Judge Allows Trip And Fall Case To Proceed Beyond Summary Judgment

In the case of Bonnell v. Knight-Confer Funeral Home, Inc., No. CV0-2023-01345 (C.P. Lyc. Co. March 23, 2026 Carlucci, J.), the court denied a Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment in a trip and fall case based upon the expert opinion of the Plaintiff’s expert engineer creating questions of fact to be decided decision by the jury.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff allegedly tripped and fell on a step on the Defendant’s premises. During her deposition, the Plaintiff did not assert that there was any debris on the step where she fell,  Nor did the Plaintiff point to any defect in the step itself.

Rather, the Plaintiff testified that she opened the door and thought she was stepping onto the sidewalk and, as a result, missed the step and fell.

The Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment arguing that the complete absence of any debris or any defects with regards to the step confirm that there was no material evidence upon which a jury could base any finding of negligence. The Defendant additionally pointed out that the Plaintiff had traveled over the same step on her way into the building without incident.

The Plaintiff’s opposition to the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment was based, in part, on the fact that the Plaintiff produced an expert engineering report. That expert offered an opinion that the single step condition at the threshold of the doorway created a hazardous condition which endangered the public. The expert further concluded that the actions and/or inactions of the Plaintiff did not cause the incident to occur. The expert otherwise noted that the step was below the normal line of sight and the Plaintiff was therefore unable to perceive it as she exited the doorway.

After reviewing the record before him as applied to Pennsylvania law, the judge noted that, if the jury believed the testimony of the Plaintiff’s engineering expert, a jury could reasonably find that the condition at the threshold of the doorway was a hazardous condition which endangered the Plaintiff and that the Plaintiff’s own conduct was not a legal cause of her injuries. 

Accordingly, the court denied the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and allowed the case to proceed forward.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (May 28, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by Becca Lavin on www.unsplash.com.

Trial Court Provides Lessons on Propriety of New Matter Pleading by Defendants

In the case of Cancilliere v. Custom Etch, Inc., No. 11163 of 2025, C.A. (C.P. Lawr. Co. May 4, 2026 Flannery, J.), the court addressed the propriety of allegations contained in a Defendant’s New Matter in a civil litigation case.

According to the Opinion, the civil litigation matter arose out a dispute relative to the application of a trust agreement.

After the Plaintiffs filed a Complaint and the Defendants filed an Answer and New Matter, the Plaintiffs filed Preliminary Objections to the Defendant’s New Matter asserting that the allegations contained within the New Matter were improper pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 1030 and that the allegations lacked the specificity required by Pa. R.C.P. 1019(a).

More specifcally, the Plaintiff initially asserted that the allegations contained within the Defendant’s New Matter were improper under Pa. R.C.P. 1030 as the allegations did not set forth affirmative defenses.

The court noted that, under Pa. R.C.P. 1030(a), it is provided that a Defendant may assert affirmative defenses in a New Matter in response to a Complaint. The court also noted, howerver, that Pa. R.C.P. 1030(a) additionally expressly provides “[a] party may set forth as new matter any other material facts which are not merely denials of the averments of the preceding pleading.” See Op. at p. 4.

The court read this portion of the Rule in to indicate that a responding party may assert new facts in a New Matter which were not previously pled in the Complaint.

The court additionally noted that a New Matter may include conclusions of law, such as an allegation that a Complaint failed to state a cause of action, but that, under Pennsylvania law, no responsive pleading by the Plaintiff is required in response to any conclusions of law contained in a New Matter. See Op. at p. 4.

Based upon the above, the court additionally noted that, when the allegations in a New Matter are either mere conclusions of law or merely a reiteration of the same facts that may have already been placed into issue in the Complaint of the Plaintiff or the Answer of the Defendant, then the Plaintiff is not required to provide a response to the same allegations in a New Matter. Rather, such allegations would be deemed to be denied, and the court is not otherwise required to strike those paragraphs in the New Matter in response to any Preliminary Objections that may be filed by a plaintiff.

The court reiterated that the inclusion of conclusions of law by a Defendant in a New Matter does not require the court to strike the same from the pleading as such pleadings are permissible.

The court did go on to note, however, that general assertions by a Defendant of affirmative defenses lacking any factual allegations in a New Matter do violate Pa. R.C.P. 1019(a) given that a Plaintiff would be unable to confirm or deny those paragraphs. Such general allegations within a New Matter can be attacked by Preliminary Objections. 

The court noted that a Defendant must pled facts to support the existence of an affirmative defense and, the failure to do so, will result in the court sustaining a Preliminary Objection for lack of specificity in violation of the requirements of Pa. R.C.P. 1019(a) with regards to pleadings.

The court also noted that, when a court sustains a Preliminary Objection for lack of specificity relative to a New Matter defense, the Defendant should generally be given an opportunity to amend its New Matter to comply with Pa. R.C.P. 1019.

Here, in this case, the court denied the Preliminary Objections given that while the Defendant’s allegations in the New Matter were insufficient to create a factual basis for potential affirmative defenses, in this case, the Defendants were not attempting to assert affirmative defenses in the New Matter but rather, were providing additional facts on the case presented as permitted by Pa. R.C.P. 1030.

The court also noted that its review of the factual allegations in the New Matter confirmed that the Plaintiff had the capability of either admitting or denying the Defendant's factual allegations.

With regards to the Plaintiff’s complaint that the New Matter contained legal conclusions, the court reiterated that the Plaintiff was not required to file a response to those types of allegations as they would be deemed to be denied.  The court reiterated that there is no legal basis for the court to strike those paragraphs simply because such allegations may have amounted to legal conclusions.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (June 4, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by G. Fring on www.pexels.com.

Court Allows Plaintiff's Expert To Testify in Medical Malpractice Case

In the case of Pratt v. Shahid, No. CV-23-00720 (C.P. Lyc. Co. April 14, 2026 Carlucci, J.), the court denied the Defendants’ Motion In Limine seeking to preclude the Plaintiff from introducing the testimony of a doctor in a medical malpractice case.

In this case, the court denied the Defendants’ request for an exclusion of the Plaintiff’s medical expert’s testimony given that the Plaintiff’s expert’s opinion was found to be supported by medical literature.

The court also noted that the Defendants’ challenge went to the Plaintiff’s expert’s conclusions rather than the methodology utilized by the expert. 

The court found that the Plaintiff’s expert’s methodology was not novel, as it was similar to the methodology used by the Defendants’ expert. The court further noted that, even if the Plaintiff’s methodology was considered to be novel, it was still generally accepted in the scientific community as supported by articles from scientific journals submitted by the Plaintiff.

In the end, the court ruled that, while the Plaintiff’s expert’s conclusions differed from those advanced by the Defendants’ expert, that difference is not a proper basis for excluding the testimony of the Plaintiff’s expert.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (May 28, 2026). 

Issues of Fact Preclude Entry of Summary Judgment in Case Challenging the Design of an Intersection

In the case of Leger v. Martin, No. 253 C.D. 2025 (Pa. Cmwlth. May 19, 2026 Cohn Jubelirer, J., Wolf, J., Leadbetter, J.) (Op. by Cohn Jubelirer, J.), the Commonwealth Court reversed a lower court’s entry of summary judgment granting a township summary judgment in a motor vehicle accident matter in which allegations were made that the intersection at issue was a dangerous intersection.

According to the Opinion, this matter arose out of a motor vehicle accident during which the Plaintiff commenced a left hand turn from a stop sign and was hit by a tractor trailer.

The Plaintiff sued various parties including the township. The Plaintiff alleged that the township was liable under a duty to design, construct, and maintain its roads in a safe condition for travelers, including having proper signage and intersection site triangles. The Plaintiff also asserted that the township placed and/or directed to be placed a stop sign at the intersection with insufficient sight distances. The Plaintiff otherwise noted that the stop sign created a dangerous condition of which the township had actual or constructive notice, making the township liable under exceptions to the governmental immunity provided under §8542 of the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act.

The trial court had granted the township’s Motion for Summary Judgment. 

The primary argument by the township on appeal was that the Plaintiff had not produced evidence showing that the stop sign had caused or contributed to his injuries, that the township had notice of any dangerous condition, or that the township owned the intersection because it was controlled by PennDOT.

On appeal, the Commonwealth Court concluded that the notice issue was for the jury and that summary judgment had, therefore, been improperly entered. The court pointed to evidence before it, including expert reports, indicating that the township would have been responsible for the initial design of the intersection and that the evidence established that reasonable minds could differ as to whether the alleged dangerous condition was apparent upon reasonable inspection before the subject crash.

Accordingly, the granting of summary judgment in favor of the township was reversed and the matter was remanded for further proceedings.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert, www.Law.com (June 9, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by Josiah Niklas on www.unsplash.com.

Appellate Court Finds that Plaintiff's Med Mal Claims Were Sufficiently Stated in Complaint

In its non-precedential decision in the case of Dasilva v. Abington Memorial Hospital, No. 1707 EDA 2025 (Pa. Super. June 2, 2026 Kunselman, J., Nichols, J., and Sullivan, J.) (Op. by Kunselman, J.), the court reversed a trial court’s decision in a medical malpractice case sustaining the Preliminary Objections of the Defendant hospital dismissing the Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint with prejudice.

The trial court had dismissed the Plaintiff’s Complaint due to the alleged insufficiency of the factual allegations in the Second Amended Complaint. Primarily, the Defendants asserted, in part, that the Plaintiff’s allegations of negligence and agency were vague and/or insufficiently specific.

On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court reinstated the medical malpractice action after finding that the Plaintiffs had plausibly alleged that the medical staff failed to properly monitor a patient who was experiencing a psychiatric episode by allowing the patient to leave the emergency room at which point he was then struck by a vehicle.

The appellate court concluded that the Plaintiffs had met the state’s fact-pleading standard by outlining key facts, including the Plaintiff’s mental state, the awareness of the hospital staff of the Plaintiff’s condition, and the alleged failure of the hospital staff to monitor or prevent the patient’s departure from the hospital.

The appellate court otherwise held that a Plaintiff need not identify any specific employees in the medical malpractice case in order to pursue vicarious liability claims against a hospital. The court noted that references contained in the Complaint to the emergency room staff were sufficiently specific to enable the Defendants to respond to the Complaint.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this non-precedential decision of the Pennsylvania Superior Court in the Dasilva may click this LINK.

Source: Article – “Abington Hospital Must Face Med Mal Claims Over Patient’s ER Escape, Pa. Appellate Court Says,” By Riley Brennan of The Legal Intelligencer (June 4, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by National Cancer Institute on www.unsplash.com.

Court Gives Detailed Opinion on Sanctions Applicable to Late Payment of Settlement Funds

In the case of Hill v. Riverside Healthcare and Rehabilitation Center, No. 2023-CV-3399 (C.P. Lacka. Co. May 22, 2026 Nealon, J.), the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas addressed a Petition filed by a Plaintiff seeking to impose sanctions against a Defendant under Pa. R.C.P. 229.1 for failing to deliver settlement funds in a timely fashion after an executed Release was produced by the Plaintiff.

According to the Opinion, this matter involved a professional liability action against a healthcare and rehab center.

In this matter, the Defendant facility owner at issue in this case eventually became insolvent and filed for bankruptcy.

During the course of this litigation, the parties agreed to participate in a settlement conference with a private mediator. Prior to the mediation, the Defendant’s attorney confirmed in writing that the parent and affiliate entities of the Defendant were insolvent and/or in bankruptcy proceedings and confirmed that the Defendant would not be able to satisfy the first $75,000.00 of any settlement but that any obligation thereafter would be covered by insurance.

After a mediation, the parties reached a settlement agreement for a net payment of $175,000.00. The total amount of the party’s settlement was actually $250,000.00 but the Plaintiff agreed to waive the Defendant’s payment of its $75,000.00 deductible with a net settlement payment of $175,000.00 to be funded entirely by the Defendant's insurance carrier.

The court’s Opinion in this matter emphasized that the insurance company’s adjuster agreed to the settlement without any indication of any coverage issue between the actual Defendant and its insurance company.

Thereafter, in this death case, the court granted the Plaintiff’s Petition for Court Approval of the Settlement. 

The Plaintiff then executed the settlement agreement and sent the signed Release, the court Order approving the settlement, and other closing documents to the Defendant’s counsel and requested payment.

The court point out that noticeably absent from the settlement agreement was any indication, or even a suggestion, that a coverage issue may exist between the Defendant and its insurance company or that any such coverage issue needed to be resolved before the Plaintiff would receive the settlement payment. 

After the closing documents were produced and the settlement check was not forthcoming, Plaintiff’s counsel wrote for the status of the settlement check.  Defense counsel indicated that there was some issue that the adjuster had to work out. There was no reference made to any insurance coverage issue during that interaction.

After several months then went by with no production of the settlement check, counsel for the Plaintiff filed the Motion at issue.

Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas reviewed Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 229.1 which governs the prompt delivery of settlement funds within twenty (20) days of the receipt of an executed Release by the Defendant. 

The Rule otherwise provides that, if court approval of the settlement is required, then the 20 day deadline under Rule 229.1 does not begin to run until the settlement is so approved.

Judge Nealon noted that, under Rule 229.1, if the Defendant fails to timely deliver settlement funds, the Plaintiff has the right to seek one of two possible remedies. First, a Plaintiff can seek to invalidate the settlement agreement and allow the matter to return to the trial list. Second, the Plaintiff can seek sanctions against the Defendant.

The court noted that, if a plaintiff opts to pursue sanctions against a defendant, Rule 229.1(e) directs the Plaintiff to (1) file an affidavit “attesting to non-payment,” to submit copies of “any document evidencing the terms of the settlement agreement,” and/or “the executed Release,” and “a receipt reflecting delivery of the executed Release,” (2) file certifications by counsel “of the applicable interest rate,” and “that the affidavit and accompanying documents have been served on the attorneys for all interested parties,” and (3) file “the form of order prescribed by subdivision (h)” for execution by the court.

The court also noted that under Rule 229.1(g), if the court determines that the Defendant has failed to deliver the settlement funds within twenty (20) days and there is no material dispute as to the terms of the settlement or the terms of the Release, the court “shall impose sanctions in the form of interests calculated at the rate equal to the prime rate as listed in the first edition of the Wall Street Journal published for each calendar year for which interest is awarded, plus one (1) percent, not compounded, running from the 21st day after the production of the executed Release to the date of delivery of the settlement funds, together with reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred in the preparation of the affidavit.

The court otherwise ruled that the fact that the insurance company’s noncompliance with the payment requirement may be attributable to a post-settlement assertion of a potential coverage issue did not warrant the denial of the Plaintiff’s request for sanctions.  Accordingly, the court granted the Plaintiff’s Motion and awarded sanctions pursuant to Rule 229.1.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source of image:  Photo by kaboom pics on www.pexels.com.

Law Allowing For Fines For Holding A Cell Phone While Driving Starts Tomorrow June 5th

A new Pennsylvania law that bans a driver from holding a cell phone while behind the wheel goes into effect tomorrow, June 5, 2026.

These fines are starting after a year of police officers issuing warning tickets in this regard.

Starting tomorrow, officers may issue tickets carrying a $50 fine, plus court costs and other fees.

Note that simply holding a phone, propping up a phone, or reaching for a phone can trigger a ticket.  You could even be issued a ticket for holding your phone at a red light or while stopped in traffic.

Drivers are permitted to use their phones to alert authorities in an emergency.

Also, drivers may still use hands-free technology to make phone calls, to use a GPS, or to listen to music.

It remains to be seen how a related violation of this statute may impact a personal injury motor vehicle accident matter.

Trial Court Rules that Plaintiff's Medical Malpractice Experts are Competent to Testify on Causation

In the case of Kenny v. Lackawanna Health and Rehab Center, No. 2021-CV-1360 (C.P. Lacka. Co. May 28, 2026 Nealon, J.), Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas addressed various Motions in Limine filed by a Defendant in a medical malpractice case.

The Defendants filed a Motion In Limine seeking to bar the decedent’s treating orthopedic surgeon and the Plaintiff’s skilled nursing care and nursing home administration expert from expressing opinions regarding the cause of the Defendant’s hip fracture.

The Defendant more specifically asserted that the decedent’s treating orthopedic surgeon failed to state his medical causation opinion with the requisite degree of medical certainty in his pre-trial reports. 

After reviewing the record before him, the court ruled that a review of all of the reports issued by the orthopedic surgeon confirmed that the doctor had articulated his medical causation opinion with the requisite degree of medical certainty. The court noted that any objection regarding the particular terminology used by the expert in his reports went to the weight of the evidence rather than the admissibility of the expert testimony. As such, this Motion In Limine was denied.

With regards to the Plaintiff’s nursing expert and the defense argument that this expert should be precluded from testifying regarding causation on the grounds that the expert lacked the required education, training or experience in orthopedics, the court noted that the most recent law in Pennsylvania is that a registered nurse is competent to testify concerning the relevant nursing standard of care as well as on the issue of medical causation. Accordingly, the court overruled the Defendant’s argument that the nursing expert is incompetent to testify as to causation.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Superior Court Affirms Trial Court's Refusal to Open a Default Judgment Against a Defendant

In the case of Kitner’s Lawn & Landscaping, LLC v. LRM Masonry, LLC, No. 699 MDA 2025 (Pa. Super. March 24, 2026 Panella, P.J.E., King, J., and Lane, J.) (Op. by Lane, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court found that a trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied a Defendant’s Petition to Open a Default Judgment.

According to the Opinion, there was a contract between the parties under which it was agreed that the Plaintiff landscaping business would provide services as a subcontractor to the Defendant masonry company.

After a dispute arose between the parties, the Plaintiff filed a Complaint seeking payment for services rendered. The Writ of Summons was personally served on the owner of the Defendant, who accepted service.

Thereafter, the Plaintiff filed a Complaint and served the Defendant by mail. The mailing was not returned.

The trial court later entered a default judgment against the Defendant for failing to file an Answer to the Complaint.

Sixty-seven days after the entry of the default judgment, the Defendant filed a Petition to Open the Judgment. The Defendant asserted that the Plaintiff was aware that the Defendant’s principal place of business was at the Defendant’s home and not another address at which the ten day notice of intent to enter a default was sent and.  The Defendant also noted that the mailing of the ten day notice was filed of record with the court and was marked as “undeliverable.”

The appellate court agreed that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and refusing to open the default judgment. The appellate court emphasized that the Defendant had no official address filed with the Department of State in Pennsylvania. It was additionally noted that the sheriff had successfully served original process, which was the Writ of Summons, on the Defendant.

The appellate court also noted that the Plaintiff sent the Complaint, the Notice of the Default Judgment, and other filings to the same address that was on the Writ of Summons. That address was noted to also appear on the Defendant’s website. Accordingly, the appellate court found that the Plaintiff had met the service requirements under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The appellate court also agreed that the Defendant did not establish a reasonable excuse for failing to file a responsive pleading to the Complaint.

The court otherwise noted that it saw no fatal defect on the record to support any separate Motion to Strike.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert, www.Law.com (April 7, 2026).

EARLY REGISTRATION DISCOUNT DEADLINE EXTENDED

 

PLEASE CONSIDER CUMMINS MEDIATION AS A MEANS TO BRING YOUR CASE TO A CLOSE

LOOKING TO BRING YOUR CASE TO A CLOSE?

LIMITED SLOTS AVAILABLE

PLEASE CALL TODAY TO SCHEDULE YOUR APPOINTMENT

570-319-5899

dancummins@cumminslaw.net

Defendant Found to Be Statutory Employer and Entitled to Immunity

In the case of Edie v. George Junior Republic In Pennsylvania, No. 546 C.D. 2025 (Pa. Cmwlth. March 27, 2026 Cohn Jubelirer, P.J., Covey, J. Wallis, J.) (Op. by Covey, J.), the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court addressed the application of the statutory employer doctrine in a third party negligence case.

According to the Opinion, the Defendant operated a youth residential institution and contracted with a food service company to provide food services at the facility.

The Plaintiff, who was employed by the food services facility, was cleaning a grill while working in the kitchen at the facility when the Plaintiff was caused to fall and suffer injuries.

The Plaintiff filed a Complaint against the youth residential institution alleging negligence due to unsafe conditions in the kitchen.

The Defendant youth residential institution responding by asserting immunity under the Worker’s Compensation Act as a statutory employer.

The trial court agreed with the Defendant and dismissed the case under a summary judgment motion. The Plaintiff appealed.

The Commonwealth Court applied the McDonald test, which requires that five (5) elements be established to establish a statutory employer status. Those elements include the existence of a contract with the owner, proof that the premises were occupied or controlled by the employer, a subcontract between the parties at issue, and proof that part of the employer’s regular business was entrusted to the subcontractor, and, finally, that the Plaintiff was an employee of the subcontractor.

Here, the Plaintiff only contested the second element, arguing that the Defendant did not have the necessary level of control or occupancy to meet this element of the doctrine.

The appellate court found that the youth residential institution occupied the premises given that its food services director was present daily and oversaw the food services provider’s operations by ensuring compliance with contractual and regulatory requirements. 

The court additionally noted that the residential facility’s employees were also regularly present in the kitchen. It was additionally noted that the residential facility maintained control over the kitchen's equipment and operation.

As such, the Commonwealth Court agreed that the Defendant residential facility had met the occupancy requirement, thereby satisfying that contested element of the McDonald test.

Accordingly, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of the Defendant as a statutory employer of the Plaintiff.  As a statutory employer, the Defendant facility was found to be entitled to immunity under the Worker’s Compensation Act from the claims presented in the third party personal injury liability lawsuit.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source: The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert, www.Law.com (April 14, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by Pylyp Sukhenko on www.unsplash.com.

DEADLINE TO SECURE EARLY REGISTRATION DISCOUNT FOR LACKAWANNA PRO BONO GOLF TOURNAMENT EXTENDED

 

Court Allows Claims of Recklessness and for Punitive Damages To Proceed Relative to Disobeying Instructions of a Flagger

In the case of Marrazzo v. Klim, No. 2025-CV-471 C.P. (C.P. Susq. Co. May 5, 2026 Legg, P.J.), President Judge Jason J. Legg of the Susquehanna County Court of Common Pleas followed the trend in Pennsylvania of denying a Defendant’s Preliminary Objections filed against allegations of recklessness and punitive damages at the pleadings stage.

Judge Legg noted that, according to Superior Court precedent, recklessness is a condition of the mind that may be averred generally. 

The court otherwise noted that, even though recklessness may be generally alleged, the court found that, in this case, the Plaintiff had included the Complaint specific allegations related to the Defendant’s alleged recklessness, including allegations regarding speeding in a work zone despite the presence of a flagger directing traffic, nearly striking the flagger, falling asleep at the wheel, and relative to the Defendant driver striking the Plaintiffs’ vehicle which had stopped for the flagger and was waiting to enter the work zone until the lane was clear.

The court otherwise noted that an allegation related to falling asleep while driving, standing alone, could be sufficient to support an allegation of recklessness at the pleadings stage.

The court also pointed to the same facts as supporting the Plaintiff’s inclusion of the separate claim for punitive damages in the Complaint.

As such, the Preliminary Objections asserted by the Defendant were overruled.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this Order which contains a detailed explanation of the Court’s decision in footnotes, may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Terrence R. Nealon, Jr. of the Scranton law firm of McDonald and MacGregor, LLC for bringing this decision to my attention.

Superior Court Clarifies Application of Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens

In the case of Duxbury v. Reconstructive Orthopedic Assoc. II, P.C., No. 2876 EDA 2024 (Pa. Super. March 25, 2026 Bowes, J., Murray, J., and Beck, J.) (Op. by Beck, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court addressed an appeal from an Order entered by the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas in a medical malpractice case granting a Motion to Dismiss under the doctrine of forum non conveniens filed by the Defendant. The trial court had directed that the action be refiled in New Jersey.

The Plaintiffs argued that the trial court erred in its application of the existing precedent regarding the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The Plaintiffs more specifically argued that a review of the facts under a correct application of the doctrine did not support the transfer of the action to New Jersey.

On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed the trial court’s Order and remanded the case for further proceedings in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas. Here, the court noted that the trial court was obligated to further weigh the circumstances linking the case to Pennsylvania to determine whether Pennsylvania was an inconvenient forum, and not simply review whether New Jersey was a more convenient forum for the Defendants.

In other words, the court noted that Pennsylvania law requires that, when courts review arguments under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, at least in a case involving two (2) separate states as here, the court is required to consider the relative convenience of allowing the claim to proceed in either of the states at issue.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert, www.Law.com (April 14, 2026).

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Rules that Sexual Abuse Exception To Governmental Immunity Only Applies to Minor Victims

Capitol Building
Pennsylvania Supreme Court

In the case of City of Philadelphia v. J.S. Sr., No. 34 EAP 2024 (Pa. March 26, 2026) (Op. by McCaffery, J.), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered the parameters of the sexual abuse exception to the general governmental immunity from tort claims as set forth in Section 8542(b)(9) of the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act.

This matter arose out of claims by an adult Plaintiff alleging that the Plaintiff was subjected to sexual abuse or assaults while the Plaintiff was incarcerated. The record before the court confirmed that the Plaintiff was not a minor at the time of the alleged abuse.

The more specific issue addressed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is whether this waiver of the immunity afforded to governmental agencies under the sexual abuse exception applies when the victim of the sexual abuse is an adult, or whether the waiver of immunity is limited to only those cases involving sexual abuse committed against a minor.

As noted in Justice Wecht's Concurring Opinion, "[t]he sexual-abuse exception to the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act applies to '[c]onduct which constitutes an offense enumerated under Section 5551(7).'  The offenses enumerated in Section 5551(7), in turn, require that 'the victim was under 18 years of age at the time of the offense.'"

In the end, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that the unambiguous language of Section 8542(b)(9) waives immunity in favor of political subdivisions or their employees only if the Plaintiff was a minor at the time of the sexual abuse.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of the Majority decision may click this LINK.  Justice Wecht's Concurring Opinion can be viewed HERE.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert, www.Law.com (April 14, 2026).



Source of image: Photo by Lacey Reapsome on www.unsplash.com.

HAPPY BIRTHDAY TORT TALK

Tort Talk was created 17 years ago today back in 2009.  There have been over 4,600 blog posts on Tort Talk and the blog is still going strong.

Sending thanks out to all the Tort Talkers who read Tort Talk and refer to it to begin and streamline your legal research.  

And thank you to all who have provided tips on important cases and copies of the same so that they can be publicized on Tort Talk for the benefit of all who practice civil litigation in Pennsylvania.

EARLY REGISTRATION DISCOUNT EXPIRES ON MAY 8TH

Recklessness Claims Allowed to Proceed in Case Where Defendant Driver Was Driving While Wearing Medical Boot

In the case of Shea v. Magar, No. 2025-CV-7877 (C.P. Lacka. Co. March 31, 2026 Gibbons, P.J.), President Judge James A. Gibbons of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas addressed Preliminary Objections filed by a Defendant against allegations of recklessness in a motor vehicle accident case.

According to the Opinion, this case matter involved a rear-end accident case. The Defendant was  allegedly wearing a medical boot at the time of the accident against doctor’s orders.  During the course of the accident, the Defendant hit the accelerator with the medical boot instead of the brake.

The court followed the current trend and relied upon the case of Monroe v. CBH2O, LP, 286 A.3d 785, 799 (Pa. Super. 2022) (en banc), and held that, at the pleadings stage, a plaintiff is permitted to make a general averment of gross negligence or recklessness as long as negligence is alleged. 

As such, the court overruled the Defendant’s Preliminary Objection in this regard.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Brian J. Walsh of the Scranton law firm of Blake & Walsh for bringing this case to my attention

Court Addresses Various Pleadings Issues in a Medical Malpractice Case, Including Allegations of Recklessness

In the case of Limon v. Kontizer, No. 2025-CV-8657 (C.P. Lacka. Co. March 30, 2026 Powell, J.), the court addressed various Preliminary Objections filed by Defendants in a medical malpractice case.

According to the Opinion, this wrongful death medical malpractice case was filed relative to the Plaintiff’s decedent’s treatment in the form of an upper GI endoscopy. According to the Complaint, the Plaintiff alleged that the various medical Defendants failed to properly diagnose, treat, and prevent aspiration pneumonia, sepsis, and multi-organ dysfunction, all of which allegedly led to the Plaintiff’s decedent’s death.

In their Preliminary Objections, the Defendants sought the dismissal of claims for reckless conduct and punitive damages, as well as claims grounded in vicarious liability and negligence.

The court overruled all of the Preliminary Objections filed.

Relative to the claims of recklessness and for punitive damages, the court held that, under Pa. R.C.P. 1019(b), conditions of the mind, such as recklessness, may be alleged in a general fashion as long as negligence is pled.

The court additionally noted that the Complaint sufficiently asserted that the Defendants knowingly disregarded serious, life-threatening risk to the decedent. Accepting these allegations are true, the court concluded that the claims for punitive damages were legally sufficient.

With regards to the issues of vicarious liability, the court rejected the Defendants’ arguments that the Complaint was deficient for failing to identify specific agents or employees. The court noted that Pennsylvania law does not require a Plaintiff in a medical malpractice case to identify every individual agent at the pleadings stage. Rather, the court noted that it is sufficient to allege that the individuals acted within the scope of their employment or agency since the identity of every healthcare professional who was involved in the decedent’s treatment during the approximately one month period at issue could be readily ascertained by the Defendants from their own records.

The court further found that the Plaintiff sufficiently alleged that the Defendants had knowledge of, and allowed the alleged reckless conduct, thereby satisfying the heightened requirements for allegations of vicarious liability for punitive damages under the MCARE Act.

The court otherwise rejected the Defendant’s objections that the Plaintiff’s negligence claims were overly broad and vague.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: Lackawanna Jurist (April 10, 2026).

Court Rules That No New UM Sign Down Form Was Required

In the case of Estate of Woloszyn v. Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 10246 of 2022, C.A. (C.P. Lawr. Co. Nov. 21, 2025 Hodge, J.), the court granted summary judgment in favor of a UM carrier on a breach of contract and bad faith claim arising out of a dispute over what the appropriate UM limits were under the policy.

According to the Opinion, this matter arose out of a motorcycle accident when a vehicle being operated by an uninsured motorist crossed the centerline and struck the Plaintiff’s son’s motorcycle, resulting in a fatal accident.

Following the accident, the Plaintiff’s estate made a claim for UM coverage under various insurance policies. There was a dispute between the parties as to whether the UM coverage should be $100,000.00 or $15,000.00.

The court noted that, in 2015, the Plaintiff’s family had obtained a vehicle insurance policy No. 858 from the carrier prior to the accident. Relative to that policy, the Plaintiff’s family executed a signed down form opting to decrease the uninsured motorist coverage to $15,000.00 per person even though the bodily injury liability limit was $100,000.00 per person.

In October of 2020, the 858 policy was replaced by a No. 916 policy as part of the Defendant carrier’s One Product initiative.

The Plaintiff’s family received a Notice of Policy Change which indicated that the 858 policy was expiring and that the policy would be renewed under the terms of the 916 policy.

The Plaintiff accepted the renewal by paying the premium for the 916 policy.


The 916 policy provided bodily injury limits of $100,000.00 per person and UM coverage limits of $15,000.00 per person, which was the same coverage as was selected by the Plaintiff’s family under the 858 policy. The court noted, however, that the Defendant carrier did not obtain an executed sign down form for the lesser amount of UM coverage from the Plaintiff’s family prior to the issuance of the 916 policy.

After the Plaintiff’s family sued the Defendant UM carrier for claims for declaratory judgment, statutory bad faith, breach of contract, negligence, and a violation of the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protections Law, the case proceeded to cross motions for summary judgment.

In ressolving the issues presented, the court ruled that there was no doubt that the policy number had changed from the 858 policy to the 916 policy. The court also noted that the Defendant carrier had provided notice to the Plaintiff that the policy number had changed. It was additionally noted that the Plaintiff did not object to that change and continued to pay the premiums for the new 916 policy.

The court otherwise concluded that the policy language and the sign down form that was previously executed by the Plaintiff relative to the 858 policy were not ambiguous.

After reviewing the facts and circumstances before it, the court concluded that the Defendant carrier’s refusal to pay the higher amount that the Plaintiff desired for the UM claim was not frivolous or unfounded given that the Plaintiff’s family had elected to continue with the reduced UM coverage under the new policy and had evidenced the same by paying the premium.

Based upon this ruling, the court also found that there was no basis for the bad faith claim presented by the Plaintiff given that the Defendant had performed its obligations under the policy by paying out the UM coverage that was paid for by the Plaintiff.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (March 5, 2026).

PLEASE SPONSOR OR REGISTER FOR LACKAWANNA PRO BONO GOLF TOURNAMENT

Plaintiff Found To Have Made Good Faith Efforts To Complete Service of Process in Medical Malpractice Case

In the case of Francis v. Xu, No. 2025-CV-3745 (C.P. Lacka. Co. April 16, 2026 Nealon, J.), the court addressed Preliminary Objections filed by a Defendant-physician in a medical malpractice matter seeking to dismiss the claims asserted against the physician on the grounds that the Plaintiffs failed to effectuate service of original process in a timely fashion or with good faith upon the Defendant-physician prior to the expiration of the two (2) year statute of limitations. 

Judge Terrence R. Nealon, writing for the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas, agreed that, in order to toll the statute of limitations, a plaintiff must indeed make a good faith effort to timely serve initial process on a Defendant. The court also agreed that, if a plaintiff fails to do so, the lawsuit is subject to dismissal where either (a) the plaintiff has demonstrated an intent to stall the judicial machinery, or (b) the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the Rules regarding service of original process has prejudiced the defendant.

After reviewing the record before him, Judge Nealon found that the Plaintiff in this matter made repeated attempts to serve the Defendant at issue at multiple locations while expeditiously and repeatedly reinstating the Complaint along the way.

Accordingly, the court found that service of process upon the Defendant physician resulted from the Plaintiff’s repeated efforts to diligently and timely serve the doctor. The court also found that the Defendant doctor did not identify any prejudice that she allegedly suffered due to any delay in serving initial process.

As such, the doctor’s Preliminary Objections asserting untimely service of original process were overruled.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

AI Hallucinations Appear in a Third Circuit Matter

In the case of McCarthy v. US Drug Enforcement Admin., No. 24-2704 (3d Cir. March 27, 2026 Phipps, J., Chung, J., and Roth, J.) (Op. by Chung, J.), in a matter of first impression, a divided US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit issued a decision in which it reprimanded a Pennsylvania attorney whose work featured fabricated case law and various inaccuracies through artificial intelligence tools.

The court reprimanded the attorney involved for filing a brief that contained AI hallucinations. More specifically, the attorney filed a brief that included summaries of eight Drug Enforcement Administration adjudications that were generated by AI and supplied to him by a non-attorney. According to the Opinion, the attorney failed to verify the cases and the summaries, seven of which were filed with factual and legal errors, and one of which involved a case that did not even exist.

The court emphasized that the attorney involved not only failed to verify the erroneous citations generated by AI, but also failed to alert the court in this regard for months, even after the opposing attorney involved in the case identified the potential errors.

In a 2 to 1 ruling, the majority concluded that sanctions were warranted. The court found that the attorney violated Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct 1.1 and Third Circuit Disciplinary Rule 2.1(d) by failing to provide competent representation.

The Third Circuit panel noted that, because it was this court’s “first opportunity to address the use of AI."  The Third Circuit panel noted that since it had not notified the attorney in question that the court would consider whether his conduct violated Pa. R.P.C. 1.1, the court was electing not to issue monetary sanctions.

However, the majority noted that, going forward, attorneys could face any of the sanctions available under the Circuit Court Disciplinary Rules 4.1-4.2, including suspension and even disbarment.

Judge Roth concurred in part and dissented in part, opining that the attorney in question also violated Pa. R.P.C. 3.3(a)(1), by making a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal on at least two occasions. Judge Roth felt that more severe sanctions were warranted.

Judge Roth went on to note that the Majority did not need to warn attorneys to use artificial intelligence responsibly. She stated that “[n]o forewarning is necessary when it is clear what standard the attorney was required to follow.” 

Judge Roth felt that the court could instead take notice of the numerous court decisions from across the country that have already addressed an attorney’s obligation to take ownership over their work product.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: Article – “ ‘No Forewarning Necessary’: Divided 3rd Circuit Weighs Discipline For Attorney’s Use of AI Hallucinations,” By Riley Brennan of The Legal Intelligencer (March 30, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by Igor Omilaev from www.unsplash.com.

Trial Court Finds That Defendant Waived Arbitration Clause in Nursing Home Case by Litigating Case in Court

 

In the case of the Estate of Smalling v. 2990 Holm Operating, LLC, Jan. Term 2024, No. 240102492 (C.P. Phila. Co. Dec. 9, 2025 Cohen, J.), the trial court issued a Rule 1925 Opinion requesting the appellate court to uphold the trial court’s decision to deny a Defendant’s Motion to Compel an Arbitration in a nursing home case.

In this matter, the Plaintiffs allege that their family member decedent had passed away due to alleged negligence treatment received at the Defendant’s facility.

After the Plaintiffs had filed suit, the case proceeded with pleadings and discovery. Fourteen months after the lawsuit was filed, the Defendants filed a Petition to Compel Arbitration.

The court denied the Petition under the primary rationale that the Defendants had waived its right to compel arbitration by availing itself of the judicial process. The court noted that, here, there was a significant delay of over one year before the Defendant sought to compel arbitration. Given the delay and the active litigation in the lawsuit, including the filing of earlier Preliminary Objections by the Defendant, the trial court found a waiver of the right of the Defendant to request arbitration.

In so ruling, the trial court did not reach the Plaintiffs’ other arguments that the arbitration clause in the nursing home agreement was unenforceable under the doctrines of procedural and substantive unconscionability, and/or the argument that the person who had signed the arbitration agreement did not have the power to bind the decedent to the arbitration agreement.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source of image:  Photo by Matthius Zomer on www.pexels.com.

Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (Feb. 12, 2026).

Trial Court Addresses Duty of Counsel To Act Reasonably in Moving Forward With Discovery and Depositions

In the case of Knick v. Lehigh Valley Hospital, No. 2024-CV-3016 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Jan,. 30, 2026, Nealon, J.), the court addressed a second Motion filed by a Plaintiff to extend the deadlines for the completion of discovery and expert discovery, and to postpone the scheduled trial date, in a medical malpractice case.

In this Opinion, the court noted earlier admonitions from the court directing the parties to promptly initiate and complete their pre-trial preparations.

In their filings on this Motion, each party claimed that the opposing party was the reason for the delay. 

The court noted, however, that defense counsel produced emails and other communications between counsel reflecting that the Plaintiff made no attempt to schedule a single deposition for the first fourteen (14) months that the case was pending and that defense counsel had made many attempts to schedule depositions only to have Plaintiff’s counsel claim that they were unavailable and, on another occasion, to cancel the depositions that had been scheduled for mutually convenient dates.

The court noted that litigants and their counsel have an obligation to act reasonably in scheduling and conducting discovery depositions, and when attorneys are unavailable to complete pending legal matters in a timely fashion, the Rules of Professional Conduct require them to either (a) decline additional work, (b) seek assistance or (c) withdraw and allow another attorney to complete the work.

Ultimately, the court granted the Plaintiff’s Motion to Extend partially by allowing for deadlines to be modified in a limited fashion. However, the request to postpone the July of 2026 trial date was denied.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

LACKAWANNA PRO BONO GOLF TOURNAMENT SET FOR JUNE 8, 2026

 

Summary Judgment Granted in Supermarket Slip and Fall Case

In the case of Jordan v. Brown’s Superstores, Inc., Aug. Term 2023, No. 02262 (C.P. Phila. Co. Dec. 5, 2025 Yu, J.), the court issued a Rule 1925 Opinion requesting the Superior Court to affirm the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in a slip and fall case involving a Plaintiff who allegedly slipped and fell on pieces of watermelon on a supermarket floor.

The trial court noted that the Plaintiff did not present any evidence that the Defendant had created the hazard. The Plaintiff also did not produce any evidence that the store had any actual knowledge of the pieces of watermelon being on the floor prior to the Plaintiff’s fall.

Moreover, no evidence was produced that would enable the Plaintiff to prove constructive notice on the part of the store. More specifically, there is no evidence presented as to how the pieces of watermelon came to be on the floor, or how long they had been present.

In addition to entering summary judgment for these reasons, the court also noted that the Plaintiff did not file any response to the Motion.

The court noted that the Plaintiff’s failure to respond to the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment provided an independent procedural basis to support the granting of the summary judgment motion under Pa. R.C.P. 1035.3(d).

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source of image: Photo by Shamblen Studios on www.unsplash.com.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (Feb. 12, 2026).

LOOKING TO MEDIATE A SLIP OR TRIP AND FALL CASE?

Contact:

dancummins@cumminslaw.net

570-591-3969

Court Rules that Placement of Wet Floor Signs Constitute Adequate Warning

In the case of Pitts v. Sonesta Intern. Hotel, Corp., No. 231002600 (C.P. Phila. Co. Nov. 24, 2025 Moore, J.), the trial court issued a Rule 1925 Opinion requesting the Superior Court to affirm the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of a hotel in a case where a Plaintiff slipped and fell on a wet floor in the hotel’s foyer area.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff slipped and fell in an area where a maintenance worker for the hotel had recently mopped the floor but had also put out yellow caution signs. Videos surveillance footage confirmed that the maintenance worker had put the signs out.

According to the Opinion, during her testimony, the Plaintiff acknowledged the presence of the signs inside the foyer. However, the Plaintiff claimed that she did not see the signs before she slipped and fell.

At trial, the court granted the defense Motion for a Non Suit on the basis that there was no genuine issue of material fact to be resolved by the jury once the Plaintiff rested and given that the Plaintiff had failed to establish a right to relief.

The court emphasized that, in Pennsylvania, a business owner had a duty to maintain a reasonably safe property and must either fix dangerous conditions or warn invitees about them.

The court additionally noted that invitees are expected to be aware of their surroundings in order to appreciate possible dangers and also to appreciate warnings of any hazards.

Here in this case, the court found that, by clearly placing the yellow “Wet Floor” signs on the floor in the hotel foyer, the Defendant had adequately warned the Plaintiff about the possibility of the foyer floor being slippery.

The court emphasized that the Plaintiff acknowledged the presence of the wet floor signs inside the foyer before she walked into the area. On cross-examination at trial, the Plaintiff agreed that she had seen at least one (1) of the yellow signs before she entered the foyer and prior to falling down. The trial court noted that, even viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff, it was the trial court’s opinion that the Plaintiff had failed to meet her burden of proving that the Defendant was liable for her fall.

Notably, the court noted in its Opinion that the placement of yellow warning signs in and around the foyer was conduct that established that the Defendant had adequately warned the Plaintiff of the dangers of the wet floor.

The court rejected the Plaintiff’s suggestion that the hotel should have also have had someone standing near the foyer to tell customers inside the hotel that the floor was wet. The court found that this was not a reasonable requirement and that the law does not require a business owner to undertake such unreasonable measures to warn of hazards on the property.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (March 5, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by Sandiyu Nuryono on www.pexels.com.

Watch Out For That Hole That is Open and Obvious

In the case of Harris v. Hutchinson Sportsman’s Club, No. 1007 WDA 2025 (Pa. Super. Feb. 4, 2026 Stabile, J., Murray, J., and Beck, J.) (Op. by Murray, J.), the Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s entry of summary judgment under the open and obvious doctrine in a case involving a Plaintiff who crashed his bike on a road owned by the Defendant.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff testified that he noticed a “giant hole” in the road and attempted to avoid it as he was operating his son’s electric bike.

The Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Plaintiff was aware of the road conditions and that they were open and obvious.

The Superior Court agreed with the trial court’s finding that the Plaintiff had failed to establish a case of negligence. The appellate court noted that the trial court had properly found that the conditions on the road were open and obvious, and that the Plaintiff was aware of the conditions, thereby negating any duty on the part of the landowner to warn or protect the Plaintiff.

The Superior Court also agreed with the trial court that the Plaintiff’s inability to pinpoint the cause of his bike accident with his testimony further undermined the Plaintiff’s negligence claim.

As such, the Superior Court upheld the entry of summary judgment, finding that the Plaintiff did not meet his burden of proof on his negligence claim.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert (Feb. 24, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by KBO Bike on www.unsplash.com.

Superior Court Addresses Discoverability of Internal Post-Incident Investigative Reports in Medical Malpractice Case

In the case of Griffin v. The Bryn Mawr Hospital, No. 3361 EDA 2024, 2026 Pa. Super. 53 (Pa. Super. March 19, 2026 Bowes, J., Murray, J., and Beck, J.) (Op. by Beck, J.) (Concurring and Dissenting Op. by Murray, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court addressed whether four internal documents created by the medical providers after the hospital allegedly mishandled fetal remains were protected from disclosure under Pennsylvania’s Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error Act (MCARE) and the Federal Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act.

According to the Opinion, the case arose out of a lawsuit filed by parents who alleged that the hospital mistakenly cremated the placenta instead of their fetus and later admitted to a “mix up.”

During discovery, the hospital withheld four internal reports tied to its investigation. The hospital asserted that these documents were privileged patient-safety materials generated as part of its compliance and internal review processes.

In its Opinion, the court addressed how far hospitals can shield internal investigation documents from discovery under the above-referenced state and federal patient-safety laws.

The Superior Court majority ruled that the documents were not protected under MCARE. The court found that the MCARE statute applied only to events involving direct patient care and not post-treatment conduct. The court here found that the allegations in this case did not implicate any medical treatment issues.

With regards to the application of the federal law, the federal law under the PSQIA, this court entered a split decision. The court held that three of the documents at issue were shielded under the broader scope of the PSQIA law because they were created as part of the hospital’s internal patient safety evaluation system.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of the Majority's decision may click this LINK.

Judge Murray's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion can be viewed HERE.

Source: Article – “Pa. Superior Court Splits On MCARE Patient-Safety Privilege Case,” By Tristin Hoffman of The Legal Intelligencer (March 25, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by RDNE Stock Project on www.pexels.com.

Defendant's Forum Non Conveniens Argument Rejected in Medical Malpractice Case Filed in Philadelphia

In the case of Miller v. Jackson, May Term, 2024, No., 240503457 (C.P. Phila. Co. Dec. 17, 2025 Cohen, J.), the court denied a Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss a case based upon the forum non conveniens doctrine in a medical malpractice case.

According to the Opinion, this case arose out of medical treatment that took place in the state of Delaware.

After the lawsuit was filed in Philadelphia County, the Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss based upon the doctrine of forum non conveniens, arguing that the case should be heard in Delaware where the events occurred.

After the court allowed discovery on the motion, the case came up for a decision.

The Plaintiffs asserted that the individual Defendants resided in Pennsylvania and a foundation related to the matter conducted significant operations in patient interactions in Pennsylvania, which allegedly established a public interest in the case being decided in Pennsylvania.

The Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas denied the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss after finding that the Defendants had failed to provide “weighty reasons” to justify the dismissal and transfer of the case.

The court noted, in part, that while the events regarding the medical treatment occurred in the State of Delaware, Pennsylvania still had a substantial connection to the case due to the residency of the individual Defendants in Pennsylvania and the operations of the foundation taking place in Pennsylvania.

The court additionally noted that the Defendants’ arguments focused on county-level convenience rather than a state-level analysis, which is required for forum non conveniens consideration.

The court otherwise determined that the increased travel time for witnesses to come to Philadelphia was not significant enough to warrant dismissal, especially since many of the witnesses were based in Philadelphia.

The trial court otherwise denied the Defendants’ request for a certification of the issues for an interlocutory appeal found that the issues at hand involved a discretionary matter of convenience and not any controlling question of law. The court additionally found that an immediate appeal would not materially advance the termination of the case but would instead delay the proceedings.

Overall, the court found no compelling reasons supporting the disturbance of the Plaintiffs’ choice of forum. As such, the case was allowed to proceed in Pennsylvania.

In this Rule 1925 Opinion, the court requested the Superior Court to affirm its decisions as noted above.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (Feb. 26, 2026).