Showing posts with label Medicare/Medicaid. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Medicare/Medicaid. Show all posts

Thursday, February 10, 2022

Corrected Link for case of M.M. a Minor v. The County of Carbon Highlighted on Tort Talk Yesterday

 Yesterday's Tort Talk post covered the case of M.M., a Minor v. The County of Carbon, No. 18-CV-2341 (C.P. Carbon Co. Dec. 29, 2021 Nanovic, J.).

Below is the corrrect Link for the decision.  I apologize for any confusion that may have been caused by the faulty Link.

In this decision, Judge Roger N. Nanovic addressed the issue of whether a minor Plaintiff was liable to pay a Department of Human Services/Medicaid lien arising out of a motor vehicle accident case in a matter where the Defendant had obtained a favorable ruling prior to trial on a Motion In Limine to exclude evidence at trial of all medical bills because it appeared that those medical bills were covered by a policy of insurance.

In the Opinion, Judge Nanovic found that the Medicaid payments were not paid under any policy of insurance and that, therefore, the lien must be paid back out of the Plaintiff’s settlement proceeds.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Court Rules on Court Approval of Settlement that Minor Plaintiff Must Satisfy Medicaid Lien


In the case of M.M., a Minor v. The County of Carbon, No. 18-CV-2341 (C.P. Carbon Co. Dec. 29, 2021 Nanovic, J.), Judge Roger N. Nanovic addressed the issue of whether a minor Plaintiff was liable to pay a Department of Human Services/Medicaid lien arising out of a motor vehicle accident case in a matter where the Defendant had obtained a favorable ruling prior to trial on a Motion In Limine to exclude evidence at trial of all medical bills because it appeared that those medical bills were covered by a policy of insurance.

According to the Opinion, the case ultimately settled and the Plaintiffs then pursued court approval of the settlement.

In that Petition for Court Approval of the Settlement, the Plaintiff asserted that, given the Motion In Limine result, which confirmed that the Plaintiff allegedly could not introduce the Medicaid payments at trial and recover on the same, the Plaintiff was not liable to pay the Medicaid lien following the court’s approval of the settlement.  The Plaintiff argued that, as such, the Medicaid lien did not have to be considered in terms of the settlement of the case.

In the Opinion, Judge Nanovic disagreed with the Plaintiff’s position and found that the Medicaid payments were not paid under any policy of insurance and that, therefore, the lien must be paid back out of the Plaintiff’s settlement proceeds.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Gerard J. Geiger of the Stroudsburg, PA law firm of Neuman Williams, P.C. for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Fabian Blank on www.unsplash.com.

Thursday, February 9, 2017

Plaintiff Secures Costs and Attorney's Fees On Petition to Enforce Settlement Agreement (Medicare Lien Issues)



In a continuing trend across the Commonwealth, Judge Kimberly McFadden of the Northampton County Court of Common Pleas granted a Plaintiff's Petition to Enforce a Settlement in the case of Williams v. Easton Coach Co., No. C-0048-CV-2015-10186.

The court awarded the Plaintiff costs and attorney's fees after Plaintiff was forced to file a Petition to Enforce a Settlement that was held up by the Defendant's refusal to accept the Plaintiff's proposed Final Settlement Detail Document designed to provide notice to Medicare of the Settlement.

In a detailed Order without Opinion, the Court ordered that the settlement go forth and awarded the Plaintiff costs and attorney's fees caused by the need to file the Petition.

I send thanks to Attorney Scott Cooper of the Harrisburg law firm of Schmidt Kramer for bringing this decision to my attention.

Anyone wishing to view the Court's Order along with the Plaintiff's Petition, may click this LINK.

Thursday, September 29, 2016

Cross-Examination of Life Care Planning Expert on Affordable Care Act Precluded by Collateral Source Rule


In his recent decision in the case of Bernheisel v. Mikaya, No. 3:13-cv-01496 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 9, 2016 Mariani, J.), Judge Robert D. Mariani addressed a number of Pre-Trial Motions in Limine filed by Defendants in this medical malpractice action including a request for a bifurcation of trial and motions seeking to preclude and limit medical expense and future economic damages claims.  

The Opinion is notable with respect to Judge Mariani’s recitation and application of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b) pertaining to motions to bifurcate trials.   Here, the Defendants requested a bifurcation of the liability issues from the damages issues.   Using his broad discretion on the matter, Judge Mariani denied this motion.  

With regards to the Motions pertaining to the economic damages claims, Judge Mariani ruled, in part, that he would defer ruling on the Defendant’s Motions relative to the Plaintiff’s medical cost claims until the time of trial.   The Court did generally note that Pennsylvania law requires the Plaintiff to produce evidence which establishes this type of claim with reasonable certainty and does not require the Plaintiff to establish a precise amount of damages.  

The Defendants also sought the permission of the court to cross-examine the Plaintiff’s life care planning experts on the future medical expenses claims by crossing the expert and introducing evidence pertaining to Medicaid, Medicare, and the Affordance Care Act.  

Judge Mariani, citing, in part, to the case of Deeds v. University of Pennsylvania Medical Center, noted that the collateral source rule precludes counsel from pursuing certain inquiries, including raising an individual’s access to Medicare, Medicaid, and benefits under the Affordance Care Act when opposing a future medical expenses claim.  

As such, the court in Bernheisel precluded the defense from cross-examining the Plaintiff’s life care planning expert on these issues.  

Anyone desiring a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

To review the February 9, 2015 Tort Talk post on the Deeds v. University of Pennsylvania Medical Center case, which contains a Link to that decision, click HERE.


The prevailing Plaintiff’s attorney in this matter was Attorney Max Kennerly, Esquire of the Philadelphia law firm of Kennerly Loutey, LLC.  I send thanks to Attorney  Michael A. O’Donnell of the Kingston, Pennsylvania O’Donnell Law Offices for bringing this decision to my attention.   

Tuesday, May 3, 2016

Judge Mariani Remands Issue Regarding Carrier's Demand for Final Medicare Lien Letter Before Payment of Settlement Funds


In a decision handed down in the Federal Middle District Court of Pennsylvania case of Mikiewicz v. Hamorski and Erie Insurance Exchange, No. 3:15-CV-02426 (M.D.Pa. May 3, 2016 Mariani, J.), Judge Robert D. Mariani granted a Plaintiff's Motion for Remand in a case involving a carrier's demand that the Plaintiff secure and produce a final lien letter from Medicare prior to any need by the carrier to issue a settlement payment following a motor vehicle accident.

This matter was originally filed by the Plaintiff in the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas as a Petition assterting that the carrier's requirement that the Plaintiff satisfy certain conditions as part of the settlement, i.e. produce a final lien letter from Medicare, violated Pa.R.C.P. 229.1 which requires that settlement proceeds be paid within twenty days of the execution of a Release.

The Plaintiff followed that Petition with a Motion to Enforce the Settlement in the state court.  The same day that Motion was argued, the carrier filed an Answer to the Motion and also filed paperwork to remove the case to federal court.

The carrier asserted that removal was proper given that Plaintiff's claim involved a federal statute, the Medicare Secondary Payer Act ("MSPA"), thereby giving rise to federal question jurisdiction.  The carrier also asserted that removal was appropriate because the MSPA is an extraordinary statute that completely pre-empted state law.

The Plaintiff responded by filing the federal court Motion to Remand at issue.  As noted, the court granted the Plaintiff's Motion.

Judge Robert D. Mariani
M.D. Pa.
 
In so ruling, Judge Mariani found that the Plaintiff's claims did not arise under Federal law as asserted by the carrier.  Rather, the court found, the carrier raised federal law as a defense to the Plaintiff's claims.  The court noted that a defendant can not transform a matter into a federal question case by injecting a federal law defense into the matter for purposes of the removal issue.

Judge Mariani also rejected the carrier's contention that the MSPA completely preempted State law.  The court reviewed the "complete pre-emption doctrine" and found that the elements of that doctrine had not been met under circumstances presented in this matter.  Judge Mariani cited to several Third Circuit decisions holding that a state law cause of action that references or involves the MSPA or the Medicare statute is not removable to federal court because it does not raise a federal question.

Accordingly, the court granted the Plaintiff's Motion for Remand and sent the case back to state court.  In so ruling, the court also granted attorney's fees, costs and expenses after finding that the carrier lacked an objectively reasonable basis for the removal.  The court noted that not only had the carrier failed to cite case law in support of the removal, the court also pointed out that the carrier had been repeatedly sanctioned in the past for making similar unsuccessful arguments regarding the MSPA.

Anyone wishing to review Judge Mariani's opinion in Mikiewicz may click this LINK.

I send thanks to the prevailing Plaintiff's attorney Paul Oven of the Moosic, PA office of Dougherty, Leventhal & Price for bringing this case to my attention.

Friday, April 10, 2015

Recurring Medicare Liens and Settlement Payment Issue Arises Again

In a Memorandum  Opinion out of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Villare v. GEICO Casualty Company, NO. 14-2288 (E.D. Pa. March 24, 2015 Baylson, J.), the court addressed a Plaintiff’s Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement where the carrier was insisting upon confirmation with respect to any Medicare Liens prior to releasing the settlement draft.

Following a settlement conference the parties settled an underinsured motorist (UIM) for $100,000.  The letter confirming the settlement included an agreement “to satisfy any and all liens being asserted in this matter with these settlement funds.”  After the Release was sent, a dispute arose as to whether the insurance company could require that confirmation be obtained that there is no Medicare lien and that no Medicare liens will exist in the future. 

The Plaintiff filed a motion to enforce the settlement when the carrier would not settle the case without the letter. The Plaintiff provided an agreement to indemnify and hold harmless and also affidavits pertaining to the Medicare issue. 

The court granted the Plaintiff's motion to enforce the settlement.  Interestingly, at footnote 5 the court noted that if the carrier "seeks certainty that Medicare will never assert a lien, the Court is doubtful that Medicare could or would provide such a guarantee with regard to the unknown, hypothetical costs for future medical care that may or may not occur.” 

Anyone desiring a copy of this decision may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.

I send thanks to Attorney Scott Cooper of the Harrisburg, PA law firm of Schmidt Kramer for bringing this case to my attention.


Commentary:

This decision supports an argument that requests for confirmation of possible future Medicare liens will not be upheld.  This decision also appears to be another example of a type of case were the court will not allow a payment of a settlement amount to be held up by a demand for the production of a Final Medicare Lien Letter first if that contingency was not a part of the pre-settlement negotiations. 

Keep in mind, however, that other court decisions have held that where the carrier makes specific demands, during the course of settlement negotiations, that a Final Medicare Lien Letter will have to be produced prior to the issuance of a settlement draft, such a demand will be upheld as a part of the meeting of the minds in the settlement process.

For other Tort Talk blog posts on this recurring issue, click HERE.


Friday, March 20, 2015

Judge Kosik of PA Federal Middle District Court Addresses Interplay Between Future Medical Expenses Claim and Medicare

As Tort Talkers may recall, a hot topic trending right now under Pennsylvania civil litigation law is the interplay between alleged damages for future medical care and the collateral source doctrine.
 
For other Tort Talk posts covering this area of the law click HERE and HERE.

This issue came up in the Federal Middle District of Pennsylvania case of Coyne v. Midland Steel Warehouse, No. 3:13-CV-02728 (M.D.Pa. Feb. 20, 2015 Kosik, J.), in which the Plaintiff’s expert intended to offer testimony that Plaintiff’s gross future medicals were around $150,000. 
 
However, according to defense counsel, at the time of the accident, and obviously going forward, Plaintiff, due to her age, was Medicare eligible.  Defense counsel reported that Medicare had actually paid for the Plaintiff's medical care up to the time of trial and was asserting a lien for a fraction of the gross cost. 

Based upon this scenario, the defense filed a Motion in Limine in which the following issues were raised. 
 
First, the defense sought to have the alleged future medicals capped to the Medicare amount.
 
Second, and in the alternative, permission was requested by the defense to cross-examine the Plaintiff’s expert on the Medicare amount.
 
Third, the defense additionally requested permission to produce a rebuttal expert to discuss the Medicare pricing of the alleged future medical care.

According to the copy of the Order only (without Opinion) secured from this case, Judge Kosik granted the defense motion in part and permitted the defense to cross-examine the Plaintiff’s expert and/or call a Medicare expert. 
 
According to defense counsel, the case settled on the eve of trial.
 
The prevailing defense counsel on the motion in Coyne was Attorney John Croumer of the Lancaster, PA office of Post & Schell and I send thanks to him for bringing this notable decision to my attention.
 
Anyone desiring a copy of the Order in question, may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.

 

Tuesday, October 14, 2014

DING DONG THE WITCH IS DEAD!


According to a press release from The American Association for Justice, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) has withdrawn its proposed rule in tort actions on future medicals called “Medicare Secondary Payer and Future Medicals.” 

According to the AAJ, this means that, currently, there is no future medicals rule pending from Medicare and the prospect of having to do Medicare Set-Asides in third party liability matters is now dead.

I send thanks to Attorney Bruce Zero of the Scranton, PA -based Powell Law for bringing this news to my attention.

Thursday, May 23, 2013

Two More Decisions Addressing Whether Medicare Lien Issues Can Hold Up a Settlement

I recently came across additional decisions in which a trial court addressed the issue of Medicare lien payments possibly holding up the resolution of a civil litigation settlement:

In his 2011 decision in the case of Mackrides v. Marshalls, Marmaxx Operating Corp., No. 11-Civil-6540 (E.D. Pa. April 23, 2013, Joyner, J.), Judge J. Curtis Joyner addressed Medicare issues with regards to a settlement of a slip and fall personal injury suit.  

In this decision, the Court addressed a Plaintiff’s Motion to Enforce a Settlement.   The Court ruled that the motion would be denied.  

In the Opinion, the Court noted that, although the Defendant’s failure to tender a proposed Release or settlement, was dilatory, unreasonable, and bordering on being deemed worthy of sanctions, the motion to enforce the settlement was denied where questions about the settlement terms remained unresolved, including questions pertaining to whether the settlement figure included funds to reimburse Medicare, whether Medicare made payments subject to reimbursement, and whether Medicare had waived any right to reimbursement.  

Anyone wishing to review this Mackrides Opinion may click this LINK. 


 
The older Northampton County Court of Common Pleas decision from back in 2011 in the case of Furman v. Wildermuth, No. C-0048-CV-2008-3556 (C.P. Northampton Co. July 12, 2011 Dally, J.), is another example of a trial court decision holding that a settlement of a personal injury may not be conditioned upon receipt of a final conditional payment letter from Medicare.   That Court relied upon the Pennsylvania Superior Court decision in Zaleppa v. Siewel, 9 A.3d 632 (Pa. 2010).  
 
The Furman decision can be viewed HERE.
 
Source:   “Court Summaries,” Pennsylvania Bar News (May, 2013) by Timothy L. Clawges.    
 


Click HERE to view other Tort Talk posts on Medicare issues, including with respect to settlements of personal injury matters.

Thursday, December 27, 2012

The 2012 TORT TALK TOP 10

THE 2012 TORT TALK TOP 10



As another year winds down to an end, here's a look back at some of the top cases and trends of the year in the 2012 TORT TALK TOP 10:




10.  Recklessness Not Covered by Exculpatory Clauses


In its decision in Tayar v. Camelback Ski, 47 A.3d 1190 (Pa. 2012), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that it was against public policy to release reckless behavior in a pre-injury exculpatory clause. The court more specifically found that a ski resort's release form attempting to release the resort and its employees for liability for reckless conduct was invalid  Click HERE for more info on that case.



9.  Error in Judgment Defense Under Fire

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed to review the case of Passarello v. Grumbine, 29 A.3d 1159 (Pa.Super. 2011), appeal granted, 44 A.3d 654 (Pa. 2012), to address whether medical malpractice defendants may continue to rely upon an "error in judgment" defense at trial.

Under an application of the "error in judgment" defense, the trial courts instruct jurors at trial that "physicians who exercise the skill, knowledge and care customarily exercised in their profession are not liable for a mere mistake in judgment."

This defense was first found to be invalid in the Superior Court case of Pringle v. Rapaport, 980 A.2d 159 (Pa.Super. 2009). In its more recent decision in Passarello, the Superior Court held that its previous ruling in Pringle could be applied retroactively.

Now, the issue is proceeding up to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Passarello for further review. The Supreme Court's decision in this regard could have a substantial impact on the defense of medical malpractice cases in the future.


  8.  Regular Use Exclusion Upheld (Again)

Over the past year, the Superior Court rebuffed several attempts by the plaintiffs bar to overturn the regular use exclusion, which upholds the all-American principle that "you can't get something for nothing."

The regular use exclusion typically comes into play where an injured party is injured in an accident while operating a vehicle that was not covered under the insurance policy that the injured party has made a claim against. The exclusion basically works to prevent an insurance company from being subjected to an additional risk of coverage for a vehicle for which the insurance company did not receive a premium or intend to insure.

Earlier this year, the Superior Court upheld a non-owned, regularly used vehicles exclusion in its nonprecedential decision in the case of Erie Insurance v. Soroka, No. 1086 M.D.A. 2011 (Pa. Super. March 8, 2012 Gantman, Allen, and Mundy, J.J.) (Memorandum by Mundy, J.).

In a September decision in the case of Adamitis v. Erie Insurance Exchange, No. 893 EDA 2010 (Pa. Super. Sept. 25, 2012 Stevens, P.J., Lazarus, J. and Colville, J.) (Opinion by Stevens, P.J.), the Superior Court revisited the regular use exclusion issue and again affirmed the validity and enforceability of that exclusion in an underinsured motorist coverage benefits case involving alleged injuries sustained by the claimant while driving at work.

In its more recent October 18 decision in the case of Rother v. Erie Insurance Exchange, No. 1770 MDA 2011, 2012 Pa. Super. 228 (Pa. Super. Oct. 18, 2012 Bowes, Ott, and Straussburger, JJ.) (Opinion by Bowes, J.), the Superior Court again upheld the validity of the regularly used, non-owned vehicle exclusion. 

The essential question in this case was whether the plaintiff was "regularly" using the subject vehicle in a way contemplated by the exclusion. The Pennsylvania Superior Court thoroughly reviewed the law pertaining to the test for regular use, i.e., "whether the use is regular or habitual," and found that the use of the vehicle was indeed regular under the facts of this case.

The court in Rother further stated that the application of the regular use exclusion to these facts did not violate any public policy grounds. To the contrary, the court found that the regular use exclusion has been repeatedly upheld on policy grounds, as that exclusion generally promotes the cost-containment policy under the MVFRL.



7.  UM/UIM Rejection Forms

Several decisions from the past year confirmed that, when it comes to rejection of UM/UIM forms, "the t's have to be crossed and thi i's have to be dotted."

The specific requirements for the language of a rejection of underinsured motorist benefits form are set forth under 75 Pa. C.S. §1731.

In its recent decision in the case of Jones v. Unitrin Auto and Home Insurance, No. 397 W.D.A. 2011 (Pa. Super. Feb. 6, 2012 Musmanno, Alan and Mundy J.J.), (Opinion by Mundy, J.) (Alan J. dissenting), the Superior Court held that insurance carriers must strictly comply with the mandates for the form utilized for an insured's rejection of UIM benefits during an application for automobile insurance.

Noting that the other prior analogous decisions have required that the subject form "specifically comply" with the requirements of §1731(c), the Superior Court in Jones found that, by adding a sentence to the form between the required language and the signature line, the Unitrin UIM rejection form did not "specifically comply" with §1731(c) as required by §1731 (c.1) and was, therefore, void.

It is noted that U.S. District Senior Judge Edmund V. Ludwig of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania relied upon Jones in ruling in Robinson v. Travelers Indemnity Co. of America, 2012 WL 677007 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 29, 2012), that the addition of even a single word to the mandated language rendered the rejection form void. In Robinson, the carrier had changed the waiver by simply adding the word "motorists" into the phrase "underinsured coverage" in the mandated language.

Thus, there can be no question that strict compliance with the statutory mandates for UM/UIM rejection forms is required.



6.  Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

In a decision that was actually handed down at the end of 2011, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed the expanding parameters of the cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED).

By was of a Supreme Court split decision in the case of Toney v. Chester County Hospital, 36 A.3d 83 (Pa. 2011), the Superior Court's decision found at 961 A.2d 192 (Pa.Super. 2008), recognizing a new variation of the tort, was allowed to stand.

According to previous precedent on this issue, the courts initially required the tortfeasor to impact the victim physically to justify recovery for NIED (impact rule). Thereafter, the requirements to state an NIED claim expanded to allow the victim to be in close proximity of physical impact (zone of impact liability). The tort was then further extended to permit recovery if the victim personally witnessed a tortfeasor physically impact a close relative (bystander liability).  Now, with Toney, comes a fourth variation.

Under Toney, the Superior Court recognized a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress exists where the emotional distress results from a "negligent breach of a contractual or fiduciary duty," absent physical impact or injury.

The Toney case involved a medical malpractice claim in which the plaintiff alleged that her medical providers had read an ultrasound during the plaintiff's pregnancy as being normal.

Unfortunately, the plaintiff's child was later born with several profound abnormalities. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants' negligence prevented her from preparing herself for the shock of witnessing her child's birth with such deformities. The Supreme Court's split decision on the case allowed the Superior Court's extension of the tort of NIED to stand.



5. Social Media Discovery

This a carry-over hot topic from last year's Tort Talk Top 10 list.  A slew of trial court opinions continue to come down on the issue of Social Media Discovery, particularly on the topic of whether personal injury defendants are entitled to view the private pages of a plaintiff's Facebook pages.

A split of authority has continued and, hopefully, an appellate court will be given an opportunity in 2013 to address the issue of whether such disclosures should be allowed under the liberal Rules of Civil Procedure pertaining to discovery. To review Social Media Discovery posts from over the past year, scroll through the Facebook Discovery Scorecard HERE.

Overall, the Pennsylvania trial court decisions handed down to date can be read as standing for the proposition that, where there is an initial threshold showing that discovery of the opposing party's private Facebook pages is likely to lead to the discovery of information pertinent to the claims or defenses presented, such discovery will ordinarily be allowed. 

This threshold showing may be made through admissions by the party at a deposition that the private pages may reveal pertinent information.  Another way to possibly make this threshold showing is by establishing that there is relevant information depicted on the public pages of the party's social media sites.



4. Barrick v. Holy Spirit Hospital

This is another carry-over from the 2011 Tort Talk Top Ten list.  In 2012, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court accepted the appeal in the case of  Barrick v. Holy Spirit Hospital  to address the issue of whether communications by an attorney to an expert retained by that attorney are discoverable.

By way of background, the Dauphin County trial court ruled in Barrick that these types of communications were indeed discoverable, particularly where an in camera review by the court of the written communications by the plaintiff's counsel with the plaintiff's medical expert confirmed that this contact from the attorney could have, in the words of the trial court judge, "materially impacted" the expert's formulation of his opinion.

On appeal, an original three-member panel of the Superior Court affirmed the trial court's decision that these types of communications by an attorney to an expert were discoverable. Then, on reargument, an en banc panel of the Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed and held that these communications were not discoverable.

In a one-page order filed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on August 31 granting allocatur, the Supreme Court noted that it will review the issue of "whether the Superior Court's interpretation of Pa.R.C.P. No. 4003.3 improperly provides absolute work-product protection to all communications between a party's counsel and their trial expert."

The Supreme Court's decision will be closely watched by civil litigators, as it could substantially impact how attorneys confer with their experts from this point forward.



3. Settlements and Medicare Liens

Here's another carry-over from the 2011 Tort Talk Top 10 list.  The issue of impact on Medicare Liens and settlements continued to come into play in 2012.

In 2011, both the Cambria County case of Vincent v. Buck, No. 2011-CV-456 (Cambria Co., April 4, 2011, Swope, S.J.), and the Monroe County case of Dailey-Console v. Barnwell, PICS Case No. 11-1115 (Monroe Co. May 18, 2011, Zulick, J.), the trial court judges relied upon the Zaleppa v. Seiwell, 9 A.3d 632 (Pa. Super. 2010)  decision to support a granting of a plaintiff’s motion to compel a defendant to pay a settlement over the Defendants’ objection that Medicare lien issues were not yet resolved.

In both decisions, the trial courts emphasized that there was nothing in the releases entered into between the parties that entitled the defense to insist that certain measures be taken by the plaintiff to ensure that the Medicare lien was addressed prior to the issuance of the settlement check. 

A similar trial court result from 2012 with an excellent analysis on the issue can also be found in Wimberly v. Katruska, PICS Case No. 12-1060 (C.P. Allegheny 2012).

In 2012, federal courts also jumped into the mix on the issue. In Carty v. Clark, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98314 (E.D.Pa. 2012), U.S. District Judge Eduardo C. Robreno of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted a plaintiff's motion to enforce settlement after citing the clear terms of the release, which stated that, once the final demand letter was produced by the plaintiff from Medicare, as was accomplished in this matter, the settlement proceeds were to be released to the plaintiff.

Pennsylvania civil litigators have also been pointing to the District Court of New Jersey's unpublished decision in Sipler v. Trans Am Trucking, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109278 (D.N.J. 2012), in which that court also ruled, in no uncertain terms, that a plaintiff's settlement could not be held up by Medicare lien or set-aside issues.

It seems that litigators on both the plaintiffs side and the defense side of the bar have welcomed these decisions clarifying the ability of parties to conclude personal injury matters despite existing Medicare liens.



2.  Pusl Overturned

Without a doubt, the most talked-about auto law opinion to come down over the past year was the Pennsylvania Superior Court's September 28 decision in the case of Smith v. Rohrbaugh, No. 91 MDA 2010, 2012 Pa. Super. 208 (Pa.Super. Sept. 28, 2012 Stevens, P.J., Bender, J., Panella, J., Donohue, J., Allen, J., Mundy, J., Olsen, J., Ott, J., and Wecht, J.) (Opinion by Ott, J.), in which that court took the rare step of reversing one of its notable earlier holdings.

In Smith v. Rohrbaugh, the Superior Court held that its previous decision in the case of Pusl v. Means, 982 A.2d 550 (Pa.Super. 2009), was wrongly decided and therefore overruled.

In Pusl, the Superior Court held that, where a plaintiff first obtained an underinsured (UIM) benefits recovery in a motor vehicle accident case from his or her own automobile insurance company, the defendant tortfeasor in the third-party liability lawsuit was entitled to a credit against the verdict up to the UIM amounts already received by the plaintiff.

The rationale behind this ruling was to prevent a double recovery by the plaintiff in violation of Pennsylvania's Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law.

When the prior Pusl decision came down in 2009, it caused quite a stir and many litigators on both sides of the bar questioned the validity of the decision. As the auto litigation bar was anxiously awaiting a review of the Pusl case by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, that court surprised many by denying allocatur, thereby leaving the Superior Court's decision as the rule of the land.

In the recent Smith v. Rohrbaugh case, the trial court applied a Pusl UIM credit against a jury's verdict entered against the tortfeasor defendant driver.

The plaintiff objected to this credit and appealed.

On appeal, the Superior Court in Smith noted that Pusl had been based, in part, upon the Superior Court's prior decision in the case of Tannenbaum v. Nationwide Ins., 919 A.2d 267 (Pa.Super. 2007), which pertained to the recovery of first-party benefits. However, the Superior Court decision in Tannenbaum had since been overruled by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Thus, a rationale underpinning the Superior Court's separate ruling in Pusl was eradicated.

In Smith, the Superior Court stated that the court in Pusl had correctly decided that a section of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law, i.e., 75 Pa.C.S.A. Section 1722, prevented a double recovery of first-party benefits in motor vehicle accident matters. The court noted that UIM benefits are generally and colloquially considered to be first-party benefits because they come from the first-party carrier.

However, the Smith court found that the Pusl decision incorrectly equated UIM benefits with the type of first-party benefits that are specifically defined in the MVFRL by the legislature. Based upon a finding that the reasoning in Pusl was incorrect, it was held in Smith that the Pusl court had also incorrectly concluded that the Section 1722 prohibition against a double recovery of first-party benefits applied to UIM payments. The court found that to rule otherwise would represent an impermissible rewriting of the MVFRL.

As such, the Pusl credit no longer exists and it appears that a plaintiff may now, if desired, secure UIM benefits prior to proceeding on a claim against the third-party tortfeasor on the liability side.

It remains to be seen whether this case will be appealed up to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and, if so, whether that court will grant allocatur to hear the appeal this time.



1.  Split on Proper Standard of Review for Products Cases

One of the most important, recurring issues over the past year has been whether the standard found in the Restatement (Second) of Torts or the different standard adopted in the Restatement (Third) of Torts should be utilized in products liability cases.

To date, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not squarely ruled upon this issue.  The Pennsylvania Federal Courts have issued conflicting decisions.

While the Restatement (Second) calls for a more narrow application of negligence principles in the products liability context, the Restatement (Third) decreases the emphasis upon the concepts of "intended use" and "intended user," along with placing a greater emphasis on the doctrine of "reasonable foreseeability," all of which changes arguably allow for a wider class of injured parties to recover against a manufacturer of a defective product.

It appears that litigators and the lower courts will have to continue to struggle with this issue until it reaches the Pennsylvania Supreme Court again.

For more information on the cases surrounding this issue, click HERE.

Saturday, December 22, 2012

ARTICLE: Year-End Review of Important Civil Litigation Cases and Trends

A Shifting Landscape: Changes Keep Things Interesting for Civil Litigators

by

Daniel E. Cummins

Pennsylvania Law Weekly
December 12, 2012


With the recent re-election of President Obama, the recurring issue of national tort reform, which was quiet during this presidential campaign, goes back on the shelf to gather more dust until another election day. In the meantime, jurisprudence in Pennsylvania meandered on and off the straight path of stare decisis with notable shifts in the law over the past year.

This second part of a two-part column analyzes the important trends and cases of the year 2012 in general Pennsylvania civil litigation matters.

A Short-Handed High Court

With a number of important issues headed toward, or already before, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, it is unfortunate that there are now only six sitting justices on that bench. Earlier this year, Justice Joan Orie Melvin was suspended from the court to address criminal allegations filed against her pertaining to charges that she used legislative and judicial staff to perform campaign work.

Now with only six justices sitting on the bench, under the applicable rules, whenever the Pennsylvania Supreme Court comes down with a 3-3 split decision on any matters before it, the lower appellate court's ruling will be allowed to stand.

Such results are rife with uncertainty and do not provide the strong guidance derived from final word on the matter by the highest court in the state as intended under the judicial system set up by the Pennsylvania Constitution.

As noted by The Legal appellate law columnist Howard J. Bashman, one wise proposal to remedy this precarious situation would be to have appeals from the Superior Court heard by the six Supreme Court justices and a randomly assigned Commonwealth Court judge and vice versa for appeals from the Commonwealth Court.

It is unclear if the Pennsylvania Supreme Court could adopt this proposed procedure on its own or if legislative action would be required. Either way, something should be done to remedy this unfortunate and troublesome situation for now and in the event it recurs in the future.

Products Liability Mixed Signals

One important issue that could benefit from a full complement of Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justices is the issue of whether the standard found in the Restatement (Second) of Torts or the different standard adopted in the Restatement (Third) of Torts should be utilized in products liability cases.

To date, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not squarely ruled upon this issue.

While the Restatement (Second) calls for a more narrow application of negligence principles in the products liability context, the Restatement (Third) decreases the emphasis upon the concepts of "intended use" and "intended user," along with placing a greater emphasis on the doctrine of "reasonable foreseeability," all of which changes arguably allow for a wider class of injured parties to recover against a manufacturer of a defective product.

The Pennsylvania federal courts have struggled with this very issue in the past year or so in the absence of concrete guidance from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Although the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has repeatedly stated or suggested in its recent decisions in Berrier v. Simplicity Manufacturing, 563 F.3d 38 (3d Cir. 2009), Covell v. Bell Sports, 651 F.3d 357 (3d Cir. 2011), and Sikkelee v. Precision Automotive, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 22185 (3d Cir. 2012),that federal trial courts should apply the Restatement (Third) in products liability cases, several federal district court judges have disagreed.

Several federal district court judges have noted that while the Third Circuit has made repeated predictions that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would adopt the Restatement (Third), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declined to adopt the Third Restatement analysis despite an opportunity to do so in the decision of Beard v. Johnson & Johnson, 41 A.2d 823 (Pa. 2012).

According to a recent compilation by Law Weekly reporter Amaris Elliott-Engel, those federal district court judges who have presently chosen to follow the Restatement (Second) in products liability cases contrary to the Third Circuit's analysis include Judge John E. Jones of the Middle District of Pennsylvania in Sikkelee v. Precision Automotive, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91497 (M.D.Pa. 2012), Judge Nora Barry Fischer of the Western District of Pennsylvania in Gross v. Stryker, 858 F.Supp.2d 466 (W.D.Pa. 2012), and Judge Arthur J. Schwab of the Western District in Konold v. Superior International Industries, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156200 (W.D.Pa. 2012).

Elliott-Engel also noted in her recent article that federal district court judges who have chosen to instead apply the Restatement (Third) under the Third Circuit's prediction include Judge Mark R. Hornak of the Western District in his decisions in the cases of Sansom v. Crown Equipment, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103734 (W.D.Pa. 2012), and Lynn v. Yamaha Golf-Car, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115936 (W.D.Pa. 2012), Judge Donetta W. Ambrose in Zollars v. Troy-Built, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148614 (W.D.Pa. 2012), and Judge Maurice Cohill Jr. in Spowal v. ITW Food Equipment Group, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47614 (W.D.Pa. 2012).

It appears that litigators and the lower courts will have to continue to struggle with this issue until it reaches the Pennsylvania Supreme Court again. Hopefully, by that time, there will be a full complement of justices on the bench.

Discoverability of Attorney-to-Expert Communications

Another issue that may be hurt by the less-than-full complement of Supreme Court justices is the issue of whether communications by an attorney to an expert retained by that attorney are discoverable. Recently, the court granted allocatur to squarely address this issue in Barrick v. Holy Spirit Hospital, 52 A.3d 221 (Pa. 2012).

For full disclosure purposes, it is noted that I drafted the amicus briefs for the Pennsylvania Defense Institute at the Superior Court level.
By way of background, the Dauphin County trial court ruled in Barrick that these types of communications were indeed discoverable, particularly where an in camera review by the court of the written communications by the plaintiff's counsel with the plaintiff's medical expert confirmed that this contact from the attorney could have, in the words of the trial court judge, "materially impacted" the expert's formulation of his opinion.

Obtaining discovery on these types of communications is important in that it will allow opposing counsel to cross-examine on whether an expert's report was, at worst, written entirely by the expert or, at least, influenced by the retaining attorney's input. The need for such discovery in this regard to provide the tools and information to test the truth of the claims or defenses presented by the opposing party's expert on cross-examination runs up against the attorney work-product doctrine that arguably protects from disclosure the theories and opinions on the case given by the attorney to his or her expert.

On appeal, an original three-member panel of the Superior Court affirmed the trial court's decision that these types of communications by an attorney to an expert were discoverable. Then, on reargument, an en banc panel of the Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed and held that these communications were not discoverable.

In a one-page order filed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on August 31 granting allocatur, the Supreme Court noted that it will review the issue of "whether the Superior Court's interpretation of Pa.R.C.P. No. 4003.3 improperly provides absolute work-product protection to all communications between a party's counsel and their trial expert."

The Supreme Court's decision will be closely watched by civil litigators, as it could substantially impact how attorneys confer with their experts from this point forward.

It is also noted on this issue that, in early 2011, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court Civil Procedural Rules Committee published a draft of its Proposed Recommendation No. 248, seeking to amend Pa.R.C.P. 4003.5, which pertains to expert discovery. The amendment would bring the state expert discovery rule more in line with its companion federal rule of civil procedure and provide greater protections against expert discovery. However, that proposal was quiet in 2012 and apparently remains under consideration somewhere in the process.

Other Supreme Court Decisions

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court took action on a number of other issues of note over the past year, as well.

In its decision in Tayar v. Camelback Ski, 47 A.3d 1190 (Pa. 2012), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that it was against public policy to release reckless behavior in a pre-injury exculpatory clause. The court more specifically found that a ski resort's release form attempting to release the resort and its employees for liability for reckless conduct was invalid.

In another decision that was actually handed down at the end of 2011, the Supreme Court also addressed the expanding parameters of a negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) claim. With the Supreme Court's split decision in its long-anticipated opinion in the case of Toney v. Chester County Hospital, 36 A.3d 83 (Pa. 2011), the Superior Court's decision found at 961 A.2d 192 (Pa.Super. 2008), recognizing a new variation of the tort, was allowed to stand.

According to previous precedent on this issue, the courts initially required the tortfeasor to impact the victim physically to justify recovery for NIED (impact rule). Thereafter, the requirements to state an NIED claim expanded to allow the victim to be in close proximity of physical impact (zone of impact liability). The tort was then further extended to permit recovery if the victim personally witnessed a tortfeasor physically impact a close relative (bystander liability).

Now, with Toney, comes a fourth variation.

Under Toney, the Superior Court recognized a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress exists where the emotional distress results from a "negligent breach of a contractual or fiduciary duty," absent physical impact or injury.

The Toney case involved a medical malpractice claim in which the plaintiff alleged that her medical providers had read an ultrasound during the plaintiff's pregnancy as being normal.

Unfortunately, the plaintiff's child was later born with several profound abnormalities. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants' negligence prevented her from preparing herself for the shock of witnessing her child's birth with such deformities. The Supreme Court's split decision on the case allowed the Superior Court's extension of the tort of NIED to stand.
Another Supreme Court decision to watch for in the year ahead is in the case of Passarello v. Grumbine, 29 A.3d 1159 (Pa.Super. 2011), appeal granted, 44 A.3d 654 (Pa. 2012), in which the court accepted an appeal to address whether medical malpractice defendants may continue to rely upon an "error in judgment" defense at trial.

Under an application of the "error in judgment" defense, the trial courts instruct jurors at trial that "physicians who exercise the skill, knowledge and care customarily exercised in their profession are not liable for a mere mistake in judgment."

This defense was first found to be invalid in the Superior Court case of Pringle v. Rapaport, 980 A.2d 159 (Pa.Super. 2009). In its more recent decision in Passarello, the Superior Court held that its previous ruling in Pringle could be applied retroactively. Now, the issue is proceeding up to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Passarello for further review. The Supreme Court's decision in this regard could have a substantial impact on the defense of medical malpractice cases in the future.

Facebook Discovery

A recurring issue that, to date, has not yet reached the Supreme Court, or even any appellate court for that matter, is whether a civil litigant's private Facebook pages are subject to discovery in a personal injury matter.

This issue has resulted in conflicting decisions in the Pennsylvania courts of common pleas. After providing a detailed summary of the split of authority amongst the Pennsylvania trial courts, Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas Judge R. Stanton Wettick, a renowned expert on discovery issues, handed down his July decision denying Facebook discovery under the particular facts set forth in the case of Trail v. Lesko.

After providing a detailed review of the issue over a 22-page opinion, which included a background on Facebook itself along with a review of Facebook discovery decisions from both within Pennsylvania and outside jurisdictions, Wettick ruled that both the plaintiff's and the defendant's cross-motions to compel access to the other's Facebook pages would be denied in this particular motor vehicle accident litigation.

Wettick denied the requests for Facebook discovery, in part, under a rationale that, pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 4011, such requests were unreasonably intrusive in that, under the facts of this case, "the intrusions that such discovery would cause were not offset by any showing that the discovery would assist the requesting party in presenting its case."

Overall, Wettick's opinion and the other Pennsylvania trial court decisions handed down to date can be read as standing for the proposition that, where there is an initial threshold showing that discovery of the opposing party's private Facebook pages is likely to lead to the discovery of information pertinent to the claims or defenses presented, such discovery will ordinarily be allowed.

Holding Up Settlements on Medicare Liens

Another ongoing trend in civil litigation matters is the continuing concern of addressing Medicare liens asserted against personal injury settlements and verdicts.

In its 2010 decision in the case of Zaleppa v. Seiwell, 9 A.3d 632 (Pa. Super. 2010), the Superior Court upheld a plaintiff's argument that a defendant's statutory obligation to reimburse Medicare was separate and distinct from Medicare's statutory right of reimbursement and that nothing under federal law or any provision of the Medicare Secondary Payer Act "expressly authorizes a primary plan to assert Medicare's right to reimbursement as a pre-emptive means of guarding against its own risk of liability."

In other words, defendants and liability carriers in personal injury matters did not have a right to demand that certain steps be taken by a plaintiff to ensure that a Medicare lien was satisfied out of the money paid to the plaintiff. To the contrary, under the Medicare Secondary Payer Act, only the U.S. government, and not any private entity, may pursue a recovery of the liens.

Since the issuance of the Zaleppa decision, a few trial court decisions have come down over the past year expanding on this issue. Last year, in both the Cambria County case of Vincent v. Buck, No. 2011-CV-456 (C.P. Cambria 2011), and the Monroe County case of Dailey-Console v. Barnwell, PICS Case No. 11-1115 (C.P. Monroe 2011), the trial court judges relied upon the Zaleppa case to support granting a plaintiff's motion to compel a defendant to pay a settlement over the defendants' objection that Medicare lien issues were not yet resolved.

A similar trial court result with an excellent analysis on the issue can also be found in Wimberly v. Katruska, PICS Case No. 12-1060 (C.P. Allegheny 2012).

In 2012, federal courts have gotten into the mix on the issue. In Carty v. Clark, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98314 (E.D.Pa. 2012), U.S. District Judge Eduardo C. Robreno of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted a plaintiff's motion to enforce settlement after citing the clear terms of the release, which stated that, once the final demand letter was produced by the plaintiff from Medicare, as was accomplished in this matter, the settlement proceeds were to be released to the plaintiff.

Pennsylvania civil litigators have also been pointing to the District Court of New Jersey's unpublished decision in Sipler v. Trans Am Trucking, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109278 (D.N.J. 2012), in which that court also ruled, in no uncertain terms, that a plaintiff's settlement could not be held up by Medicare lien or set-aside issues.

It seems that litigators on both the plaintiffs side and the defense side of the bar have welcomed these decisions clarifying the ability of parties to conclude personal injury matters despite existing Medicare liens.

Looking Ahead

As noted above and in the previous companion article on auto law issues, there are a number of important issues on the dockets at all levels of the Pennsylvania state and federal court systems that should keep things interesting for civil litigators in the year ahead. Developing law on post-Koken questions, UM/UIM issues, proper standards for products liability matters, and Facebook discovery requests should all continue to play a major part in the ever-changing landscape of civil litigation in Pennsylvania. •



Daniel E. Cummins is a partner and civil litigator with the Scranton law firm of Foley Comerford Cummins. His civil litigation blog, Tort Talk, may be viewed at www.torttalk.com.



Monday, August 6, 2012

Link to Sipler v. Trans AM Trucking Medicare Decision

Yesterday I posted a summary of the Medicare decision out of the District Court of New Jersey in Sipler v. Trans AM Trucking, Inc., et al, No. 10-3550(DRD)(D.N.J. July 24, 2012 DeBevoise, S.J.).  I don't believe the link to that opinion was working.


Accordingly, I have attempted to fix the link and I provide the link to the Sipler Opinion again--click HERE.

Sorry for any inconvenience.

Sunday, August 5, 2012

More Decisions Regarding Impact of Medicare Liens on Finalization of Settlements

Below are summaries of two recent federal court decisions regarding the impact of potential Medicare liens on the finalization of a settlement of a third party action:

Carty v. Clark, Civil Action No. 11-6083 (E.D.Pa. June 14, 2012 Rueter, Mag. Judge)(Order by Robreno, J.)

In Carty, the Plaintiff agreed in a Release that defense counsel could hold settlement amount in escrow until Plaintiff produced Final Demand Letter from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services.

The Plaintiff thereafter produced a Final Demand Letter and the defense counsel refused to release settlement amount citing fears that an unpaid medical bill might be paid by Medicare in the future and would have to be added to the lien.

The Court granted Plaintiff's Motion to Enforce settlement citing the clear terms of the Release which stated that, once the Final Demand Letter was produced by the Plaintiff from Medicare, the settlement proceeds were to be released to the Plaintiff. 

The Plaintiff's request for sanctions were denied as it did not appear to the court that the defense had acted in bad faith.

To view Federal Magistrate Rueter's Report and Recommendation, click HERE.

To view the Eastern District Court Order issued by Judge Eduardo C. Robreno adopting Judge Rueter's Report and Recommendation, click HERE.

I send thanks to Attorney Bill Mabius of the Pennsylvania Association of Justice for bringing this case to my attention.



Sipler v. Trans AM Trucking, Inc., et al, No. 10-3550(DRD)(D.N.J. July 24, 2012 DeBevoise, S.J.)

Although the Sipler case is a Federal District Court of New Jersey decision that was marked by that court as "NOT FOR PUBLICATION," a number of Pennsylvania litigators are pointing to the case for its persuasive authority on the issue of the impact (or more appropriately, the non-impact) of Medicare issues on personal injury settlements.

In the District of New Jersey case of Sipler, the parties settled a personal injury action arising out of a motor vehicle accident.  The parties were unable to finalize the settlement due to disagreements over the terms of the Release, which dispute included issues over release terms pertaining to Medicare matters.  The Plaintiff brought the matter before the court by way of a Motion to Enforce Settlement.

After thoroughly reviewing the applicable law pertaining to Medicare and the potential for Medicare liens, the court in Sipler noted that, while the Plaintiff was Medicare eligible, there was no evidence that Medicare had paid for any of the Plaintiff's accident-related treatment.

Based on the demands of the defense in this matter in terms of the requested provisions of the release, one of the issues in this case became whether the Medicare Secondary Payer statute required language in the release provisions of the plaintiff's settlement agreement specifying (1) the plaintiff's obligation not to seek such payments from Medicare, and (2) that a portion of the settlement amount would be set aside for future medical expenses arising out of the accident.

The court in Sipler noted that, while set-aside agreements were common in workers' compensation matters, "no federal law requires set-aside arrangements in personal injury settlements for future medical expenses."  Op. at p. 6.

The court went on to note that personal injury settlements should not be required to have such set-aside agreements because "to require personal injury settlements to specifically apportion future medical expenses would prove burdensone to the settlement process and, in turn, discourage personal injury settlements."  Id. at p. 7.

In a footnote, Judge DeBevoise also stated "Indeed, it would be particularly discouraging if litigants were required to obtain Medicare's approval of a settlement."  Id. at p. 7, n. 1.

Accordingly, the court held that "the parties in this case need not include language in the settlement documents noting [the Plaintiff's] obligations to Medicare or fashion a Medicare set-aside for future medical expenses."  Id. at p. 7.

To view the Sipler decision online, click this LINK.

I thank several attorneys for pointing this decision out to me including, but not limited to, Attorney Andrew Bigda of the Wilkes-Barre, PA law firm of Rosenn, Jenkins & Greenwald, and Attorney Thomas Foley, Jr. of the Scranton, PA Foley Law Firm.


To review, other Tort Talk posts (as well as my July of 2012 Pennsylvania Law Weekly article) on this issue of the interaction of Medicare lien issues and personal injury settlements,
click this LINK.

Thursday, July 26, 2012

ARTICLE: Show Me The Money: Medicare Liens and Personal Injury Matters

The below article of mine was recently published in the July 17, 2012 Pennsylvania Law Weekly and is republished here with permission:


Show Me the Money: Medicare Liens and Personal Injury Matters

Courts Repeatedly Rule That Settlements Cannot Be Upheld by Medicare Liens

By

Daniel E. Cummins
Pennsylvania Law Weekly
July 17, 2012


A recent trend in the settlement of personal injury matters involves demands by the tortfeasor's liability insurance company requesting a plaintiff to produce final lien information in regard to Medicare before the matter can be finally concluded and a settlement draft issued. This is so because of the potential penalties that may arise if Medicare liens are not addressed out of the settlement funds.

In response to these demands by liability carriers, there has been a more recent push back by plaintiffs counsel objecting to such requests for documented lien information, particularly where there has been previous confirmation that no such Medicare liens exist.

It seems that the Medicare rules and regulations surrounding the payment of Medicare liens are so obtusely intertwined and worded that even lawyers need other lawyers to fully explain the mandates and requirements of the law.

This makes lawyers nervous. And when lawyers get nervous, litigation is likely to result as they turn to the courts for guidance on how to proceed.

The recurring dispute over whether or not final lien letters from Medicare are required before a settlement can be completed has resulted in a number of recent court decisions. All of these decisions appear to support the conclusion that the settlement of a personal injury action cannot be held up by a demand that a final lien letter be secured from Medicare.

Framework of Medicare Liens

As noted, the Medicare rules on liens are difficult to follow. However, Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas Judge R. Stanton Wettick Jr. aptly summarized the framework of the law in his recent opinion in the case of Wimberly v. Katruska, PICS Case No. 12-1060 (C.P. Allegheny Co. May 23, 2012 Wettick, J.).

Wettick explained that, under the federal Medicare Secondary Payer Act, Medicare can only pay bills not paid by a "primary payer." Under the law, if Medicare initially makes a payment of a medical expense and a primary payer is later identified, the primary payer must reimburse the U.S. government for the payment made.

Wettick went on to note that under the Medicare Secondary Payer Act, automobile or liability insurance carriers meet the definition of a primary payer. Therefore, under the law, a liability insurance company paying a settlement can be required to reimburse Medicare under the applicable regulations. The regulations also give Medicare and the Centers for Medicare Services a direct right of action to recover the lien amount from any primary payer.

Thus, there is a valid fear for automobile and liability insurance carriers that, if they pay out a settlement, Medicare could later come after the insurance carrier to pay back a Medicare lien if that lien is not satisfied by the injured party plaintiff out of the settlement proceeds. To guard against this, the insurance carriers have demanded, before the settlement check is issued, that the injured party plaintiffs provide written confirmation from Medicare that there is no Medicare lien to be addressed. In some instances, as a further means of protection, some insurance carriers have even demanded that Medicare be listed as a payee on the settlement draft.

Guidance from Superior Court

In its 2010 decision in the case of Zaleppa v. Seiwell, 9 A.3d 632 (Pa.Super. 2010, Allen, Mundy, and Colville, JJ.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court addressed the propriety of a liability carrier's demand that Medicare be listed as one of the payees on a settlement check.

In Zaleppa, the plaintiff obtained a $15,000 jury verdict against the defendants, $5,000 of which was for future medical expenses and the remainder of which was for pain and suffering.

In post-trial motions, the defendants argued that the trial court erred in denying the defendants' request that the court enter an order directing the defendants to pay the verdict either (1) by naming Medicare, along with the plaintiff and her attorneys, as payees on the check satisfying the verdict, or (2) by paying the verdict into court pending notification from Medicare that all outstanding Medicare liens had been satisfied.

In its opinion, the Superior Court noted that there was no evidence presented at the trial court level that any of the plaintiffs' past medical treatment had been paid by Medicare to date. The Superior Court additionally noted that there was no claim presented by the plaintiff at trial for any past medical expenses because she was precluded from doing so by 75 Pa.C.S.A. 1722 in that the first-party medical benefits under the plaintiff's own automobile insurance policy had not been exhausted. The Zaleppa court further emphasized, in any event, that the jury did not enter any award for past medical expenses.

The Superior Court therefore upheld the argument by plaintiffs counsel Lenahan & Dempsey of Scranton that there was no legal basis under either federal or Pennsylvania law for the insurance carrier to assert the interests of the U.S. government as to the reimbursement of Medicare liens. As such, the Superior Court held that the trial court properly denied the defendants' request for an order granting leave to the carrier to list Medicare as a payee on the settlement draft.

It is noted that the Superior Court provides a nice analysis in Zaleppa of a defendant's (and arguably a plaintiff's) obligations under the Medicare Secondary Payer Act.

A String of Trial Court Opinions
After the Superior Court took away the possible protection offered by naming Medicare as a payee on settlement drafts, automobile and liability insurance carriers sought out protection from potential Medicare liens by demanding that injured party plaintiffs provide written confirmation from Medicare as to whether or not any Medicare liens existed before a settlement draft would be issued. In response, plaintiffs have refused, demanded immediate payment of the agreed-upon settlement amount and proceeded to courts on motions to enforce the settlement.

These disputes have led to a series of trial court opinions over the past year, all of which have held that a settlement of a claim cannot be held up in this regard. The recent decisions suggest that, instead, the insurance carriers and their insureds should seek to protect themselves by way of clearly worded indemnification clauses in the general release mandating that the injured party agree to protect the insurance carrier should any Medicare lien issue arise in the future.

In both the Cambria County case of Vincent v. Buck, and the Monroe County case of Dailey-Console v. Barnwell, PICS Case No. 11-1115 (Monroe Co. May 18, 2011, Zulick, J.), the trial court judges relied upon the Zaleppa case to support the granting of a plaintiff's motion to compel a defendant to pay a settlement over the defendants' objections that Medicare lien issues were not yet resolved. In both decisions, the trial courts emphasized that there was nothing in the general releases entered into between the parties that entitled the defense to insist that certain measures be taken by the plaintiff to ensure the Medicare lien was addressed prior to the issuance of the settlement check.
In Dailey-Console, Judge Arthur L. Zulick granted a plaintiff's motion to compel a defendant to pay a settlement over the defendants' objection that Medicare lien issues were not yet resolved.

The Dailey-Console case arose out of a motor vehicle accident. The parties eventually agreed to settle the claims and the plaintiffs signed a general release. However, the defendants did not tender payment of the settlement because they asserted that a Medicare lien existed that had to be satisfied prior to payment as the defendants could potentially be liable for the lien.

The plaintiffs argued that the terms of the release executed by the parties governed the dispute and that, under the release, they were entitled to an immediate payment of the settlement funds. The court agreed.

Reviewing the release between the parties, Zulick found that, although the release contained provisions holding the defendants harmless from payments to a third party and specifically stated that the plaintiffs would be responsible for the satisfaction of any separate Department of Public Welfare Medicaid lien from the settlement proceeds, the release was silent as to any obligation by the plaintiff to obtain clearance from Medicare.

Since the court in Dailey-Console determined that the release was valid as written and that the terms of the release did not address any Medicare lien, the Medicare lien issue could not be relied upon as a roadblock to the enforcement of the release terms, including the payment of the settlement amounts to the plaintiff. In so ruling, Zulick pointed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court Decision in Zaleppa v. Seiwell.

Similarly, in an April 4, 2011, order in the case of Vincent v. Buck, No. 2011-CV-456 (Cambria Co., April 4, 2011, Swope, S.J.), Senior Judge Thomas A. Swope Jr. of the Cambria County Court of Common Pleas granted a plaintiff's motion to enforce a settlement in a case where the carrier refused to issue a settlement check in a motor vehicle accident case until the plaintiff produced documentation confirming the status of any Medicare/Medicaid lien.

In Vincent, the plaintiff's attorney had provided the liability carrier with copies of letters from Medicare confirming that there were no liens for either of the two plaintiffs involved in this matter (these letters were not, however, "final" confirmation lien letters). The attorney also confirmed that, with respect to one of the plaintiffs, that person's first-party medical benefits coverage had not yet even been exhausted (meaning the first party automobile insurance carrier would be responsible to pay the medical bills, not Medicare).

The plaintiffs also emphasized that in the release, which was authored by the automobile insurance carrier, there was no express requirement that the plaintiffs provide any final lien documentation before the payment of the settlement funds as demanded. Furthermore, the release provided that the plaintiffs agreed to remain responsible for any and all liens, including any liens asserted by any federal entity or agency. In the release, the plaintiffs also specifically agreed to indemnify and hold the liability carrier and its counsel harmless for any and all liens that may arise.

In addition to arguing the above, the plaintiffs also pointed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court decision of Zaleppa v. Seiwell, in which the appellate court held that neither the liability carrier nor the defendant tortfeasor had any legal standing to attempt to act on behalf of Medicare in terms of protecting a lien.

Based on these facts, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion to enforce the settlement. In its order, the trial court also granted the plaintiffs' requests for interest on the delayed payment and attorney's fees and costs associated with the motion.

This issue was also more recently addressed by Wettick in his May 23 opinion in Wimberly v. Katruska.

In Wimberly, the plaintiff settled her personal injury claims and demanded payment. The defendant and the defendant's carrier apparently refused to issue the settlement payment until the plaintiff provided a no-lien letter from Medicare. Accordingly, the plaintiff filed a petition to enforce the settlement.

The defense in Wimberly, argued that the liability insurance company was entitled to withhold its payment of the settlement until Medicare issued a no-lien letter as that was the only way an insurance company and its insured could avoid potential double payments if the plaintiff did not satisfy any such lien out of the settlement proceeds.

Wettick rejected this argument and, like the other trial court judges, pointed to the Superior Court decision of Zaleppa v. Seiwell.

However, because the defendant in this Wimberly matter contended that the parties' settlement agreement conditioned the payment of the settlement on the receipt of a no-lien letter, the court issued a rule to show cause why the settlement agreement should not be enforced. In issuing the rule, the court noted that the defendant had the burden of establishing an agreement between the parties that the payment was conditioned on the securing of a no-lien letter.

Remedy: Spell It Out In the Release

The cases to date reviewing the impact of Medicare liens on the finalization of personal injury matters have clearly stated that the defense cannot mandate that Medicare be included as a payee on any settlement draft.

The decisions have also clarified that, unless set forth as a requirement in the general release between the parties, the defense cannot require the injured party plaintiff to produce a no-lien letter or final lien letter from Medicare before the settlement check will be issued.

Given the ridiculously slow response time of Medicare to requests for information on any Medicare liens, it is unlikely that plaintiffs will be willing to hold up any settlement payment by an agreement to produce written documentation from Medicare regarding the existence or status of any Medicare lien.

As such, it appears that the more reasonable, and judicially supported, fashion to finalize a personal injury settlement while still protecting the defense from any potential Medicare lien, would be to include language in the general release that (1) provides that the plaintiff agrees to remain responsible for any and all liens, including any liens asserted by any federal entity or agency, including but not limited to Medicare (and/or the Department of Public Welfare/Medicaid), and (2) provides that the plaintiff also specifically agrees to indemnify and hold the defendant and its liability carrier harmless for any and all liens that may arise, including but not limited to any Medicare (or Medicaid) liens.  •



Daniel E. Cummins is a partner and civil litigator with the Scranton law firm of Foley, Comerford & Cummins. His civil litigation blog, "Tort Talk," may be viewed at http://www.torttalk.com/.

Thursday, June 14, 2012

Show Me the Money

In the recent Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas decision by Judge R. Stanton Wettick in the case of Wimberly v. Katruska, PICS Case No. 12-1060 (C.P. Allegheny Co. May 23, 2012 Wettick, J.), the Court addressed the recurring issue of personal injury settlements being held up by Medicare issues.
Judge R. Stanton Wettick
In this matter, a Plaintiff settled her personal injury claims and demanded payment. Apparently, the Defendant and the Defendant’s carrier refused to issue the settlement payment until the Plaintiff provided a no-lien letter from Medicare. Accordingly, the Plaintiff filed a Petition to Enforce the Settlement.

According to a report on this opinion, Judge Wettick noted that, under the Medicare Secondary Payer Act (MSPA), Medicare can only pay bills not paid by a “primary payer.” Under the law, if Medicare makes a payment and a primary payer is identified, the primary payer must reimburse the United States government for the payment made.

The MSPA identifies an automobile or liability insurance policy as a primary payer. Therefore, under the law, if an insurance company has already made a payment for the same services, the insurance company paying the settlement amount can be required to reimburse Medicare under the applicable regulations. The regulations also give Medicare and the Centers for Medicare Services (CMS) a direct right of action to recover from any primary payer.

In this Wimberly case, the Defendant argued that his insurance company was entitled to withhold payment until Medicare issued a no-lien letter because that was the only way an insurance company and its insured could avoid double payments.

Judge Wettick rejected this argument and pointed to the Superior Court decision of Zaleppa v. Seiwell, 9 A.3d 632 (Pa. Super. 2010), under which the Superior Court rejected a similar argument because the MSPA was not designed to enable private parties to act on behalf of the United States Government in securing reimbursement to Medicare.

However, because the Defendant in this Wimberly matter contended that the parties’ settlement agreement conditioned payment on the receipt of a no-lien letter, the Court issued a rule to show cause why the settlement agreement should not be enforced. In issuing the Rule, the Court noted that the Defendant had the burden of establishing an agreement that the payment was conditioned on a no-lien letter.

For other Tort Talk posts on other similar cases addressing the same issue, click here. Anyone desiring a copy of the Wimberly v. Katruska Opinion may contact the Pennsylvania Law Weekly’s Instant Case Service at 1-800-276-7427 and give the above PICS Case No and pay a small fee.

Source of Image:  www.bisel.com

Tuesday, December 27, 2011

The 2011 Tort Talk Top 10

THE 2011 TORT TALK TOP 10

As another year comes to an end, here's a look back at some of the top cases and trends of the year in the 2011 TORT TALK TOP 10.  Each selection is linked to the post(s) from over the past year where you can read more info on the selected Top 10 topic:


10.  Changes to the Federal Removal Statute

This one is recent. President Obama recently signed into law the Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011.  As part of the Act, certain changes and clarifications were made with regards to the procedures for the removal of state court actions to federal court.  Just when you think you have the old procedures figured out, they go and change things on you.  Here is a link to the Tort Talk post that refers you to an excellent post by the Drug and Device Law Blog providing a nice summary of the changes along with a link to the legislation.


9.  Recovery of Medicaid Liens Upheld

In 2011, the long-standing procedures regarding the recovery of Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare Medicaid liens were upheld as valid by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on June 29, 2011 in its fifty-nine (59) paged decision in the case of Tristani v. Richman, 652 F.3d 360 (3rd Cir. 2011 Hardiman, J.).  To view more information on this topic, click here and here.
 

8.  Settlements and Medicare Liens

In both the Cambria County case of Vincent v. Buck, No. 2011-CV-456 (Cambria Co., April 4, 2011, Swope, S.J.), and the Monroe County case of Dailey-Console v. Barnwell, PICS Case No. 11-1115 (Monroe Co. May 18, 2011, Zulick, J.), the trial court judges relied upon the Zaleppa case to support a granting of a plaintiff’s motion to compel a defendant to pay a settlement over the Defendants’ objection that Medicare lien issues were not yet resolved. In both decisions, the trial courts emphasized that there was nothing in the releases entered into between the parties that entitled the defense to insist that certain measures be taken by the plaintiff to ensure that the Medicare lien was addressed prior to the issuance of the settlement check.  Both cases rely upon last year's Superior Court decision in the case of Zaleppa v. Seiwell, 9 A.3d 632 (Pa. Super. 2010).  Seems like both plaintiff and defense counsel are happy with these decisions.  For more, read this, this, and this.


7.  Covell v. Bell Sports Inc.

On July 12, 2011, the U.S. Third Circuit Court of Appeals issued an important decision in the products liability case of Covell v. Bell Sports, Inc., 651 F.3d 357 (3d Cir. 2011 Aldisert, J.).  In Covell, the Third Circuit affirmed the Eastern District Court's application of the Third Restatement of Torts and negligence concepts to claims of injuries allegedly caused by a defective product.  Better get to the library and brush up on the Third Restatement.  To read more on Covell, go to this link.


6.  Williams v. GEICO

In its decision in Williams v. GEICO, 2011 WL 4953433 (Pa. Oct. 19, 2011 Orie Melvin, J.), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions that  the “regular use” exclusion contained in a personal automobile insurance policy was valid to preclude payment of underinsured motorist (“UIM”) benefits to a police officer injured in the course of employment while operating a police vehicle.  This decision basically leaves first responders without UIM coverage in certain, common situations.  Might see some legislation on this with respect to first responders in the future.  To read more on this decision, click here.


5.  GEICO v. Ayers

On April 28, 2011, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court handed down a 3-3 plurality decision, with Justice Orie Melvin having recused herself from the matter, in the household exclusion case of GEICO v. Ayers, 18 A.3d 1093 (Pa. 2011) which decision served to affirm the Superior Court's ruling that an insured was barred by the exclusion from collecting stacked UIM benefits to compensate him for injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident under a case involving a plaintiff who had insured multiple vehicles through one insurance company but on separate policies.  For more on this decision, click here.


4.  Sehl v. Neff

On July 25, 2011, the Pennsylvania Superior Court handed down its opinion in the Post-Koken case of Sehl v. Neff, 26 A.3d 1130 (Pa. Super. 2011), in which the court found proper venue in cases where the UIM carrier’s policy did not have a forum selection clause would be in the county where the defendant tortfeasor could be served, where the defendant tortfeasor resided, or where the accident occurred as venue against the UIM carrier was also proper in those counties as well.  In other words, the court rejected the plaintiff's contention that, since the UIM carrier defendant conducted business in all of the counties of the Commonwealth, venue of this action was likewise proper in any county of the Commonwealth.  This opinion therefore effectively prevents rampant and widespread forum shopping with respect to Post-Koken cases.  Click here to read more on this case.


3.  Social Media Discovery

A slew of trial court opinions continue to come down on the issue of Social Media Discovery, particularly on the topic of whether personal injury defendants are entitled to view the private pages of a plaintiff's Facebook pages.  A split of authority has developed and, hopefully, an appellate court will be given an opportunity in 2012 to address the issue of whether such disclosures should be allowed under the liberal Rules of Civil Procedure pertaining to discovery.  To review Social Media Discovery posts from over the past year, scroll through the listing of related blog posts at this link here.


2.  Barrick v. Holy Spirit Hospital

On November 23, 2011, an en banc panel of the Pennsylvania Superior Court issued an Opinion that served to provide blanket protection to litigating attorneys against having to disclose the content of the letters and emails they send to their trial experts on how the expert should write his report.  And that's a good thing?!  A Petition for Allowance of an Appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has been filed.  To read more on this case, click here, here, here, here, and here


1.  The Fair Share Act

The biggest event in the civil litigation arena over the past year occurred when the Pennsylvania Legislature passed the Fair Share Act on June28, 2011 (remember that date--the Act only applies to causes of action accruing on that date and forward).  Now all really is fair in love and war.  Click here to read more.


I am sure I left out some cases or trends that should have been included and perhaps included some that you may not think worthy.  In any event, I hope you enjoy this list and you are left with a sense of some of the more important topics of civil litigation from 2011.