WATCH OUT FOR THIS PITFALL WITH DEADLINES

On December 24, 2025, the U.S. Postal Service implemented new procedures for dating mail.  As of that date and going forward, the Post Office will postmark letters and packages with the date they are processed at the postal facility rather than the date that they are dropped off in the mailbox as was the case in the past. 

This shift in procedure could affect whether time-sensitive mail is considered to be on time.

Commentators have recommended that, if your mail is time-sensitive in this regard, you should walk the mail into the post office and request a manual postmark to ensure that the postmark date matches the day you mailed the item.  You can also request a certificate of mailing.

Source of image:  Photo by Anthony Acosta on www.pexels.com.

Please Consider Signing Up As a Mock Trial Juror for Lackawanna County Competition

 

Summary Judgment Denied in Federal Court Snow and Ice Slip and Fall Case

In the case of Spa Resort, L.P., No. 3:24-CV-0796 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 2026 Saporito, J.), the court denied the Defendant resort’s Motion for Summary Judgment in a slip and fall case.

The Defendant landowner argued that the hills and ridges doctrine applied because the Plaintiff allegedly slipped and fell due to icy conditions that resulted from snowfall on the day of the incident.

In opposition, the Plaintiffs argued that the Plaintiff did not slip and fall due to icy conditions caused by the snowstorm, but rather, because the Defendants’ driveway was improperly maintained and repaired such that the hills and ridges doctrine did not apply.

The court ultimately concluded that questions of fact remained as to whether the hills and ridges doctrine applied to shield the property owner from liability regarding the allegedly slippery conditions on the premises.

Judge Joseph F. Saporito, Jr.
M.D. Pa.

In his decision, Judge Saporito provided a detailed review of the current status of the law in Pennsylvania regarding the hills and ridges doctrine.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: Article – “Jury To Decide If Spa Resort Can Be Liable Under ‘Hills and Ridges’ Doctrine In Slip-And-Fall Case,” By Riley Brennan of The Legal Intelligencer (Jan. 12, 2026).

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Finds It Cannot Reach Question of Validity of Uber's Arbitration Clause

In the case of Chilutti v. Uber, No. 58 EAP 2024 (Pa. Jan. 21, 2026) (Op by Brobson, J.), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed a request by Uber to refer a personal injury civil litigation matter to arbitration.

According to the Opinion, a woman who uses a wheelchair sued Uber Technologies, Inc. and others after an incident in which an Uber driver failed to provide her with a seat belt while transporting her in a wheelchair-accessible vehicle, causing her to fall and sustain injuries.

The Plaintiff filed a negligence cause of action in court. Uber responded by filing a Petition to Compel Arbitration, arguing that the Plaintiffs had agreed to arbitrate their claims when they enrolled in Uber’s service.

At the trial court level, the trial court granted Uber’s Petition and ordered the parties to proceed to Arbitration.

At the Superior Court level, the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed and held that there was valid agreement to arbitrate and remanded for further proceedings.

In this decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme court first reviewed whether an Order compelling Arbitration and staying trial proceedings is an immediately appealable collateral Order. The Supreme Court held that such an Order does not meet the requirements for a collateral Order because the issue can be reviewed after the entry of a final judgment and, as such, did not result in irreparable loss if the judicial review is postponed. 

Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the Superior Court’s decision and remanded the case back to the trial court with instructions on how to proceed.

In light of this decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not address the issue of the validity of the Uber Arbitration Agreement or the merits of whether Arbitration could be compelled in cases involving Uber.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: Justia Daily Opinion Summaries, www.justia.com (Jan. 22, 2026).4

Source of image:  Photo by Tingey on www.unsplash.com.

Plaintiff Lost In More Ways Than One: Summary Judgment Granted Where Plaintiff Ventured Onto the Property By Mistake and Fell

In its unpublished decision in the case of DeWitt v. Bedford County Airport Auth., No. 1345 C.D. 2024 (Pa. Cmwlth. Nov. 10, 2025 Wolf, J., Jubelirer, J., and Wojcik, J.) (Op. by Wolf, J.) (unpublished), the Commonwealth Court affirmed the entry of summary judgment in favor of the Defendant after finding that the record confirmed that the Plaintiff, at the time of his premises liability accident, was a trespasser and not a business invitee.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff was traveling to a house to take a look at a trailer he was thinking of buying from the owner.  The Plaintiff followed GPS directions via the Google Maps app but ended up unkowningly going to the wrong address. The record confirmed that the Plaintiff was only on the property by mistake at the time he slipped and fell on an icy condition.

After discovery, the Defendant homeowners filed a Motion for Summary Judgment asserting that the Plaintiff was a trespasser and that, therefore, the homeowners legally did not owe the Plaintiff any duty with respect to the icy condition.

The trial court entered summary judgment and the Commonwealth Court affirmed.

In its Opinion, the Commonwealth Court noted that, even if the Plaintiff had license to ask for direction while on the property, the Plaintiff was injured after he went to a second location deeper into the land owned by the landowner, further trespassing on the property.

The court stated a rule of law that a mistake by an entrant onto another’s land as to their status or permission enter the land does not relieve such entrant of a trespasser status.  See Op. at 5 citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 329 [other citations omitted].

The appellate court noted that the implied license doctrine does not extend to premises liability actions.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision, which the Commonwealth Court marked as an "Opinion Not Reported," may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney James Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Tamas Tuzes-Katai on www.unsplash.com.

Judge Linhardt of Lycoming County Rules that Allegations of Recklessness Must Be Supported By Facts Pled in the Complaint

In the case of Charles v. Martin, No. CV25-00, 974 (C.P. Lyc. Co. Dec. 12, 2025 Linhardt, J.), Judge Eric R. Linhardt of the Lycoming County Court of Common Pleas overruled a Defendant-driver’s Preliminary Objections against allegations of recklessness in a motor vehicle accident case in a matter in which intoxication on the part of the Defendant-driver was alleged.

Notably, in his decision, Judge Linhardt held that, while allegations of recklessness could be pled generally, a plaintiff still also has to plead facts in the Complaint to support such a claim.   

According to the Opinion, this matter arose out of a fatal motor vehicle accident during which it was alleged that the Defendant-driver crossed the center line and was involved in a head-on collision with the decedent’s vehicle.  As noted, included in the Complaint were allegations that the Defendant-driver was intoxicated and under the influence of a controlled substance at the time of the incident.

After the Plaintiff filed a Complaint alleging, in part, that the Defendant driver was negligent, careless and reckless, the Defendant-driver filed Preliminary Objections for a variety of reasons. In part, the Defendant asserted that the Complaint contained non-specific allegations of recklessness which should be stricken or dismissed. The Defendant also requested that the Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages also be stricken or dismissed.

After reviewing the current status of Pennsylvania law regarding the pleading of recklessness allegations and claim for punitive damages, the court noted that, while Pennsylvania is a fact-pleading state which requires a Plaintiff to plead the material facts upon which a cause of action is based, notwithstanding this rule, allegations regarding conditions of a tortfeasor’s mind may be alleged generally.

However, in his decision, even after referring to the Superior Court's decision in the case of Monroe v. CBH2O, LP, 286 A.3d 785, 798-99 (Pa. Super. 2022), Judge Linhardt noted that the exception to the general rules of pleading permitting a party’s state of mind to be pled generally does not dispense with the requirement that material facts constituting the conduct of a Defendant must also still be pled. See Op. at 7 citing Ammlung v. City of Chester, 302 A.2d 491, 497-98 (Pa. Super. 1973).

Judge Eric R. Linhardt
Lycoming Co.

Accordingly, Judge Linhardt held that, although a Plaintiff may generally allege that the Defendant- driver acted recklessly, the Plaintiff still “must allege sufficient material facts to support their general allegation and, if the material facts proposed in their Complaint operate to disprove their allegations of recklessness, those allegations must be dismissed.” See Op. at 7 citing with see, e.g. signal, Orange Stones Co. v. City of Reading, 87 A.3d 1014, 1025-26 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014).

In this case, the court noted that the Plaintiff’s Complaint alleged that the Defendant acted recklessly because he operated a motor vehicle while intoxicated and under the influence of a controlled substance. The Complaint also alleged a number of ways in which the Defendant was reckless by violating several provisions of the Motor Vehicle Code.

Judge Linhardt pointed to case law confirming that the operation of a vehicle while under the influence is sufficient to support allegations that a Defendant driver acted recklessly and may be exposed to an award of punitive damages.

Accordingly, the court found that the Plaintiff had sufficiently pled their allegations of recklessness such that the Preliminary Objections were overruled. 

Judge Linhardt ended his decision by noting that, should facts emerge during discovery calling the Plaintiff’s allegations into question, the Defendant had the right to file an appropriate Motion.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (Jan. 8, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by Olia Danilevich on www.pexels.com.

Summary Judgment Granted Due to Lack of Actual or Constructive Notice of a Spill

In the case of Donahue v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, No. 2:24-68 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 2025 Dodge, M.J.), the court granted summary judgment in a slip and fall case.

The court ruled that the mere existence of an allegedly harmful condition or the mere happening of an accident is not evidence of negligence nor does it create a presumption of negligence.

In this matter, the court confirmed that the Plaintiff did not have any evidence of any actual notice on the part of the Defendant of the alleged spill.

The court additionally found that evidence of seven (7) incidents over the previous five (5) years in other areas of the store were insufficient to impute knowledge on the part of the Defendant.

The court also noted that the Plaintiff failed to present any evidence as to the amount of time that the alleged spill existed.

Without such evidence, the court noted that a claim of constructive notice cannot be supported. The court also noted that constructive notice cannot be shown by a negative inference.

Any speculation about how long the alleged condition may have existed before the start of the surveillance video available was insufficient.

The court also held that liability cannot be based on the Defendant’s failure to adhere to its own inspection policies or that its inspection policies were generally inadequate. Rather, there may be a duty of care before there can be a breach.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney James Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Eva Bronzini on www.pexels.com.

Heavy Reading: Summary Judgment Recommended in Case Where Plaintiff Hit By Books He Accidentally Pulled From Shop Shelf

In the case Pidich v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 3:24-CV-1848 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 28, 2025 Bloom, M.J.), the court recommended the entry of summary judgment.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff was reaching up to try to get a book out of a box on a top shelf.  The book was wedged in the box tightly with other books.  The Plaintiff testified that he "pulled really hard" and the Plaintiff was then hit by multiple falling books.

This all occurred in an aisle where there was a sign that directed customers to "[a]sk for assistance with items on the top shelf."  

In this matter, Federal Magistrate Judge Bloom found that the Plaintiff violated an explicit warning to ask for assistance for items on the top shelf. As such, the court found that the evidence established that the Plaintiff caused his own injuries when the item he pulled off the top shelf fell upon him.

The court additionally noted that, assuming that the item was not, in fact, on the top shelf, then the Plaintiff had no evidence to show that the Defendant had notice of an allegedly dangerous condition.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney James Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Becca Correia on www.pexels.com.

ARTICLE: Preserving Confidentiality When Using AI Platforms

 The below article of written by myself and my son, Michael appeared in the January 22, 2026 edition of the Pennsylvania Law Weekly and is republished here with permission.

Michael is a Computer Science major focusing on Artificial Intelligence studies at Ursinus College outside of Philadelphia, PA. He provided the insight on the computer science aspects of the article and I focused on the legal points included in the article.

Expert Opinion/Legal Ethics and Attorney Discipline

Preserving Confidentiality When Using AI Platforms

By

Daniel E. Cummins & Michael J. Cummins

As the use of artificial intelligence (AI) rises in the practice of law, so does the concern for preserving confidentiality. Whether it be preserving one’s own client’s confidentiality as required by the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Responsibility, or preserving the confidentiality of records related to an opposing party under the requirements of HIPAA, counsel must be careful.

This is particularly so with the rising trend of automation through the use of AI platforms for completing tasks such as streamlining review and summarization of documents, including medical records, in the practice of law. In this day in age, lawyers can upload documents to an AI platform and have the platform review the records and create a summary of the same. In fact, some insurance carriers are beginning to mandate that their defense counsel do so. This practice raises ethical and confidentiality concerns.

The Requirement of Confidentiality

Under Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6, attorneys are required to protect the confidentiality of certain information that they are handling. Under Rule 1.6, titled “Confidentiality of Information,” it is provided, in pertinent part, that “a lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation … .”

The commentary to the rule notes that the rule of confidentiality “contributes to the trust that is the hallmark of the client-lawyer relationship.” With confidentiality, a client is encouraged to communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer on the subject matter of the representation. The rule also emphasizes that the lawyer may not disclose confidential information provided to the lawyer by the client except as authorized or required by the Rules of Professional Conduct or some other pertinent law.

As such, utilizing an AI platform that results in the inadvertent disclosure of a client’s private information could land an attorney in hot water with an unforgiving Disciplinary Board.


HIPAA Violations and Enforcement

In addition to attorneys needing to protect the private information of their own clients, lawyers also have to be careful with the confidential information of opposing parties, such as medical records of an opposing party.

HIPAA requires both physical and digital safeguards for patient data. In addition to mandating that medical files should not be left unattended in public areas, the law also requires that private health information must be stored digitally in a secured fashion that prevents unauthorized viewing.

The requirement of keeping an opposing party’s medical records private is mandated by HIPAA. Under the relevant law, failure to comply with HIPAA can result in civil and criminal penalties.

If a HIPAA complaint describes an action that could be a violation of the criminal provisions of HIPAA, the office for civil rights under the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services may refer the complaint to the Department of Justice for an investigation.

Criminal charges typically only arise where an individual “knowingly” obtains and/or discloses individually identifiable confidential health information. The question of whether such criminal penalties could be extended to lawyers handling medical records in a civil litigation matter is subject to dispute. The HIPAA law appears to limit criminal penalties to certain entities within the health care field. Yet, HIPAA also covers third parties that handle private health information on behalf of covered entities, including law firms assisting with medical-related legal matters.

In terms of any noncompliance that may result in the imposition of civil money penalties, the Secretary of the Health and Human Services Department has the discretion in determining the amount of the penalty based upon the nature and extent of the violation and the nature and the extent of the harm resulting from the violation. Civil penalties can range from $100 to $50,000 per violation, with additional penalties for repeat violations.

Based upon the stiff HIPAA penalties that can result from violating client confidentiality or the privacy of third parties, attorneys must be very careful in the use of artificial intelligence when using such platforms to review and summarize medical records and other private information that may arise in a civil litigation matter.


Local AI versus Third-Party AI

When utilizing an AI chatbot, such as Chat-GPT or Google’s Gemini, it may appear that it is entirely personalized and private to yourself. In reality, when utilizing any form of cloud based large-language models (LLM), there is a high risk that the company that provides the model will save, maintain, and even train future models based upon the data the user inputs.

In other words, if you provide a document for Chat-GPT to summarize or prompt a question, you are giving permission for OpenAI, the company that developed and owns Chat-GPT, to save and use that document or question for future training purposes. In addition to utilizing the information or documentation to train the model, this also leaves your documents vulnerable in the case of a data breach of the model provider.

However, this does not mean that this technology is completely useless. If you want to utilize an AI tool without the potential data security risks, you can locally host one within your organization.


How to Create Your Own Safe AI Platform

Using a designated device or server, you can download a model (there are free or pay-to-use options), design an interface for your organization, and run the model locally.

Once the model is running within your network, it will not even require an internet connection, meaning that all data and documents provided to the model will remain safely within your control within your office.

In order to take advantage of such a strategy, a law firm would likely need to hire an AI consultant company or professional to set up, design, and secure the system within one’s own office. There are also options to enter enterprise agreements with companies like OpenAI to establish a business relationship which does not allow them to retain the user input and data for training purposes.


Conclusion

While the use of AI platforms to automate certain tasks in a law office, such as the review and summarization of medical records, provides certain challenges, those challenges are not insurmountable.

Certain vendors who subpoena medical records for law firms have begun to provide AI generated summaries of medical records. Steps should be taken by law firms to ensure that these vendors are utilizing closed AI platforms that protect the confidentiality of the documents.

For those law firms that wish to begin to utilize AI platforms in-house, IT professionals can be retained to assist those firms in creating AI programs that prevent the information being handled from being disclosed outside of the office.

Daniel E. Cummins is the managing attorney at Cummins Law where he focuses his practice on motor vehicle and trucking liability cases, products liability matters, and premises liability cases. He also serves as a mediator for the Federal Middle District Court and for Cummins Mediation. He is additionally the sole creator and writer of the Tort Talk Blog at www.TortTalk.com. 

Michael Cummins, Daniel's son, is a computer science and philosophy major at Ursinus College with a focus on researching artificial intelligence.




Reprinted with permission from the January 22, 2026 edition of the "The Pennsylvania Law Weekly © 2026 ALM Global Properties, LLC. All rights reserved. Further duplication without permission is prohibited, contact 877-256-2472 or asset-and-logo-licensing@alm.com.

Federal Court Addresses Liability of Both Renters of Vehicles and Out-of-Possession Landlords Under Dram Shop Act

In the case of Stopko v. Cobbs, No. 2:25-CV-00074-CB (W.D. Pa. Dec. 31, 2025 Bissoon, J.), the court addressed the issue of the liability of renters of cars and issues surrounding the Dram Shop statute.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant rented a vehicle from a Co-Defendant company. T

The Plaintiff alleged that the Co-Defendant company did not perform any background check on the Defendant driver or review the Defendant driver’s driver’s history before renting him the vehicle. The Plaintiff alleged that, if the rental company had done so, they would have discovered that the Defendant driver should not have been entrusted with the rental vehicle.

The Plaintiff further alleged that, on the date of the accident, the Defendant driver went to a bar where he was allegedly served alcohol, including allegedly being served after he was allegedly visibly intoxicated.

The Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant driver then got into the vehicle that he had rented from the rental company and drove it, while intoxicated, the wrong way on the roadway, colliding in a head-on fashion with the Plaintiff.

In this decision, the court was addressing Motions to Dismiss filed by the Defendants with respect to allegations of negligence against the rental car company and with respect to the Defendant owners of the bar where the Defendant driver was drinking on the night of the accident.

The court granted the rental car company’s Motion to Dismiss after finding that the Plaintiff’s allegations were both factually and legally insufficient to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

The court noted that the Plaintiff’s entire theory of liability rested on the allegation that the rental car company should have performed a background check on the Defendant driver or investigated his driver’s history before renting him the vehicle. The Plaintiff alleged that, due to these failures, the Defendant rental car company was negligent in entrusting the driver with the vehicle.

The court found that the Plaintiff had only pled conclusory statements regarding the Defendant driver’s driver’s history in support of these allegations. The court noted that no facts regarding the actual driver’s history appeared anywhere in the Complaint. The court held that, without more, the Plaintiff had failed to plead sufficient facts to support the claim stated.

The court otherwise noted that lessors of vehicles are not liable for a lessee’s negligent driving, unless the lessor was negligent in leasing or renting the vehicle to a person they had reason to know was incompetent to drive the vehicle. 

The court also noted that there was no basis under Pennsylvania law to interpret this standard to impose a duty on rental car companies to investigate a driver’s history before renting a vehicle to them.

The court also noted that other Pennsylvania courts have only considered lessors liable for the harm caused by a lessee’s intoxicated driving when the lessee was intoxicated at the time the vehicle was entrusted to the driver, or where the lessor had reason to know that the driver would later drink and drive. Such was not the case under the facts presented in this matter.

The court noted that, where lessees or drivers unexpectedly become intoxicated later unbeknownst to the lessor or owner of the vehicle, other courts had found that the owners and/or lessors are not liable for the injuries caused by the driver.

Relative to the separate claims against the liquor license holder for the bar and the owner of the bar, the court found that there was no basis in Pennsylvania law to support and argument by the Plaintiff that there is a duty on such Defendants, that is, bars and taverns, to prevent visibly intoxicated patrons from leaving the establishment without safe transportation, to offer alternative transportation, or to contact friends or family of the intoxicated customer. 

This court noted that there was no Pennsylvania or federal appellate court decisions in the Third Circuit that appeared to have directly addressed this issue. However, the court pointed to an unreported Eastern District court decision in which that court found that there was no basis in Pennsylvania law to impose a duty on an alcohol licensee or its agents to prevent an intoxicated patron from operating a motor vehicle.

Relative to the separate argument by the Defendants that all of the Plaintiff’s common law negligence claims should be dismissed because the Pennsylvania Dram Shop Act restricts liability for liquor licensees only to those duties imposed by the Act, the court stated that there was a lack of consensus among the Pennsylvania courts on the exclusivity of the Act. As such, this court attempted to anticipate how the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would rule if faced with this issue.

In the end, this court noted that the Dram Shop Act imposes a statutorily created duty on liquor licensees not to sell alcohol to visibly intoxicated customers and that the breach of such a duty constitutes negligence per say under the Act. This court noted that, once this duty is breached, “it does not stand to reason that [the Dram Shop Act] should shield licensees from all derivative common law liability for their actions in breaching it, including the negligent supervision that led to the breach.” See Op. at 12. Accordingly, the court allowed the Plaintiff’s common law negligence claim to proceed.

This court otherwise ruled that there was support under Pennsylvania law to also allow a claim against a landlord to go forward under an allegation that the landlord may be liable for injuries caused by their tenants’ intoxicated business invitees when the landlord knew, at the time of the lease, that the tenant would sell alcohol on the property, and later, that tenant was doing so improperly. As such, the court in this case allowed the claims against the landlord Defendant to proceed.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Joseph Hudock of the Pittsburgh office of the law firm of Summers McDonnell Hudock Guthrie & Rauch P.C. for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Brett Jordan on www.pexels.com.

Premises Liability Plaintiff Tripped Up By Lack of Medical Expert

In the case of Montanez-Fontanez v. Lehigh Valley Health Network, No. 2023-C-0880 (C.P. Lehigh Co. Oct. 16, 2025 Reichley, J.), the court granted summary judgment due to a Plaintiff’s failure to produce expert evidence on the issue of causation with respect to the Plaintiff’s injuries that resulted from a fall down event.

In this matter, the Plaintiff was attending a physical therapy appointment to undergo therapy for her knee which had undergone a replacement surgery a month before.  As the Plaintiff was leaving the facility, she fell.

During the course of the matter, the defense filed a motion in limine and secured a Court Order holding that the Plaintiff's treating medical providers would be limited to the opinions noted in their office notes and were precluded from offering any opinions on causation.

The defense then followed up with a Motion for Summary Judgment on the grounds that the Plaintiff had not secured and produced an expert opinion on the causation of her alleged injuries.   

The Court noted that, while the Plaintiff’s injuries were immediate and of the type that could be expected to result from the nature of the alleged accident, the Plaintiff’s failure to produce expert causation evidence was still fatal. The Court ruled that, in this matter, unlike other cases that hold that causation may be sufficiently obvious such that no expert testimony is necessary, this Plaintiff was not in good health and had prior medical issues with regards to the same parts of her body before the subject incident.

As such, the Court noted that the facts in this matter that surrounded the Plaintiff’s injuries were not so apparent that a lay person on a jury could diagnose the cause of those injuries as being solely from the Plaintiff’s alleged incident.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney James Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of imaging: Photo by Online Marketing on www.unsplash.com.

Application of Sidewalk Exception to Governmental Immunity Statute Defeats Summary Judgment Motion

Jim Thorpe, PA

In the case of Hontz v. McFarland, No. 22-CV-2524 (C.P. Carbon Co. Dec. 5, 2025 Matika, J.), the trial court denied a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the Borough of Jim Thorpe after determining that the Borough was not immune from liability under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff tripped and fell over the base of a broken pole that was affixed to a sidewalk. Two days prior to the Plaintiff’s trip and fall, there was a motor vehicle accident during which a vehicle collided with the metal pole and broke it. This left a base of the sign protruding out of the sidewalk surface by 5-6 inches. 

In response to the Motion for Summary Judgment, the Plaintiff asserted that it was permitted to proceed against the Borough under the sidewalk exception to the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act. That exception is found at 42 Pa. C.S.A. §8542(b)(7).

Here, the court found that the Borough was not permitted to raise the defense of governmental immunity where the dangerous condition at issue was “of” the sidewalk where the defect was caused by the Borough’s failure after due notice to properly maintain or to repair the defect in question.

As such, the court denied the Borough’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source: “The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert” www.Law.com (Jan. 21, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by Mariya E. on www.pexels.com.

Golden Gavel Award for Mock Trial Coaching

This past weekend my wife, Anne, and I were honored to have recieved an unexpected award at the Ben Franklin Invitational Mock Trial Tournament at UPENN in Philadelphia where we were presented with the Golden Gavel Award.  The Award recognizes outstanding mock trial coaching and dedication to the program.

We thank our student team members for nominating us for this Award.

Anne and I have been working with the Abington Heights High School Mock Trial Team from Clarks Summit, PA for the past decade as our three sons worked their way through the high school and participated on the Mock Trial Team.  Our youngest son is currently on the team and will graduate next year.  

Over the past decade, the excellent students who have made up the Abington Heights High School Mock Trial Teams have one three State Championships and the only National Championship ever won by a High School Mock Trial Team from Pennsylvania in the 40 year history of the competition.

Anne and I truly believe that the high school mock trial competition put on by the Pennsylvania Bar Association changes the students' lives and teaches them skills that will help them for the rest of their lives (reading and writing analytical skills, public speaking, thinking on their feet) and also helps to greatly improve their self-confidence.

Please consider being a part of this competition by volunteering to be a Judge or a juror at a competition near you.  The students truly appreciate when lawyers come out and fill up the jury boxes for their competitions.

PLEASE REGISTER TO VOLUNTEER AS A MOCK TRIAL JUROR

 

Superior Court Addresses Statutory Privilege Related to Patient Safety Reports In Med Mal Cases

In the case of Boyle v. Mainline Health, Inc., No. 2454 EDA 2023 (Pa. Super. Sept. 10, 2025 Lazarus, P.J., King, J., and Lane, J.) (Op. by King, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court ruled that a failure to provide a Patient Safety Report (PSRS) to the hospital’s Patient Safety Committee or governing board meant that the hospital could not rely upon the statutory privilege under the Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error Act (MCARE). 

The court otherwise ruled that the creation of other records as part of a patient safety evaluation system did trigger the privilege under the Patient Safety and Healthcare Quality Improvement Act (PSQIA). As such, the discovery Order of the trial court was affirmed in part and reversed in part.

This matter arose out of a medical malpractice action in which the Plaintiff’s alleged that there child suffered birth injuries. During the discovery, the Plaintiffs sought documents related to the investigation of the baby’s delivery. 

In response, the Defendants produced a privilege log identifying four (4) responsive documents, the Patient Safety Occurrence Worksheet, the Situation Background Assessment/Recommendations, the Patient Safety Reporting System, and the Potential Compensible Event Report. The Defendants asserted that these documents were privileged under the MCARE Act and the PSQIA. 

The Plaintiff responded with a Motion to Compel.

After the trial court granted the Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel, the case went up on appeal. As noted, the Superior Court affirmed in part and reversed in part.  The Superior Court found that the Defendants did not meet their burden of establishing the PSRS report arose out of a matter reviewed by a patient safety committed or governing board pursuant to their Section 311(b) MCARE Act responsibilities.  As such, the Defendants were required to disclose the PSRS report.

The appellate court also reversed the portion of the trial court's Order finding that the Defendants failed to establish that the PSQIA privilege applied to certain other documents.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

The Concurring/Dissenting Opinion by Judge Lane can be viewed HERE.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert, www.Law.com (Sept. 30, 2025).

Source of image:  Photo by Thirdman on www.pexels.com

MOCK TRIAL JURORS NEEDED -- PLEASE CONSIDER VOLUNTEERING

 

Various Pre-Trial Motions in Limine Decided in Federal Court Trucking Accident Case

In the case of Kozak v. Klikuszewski, No. 4:21-CV-01609 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 5, 2025 Schwab, J.), the court decided a variety of Motions In Limine prior to a motor vehicle accident trial.

This matter arose out of an accident between the Plaintiff's car and the Defendant's tractor trailer during a snow squall on Interstate 80.   

Of note, the court denied the Defendant’s Motion for Bifurcation after finding that the Defendant offered no reason in support of bifurcation other that the Plaintiffs were claiming a serious injury. The court found this to be an insufficient reason to support a request for bifurcation.

The court also found evidence to support the claim to allow the punitive damages claims to go forward.

The court noted that, when there is a punitive damages claim against a supervisor, negligent supervision, hiring, and entrustment claims may also proceed.

The court additionally ruled that evidence of a driver’s past traffic citations and accidents was relevant to the Plaintiff’s claims for negligent hiring, retention, and entrustment. As such, that evidence was ruled as admissible.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Court's companion Order can be viewed HERE.


I send thanks to Attorney James Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Superior Court Addresses Crashworthiness Doctrine

In its non-precedential decision in the case of Amagasu v. Fred Beans Family of Dealerships, No. 1594 EDA 2024 (Pa. Super. Dec. 22, 2025 Olson, J., Dubow, J., and Beck, J.) (Op. by Olson, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court vacated a one billion dollar jury verdict in favor of the Plaintiffs in a products liability case.

According to the Opinion, this case arose out of a motor vehicle accident. In this product liability case against Mitsubishi, the Plaintiffs allege, in part, that the seat belt system and the low roof configuration of the vehicle, and other related structures were defective.

In its Opinion, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held, in part, that the trial court had erroneously instructed the jurors to apply a wrong legal standard, resulting in a verdict that was reached by the jury under an improperly reduced burden of proof.

The Superior Court noted that the jurors at the trial should have been instructed to apply the “crashworthiness” doctrine. This standard holds a vehicle manufacturer liable for injuries caused by design defects in their vehicles during accidents.

In this matter, the jurors were instead instructed to apply a general strict liability standard which had a lower burden of proof.

Accordingly, the Superior Court agreed with the defense argument that the trial court abused its discretion in electing to given only a traditional Section 402A strict products liability instruction.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this non-precedential decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney Kenneth T. Newman of the Pittsburgh office of the Thomas Thomas & & Hafer, LLP law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Court Grants Summary Judgment and Rejects Plaintiff's Reliance Upon Local Ordinance Requiring Ice and Snow Removal

In the case of Foxx v. City of New Castle, No. 11038 of 2023, C.A. (C.P. Lawr. Co. Hodge, J.), the court granted summary judgment in a premises liability case.

According to the Opinion, this matter involved a Plaintiff who left her residence and proceeded two (2) blocks to a Rite Aid pharmacy in a motorized wheelchair. As the Plaintiff approached the corner of one intersection, she attempted to proceed through a crosswalk but noted that snow was not cleared from the sidewalk. As a result, the Plaintiff was forced to cross the street in a different area and enter the Rite Aid parking lot utilizing a vehicle ramp. The Plaintiff was able to safely traverse that area and enter the store.

After leaving the store, the Plaintiff went to the end of the parking lot and stopped on the sidewalk as she noticed that it was full of snow and ice. Accordingly, she went back over to the same vehicle ramp that she had previously used to enter the parking lot. 

As she proceeded down to the bottom of the ramp, her wheels got caught in a hole which resulted in her falling from the motorized wheelchair and onto the street. The Plaintiff stated that she could not see the hole as it was slushy, dark brown water was coming down the street. 

Plaintiff later filed suit for her personal injuries.

The Defendant making the motion for summary judgment in this matter was the out-of-possession owner of the Rite Aid premises. The Defendant landowner asserted that its tenant was in possession of the premises and had the responsibility to repair and maintain the premises. The Defendant owner asserted that the tenant’s responsibility extended to the exterior facility such as the sidewalks and parking areas.

The Defendant asserted in its Motion for Summary Judgment that the Plaintiff had not presented any evidence that the Defendant, as a landlord out-of-possession, had breached any duty of care owed to the Plaintiff. 

The Defendant also asserted that the condition that allegedly caused the Plaintiff’s injuries was an open and obvious condition.

After reviewing the record before it, the court provided a detailed recitation of the current status of the premises liability law in this regard relative to a landlord out of possession. The court ruled that the record before it confirmed that the landlord out-of-possession had leased the premises to a tenant who exercises exclusive possession of the premises at the time. The lease agreement also required that the tenant was responsible for maintaining and repairing the premises including the sidewalk areas and the place where the Plaintiff was injured.

The trial court rejected the Plaintiff’s reliance upon a local ordinance regarding ice and snow removal in an effort to attach liability to the out-of-possession landlord.  The court found that the local ordinance did not appear to be applicable as the Plaintiff’s injuries were not sustained as an accumulation of snow and ice but due to the motorized wheelchair encountering a hole near the end of the vehicle ramp. The ordinance at issue appeared to only apply to ice and snow that rendered sidewalks dangerous to pedestrian travel.

It appears that, given the court’s decision on the landlord out of possession issue, it did not reach the open and obvious argument presented by the defense.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Gerald Connor of the Scranton office of the Margolis Edelstein law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Damian McCoig on www.unsplash.com.

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Superior Court Rules That 3 Hour Delay Between End of Snowstorm and Beginning of Cleanup Was Not Unreasonable (Non-Precedential)

It appears that it is reasonable in Pennsylvania to have a cup of coffee or tea and enjoy the sight of a freshly fallen snow before having to go out and shovel.

In its non-precedential decision in the case of Melvin v. Sellani, No. 1234 MDA 2024 (Pa. Super. Dec. 31, 2025 Bowes, J., Stabile, J., and Stevens, P.J.E.) (Mem. Op. by Stabile, J.), the court affirmed the entry of summary judgment in favor of the Defendant landowners and property manager in a slip and fall matter involving ice and/or snow.

The trial court decision entering summary judgment in favor of the Defendants had been entered by Judge Richard M. Hughes, III of the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas.

Relative to the hills and ridges argument, the court noted that the Plaintiff failed to present evidence to establish when photographs of the scene of the incident were taken. There were conflicting statements as to whether the photos were taken the day of the incident or shortly thereafter. As such, the court noted that the photographs relied upon by the Plaintiff were not sufficient to create any material issues of fact as to whether the Defendants were under a duty to remedy any alleged hills and/or ridges of snow at the time of the incident.

The Superior Court otherwise observed that the Plaintiff failed to establish that an unreasonable of time had passed between the snowstorm and the alleged dangerous accumulation of snow or ice.

By the Plaintiff’s own testimony, it was snowing when she arrived at work at 6:30 in the morning on the day of the fall. The Plaintiff also confirmed that the snow had stopped by 3:00 p.m. when she left work. Three (3) to five (5) inches of snow had accumulated.

It was additionally indicated that the Defendant property manager indicated that he had begun to remove snow at 9:30 a.m. at the Plaintiff’s residence. The Plaintiff confirmed that the property manager was still working at snow removal when the Plaintiff arrived at home.

The court noted that, even if the snow had stopped immediately when the Plaintiff arrived at work earlier that morning, the Plaintiff provided no case law to support an argument “that a 3-hour delay between the cessation of the snow and the beginning of the clean up effort constitute[d] an unreasonable delay.” See Op. at 7.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source of image:  Photo by Jill Wellington on www.pexels.com.

Civil Trial Stayed Pending Resolution of Companion Criminal Case

In the case of Estate of Dugan v. Hotton, No. 2023-CV-4957 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Jan. 6, 2026 Nealon, J.), the court granted a Defendant’s Motion to Stay a civil jury trial in a wrongful death action arising out of a motor vehicle accident pending the resolution of the Defendant’s companion criminal court proceedings under charges of driving under the influence.

In so ruling, the court reviewed the applicable six-factor balancing test adopted by the Pennsylvania Superior Court in the case of Kessee v. Dougherty, 230 A.3d 1128 (Pa. Super. 2020). After reviewing those 6-factors, the court deemed it appropriate to enter the stay.

Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas, who decided this issue, handed down a very detailed Opinion outlining the current status of the law in this regard.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Defense counsel in this case is Daniel E. Cummins, Esq.

Source of image: Photo by Cottonbro Studios on www.pexels.com.

Court Allows Claim To Proceed Against UIM Carrier Where UIM Claims Rep Allegedly Interfered With Settlement Negotiations In Third Party Case

In the case of Winner v. Progressive Advanced Ins., No. 2230 EDA 2024 (Pa. Super. Sept. 24, 2025 Panella, P.J.E., Nichols, J., and Ford Elliott, P.J.E.) (Op. by Panella, P.J.E.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court overruled the dismissal of an Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL) claims that was based on alleged actions of an insurance adjuster who allegedly intentionally interfered with the policyholder’s settlement negotiations in a lawsuit with a third party Defendant.

According to the Opinion, this matter arose out of a car accident.  During the course of the matter, after completing productive settlement negotiations in the third party matter, Plaintiff's counsel contacted the UIM carrier to request that a UIM claim be opened.

Thereafter, the UIM claims representative, without the consent of the carrier's insured or the insured's attorney, contacted the third party defense attorney and informed that defense attorney of a subsequent accident that the Plaintiff had been involved in.  As is turned out, the subsequent accident only involved property damages and no injuries to the insured.

Plaintiff's counsel in this matter alleged that the UIM carrier had allegedly contacted the third party defense attorney in order to persuade that attorney to reduce his settlement offer in the third party case in an attempt to shield the UIM carrier from the UIM claim.  In other words, the Plaintiff asserted that the UIM carrier purposely interfered in the third party matter in an effort to prevent the Plaintiff from recieving UIM benefits.

Based on these facts, the Superior Court overruled the trial court's dismissal of the Plaintiff's UTPCPL claims.

The Superior Court additionally held that the forum selection clause in the policy that applies to any action brought against the insurance company requiring that such action must be brought in a county in which a person seeking benefits resides also applies to bad faith and unfair trade practices claims based on the conduct alleged in this matter.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “Court Summaries” By Timothy L. Clawges, Pennsylvania Bar News (Oct. 20, 2025).

Source of image:  Photo by Sean Musil on www.unsplash.com.

Not So Fast: Superior Court Quashes Appeal After Finding That Trial Court Order Was Not a Final Order

In the case of Henry v. Colangelo, 2025 Pa. Super. 265 (Pa. Super. Nov. 26, 2025 Kunselman, J., McLaughlin, J., and Lane, J.) (Op. by Kunselman, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court quashed an appeal after finding that the Order that the appellant had appealed from was not a final Order.

More specifically, although the trial court had certified an Order granting summary judgment against some but not all of the Defendants in a negligence and wrongful death suit as a final Order and immediately appealable, the Superior Court quashed the appeal after finding that the Order was not final and that an appeal would not facilitate resolution of the entire case.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “Court Summaries” By Timothy L. Clawges, Pennsylvania Bar News (Dec. 22, 2025).

Court Refers To Required Liberal Construction of Rules in Relieving Pro Se Plaintiff From a Judgment Non Pros

In its non-precedential decision in the case of Morrison v. Pennsylvania State Police, No. 182 C.D. 2024 (Pa. Cmwlth. Dec. 9, 2025 Covey, J., Fizzano Cannon, J., and Wallis, J.) (Op. by Covey, J.) (Op. not reported), the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court ruled that a trial court’s failure to send a Notice of Judgment Non Pros to Plaintiff’s correct address warranted a liberal application of the Rules of Procedure to allow the Plaintiff to amend his Motion to Strike the Judgment of Non Pros in order to allow the Plaintiff to comply with the rules’ requirements.

Based upon this ruling, the appellate court vacated the trial court’s Order and remanded the case for further proceedings.

This matter involved a pro se prisoner Plaintiff.

In so ruling, the appellate court also referred to the liberal construction of the Rules of Civil Procedure that is required by Pa.R.C.P. 126.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this non-precedential decision may click this LINK.


Source: “The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert,” www.Law.com (Dec. 23, 2025).

Judge Munley of Federal Middle District Court Addresses Scope of State Created Danger Claims

In the case of T.M. v. East Stroudsburg Area School District, No. 3:24-CV-1465 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 2025 Munley, J.), the court granted in part and denied in part a Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss a personal injury action arising out of allegations that the minor Plaintiff, who was a 6 year old boy with special education needs, allegedly sustained permanent injuries after being allegedly violently beaten by another student on a school bus.

According to the Opinion, the case involved, at a minimum, constitutional claims against the school district and certain school officials, as well as state law claims under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA). Included in the claims were state created danger federal claims.

As part of her decision, Judge Julia K. Munley rejected the defense argument that the Plaintiffs were required to allege “affirmative acts” on the part of the state actors to meet the legal standards required to proceed on a claim of a state created danger.

Judge Julia K. Munley
M.D. Pa.

Rather, Judge Munley agreed with the Plaintiff’s argument that an awareness of a risk, coupled with acts of omission or failures to act, could render the Plaintiff more vulnerable to harm. The court therefore held that such circumstances could constitute “affirmative misuse of state authority” sufficient to establish a state created danger claim, assuming the other elements of that cause of action are also met. In so ruling, the court rejected the Defendants’ argument that affirmative action is required to support a claim of a state created danger.

The court also addressed the vehicle exception to governmental immunity under the PSTCA. The court rejected the Defendants’ argument that the Plaintiff’s injury must stem from the actual operation of a vehicle in motion. To the contrary, the court ruled that the exception applies even where a state actor is in actual physical control of the vehicle when the harm occurs, such as even when a parked vehicle is involved. Accordingly, the court ruled that the exception could apply regardless of whether the vehicle was in motion.

Judge Munley additionally rejected the defense argument that pain and suffering damages were not available to the 6 year old minor Plaintiff under the PSTCA. The Defendants argued that the minor’s injuries did not amount to a permanent loss of bodily function or disfigurement. In this case, the Plaintiff sustained a concussion, facial contusions and lacerations, and severe PTSD.

Judge Munley found that such injuries did in fact support a request for pain and suffering damages under the PSTCA.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Court's companion Order can be viewed HERE


I send thanks to Attorney Robert T. Moran of the Moran Law Group, LLC in Scranton, PA for bringing this case to my attention.

Another Appellate Brief Containing AI Hallucinations Found in Pennsylvania

In the case of Assoc. Builders and Contractors, Inc. v. Bucks County Community College, No. 1172 C.D. 2025 (Pa. Cmwlth. Nov. 24, 2025 Cohn Jubelirer, P.J.) (Opinion not reported), the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court refused to allow an attorney to file an Amended Appellate Brief after it was determined that the original Brief filed by that attorney was created using generative artificial intelligence (AI) and was riddled with numerous factual and legal errors.

This matter arose out of an emergency application for a stay in the nature of a preliminary injunction pending appeal. There was an expedited consideration of the appeal by the court. There was also a condensed briefing scheduled issued.

The attorney for the appellee filed an initial Brief. The appellant filed a Reply Brief in which it contended that AI may have been used by the appellee to prepare the initial Brief given that the appellee’s Brief was apparently filled with fake citations, quotes to cases that do not exist and to information in the record that did not exist, and material misrepresentations with respect the record, all of which were described as AI-created hallucinations.

A week later and just two (2) days before the appeal was scheduled to be argued before the court, another attorney for the appellee filed a Motion for Leave to File an Amended Brief. The proposed Amended Brief was noted to be significantly different from the initial Brief of the appellee in both form and substance.

The appellant filed an opposition to the request for permission by the appellee to file an Amended Brief.

The Commonwealth Court confirmed that the appellee’s initial Brief was replete with both factual and legal errors. The court held that granting leave of court for the appellee to file an Amended Brief was “not an option.” The court noted that it would be prejudicial to the appellant to allow the appellee to file what is essentially an entirely new appellate Brief just two (2) days before the argument was scheduled before the en banc appellate court.

The Commonwealth Court also agreed with the argument by the appellant that granting leave under these circumstances would set a poor precedent. As such, the Commonwealth Court denied the application and struck the “AI-ridden” initial Brief. The Commonwealth Court noted that “cannot condone the filing of any legal document that admittedly contained numerous factual legal errors.”

In so ruling, the court noted that the creation of a legal document by way of generative artificial intelligence, in and of itself, is not problematic. However, the court noted that what is problematic is when the document is filed with numerous factual and legal errors and obviously not reviewed and corrected prior to the filing of the document.

In its Opinion, the court referenced a Pennsylvania Federal Court decision addressing similar issues regarding AI hallucinations being found in an filed brief. The court also reviewed the Joint Formal Opinion 2024-200 issued by the Pennsylvania Bar Association Committee on Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility and the Philadelphia Bar Association Professional Guidance Committee which provided guidance on the use of AI for the creation of legal documents.

In its Opinion, the Commonwealth Court noted that it did not “determine or pass judgment on whether any ethical rules were violated” in this case. See Op. at 8. However, with its decision, the court wished “to bring attention to the gravity of the implications of the use of generative AI by attorneys.” See Op. at 8.

In the end, the court denied the application by the appellee to file an Amended Brief.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Court Issues Sanctions When Defense Discloses 600 Pages of Documents on the Eve of Trial

In the case of McCready v. Re/Max Achievers, No. 2:24-CV-02226-JFM (E.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2025 Murphy, J.), the court addressed a Motion for discovery sanctions against a defense counsel due to the defense counsel’s failure to produce discoverable documentation during the discovery phase of the case. Defense counsel produced 600 pages of the previously undisclosed documentation at issue days before the trial date.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff sued the Defendants after he was allegedly placed at an allegedly unlicensed sober home, which allegedly improperly administered his medication, allegedly leading the Plaintiff to suffer a near fatal state of low blood pressure. The Plaintiff also claimed that he was wrongfully evicted from the facility. He sued various Defendants before settling with Re/Max, which was a property manager for the home.

While the Plaintiff asserted that the Defendant at issue should be sanctioned with a default judgment for its late disclosure of relevant evidence, after reviewing the standards applicable to discovery sanctions, the court concluded that an alternative sanction would suffice.

The court awarded attorney’s fees and costs incurred in connection with the discovery issues. The court also prohibited the Defendant from asserting that any negligence found was attributable to parties who had already settled out of the case. The court additionally permitted the Plaintiff to utilize the late-produced documents at trial, but prohibited the culpable Defendant from doing so.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Court's companion Order can be viewed HERE.


Source: Article: “Marshall Dennehey, Re/Max Sanctioned For Delayed Discovery Disclosures Ahead of Trial,” By Riley Brennan of The Legal Intelligencer (Dec. 10, 2025).

Court Rejects Allegations of Fraud Relative to Opposing Counsel Allegedly Meeting Ex Parte With Arbitrator During Lunch Break

In the case of Shannon v. Weis Markets, Inc., No. 1604 MDA 2024 (Pa. Super. Sept. 16, 2025 Panella, P.J.E., Lane, J., and Stevens, P.J.E.) (Op. by Lane, J.), the Superior Court affirmed a trial court’s Order denying a Plaintiff’s Petition to vacate or set aside an Arbitration Award in favor of the Defendant under 42 Pa. C.S. A §7341.

According to the Opinion, this negligence action arose out of a slip and fall in a supermarket. 

After the completion of discovery, the parties agreed to submit the matter to binding Arbitration pursuant to a binding high/low Arbitration pursuant to a written agreement. 

After the Arbitration was completed, the arbitrator determined that the store was not negligent. Consistent with the high/low agreement, the arbitrator entered an award in favor of the Plaintiff in the amount of $75,000.00, which was the low parameter of the high/low agreement. 

Thereafter, the Plaintiff filed a Petition to Vacate or Set Aside the Arbitration Award. The Plaintiff asserted that the arbitrator, Weis’s counsel and a Weis’s corporate representative met privately during a lunch break without the Plaintiff or her counsel present, thereby creating an appearance of “fraud, misconduct, corruption, or other irregularity” resulting in an outcome that was “unjust, inequitable, or unconscionable.”

The trial court denied the Petition and, with this decision, the Superior Court affirmed the denial.

In its Opinion, the Superior Court reaffirmed high burden set by the scope of review relative to an arbitration award.   

In addition to confirming that the Plaintiff never made an inquiry about the alleged meeting and never produced facts to suggest that the arbitrator’s award was influenced by the alleged meeting, the Superior Court held that the mere appearance of impropriety arising from an alleged ex parte contact between an arbitrator and one party’s counsel’s representative, without clear, precise, and indubitable evidence of misconduct or resulting prejudice, is insufficient to support the vacation of a common law Arbitration Award under §7341.

The court additionally noted that the award itself was not inequitable since the Plaintiff received $75,000.00 under the high/low agreement even though the arbitrator found that the store was not negligent.

The Superior Court otherwise found that the Plaintiff had waived the argument that the trial court had abused its discretion by not developing a factual record before entering its decision denying the Petition to Vacate. The appellate court noted that the trial court’s local rules allowed the trial court the discretion to determine whether to issue a Rule to Show Cause based upon the sufficiency of the allegations. The appellate court noted that, since the Plaintiff’s allegations were insufficient, the record did not need further development for a proper decision.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert, www.Law.com (Sept. 30, 2025).

Source of image:  Photo by Rebrand Cities on www.pexels.com.

Effort To Dismiss Case Due To Service of Process Issues Fails Procedurally and Substantively

In the case of Howey v. O’Leary, No. 2024-CV-5227 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Dec. 15, 2025 Nealon, J.), Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas denied a Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings based upon service of process issues. According to the Opinion, this matter arose out of a motor vehicle accident.

In the Complaint, the Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant resided at a certain address. The Sheriff’s Department served the Complaint on the Defendant’s father at the address pled in the Plaintiff’s Complaint.

Thereafter, the Defendant did not file any Preliminary Objections asserting improper service of a Complaint. Nor did the Defendant file a responsive pleading raising the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense under Pa. R.C.P. 1030(a).

Rather, before the pleadings were closed, the Defendant filed a Motion for Judgment on the pleadings in which she asserted that she did not reside at the address pled in the Complaint when the Complaint was served.

In response, the Plaintiff asserted that the Defendant’s address was identified on the Defendant’s driver’s license, vehicle registration, and insurance paperwork as being the correct address. 

Judge Terrence R. Nealon
Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas

In addresssing the matter before him, Judge Nealon initially noted that Pennsylvania law requires that any alleged defects in service of process must be raised by way of Preliminary Objections. The court additionally noted that a party who fails to object to service of process by way of Preliminary Objections waives the issue. As such, the court found that the Defendant waived the issues regarding service of process by proceeding with a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.

Judge Nealon went on to note that, even if the Defendant’s claim of a failure to complete proper service of process was considered, the defense's request for relief would be denied in any event.

First of all, the court noted that the pleadings were not closed and, as such, the filing of a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings was improper. 

The court additionally noted that the Defendant failed to satisfy the standard of review of showing that there were no disputed issues of fact and that the Defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Here, there was as dispute between the parties as to where the Defendant resided.

For all of these reasons, the court denied the Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and directed that the Defendant file a responsive pleading to the Complaint.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.