Interesting Legal Issue: ChatGPT Sued in Federal Court in Illinois Under Allegation of Practicing Law Without a License

According to an article written by Laura Lorek which was published in a March 9, 2026 online edition of The Legal Intelligencer, an interesting lawsuit was filed in the US District Court of the Northern District of Illinois recently, naming OpenAI Foundation and OpenAI Group PBC as Defendants. The lawsuit accuses ChatGPT, a chatbot developed by OpenAI, of practicing law without a license.

Nippon Life Insurance Company of America filed suit against the Defendants noted after a former pro se litigant used ChatGPT to contest a previously settled and dismissed lawsuit, which the pro se Plaintiff later acknowledged was a final and enforceable settlement.

The Complaint that was filed in the lawsuit alleges that ChatGPT provided unauthorized legal assistance to the former pro se litigant who had settled claims against the insurance company. The Complaint alleges that the unauthorized legal assistance provided by ChatGPT resulted in forty-four (44) frivolous Motions being filed and allegedly caused the Plaintiff $300,000 in legal expenses.

The insurance company was seeking in its lawsuit $300,000 in compensatory damages, court costs, attorneys’ fees, a permanent injunction barring OpenAI from providing legal assistance in Illinois, and $10 million dollars in punitive damages.

As noted in the article written by Laura Loreck for The Legal Intelligencer, the case raises unresolved legal questions, including whether AI tools can be held liable as third-party offenders, whether providing legal assistance constitutes “the practice of law” under state statutes, and the extent to which AI companies are responsible for foreseeable misuse of their products.

Source: Article – “Practicing Law Without a License: ChatGPT Sued For Legal Fees,” By Laura Lorek of The Legal Intelligencer (March 9, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by Matheus Bertelli on www. pexels.com.

Pa. Supreme Court Finds Issues of Fact Regarding Immunity Defense in Third Party Liability Case Arising Out of a Work Injury

In the case of Brown v. Gaydos, No. 22 WAP 2024 (Pa. Feb. 18, 2026) (Op. by Mundy, J.)(Brobson, J., concurring and dissenting)(Wecht, J. dissenting), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of a Defendant employer in a third party litigation based upon §205 of the Workers’ Compensation Act, 77 P.S. §72, which provides for co-employee immunity, was appropriate.

The court noted that, §205 of the Workers' Compensation Act provides that, “[i]f disability or death is compensable under this act, a person shall not be liable to anyone at common law or otherwise on account of such disability or death for any act or omission occurring while such person was in the same employ as the person disabled or killed, except for intentional wrong.

The court found that there were no genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the Defendant employee’s allegedly negligent acts or omissions occurred while he was in the same employ as the Plaintiff that supported the trial court's denial of summary judgment. As such, the court remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings.

According to the Opinion, this matter involved a workplace accident that occurred when the Plaintiff decedent was fatally injured by a skid loader which was owned by the Defendant employer. The decedent’s supervisor was not on the premises at the time of the incident.

After securing workers' compensation from his employer, the estate of the decedent pursued a third party claim against his employer and asserted that, among other acts, the employer and its employees were negligent in maintaining the skid loader and in failing to train or supervise the company’s employees in operating the machine.

The employer filed a Motion for Summary Judgment asserted that the Workers’ Compensation Act provided immunity from civil suit as either the decedent’s employer or co-employee.  In this decision, the Supreme Court ruled that issues of fact should have compelled the trial court to deny the Motion.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of the Majority Opinion for this decision may click this LINK.

Justice Brobson's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion can be viewed HERE.

Justice Wecht's Dissenting Opinion can be viewed HERE.


Source: Article – “Pa. Supreme Court Rules Against Broad Application of Co-Employee Immunity Under the Workers’ Comp Act, “ By Riley Brennan of The Legal Intelligencer (Feb. 18, 2026).

Superior Court Upholds Right to Jury Trial and Rejects Arbitration Clause Relative to Contract Plaintiff Entered Into on Defendant's Website

In the case of Duffy v. Tatum, No. 483 EDA 2025 (Pa. Super. March 3, 2026 Lazarus, P.J., Panella, P.J.E., and Sullivan, J.) (Op. by Panella, P.J.E.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed a trial court’s Order overruling a Defendant’s Preliminary Objections under which the Defendant asserted that a Plaintiff had waived the right to a jury trial by way of an agreement entered into via the Defendant's website.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff had proceeded to the Defendant’s website to book services provided by the Defendant moving company.

On that website, the customer was required to check off a box accepting the Defendant’s terms of services. The customer had the ability to click on an underlined phrase that would take the customer to the Defendant’s Terms of Service by way of a hyperlink. 

On that hyperlink, if the customer accessed it, one of the provisions that would be seen in the language on that page would be an ADR clause for the resolution of any disputes that arose between the parties by way of mediation followed by an arbitration, as opposed to by way of an opportunity for a jury trial in a court of law.

In this matter, the trial court found that the Defendant’s website did not provide a reasonably obvious notice of its Terms of Service to the Defendant’s customers prior to the customer’s purchasing the services offered by the company.  As such, the trial court ruled that the customer had never agreed to waive his constitutional right to a jury trial. As noted, on appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s decision in this regard.

The Superior Court framed the central issue before it as involving “an overarching question of whether a person should be deprived of their constitutional right to a jury trial when they ostensibly enter into an arbitration agreement through hyperlinked Terms of Service on a website that the person never clicked on, viewed, or read.” See Op. at p. 6.

In so ruling, the Pennsylvania Superior Court referred to its prior decisions on this issue in which the court had held that the Pennsylvania State Constitution provides its citizens with the greater protections afforded by the right to a jury trial.

The Superior Court otherwise noted that the “copious use of contracts with restrictive arbitration agreements causes concern, particularly in the context of internet contracts like the one at issue here, where the parties are frequently of unequal bargaining power and one party may be unaware of the significant rights they are waiving simply by using a website to make a purchase or retain services.” See Op. at p. 8.

President Judge Emeritus Panella noted in his Opinion that, in recognition of this reality, Pennsylvania courts have taken a small step towards righting the wrongs of arbitration agreements with respect to wrongful death actions involving negligent nursing center facilities. The court otherwise noted that there is still a need for greater scrutiny regarding a person’s waiver of their constitutional right to a jury trial when it comes to these types of arbitration agreements in other scenarios as well. 

Judge Panella stated that “[t]his need is imperative when there is no genuine effort to inform a purchaser of the terms of the contract before they click on a link or box that purports to generate their agreement to a contract, as the case” was in this matter. See Op. at p. 9.

The court went on to note that it found that it is imperative that, in the context of civil litigation matters, that a person be fully informed of their constitutional right to a jury trial and of the effect of waiving that right. Accordingly, the court held that it is essential that any waiver of the right to a jury trial must be clearly described and evidenced such that the person waiving the right fully understands the right that they are giving up by agreeing to enter into the contract.

In light of its holding that the constitutional right to a jury trial in Pennsylvania should be afforded the greatest protection possibly by the courts of Pennsylvania, the court in this Duffy case enunciated a “strict burden of proof [that its] necessary to demonstrate a person’s unambiguous manifestation of assent to arbitration.” See Op. at p. 15.

More specifically, the court noted that this strict burden of proof necessary to demonstrate a person unambiguous assent to arbitration requires (1) an explicit statement on the registration website and application screens that a consumer is waiving their right to a jury trial when then the person agrees to the seller’s Terms of Service and the registration cannot be completed until the person is fully informed of that waiver, and (2) when the agreements are available for viewing after a user has clicked on a hyperlink, the waiver should be not hidden in the middle of the document, but rather, should appear prominently in bold, capitalized text. See Op. at p. 15.

The court additionally noted that the word “arbitration” must also be clearly defined within the arbitration agreement in addition to being prominently displayed in the language of the contract. See Op. at p. 16.

In the end, in this case, where the customer here never clicked on the Terms of Service and, therefore, never saw the Terms of Service, the court ruled the customer did not unambiguously assent or agree to give up his or her rights to a jury trial in favor of arbitration. 

The Superior Court also ruled that, where the website did not provide a reasonably obvious notice of its Terms of Service, there was no meeting of the minds on a contractual basis relative to the issue of arbitration for the resolution of any disputes. 

As such, the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the lower court's decision and found that the trial court did not err in overruling the Defendant company’s Preliminary Objections on the issues presented.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: Article – “Pa. Superior Court Rules Company’s Terms Didn’t Waive Customer’s Right to Jury Trial” By Tristin Hoffman of The Legal Intelligencer (March 6, 2026).


I also send thanks to Attorney Thomas F. Foley, III of the Foley Law Firm in Scranton, Pennsylvania for making sure that I saw this decision as well.

Source of image:  Photo by Vojtech Okenka on www.pexels.com.

Court Allows Punitive Damages Claims to Proceed in Dog Bite Case

In the case of Clifford v. Dickson, No. S-1799-25 (C.P. Schuylk. Co. Feb. 12, 2026 Burke, J.), the court addressed various issues raised by way of Preliminary Objections filed against a Complaint in a dog bite case.

Of note, the court rejected the Preliminary Objection filed by the Defendant relative to the Plaintiffs’ description of the Defendant’s dog as “vicious.” The court noted that it did not see any prejudice from the use of the term “vicious” at this early stage of the proceedings.  The court did note that the use of the term “vicious” may not prove to be admissible at trial.

With regards to the Preliminary Objections filed with regards to the Plaintiff’s claims of outrageous conduct and evil motive, as well as with respect to the request for punitive damages, the court found that the facts pled in the Complaint supported the claims and allegations in this regard.

Here, the court found that the conduct of the Defendant was allegedly more than mere or ordinary negligence. In the Complaint, there were allegations that the Defendant acted in an intentional, willful, wanton, or reckless manner. More specifically, the court noted that there were allegations that the Defendant not only allowed her two pitbulls and another large dog to be unleashed, unrestrained, and uncontrolled on the day of the accident, it was also alleged that the Defendant dog owner had allowed this to happen on prior occasions as well.

The court also pointed to the allegations that the Defendant had failed to vaccinate the dogs in question.

The court additionally noted that it would premature to dismiss the Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages at the pleadings stage. Rather, based, in part, on the Superior Court's decision in the case of Monroe v. CBH2O, LP, 286 A.3d 785, 799-800 (Pa. Super. 2022), the court felt that it would be more appropriate for the Defendant to seek to attempt to have the punitive damages claims dismissed after the close of discovery by way of a Motion for Summary Judgment.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Thomas J. Newell, a plaintiff's attorney who exclusively represents dog attack victims, for bringing this decision to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Pozva on www.unsplash.com.

Superior Court Affirms Trial Court's Refusal to Give Increased Risk of Harm Jury Instruction in Medical Malpractice Case

In its non-precedential decision in the case of Matthews v. Hosp. of the Univ. of Penn., No. 1163 EDA 2024 (Pa. Super. Feb. 26, 2026 Lazarus, P.J., Kunselman, J., and King, J.) (Op. by King, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court denied a medical malpractice Plaintiff’s attempt to overcome a defense verdict in a Philadelphia County case.

In part, the Plaintiff argued that the trial court had erred in denying the Plaintiff’s request for an increased risk of harm jury charge.

Upon review of the record, the court found that the jury instruction was not warranted because the Plaintiff’s witnesses, including expert witnesses, failed to testify as to how the Defendant’s alleged delay in performing a cesarean section caused or increased the risk of harm to the Plaintiff’s child. 

The court noted that the record revealed that the Plaintiff’s expert did not state, within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the Defendants’ alleged failure to perform a C-Section earlier could either cause or increase the risk the type of brain injury suffered by the child.  As such, the Superior Court ruled that the Plaintiff was not entitled to the increased risk of harm jury instruction under the evidence that was presented at trial.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this non-precedential decision may click this LINK.


Source: Article – “Insufficient Expert Testimony Sinks Push To Overturn Med. Mal Defense Win, Pa. Appeals Court Rules.” By Riley Brennan The Legal Intelligencer (Feb. 27, 2026).

PLEASE CONSIDER CUMMINS MEDIATION FOR YOUR NEXT MEDIATION

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Superior Court Refuses to Weigh The Evidence on Appeal

In its non-precedential decision in the case of Kopeissi v. Shipwire, Inc., No. 2789 EDA 2024 (Pa Super. Jan. 23, 2026 Lazarus, P.J., Bowes, J., and Ford Elliot, P.J.E.) (Mem. Op. by Bowes, J.), the court addressed post-trial motions in a matter in which the Plaintiff challenged the trial court’s denial of his request for a new trial on punitive damages.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff was allegedly injured when unloading pallets of Peloton weights from a tractor trailer that had allegedly been improperly stacked on top of each other.

At trial, the Defendant admitted that it had allegedly stacked the pallets did not contest that it acted negligently. Rather, its defense at trial was that it did not act recklessly.

At trial, the jury found that the tractor trailer company was not negligent. However, the jury found that the Defendant that had stacked the pallets and who had admitted negligence but denied recklessness was 80% negligent.  However, the jury found that the actions of that Defendant were not reckless.

After trial, the Plaintiff argued that the jury’s verdict on the issue of reckless was against the weight of the evidence. It was also argued that improper remarks during closing arguments prejudiced the jury and tainted their deliberations on the issue of recklessness.

On appeal, the Superior Court rejected both arguments.

Relative to the claim that the jury’s finding on the issue of recklessness was against the weight of the evidence, the Superior Court noted that the Plaintiff essentially wanted the Superior Court to re-weigh the evidence and come to a different result. The Superior Court noted that it was refusing to do so. The Superior Court otherwise noted that it found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s conclusion that the jury’s verdict did not shock the trial court’s conscience.

As such, the denial of the Plaintiff’s post-trial motions was affirmed.


Anyone wishing to review a copy of this non-precedential decision may click this LINK.

Article: How To Bypass an Impasse At Mediation

Here is a LINK to my article entitled "How To Bypass an Impasse at Mediation" which has just been published in the March/April edition of the Pennsylvania Lawyer magazine.

With this article I gathered lessons from my experience as a certified Federal Middle District Court Mediator and as a private Mediator with Cummins Mediation in order to provide tips on how to get past those difficult times at Mediation where there seems to be no way to move forward with the negotiations.  The hope is that these suggestions will enable you to realize more success at more Mediations.

Proud to note that this is my 200th published article.  Hope you enjoy it and that it helps you with your practice.

Should you ever need assistance with trying to bring a case of yours to a close through a Mediation, please consider Cummins Mediation.

570-319-5899

dancummins@cumminslaw.net

Abington Heights Mock Trial Team Wins Regional Championship! Headed Back to States!

The Abington Heights High School Mock Trial Team from Clarks Summit, Lackawanna County won the 2026 REGIONAL Mock Trial Championship last night and are on their way to the STATE Championship Competition in Harrisburg, PA which is set to take place later this month!

If you have a high school student in your house, or one about to go to high school, please encourage them to consider doing Mock Trial even if they have no intentions or idea of a career in the law.  There is no better activity for increasing a student's self-confidence, public speaking skills, and analytical skills.  Mock Trial students are required to think on their feet and pivot in response to sudden changes in circumstances.  

It is also a great activity for comradery as the students really support one another during the course of the season.

Sending thanks to all the jurors who volunteered their time to serve last night and to those who volunteered through out the season.  The competition cannot succeed without those local lawyers, paralegals, law office staff members, and others who are willing to volunteer.  Thank you.

Also sending thanks to the Lackawanna Bar Association and its Executive Director, Lee Ann Munley, as well as Kaitlin McDonough of that office for all their time and work to make the program a success.

Also sending thanks to Lori Siegle, the Executive Director of the Monroe County Bar Association and her staff for all of their time and work on Mock Trial in their District and for the Regional Competition this year.

Also sending great thanks to the District Coordinator for the Mock Trial Competition, Mackenzie Wilson, a great attorney with Munley Law, for donating all of her time and hard work to make the local competition a success.

Let's go Comets!  Keep soarin' onto the States!  So proud!

Trial Court Overrules Preliminary Objections to Allegations of Recklessness and Claims For Punitive Damages

In the case of Fisher v. Leo, No. 2025-CV-05941 (C.P. Luz. Co. Feb. 4, 2026, Pierantoni, J.), the court overruled a Defendant’s Preliminary Objections to allegations of recklessness and punitive damages. 

In so ruling, the court cited to the Pennsylvania Superior Court case of Monroe v. CBH20, L.P., 286 A.3d 785, 798 (Pa. Super. 2022).

The court also noted that the issue of the validity of claims for recklessness and punitive damages are more appropriate for consideration at the summary judgment stage.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Peter Biscontini of Biscontini Law for bringing this case to my attention.

Abington Heights High School Mock Trial Team Wins District Championship

2026 Abington Heights Mock Trial Team
From L. to R.: Mark Barbrack, Christopher Cummins, Aaliya Murray, Nolan Moore, Amishi Amit, Leen Abughnia, Chase Roberts, Jasleen Montesino, Henry Mahoney, Hatice Kucak, Sadie Robson, Grace Bennett, Ananya Phadke, Gabe Westgate, Eloise Giroux

Proud to note that the Abington Heights High School Mock Trial Team from Clarks Summit, Lackawanna County won the 2026 District Championship Trial last night and are on their way to the Regional Championship!

The Team is made up of a great bunch of very bright and polite students who work hard and support one another.  Very proud of all of the students on the team, including my son, Christopher.

The coaches and advisors for the team include my wife, Anne Cummins, myself Dan Cummins, Jody Healey, Esq. and Denise Bennett.  We are all so proud of the hard work these students have put in towards the success of the program.

The Mock Trial case this year was an interesting medical malpractice case involving a defendant family doctor's alleged failure to diagnose the plaintiff's medical condition.

The Finals Trial was presided over by The Honorable Judge Terrence R. Nealon who did an excellent job allowing the kids to argue their objections while providing them lessons on the law with his rulings.  Sending thanks to Judge Nealon for donating his time and expertise to the competition.

Also sending thanks to all the jurors who volunteered their time to serve last night and to those who volunteered through out the season.  The competition cannot succeed without those local lawyers, paralegals, law office staff members, and others who are willing to volunteer.  Thank you.

Also sending thanks to the Lackawanna Bar Association and its Executive Director, Lee Ann Munley, as well as Kaitlin McDonough of that office for all their time and work to make the program a success.

Sending great thanks to the District Coordinator for the Mock Trial Competition, Mackenzie Wilson, a great attorney with Munley Law, for donating all of her time and hard work to make the local competition a success.

Let's go Comets!  Keep soarin' onto the Regionals!  So proud!

Mock Trial Jurors Needed for the Northeast PA Regional Final Set For Next Monday

 The Regional Mock Trial Final for northeastern Pennsylvania is set for March 9, 2026 in the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas with a start time of 6:00 p.m.

This Region covers schools in Lackawanna, Wayne, Pike, and Monroe County.

Jurors are needed to fill up the jury box for the students.  If you are willing and able to volunteer as a juror for this Regional Mock Trial Final, here is a LINK to the form being used by the Monroe County Bar Association to sign up.

Litigant Chided For Including AI Hallucinations in Appellate Filings

In the case of Saber v. Navy Federal Credit Union, No. 2449 EDA 2024 (Pa. Super. Jan. 14, 2026 Panella, P.J.E., Dubow, J., and Nichols, J.) (Op. by Nichols, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court again addressed an appeal in which a litigant (possibly pro se) utilized AI to draft the appellate submissions which submissions included citations to non-existent case law.

The case involved a dispute over a car loan.

In footnote 4 of its decision, the Pennsylvania Superior Court noted that the litigant provided “non-sensical citations to and characterization of" certain cases. The litigant’s Brief also contained citations to several other cases that did not exist. The court noted that these issues suggested that the litigant utilized generative artificial intelligence to draft his Brief.

The court noted that the party’s reliance upon these hallucinations led to a waiver of his claims on appeal. The Superior Court emphasized the importance of citing pertinent authority and pointed out the potential issues with using generative AI for legal filings without verifying the information secured.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert, www.Law.com (Feb. 3, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by Ali Numan on www.unsplash.com.

Mock Trial Jurors Needed For Finals Trial in Lackawanna County Competition Set For Next Tuesday -- Please Consider Volunteering

 

Superior Court Addresses How To Address Settled Defendants at Trial

In its non-precedential decision in the case of Swank v. Rabkin Dermatopathology Laboratory, P.C., No. 342 WDA 2025 (Pa. Super. Dec. 15, 2025 Panella, P.J.E., McLaughlin, J., and Bender, P.J.E.) (Op. by Panella, P.J.E.), the court reversed the entry of judgment in favor of certain Defendants in a medical malpractice case and remanded the case back down for further proceedings.

According to the Opinion, this matter involved a delayed cancer diagnosis case.

Prior to trial, the Plaintiff reached a settlement with all parties except one and proceeded to trial against that last remaining party.

The Plaintiff, along with the settling Defendants, requested the trial court to dismiss the settling Defendants prior to trial because the remaining Defendant did not have any expert to provide an expert opinion against the settling Defendants. Moreover, the remaining Defendant did not file any crossclaim against the settled Defendants. Also, the Plaintiff did not have any expert testimony that was critical of the settling Defendants that would be presented at trial.  At the trial level, it was the Plaintiff’s position that it was legally impossible for there to be a prima facie case established against the settling Defendants and that, as such, those Defendants should be dismissed. 

The trial court disagreed and kept those settling Defendants in the case, relying upon the Fair Share Act in doing so.

As the case proceeded, the trial court did end up dismissing one of the settling Defendants after the Plaintiff’s case-in-chief was completed. The remaining other settled Defendants were dismissed just before closing arguments.

At trial, the Plaintiffs claimed that there was prejudice to the Plaintiff because the jury was left wondering why these Defendants were dismissed after they participated in the trial.

The jury ended up entering a defense verdict.  

The Plaintiff appealed and, in this Superior Court decision, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision and remanded the matter for further proceedings after finding that the trial court’s reliance upon Fair Share Act was misplaced.

Judge Panella, who wrote this Opinion, as well as the Fair Share Act case of Spencer v. Johnson, 249 A.3d 529 (Pa. Super. 2021), noted that the Superior Court has concluded that, for the “Fair Share Act to apply, the Plaintiff’s negligence must be an issue in the case.” See Op. at 13 citing Spencer, 249 A.3d at 559.

The court noted that, in this case, the Plaintiff’s negligence was not at issue in the case. As such, the court ruled that the trial court erred in relying upon the Fair Share Act to keep Defendants in the case.

The court otherwise noted that there is no absolute right to have settled Co-Defendants on a Verdict Sheet. Rather, the appellate court noted that a trial court must determine whether any evidence of the settled Co-Defendant’s liability exists in the case presented before deciding whether that party should be put on the Verdict Slip.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this non-precedential decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Carmen J. Nocera of the Pittsburgh law firm of Harry S. Cohen & Associates, P.C. for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of image: Photo by Tima Miroshnichenko on www.pexels.com.

Superior Court Upholds The "Miscellaneous Vehicle" Exclusion Contained in UIM Policy

In the case of Erie Ins. Exch. v. Estate of Kennedy, 210 WDA 2025, 2025 Pa. Super 276 (Pa. Super. Dec. 11, 2025 Bowes, J., Stabile, J., Bender P.J.E.) (Op. by Stabile, J.), the Superior Court upheld a "miscellaneous vehicle" exclusion contained in the UIM carrier’s policy. 

The court more specifically ruled that the denial of coverage was proper when the deceased injured party had a policy providing stacking of uninsured and underinsured benefits that included an exclusion stating that the policy would not cover damages sustained by an insured while occupying a miscellaneous vehicle owned by a relative and that was not covered under the subject insurance policy. 

The Superior Court ruled that the "miscellaneous vehicle" exclusion was valid in this case because the insured was seeking to stack policies but had not first received uninsured and underinsured coverage under the policy applicable to the vehicle he occupied at the time the injuries occurred.  

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source:  “Court Summaries” by Timothy L. Clawges in the Pennsylvania Bar News (Jan. 19, 2026). 

Please Consider Helping Out -- Mock Trial Jurors Still Needed for Tomorrow's Lackawanna Competition

 

PA Federal Court Predicts PA Supreme Court Will Adopt Efficient Proximate Cause Doctrine in Property Insurance Coverage Cases

In the case of Stella Prop. Dev. and Event Prod., LLC v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., No. 3:24-CV-00060-SLH (W.D. Pa. Jan. 28, 2026 Smith, J.), the court ruled in favor of an insurance carrier on Cross-Motions for Partial Summary Judgment in an insurance coverage, breach of contract, and bad faith claims.

According to the Opinion, this matter involved a commercial property policy that offered protection to the Plaintiff’s property. The Plaintiff’s property allegedly sustained damages from a windstorm.

The Plaintiff had an inspection completed and submitted a claim to the insurance company for first-party property coverage. The Plaintiff provided the carrier with the inspection report.

The carrier had their own inspection completed and that report indicated that the damage to the Plaintiff’s roof involved shingles that appeared to be over twenty-five (25) years of age and in very poor condition. That expert also concluded that no sudden loss created the damages to the roof. 

The carrier also secured an engineering expert who completed an additional inspection and also concluded that the roof and the shingles on the roof were not damaged by the wind event. Based at least in part on these reports, the carrier denied the claim.

In issuing the denial, the carrier relied upon certain exclusions including a wear-and-tear exclusion and a maintenance exclusion.

Thereafter, the Plaintiff filed suit alleging a breach of contract and bad faith claims. The matter came before this court on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment on the issues presented.

The court denied the Plaintiff’s Motions and granted the insurance company’s Motions.

In reviewing the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment on its breach of contract claim, the court noted that, based upon the exclusions claimed by the carrier, the carrier was asserting that summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiff was inappropriate because there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the damages to the roof pre-existed the storm or were caused by the storm.

In this regard, the court reviewed the efficient proximate cause doctrine and compared it to the concurrent causation doctrine in coverage dispute matters.

In the end, this court predicated that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would adopt and apply the efficient proximate cause doctrine if faced with the issue.

Applying that doctrine to the case presented, the court noted that the Plaintiff’s claims of a breach of contract is not defeated merely because wear-and-tear and/or inadequate maintenance may have contributed to the roof damage. Rather, the Plaintiff must still be provided with an opportunity to prove that the windstorm was the “dominant and efficient” cause of the roof destruction as opposed to being merely a “remote” or “incidental” cause. 

Given that there were issues of material fact in this regard, the court ruled that this question should be decided by a jury.

Relative to the carrier’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Plaintiff’s statutory bad faith claim, the court ruled that the Plaintiff had not produced sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude, by clear and convincing evidence, that the carrier lacked a reasonable basis to deny the claim. 

The court noted that the record before it confirmed that the carrier relied upon detailed investigative materials and expert assessments that attributed the roof damage to decay and wear-and-tear. 

The court found that these expert assessments supplied an objectively reasonable basis for the carrier to conclude that wear-n-tear and/or inadequate maintenance, as opposed to a covered windstorm, was the dominant and efficient cause of the loss, and that the exclusions therefore applied.

The court noted that the mere possibility that the insured may prevail at proving the Plaintiff’s case in this regard “hardly equates to bad faith.” Rather, the court noted that the question under the bad faith statute, 42 Pa. C.S.A. §8371 is whether the denial lacked a reasonable basis. The court cited to other case law confirming that a reasonable basis for the denial of a claim is all that is required in order to defeat a claim of insurance bad faith.

Based on this law, the court ruled in favor of the carrier’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the bad faith issues and dismissed that claim of the Plaintiff with prejudice.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Robert S. Stickley of Stickley Law LLC in Newtown Square, PA for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Andreas Ebner on www.pexels.com.

Philadelphia County Matter Coordinated to Matter in Jefferson County Arising Out of Same Incident

Jefferson County Courthouse

In the case of Bucci Express, LLC v. SG Freight, Inc., No. 263-CV-2025 C.D. (C.P. Jeff. Co. Dec. 29, 2025 Foradora, P.J.), the court granted a Plaintiff’s Motion for Coordination of Actions in different counties relative to separate claims arising out of the same trucking accident, one of which was filed in Jefferson County and one of which was filed in Philadelphia County. The court ruled that the Philadelphia County lawsuit would be coordinated with the case that was filed in Jefferson County. The court made this ruling pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 213.1.

According to this Opinion, this matter arose out of a fatal multi-vehicle crash involving commercial trucks. Following the crash, two (2) trucking companies files suit in Jefferson County against multiple Defendants, including Pennsylvania Department of Transportation. The Plaintiffs alleged that the Jefferson County lawsuit was improperly filed to block proceedings in Philadelphia County.

In issuing his ruling, the court noted that PennDOT’s presence in the case weighed heavily in the decision, noting that state law limits where that agency can be sued. The court noted that keeping the case out of Jefferson County would effectively block the Plaintiffs from pursuing certain claims against PennDOT under the applicable law.

Although the court acknowledged that Philadelphia County may have been more convenient for some of the parties in that case, the court found that key witnesses, including first responders, were based in Jefferson County and should not be required to travel long distances.

Judge Foradora also noted that many pre-trial proceedings could be handled remotely, thereby reducing travel burdens on lawyers and witnesses.

The court additionally noted that, by coordinating the lawsuits, duplicative and inconsistent rulings, Orders, or judgments would be avoided a judicial economy furthered.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source: Article “Venue Fight Ends As Court Moves Fatal Trucking Cases Outside Of Phila. Courts” By Tristin Hoffman of The Legal Intelligencer (Dec. 30, 2025).

Pennsylvania Lawyer Magazine Recognized on a National Level

An article of mine was featured in The Pennsylvania Lawyer magazine over the past year, which magazine was awarded a 2025 Luminary Award from the National Association for Bar Professionals!

My article entitled "Use of Exhibits in Opening Statements is Allowed" appeared in the May/June 2025 edition of the magazine. Here is a LINK to the Tort Talk post on that article, which post contains a link to the article.

I send thanks to Patricia Graybill, the editor of The Pennsylvania Lawyer magazine for agreeing to publish the article. I also extend my congratulations to her for receiving this recognition for the excellent work she has done for years with the magazine for the Pennsylvania Bar Association.

If you are interested in authoring an article, contact the Pennsylvania Bar Association via email at: editor@pabar.org.

Mock Trial Jurors Needed For Semi-Final Round of Lackawanna County Competition Set For February 24th

 

Pennsylvania Federal Court Rules that Insurance Information Is Not Admissible at Post-Koken Trial on UIM Claims

In the case of Saeli v. Geico Adv. Ins. Co., No. 1:24-CV-00025-RAL (W.D. Pa. Jan. 28, 2026 Lanzillo, Chief Mag. J.), the Chief Magistrate Judge for the Western District Federal Court of Pennsylvania addressed a Motion In Limine filed a UIM carrier in a post-Koken case seeking to preclude the Plaintiff from introducing any evidence or testimony regarding the amount of the tortfeasor’s liability limits, the UIM limits, or any premiums paid.

The court ruled that, since the probative value of such evidence, if any, is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and confusion on the issues presented, the UIM carrier’s Motion was granted.

The court additionally found that the evidence at issue is irrelevant to the issues presented in the trial. The court noted that the central issue in the case was the extent of the damages sustained by the Plaintiff. As such, the court found that the amount of the tortfeasor’s liability limits, the UIM limits, and the premiums paid were irrelevant to such issues.

The court noted that, while the tortfeasor’s liability coverage will have to be credited to the UIM carrier, the court noted that this is a simple mathematical calculation that the court could accomplish by molding the verdict after the verdict is handed down the jury and without the need to involve the jury.

The court felt that requesting a jury to apply the liability limit against the UIM benefits coverage would unnecessarily complicate the issues before the jury and could risk prejudice to Geico.

Magistrate Judge Lanzillo included in his Opinion a review of other Pennsylvania federal court decisions on the issue and noted that all but one had held the evidence of coverage limits and premiums paid provided no benefit to the jury in determining the issue of damages in post-Koken cases and that, even if such evidence was minimally relevant, its probative value was substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice to the Defendant. See Op. at 4.

It is noted that the court additionally indicated that the Plaintiff did not file a Response to Geico’s Motion In Limine by the time of the deadline set by the court.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney Joseph Hudock of the Pittsburgh office of the Summers, McDonnell, Hudock, Guthrie & Rauch, P.C. law firm for bringing this case decision to my attention.


Please note that the Post-Koken scorecard on the Tort Talk blog will be updated with this decision.

The post-Koken scorecard on the Tort Talk blog is always freely available for research. You can access the scorecard by going to www.TortTalk.coom and scrolling a bit down the hand column to the label for Post-Koken Scorecard and clicking on the date under that.

Source of image:  Photo by Scott Greer on www. unsplash.com.

Motion For Summary Judgment Denied in Zipline Accident Case

In the case of Witkowski v. Hellerick’s Family Farm, Inc., No. 230900999 (C.P. Phila. Co. Sept. 18, 2025), the trial court issued a Rule 1925 Opinion requesting the Superior Court to affirm its decision denying a Motion for Summary Judgment in a premises liability case.

According to the Opinion, this matter arises out of a fatal accident that occurred when the Plaintiff died after experiencing difficulties on a zipline course at the Defendant’s farm.

Prior to the incident, the Plaintiff has signed liability waivers acknowledging the risks involved in the activity.

After the accident, the Plaintiff filed a negligence suit in which recklessness was alleged as well.

The Defendant farm moved for summary judgment arguing that the signed waivers and the Agritourism Activity Protection Act shielded the Defendants from liability.

According to the Opinion, the Agritourism Activity Protection Act limits liability for agritourism providers unless gross negligence or recklessness is proven.

The court found that issues of fact with regards to whether the Defendant’s conduct constituted gross negligence or recklessness, which would negate the protections of the waivers and the act existed in the case presented. As such, the court noted that the issues should be permitted to proceed to a jury.

The trial court otherwise noted that the appeal should be dismissed on procedural grounds as its order did not meet the criteria for an appealable Order under Pennsylvania law given that the Order at issue was not a final Order.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (Jan. 8, 2026).

Trial Court Addresses Whether a Certificate of Merit is Required

In the case of Muniz-Colon v. Friends Hospital, Sept. Term, 2025, No. 0068500065 (C.P. Phila. Co. Jan. 12, 2026 Hill, J.), the court addressed the issue of when a Certificate of Merit may be required for a professional negligence case.

According to information gathered on this case, the Plaintiff in this matter was allegedly brought to the hospital where he was allegedly assaulted and apparently knocked unconscious by the staff as he was allegedly being admitted to the facility on a 302 admission.

In response to the lawsuit filed, the Defendants all filed Motions for Non Pros due to the failure of the Plaintiff to present a Certificate of Merit under the MCARE statute.

Plaintiff’s counsel filed a Motion under Pa. R.C.P. 1042.6(c) for a determination as to whether a Certificate of Merit was required or not.

In its decision, the court ruled that the alleged assault may have indeed occurred in the course of a professional relationship given that it occurred during the admissions process. However, the court ruled the allegations in the Complaint as involving alleged negligence that did not involve medical judgment. 

Accordingly, the court ruled that no Certificate of Merit was required for the case presented.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Robin Feeney of the Philadelphia law firm of Matkoff, Shengold, Berman, Goodnow & Associates, P.C. for bringing this case to my attention.

Mock Trial Jurors Still Needed For Tomorrow's Lackawanna County Mock Trials -- Please Consider Volunteering

 

Link to Copy of Hagedorn Decision Reviewed in Yesterday's Tort Talk Post.

Yesterday's Tort Talk blog post reviewed the case of Hagedorn v. Rick’s Backhoe Service, Inc., No. 2018-CV-3723 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Jan. 9, 2026 Nealon, J.), which involved a decision on a Motion for Bifurcation.  The Link to the post was not complete.

Here is the LINK to the above decision.  Sorry for any inconvenience.

Thank you for reading Tort Talk.

Motion To Bifurcate Motor Vehicle Accident Lawsuit Involving Bad Injuries Denied

In the case of Hagedorn v. Rick’s Backhoe Service, Inc., No. 2018-CV-3723 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Jan. 9, 2026 Nealon, J.), the court denied a Defendant’s Motion to Bifurcate the liability and damages issues presented in a motor vehicle accident case.

According to the Opinion, this matter arose out of a motor vehicle accident during which the Plaintiff was operating a motorcycle.  The Plaintiff and the Defendant driver allegedly engaged in road rage in a construction zone and that, during the interaction, the Defendant driver negligently and recklessly struck the Plaintiff’s motorcycle, resulting in the accident.

In seeking to bifurcate the liability and damages issues presented, the Defendants asserted that they were proceeding on a strong liability defense. 

The Defendants also asserted that, given the severity of the injuries sustained by the Plaintiff, there was a strong likelihood that the jury’s decision on liability would be tainted by sympathy for the Plaintiff if the jury was to hear the damages evidence and the severity of the damages alleged. 

The defense further argued that the bifurcation would expedite the action by allowing for a clear presentation of the negligence issues to the jury without confusing the issues relative to the injuries and damages claims presented.

In opposition, the Plaintiff asserted, in part, that the testimony of the treating physicians would explain, in part, the mechanics of the Plaintiff’s injuries which could also provide relevant context on how the collision actually occurred and what the forces involved were. The Plaintiff additionally asserted that a bifurcation of the trial would not serve the interests of judicial economy as it would cause a lengthier trial and additional expenses.

Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas reviewed the Motion to Bifurcate under the standard of review set forth in Pa. R.C.P. 213(b). 

In reviewing the law, Judge Nealon noted that appellate decisions indicated that cases should only be bifurcated where the separation of the issues would facilitate the orderly presentation of evidence and would support judicial economy. Bifurcation is typically only granted where the issues of liability and damages are “totally independent.” See Op. at 4 [citation omitted].

Here, the court found that bifurcation of the trial would not promote convenience or judicial economy. The court additionally found that the issues of liability and damages were not totally independent from one another based upon the information in the record before the court.

Judge Terrence R. Nealon
Lackawanna Co.

In this regard, Judge Nealon noted that the Plaintiff indicated that his treating physicians would testify regarding the mechanics of his injuries, which could provide context regarding the dynamics of the impact, which could bear on the issue of how the accident occurred. Judge Nealon also noted that proof of that nature indicates that certain evidence on liability and damages is intermingled. 

The court also noted that the defense had not established that bifurcation was necessary to actually avoid prejudice. In terms of any concern that the jury might be sympathetic towards the Plaintiff due to the nature of the Plaintiff’s injuries, the court noted that the jury would be furnished with instructions from the court admonishing the jury that they should not allow sympathy or emotion to influence their deliberations or verdict.

Judge Nealon additionally cited to Pennsylvania Supreme Court precedent confirming that the courts may assume that juries will follow judicial instructions faithfully.

Based upon its review of the matter, the court found that bifurcation of the liability and damages issues into separate trials pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 213(b) was not proper in this matter. Accordingly, the Motion was denied.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Mock Trial Jurors Needed For First Round of Lackawanna County Competition Set for Next Wednesday - Please Consider Volunteering

 

Third Circuit Addresses Strict Liability Claims in Alleged Food Poisoning Case

In its unpublished decision in the case of Kovalev v. Lidl US, LLC, No. 24-3224 (3rd Cir. Nov. 12, 2025 Hardiman, J., Matey, J., Chung, J.) (per curiam) (unpublished), the appellate court affirmed the entry of summary judgment and other motions after finding that the thirty (30) day removal to federal court deadline begins when the Defendant learns that the case is indeed removable.

According to the record before this court, the Plaintiff had made a demand in excess of the diversity jurisdictional amount.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff claimed food poisoning from eating bread from a loaf of bread he had purchased.   

The court otherwise noted that the Plaintiff failed to establish that the alleged defective condition existed at the time of the sale, thereby precluding any strict liability claims. The court also found that the Plaintiff did not have any evidence to support the allegation that the alleged defect caused his claimed injuries.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney James Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

More Attorneys In Trouble for AI Hallucinations in Citations in Brief

In the case of Lifetime Well LLC v. Ibspot.com, Inc., No. 2:25-CV-05135-MAK (E.D. Pa. Jan. 26, 2026 Kearney, J.), a federal court judge sanctioned two (2) Pennsylvania and New York based attorneys after the court identified numerous artificial intelligence hallucinations in briefs. The court issued both non-monetary and monetary sanctions.

In its Opinion, the court noted that the two (2) attorneys failed to thoroughly review a Brief that they both signed and filed. According to the Opinion, a law clerk in the law office had allegedly drafted the Brief utilizing AI. The court found that the conduct of the attorneys was in violation of Federal Rule 11.

The court felt that sanctions were necessary in order to deter other attorneys from repeating such conduct.

Given that both attorneys had taken steps to remedy their mistakes, the court declined to refer the attorneys to the disciplinary board.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source: Fed. Judge Sanctions Two Attorneys Over AI Hallucinations, Declines Disciplinary Referral By Riley Brennan of The Legal Intelligencer (Jan. 26, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by Numan Ali on www.unsplash.com.

Accidental Shooting From One Vehicle To Another Found To Involve "Use" of a Motor Vehicle

In the case of Allmerica Financial Benefit Ins. Co. v. Hunt, No. 2:24-CV-02767 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 15, 2025 Weilheimer, J.), the court denied Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by two (2) UIM carriers in a case in which the two (2) automobile insurance companies were attempting to avoid having to pay underinsured motorists (UIM) coverage after an accidental shooting while the vehicle was at a red light.

This matter arose out of an accidental shooting that occurred between two drivers at a red light. One driver was attempting to unload a gun he had taken out of his glove compartment. The gun accidentally went off and struck an individual in the adjacent car, resulting in fatal injuries to that person.

The family of the decedent recovered the liability limits from the tortfeasor’s coverage and then turned to seek UIM coverage.

The UIM carrier filed suit, arguing that the shooting did not result from the “use” of a vehicle as required under the terms of that policy.

The court held that the policy language contained in the UIM policies conflicted with Pennsylvania’s Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL) because it attempted to impose a stricter, proximate cause standard for UIM coverage instead of Pennsylvania’s broader standard of review.

The court wrote that, in close or doubtful insurance coverage cases, the law requires judges to err on the side of the insured.

The court additionally noted that, while insurers should not be considered to always be on the hook in terms of coverage because of their perceived ability to bear the cost of paying on the policy, public policy dictates that when there is a “tie” on the positions put forth by the UIM carrier and the insured on a coverage dispute, the court should err in favor of finding coverage.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Court's companion Order can be viewed HERE.


Source: Article – “Pa Federal Judge Rules Auto Insurers Can’t Dodge UIM Coverage In Fatal Stoplight Shooting Case,” By Tristin Hoffman of the Legal Intelligencer (Jan. 2,2 026).

Senior Judge Minora Addresses Permissible Scope of Pre-Complaint Discovery Addressed to an Insurance Company in a Bad Faith Claim

In the case of Minooka Pastry Inc. v. Erie Insurance, No. 2024-CV-4077 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Jan. 15, 2026), Judge Carmen D. Minora of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas addressed pre-Complaint discovery issues in a bad faith and breach of contract action brought against an insurance carrier.

According to the Opinion, this matter arose out of a claim presented by the Minooka Bakery to Erie Insurance for water damage sustained the interior of the property during a windstorm. After Erie denied the claim, the Minooka Bakery was seeking to commence a multi-count lawsuit against Erie, including causes of action for bad faith, breach of contract, and violation of Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law.

To assist it in the preparation of a Complaint, the Minooka Bakery served upon Erie Insurance written discovery requests. In response, Erie objected to the same but otherwise independently provided some materials along with a privilege log.

This matter came before the court on the Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Pre-Complaint Discovery under Pa. R.C.P. 4003.8. The Plaintiff asserted that it was still in need of additional information and documentation despite the materials produced by Erie Insurance. The carrier asserted that the materials it turned over were sufficient.

In the end, the court granted in part and denied in part the Motion to Compel.

In so ruling, the court noted that, because the Plaintiff intends to assert a bad faith claim against its carrier, an expansion of the scope of pre-Complaint discovery was warranted given that that particular cause of action requires the Plaintiff to present clear and convincing evidence that the carrier did not have a reasonable basis for denying benefits under the policy and that the carrier knew, or recklessly disregarded, its alleged lack of a reasonable basis in denying the claim.

Senior Judge Carmen D. Minora
Lackawanna County 

Judge Minora noted that the second prong of this test requires a demonstration of a heightened level of intent on the part of the carrier, thereby making inquiry into certain areas, “such as past practices and reserve information,” more likely accessible for purposes of pre-Complaint discovery.

Keeping in mind that the burden upon the Plaintiff to assert a bad faith claim sufficient to defeat any Preliminary Objections for lack of specificity, and also considering the discovery sought “will not cause unreasonable annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, burden or 

expense” under Pa. R.C.P. 4003.8(a), the court overruled the carrier’s objections, except those objections asserted with respect to privilege material. In this regard, the court reviewed the carrier’s privilege log and agreed with the carrier’s position with respect to those objections.

The court more specifically noted that, in making this ruling, it was specifically determined that “guidebooks, training manuals, non-privilege communications, reserve information, comparative claim data and regulatory filings” were within the permissible scope of pre-Complaint discovery in this matter. The court did impose a time limitation of not to exceed three (3) years prior to the date of loss relative to the scope of the information required to be produced.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Paul Walker of Walker Law in Clarks Summit, Pennsylvania for bringing this case to my attention.

U.S. Supreme Court Decision Ruling that Delaware Rule Requiring Certificate of Merit for Professional Liability Claims Has Implications In Pennsylvania Matters

In the United State Supreme Court case of Berk v. Choy, No. 24-440 (U.S. Jan. 20, 2026) (Op. by Barrett, J.), the United States Supreme Court held that a Delaware law requiring a Plaintiff suing for medical malpractice to provide an affidavit from a medical professional attesting to the merit of the claims presented in the law suit conflicts with valid Federal Rule of Civil Procedure and, as such, does not apply in federal court proceedings.

According to commentators, this United States Supreme Court decision can be read as establishing that Pennsylvania's requirements for a Certificate of Merit in professional negligence in state court matters would not apply in the federal courts of Pennsylvania.

As such, these commentators have suggested that, in those cases where a plaintiff can establish diversity jurisdiction in order to get into federal court, those plaintiffs may opt to proceed in federal court where they need not secure and produce a Certificate or Merit before proceeding with a professional negligence claim, such as a medical malpractice claim or a legal malpractice claim.   

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney Thomas J. Foley, III of the Foley Law Firm in Scranton, PA for bringing this decision to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Fine Photographics on www.pexels.com.

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Reviews, in Part, Ability of a Party To Proceed on A Cause of Action Based on Spoliation of Evidence

In the case of Erie Insurance Exchange v. United Services Auto, No. 19 WAP 2024 (Pa. Jan. 21, 2026) (Op. by Donohue, J.), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether one carrier had a claim against another carrier under and allegation of promissory estoppel due to the failure to preserve evidence pertinent to the damages claims presented in a property damage subrogation claim.

According to the Opinion, this matter involved a fire that occurred at an auto repair shop, resulting in damages to the property and several vehicles. 

The insurance company for the property paid out damages and then sought reimbursement from those parties allegedly responsible. The insurer who brought the lawsuit suspected that a specific vehicle, insured by another insurance company, was the source of the fire.  As such, the Plaintiff insurance company requested that the vehicle in question be preserved for further investigation. 

Despite assurances that the vehicle would be preserved, the vehicle was instead sold at a salvage auction, thereby eliminating the possibility of further examination of the vehicle and hindering the Plaintiff’s potential claims against the other parties.  The Plaintiff insurance company filed suit based, in part, on the other insurance company's failure to preserve evidence as requested.

The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendant, concluding that the promissory estoppel claim was, in substance, a claim for negligence spoliation of evidence, which was a cause of action not recognized in Pennsylvania.

The trial court also noted that subrogation principles did not allow recovery because the Defendant had not caused the original property loss.

On appeal, the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed and found that the facts might support a promissory estoppel claim. The Superior Court also felt that the trial court erred in dismissing the Complaint on grounds of speculative damages and unrecognized causes of action.

Further up the appellate ladder, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that, as subrogee, the Plaintiff insurance company’s rights were limited to recovery from the party responsible for the original loss and, because that Defendant did not cause the fire, no right of recovery existed. As such, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court vacated the Superior Court’s erroneous decision, and reinstated the trial court’s Order in favor of the Defendant.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of the Majority's decision may click this LINK.

Justice Brobson's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion can be viewed HERE.

Justice Dougherty's Dissenting Opinion can be viewed HERE.


Source: Justia Daily Opinion Summaries, www.justia.com (Jan. 22, 2026).