Pennsylvania Supreme Court to issue a stunning decision to overturn that long-standing precedent in the case of Gallagher v. GEICO, 201 A.3d 131 (Pa. 2019).

In an opinion with language that was seemingly hostile toward the insurance industry, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not limit its decision to the facts of the case before it, but rather, in a plaintiffs-friendly fashion attempted to set up its decision in Gallagher v. GEICO as entirely eradicating the household exclusion across the board.

While federal court judges addressing the validity of the household exclusion ever since Gallagher have largely followed the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s mandate in favor of plaintiffs in this regard, some state court appellate and trial judges have limited the Gallagher v. GEICO decision to its facts and have noted that the household exclusion still remains valid and enforceable in certain circumstances.

Yet, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has since reiterated its plaintiffs-friendly stance in the case of Donovan v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance, 256 A.3d 1145 (Pa. 2021), by reaffirming its previous decision in Gallagher v. GEICO and again ruling that plaintiffs need not worry about the household exclusion provision as it is invalid and, therefore, unenforceable. Whether other state and federal courts will follow this effort at the complete eradication of the exclusion or will, again, limit the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision(s) to its facts, remains to be seen.

Sudden Emergency Doctrine

The plaintiffs bar rolled on to other areas of the law with additional successes at the Supreme Court level. With the case of Graham v. Check, 243 A.3d 153 (Pa. 2020), the plaintiffs convinced the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to somewhat limit the application of the sudden emergency rule in a manner that favors plaintiffs.

Under the long-standing sudden emergency doctrine, a defendant motorist is required to use an honest judgment in response to being faced with a sudden emergency on the roadway, such as a pedestrian negligently darting out from an area of safety and running out into the path of an oncoming vehicle without looking.

In Graham, which involved a pedestrian who was struck by the defendant motorist while the pedestrian was within a crosswalk, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the trial court in this case erred in instructing the jury on the sudden emergency doctrine. The court stated that the evidence in the case failed to lay a foundation for the provision of that instruction to the jury.

In light of this plaintiffs-favorable decision by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, it is likely that the application of the sudden emergency doctrine will no longer be automatically applied in dart-out pedestrian cases, particularly in the case of a pedestrian who was within a crosswalk at the time of an incident. As such, with this decision, the plaintiffs bar has been successful in securing a limitation of the application of this defense in motor vehicle accident matters.

Forum Shopping by Plaintiffs Permitted

In addition to limiting the defenses of tortfeasors and expanding the types of claims plaintiffs may seek a monetary recovery for, the plaintiffs bar has also been successful in convincing the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to repeatedly expand opportunities for plaintiffs to shop for the best forum to obtain the most liberal recovery possible.

In the case of Fox v. Smith, 263 A.3d 555 (Pa. 2021), the plaintiffs bar was successful in litigating the issue of proper venue in internet defamation cases and convinced the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to rule that internet-based defamation claims can be filed anywhere that the defamatory statements were viewed and understood as defamatory.

Since the internet is anywhere and everywhere, it appears that, under this ruling by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, an internet defamation case may be filed anywhere in Pennsylvania, thereby allowing the plaintiffs to file in the most liberal courts in Pennsylvania, if desired.

As noted below, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court also supported the expansion of the plaintiffs’ ability to engage in forum shopping sprees in medical malpractice cases.

Plaintiffs-Friendly Rule Changes

In addition to securing the above-referenced plaintiffs-friendly decision on venue from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the plaintiffs bar has also had great success in convincing the Court to issue changes to long-standing Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure on venue.

Under a Pennsylvania Supreme Court Order recently issued on Aug. 25, 2022, the court approved plaintiffs-favorable amendments to the medical malpractice venue rules. Under the new medical malpractice litigation venue rules, that went into effect on Jan. 1, plaintiffs will now be able to go on potentially lucrative forum shopping trips in terms of where they file their medical malpractice lawsuits.

These amendments undo a 20 year old Rule of Civil Procedure. Under the old rule, plaintiffs were required in medical malpractice cases to sue their medical providers in the counties where the treatment was completed.

Under the new rules, plaintiffs will be allowed to sue providers in any of the counties where the providers regularly do business or have significant contacts. With medical systems advertising on television and on the internet all across the commonwealth of Pennsylvania and also having satellite offices in many areas, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has opened the door for Plaintiffs to choose to file their medical malpractice claims in courts that are considered to have the most liberal, plaintiffs-friendly jurors.

Commentators have noted a concern that this Rule change may result in higher insurance premiums for medical providers, which may lead or force some doctors to leave the commonwealth to practice medicine elsewhere. There is also a concern that medical provider defendants who may not be responsible will be added to lawsuits for the sole purpose of triggering jurisdiction in a liberal venue. Another concern is that the Philadelphia County and Allegheny County Courts of Common Pleas will now again face a deluge of medical malpractice cases involving treatment that was performed elsewhere.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has also recently approved other plaintiffs-friendly changes to the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. In an order that went into effect on July 1, 2022, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court put into place a new rule amending Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1311.1, which applies to appeals from courthouse arbitration proceedings.

Under the new Rule 1311.1, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upped the maximum limit on the amount of money that a plaintiff can recover in money damages at trial on appeal from an arbitration award.

Under the old rule, that limit was set at $25,000. Under the new rule, the maximum limit has been changed to “an amount equal to the jurisdictional limit for compulsory arbitration of the judicial district in which the action was filed.” While different judicial districts have differing jurisdictional limits for arbitration, most counties have their limit is capped at a maximum $50,000 under Section 7361 of the Judicial Code.

The Sky’s the Limit

With this Pennsylvania Supreme Court, it appears that the sky’s the limit for the plaintiffs bar to try to effectuate additional changes in Pennsylvania law for the benefit of plaintiffs.

What other decades long-standing precedent and rules that may be changed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court for the benefit of plaintiffs remains to be seen. The plaintiffs bar has raised challenges to the Fair Share Act in terms of whether it should be applied to innocent plaintiffs who bear no contributory negligence with regards to the happening of an accident. The plaintiffs bar also has their sights set on overturning the regular use exclusion found in motor vehicle policies and that issue is currently pending before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

Relative to the current makeup and judicial perspective of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, there certainly has never been a better time to be a plaintiff or a plaintiffs lawyer in Pennsylvania. Only time will tell what additional expansions of the avenues of recovery for injured parties and what limitations on defenses the plaintiffs bar will be able to accomplish and realize at the Supreme Court level while the pendulum remains so far over on their side of the bar.


Daniel E. Cummins is the managing partner of the Clarks Summit law firm of Cummins Law, a civil litigation practice. He also conducts mediations of civil litigation matters through Cummins Mediation Services. Cummins is also the sole creator and writer of the Tort Talk Blog (www.TortTalk.com), which is designed to provide continuing updates on important cases and trends in Pennsylvania civil litigation law. He can be reached at dancummins@CumminsLaw.net.






Friday, September 2, 2022

Defendant Township Found Not to Be a Joint Tortfeasor With Co-Defendant Given Township's Immunity from Suit



In the case of Owens v. Huffman, No. 10612 of 2021, C.A. (C.P. Lawr. Co. July 8, 2022 Motto, P.J.), the court ruled that a Defendant Township was not a joint tortfeasor with its Co-Defendants in this lawsuit involving alleged property damages related to septic system issues.

The Court ruled that the Township was not a joint tortfeasor with the Co-Defendants due to the Township’s standing as a governmental agency and concomitant immunity.

As such, the court ruled that the Co-Defendants could not recover on or pursue a claim of indemnity or contribution from the Township. In light of this ruling, the courts sustained a Defendant Townships Preliminary Objections in this case involving damages claims arising out of issues with a septic system on the property involved.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions.” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (Aug. 30, 2022).

Thursday, October 28, 2021

Denial of Defense of Sovereign Immunity Immediately Appealable

In the case of Brooks v. Ewing Cole, Inc., No. 4 EAP 2021 (Pa. Sept. 22, 2021)(Op. by Mundy, J,), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that a claim of sovereign immunity was immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine given that sovereign immunity was a complete production from suit, not just liability for damages.   

The court noted that the benefit of the immunity provided to a government agency would be irreparably lost if that entity were forced to litigate all the way through to a final judgment and then seek appellate review on its immunity claim.   


As such, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that a trial court order denying summary judgment on the issue of sovereign immunity was immediately appealable as a collateral Order.


Anyone wishing to review this decision may click this LINK.

Source: "Digests of Recent Opinions." Pennsylvania Law Weekly (Oct. 19, 2021).

Wednesday, October 6, 2021

Motion For Summary Judgment Entered in Favor of PennDOT in Pothole Case



In the case of Teixeira v. Com. of Penna., Dept. of Transp., No. 7917-CIVIL-2019 (C.P. Monroe Co. Aug. 5, 2021 Williamson, J.), Judge David J. Williamson of the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas granted the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment in a matter involving a motorcycle accident.

The Plaintiff motorcyclist alleges that he hit a large pothole on Interstate Route 80 in Monroe County as a result of which he crashed and sustained multiple injuries.

The court noted that the issue before it concerned the pothole exception to the sovereign immunity allowed under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, 42 Pa. C.S.A. §8522(b)(5). The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania asserted that it was protected from civil suits based in tort under the doctrine of sovereign immunity unless one of the ten narrow exceptions to the law apply. As noted, the Plaintiff was arguing the potholes and other dangerous conditions exception to the Act.

The court noted that a Plaintiff seeking to utilize this exception must prove that there was sufficient prior written notice provided to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania of the allegedly dangerous condition.

Here, the court accepted PennDOT’s argument that the Plaintiff failed to show that there was actual written notice provided to PennDOT of the pothole in question. 

The court noted that, while the record revealed that various complaints were called in by members of the public and reduced to writing by the PennDOT call center, those complaints identified problems with Route 80 in general and varied widely in terms of complaints with respect to the area where potholes existed. 

The court additionally noted that nothing was submitted in actual writing by the actual complainants themselves to PennDOT. 

The court additionally confirmed that none of the complaints identified in the records reference the exact pothole that was involved in this accident. Nor were any of the complaints specific to the mile marker at the location of the accident. Rather, the complaints were generally applied to Route 80 which stretches at least 20 miles through Monroe County.

As such the court found no genuine issue of material fact was presented in this case on the question at issue of whether any actual notice of the pothole in question was provided to PennDOT prior to the subject incident. As such, the court granted PennDOT’s Motion for Summary Judgment.


Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Tuesday, August 17, 2021

Real Property Exception To Immunity Found Inapplicable in School Injury Case


In the case of Kilroy v. Owen J. Roberts School District, No. 2018-09778-TT (Jan. 11, 2021 Sommer, J.), the court granted a school district’s Motion for Summary Judgment in a premises liability case based upon an application of the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, 42 Pa. C.S.A. §8541.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff alleged that the minor Plaintiff’s thumb was injured on a metal shelf while the minor was attempting to block a ball being thrown in a boy’s bathroom.

The Plaintiffs were attempting to rely upon the real property exception to defeat the claim of immunity asserted by the school.

After reviewing the current status of Pennsylvania law on whether a chattel, such as a shelf, is real property or personal property, the court noted that the shelf in question was attached to the wall with six (6) small screws. It was noted that the shelf could be removed with a simple screwdriver, an electric screwdriver, or a power drill in a matter of seconds or minutes depending on the apparatus used.

The court found that the shelf was intended to be easily removed for purposes of replacement without damaging the property itself.

It was also noted that there was no evidence presented that the bathroom had been physical altered to accommodate the metal shelf, or that the metal shelf had to remain in its location.

Based upon these findings, the could held that the shelf was personalty, and not a fixture. As such, the court found that the facts did not fall under the real property exception.  Accordingly, the court granted the school district summary judgment based upon the immunity provided by the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act.

 

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions.”  Pennsylvania Law Weekly (July 20, 2021). 


Tuesday, May 25, 2021

Summary Judgment Denied in Football Sidelines Injury Case



In the case of Cantafio v. Valley View School District, No. 2018-CV-2991 (C.P. Lacka. Co. May 13, 2021 Gibbons, J.), Judge James A. Gibbons of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas addressed a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the Defendant, Valley View School District, in a case in which the Plaintiff's decedent was standing along the sidelines of a high school football game and was hit by players who spilled onto the sidelines during a play, which caused the decedent to be propelled backwards, as a result of which he ultimately fell backwards and struck his head on an asphalt surface which bordered the playing field. 
The decedent unfortunately suffered injuries which ultimately resulted in his death approximately ten (10) days later. The decedent’s son was on the stand with the decedent’s grandson and witnessed the incident.

The Defendant, Valley View School District, offered several reasons in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment. The school district argued that, as a political subdivision, it was entitled to immunity under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act. 

The school district Defendant also asserted that it was entitled to judgment under the law of the no-duty doctrine. 

The Defendant additionally asserted that it was entitled to summary judgment under assumption of risk doctrine and/or that the Plaintiff had failed to establish that the Defendant was negligent as a matter of law. 

On the claims asserted by the decedent's son, the Defendant argued that the Plaintiff had failed to put forth facts sufficient to support a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress.

The court addressed each of these arguments in term and denied all of them.  In the end, the school district’s Motion for Summary Judgment was denied.

In his Opinion, Judge Gibbons provides a thorough update on the current status of the law surrounding the no-duty doctrine and the immunity provided under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act.

Judge Gibbons also confirmed that the assumption of risk doctrine remains a valid defense under Pennsylvania law. After outlining the elements of that defense, the court found that the Defendant had not offered sufficient proof to compel the application of that doctrine. The court emphasized that there remains a “reluctance under Pennsylvania law to find that the assumption of the risk applicable unless it is quite clear that the specific risk that occasioned injury was both fully appreciated and voluntarily accepted.” [citation omitted] [emphasis in original citation deleted here]

With regard to the claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress asserted on behalf of the decedent’s son, the court outlined the current elements of that law and found that issues of act prevented the entry of summary judgment.


Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.