Recklessness Claims Allowed to Proceed in Case Where Defendant Driver Was Driving While Wearing Medical Boot

In the case of Shea v. Magar, No. 2025-CV-7877 (C.P. Lacka. Co. March 31, 2026 Gibbons, P.J.), President Judge James A. Gibbons of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas addressed Preliminary Objections filed by a Defendant against allegations of recklessness in a motor vehicle accident case.

According to the Opinion, this case matter involved a rear-end accident case. The Defendant was  allegedly wearing a medical boot at the time of the accident against doctor’s orders.  During the course of the accident, the Defendant hit the accelerator with the medical boot instead of the brake.

The court followed the current trend and relied upon the case of Monroe v. CBH2O, LP, 286 A.3d 785, 799 (Pa. Super. 2022) (en banc), and held that, at the pleadings stage, a plaintiff is permitted to make a general averment of gross negligence or recklessness as long as negligence is alleged. 

As such, the court overruled the Defendant’s Preliminary Objection in this regard.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Brian J. Walsh of the Scranton law firm of Blake & Walsh for bringing this case to my attention

Court Addresses Various Pleadings Issues in a Medical Malpractice Case, Including Allegations of Recklessness

In the case of Limon v. Kontizer, No. 2025-CV-8657 (C.P. Lacka. Co. March 30, 2026 Powell, J.), the court addressed various Preliminary Objections filed by Defendants in a medical malpractice case.

According to the Opinion, this wrongful death medical malpractice case was filed relative to the Plaintiff’s decedent’s treatment in the form of an upper GI endoscopy. According to the Complaint, the Plaintiff alleged that the various medical Defendants failed to properly diagnose, treat, and prevent aspiration pneumonia, sepsis, and multi-organ dysfunction, all of which allegedly led to the Plaintiff’s decedent’s death.

In their Preliminary Objections, the Defendants sought the dismissal of claims for reckless conduct and punitive damages, as well as claims grounded in vicarious liability and negligence.

The court overruled all of the Preliminary Objections filed.

Relative to the claims of recklessness and for punitive damages, the court held that, under Pa. R.C.P. 1019(b), conditions of the mind, such as recklessness, may be alleged in a general fashion as long as negligence is pled.

The court additionally noted that the Complaint sufficiently asserted that the Defendants knowingly disregarded serious, life-threatening risk to the decedent. Accepting these allegations are true, the court concluded that the claims for punitive damages were legally sufficient.

With regards to the issues of vicarious liability, the court rejected the Defendants’ arguments that the Complaint was deficient for failing to identify specific agents or employees. The court noted that Pennsylvania law does not require a Plaintiff in a medical malpractice case to identify every individual agent at the pleadings stage. Rather, the court noted that it is sufficient to allege that the individuals acted within the scope of their employment or agency since the identity of every healthcare professional who was involved in the decedent’s treatment during the approximately one month period at issue could be readily ascertained by the Defendants from their own records.

The court further found that the Plaintiff sufficiently alleged that the Defendants had knowledge of, and allowed the alleged reckless conduct, thereby satisfying the heightened requirements for allegations of vicarious liability for punitive damages under the MCARE Act.

The court otherwise rejected the Defendant’s objections that the Plaintiff’s negligence claims were overly broad and vague.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: Lackawanna Jurist (April 10, 2026).

Court Rules That No New UM Sign Down Form Was Required

In the case of Estate of Woloszyn v. Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 10246 of 2022, C.A. (C.P. Lawr. Co. Nov. 21, 2025 Hodge, J.), the court granted summary judgment in favor of a UM carrier on a breach of contract and bad faith claim arising out of a dispute over what the appropriate UM limits were under the policy.

According to the Opinion, this matter arose out of a motorcycle accident when a vehicle being operated by an uninsured motorist crossed the centerline and struck the Plaintiff’s son’s motorcycle, resulting in a fatal accident.

Following the accident, the Plaintiff’s estate made a claim for UM coverage under various insurance policies. There was a dispute between the parties as to whether the UM coverage should be $100,000.00 or $15,000.00.

The court noted that, in 2015, the Plaintiff’s family had obtained a vehicle insurance policy No. 858 from the carrier prior to the accident. Relative to that policy, the Plaintiff’s family executed a signed down form opting to decrease the uninsured motorist coverage to $15,000.00 per person even though the bodily injury liability limit was $100,000.00 per person.

In October of 2020, the 858 policy was replaced by a No. 916 policy as part of the Defendant carrier’s One Product initiative.

The Plaintiff’s family received a Notice of Policy Change which indicated that the 858 policy was expiring and that the policy would be renewed under the terms of the 916 policy.

The Plaintiff accepted the renewal by paying the premium for the 916 policy.


The 916 policy provided bodily injury limits of $100,000.00 per person and UM coverage limits of $15,000.00 per person, which was the same coverage as was selected by the Plaintiff’s family under the 858 policy. The court noted, however, that the Defendant carrier did not obtain an executed sign down form for the lesser amount of UM coverage from the Plaintiff’s family prior to the issuance of the 916 policy.

After the Plaintiff’s family sued the Defendant UM carrier for claims for declaratory judgment, statutory bad faith, breach of contract, negligence, and a violation of the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protections Law, the case proceeded to cross motions for summary judgment.

In ressolving the issues presented, the court ruled that there was no doubt that the policy number had changed from the 858 policy to the 916 policy. The court also noted that the Defendant carrier had provided notice to the Plaintiff that the policy number had changed. It was additionally noted that the Plaintiff did not object to that change and continued to pay the premiums for the new 916 policy.

The court otherwise concluded that the policy language and the sign down form that was previously executed by the Plaintiff relative to the 858 policy were not ambiguous.

After reviewing the facts and circumstances before it, the court concluded that the Defendant carrier’s refusal to pay the higher amount that the Plaintiff desired for the UM claim was not frivolous or unfounded given that the Plaintiff’s family had elected to continue with the reduced UM coverage under the new policy and had evidenced the same by paying the premium.

Based upon this ruling, the court also found that there was no basis for the bad faith claim presented by the Plaintiff given that the Defendant had performed its obligations under the policy by paying out the UM coverage that was paid for by the Plaintiff.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (March 5, 2026).

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Plaintiff Found To Have Made Good Faith Efforts To Complete Service of Process in Medical Malpractice Case

In the case of Francis v. Xu, No. 2025-CV-3745 (C.P. Lacka. Co. April 16, 2026 Nealon, J.), the court addressed Preliminary Objections filed by a Defendant-physician in a medical malpractice matter seeking to dismiss the claims asserted against the physician on the grounds that the Plaintiffs failed to effectuate service of original process in a timely fashion or with good faith upon the Defendant-physician prior to the expiration of the two (2) year statute of limitations. 

Judge Terrence R. Nealon, writing for the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas, agreed that, in order to toll the statute of limitations, a plaintiff must indeed make a good faith effort to timely serve initial process on a Defendant. The court also agreed that, if a plaintiff fails to do so, the lawsuit is subject to dismissal where either (a) the plaintiff has demonstrated an intent to stall the judicial machinery, or (b) the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the Rules regarding service of original process has prejudiced the defendant.

After reviewing the record before him, Judge Nealon found that the Plaintiff in this matter made repeated attempts to serve the Defendant at issue at multiple locations while expeditiously and repeatedly reinstating the Complaint along the way.

Accordingly, the court found that service of process upon the Defendant physician resulted from the Plaintiff’s repeated efforts to diligently and timely serve the doctor. The court also found that the Defendant doctor did not identify any prejudice that she allegedly suffered due to any delay in serving initial process.

As such, the doctor’s Preliminary Objections asserting untimely service of original process were overruled.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

AI Hallucinations Appear in a Third Circuit Matter

In the case of McCarthy v. US Drug Enforcement Admin., No. 24-2704 (3d Cir. March 27, 2026 Phipps, J., Chung, J., and Roth, J.) (Op. by Chung, J.), in a matter of first impression, a divided US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit issued a decision in which it reprimanded a Pennsylvania attorney whose work featured fabricated case law and various inaccuracies through artificial intelligence tools.

The court reprimanded the attorney involved for filing a brief that contained AI hallucinations. More specifically, the attorney filed a brief that included summaries of eight Drug Enforcement Administration adjudications that were generated by AI and supplied to him by a non-attorney. According to the Opinion, the attorney failed to verify the cases and the summaries, seven of which were filed with factual and legal errors, and one of which involved a case that did not even exist.

The court emphasized that the attorney involved not only failed to verify the erroneous citations generated by AI, but also failed to alert the court in this regard for months, even after the opposing attorney involved in the case identified the potential errors.

In a 2 to 1 ruling, the majority concluded that sanctions were warranted. The court found that the attorney violated Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct 1.1 and Third Circuit Disciplinary Rule 2.1(d) by failing to provide competent representation.

The Third Circuit panel noted that, because it was this court’s “first opportunity to address the use of AI."  The Third Circuit panel noted that since it had not notified the attorney in question that the court would consider whether his conduct violated Pa. R.P.C. 1.1, the court was electing not to issue monetary sanctions.

However, the majority noted that, going forward, attorneys could face any of the sanctions available under the Circuit Court Disciplinary Rules 4.1-4.2, including suspension and even disbarment.

Judge Roth concurred in part and dissented in part, opining that the attorney in question also violated Pa. R.P.C. 3.3(a)(1), by making a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal on at least two occasions. Judge Roth felt that more severe sanctions were warranted.

Judge Roth went on to note that the Majority did not need to warn attorneys to use artificial intelligence responsibly. She stated that “[n]o forewarning is necessary when it is clear what standard the attorney was required to follow.” 

Judge Roth felt that the court could instead take notice of the numerous court decisions from across the country that have already addressed an attorney’s obligation to take ownership over their work product.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: Article – “ ‘No Forewarning Necessary’: Divided 3rd Circuit Weighs Discipline For Attorney’s Use of AI Hallucinations,” By Riley Brennan of The Legal Intelligencer (March 30, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by Igor Omilaev from www.unsplash.com.

Trial Court Finds That Defendant Waived Arbitration Clause in Nursing Home Case by Litigating Case in Court

 

In the case of the Estate of Smalling v. 2990 Holm Operating, LLC, Jan. Term 2024, No. 240102492 (C.P. Phila. Co. Dec. 9, 2025 Cohen, J.), the trial court issued a Rule 1925 Opinion requesting the appellate court to uphold the trial court’s decision to deny a Defendant’s Motion to Compel an Arbitration in a nursing home case.

In this matter, the Plaintiffs allege that their family member decedent had passed away due to alleged negligence treatment received at the Defendant’s facility.

After the Plaintiffs had filed suit, the case proceeded with pleadings and discovery. Fourteen months after the lawsuit was filed, the Defendants filed a Petition to Compel Arbitration.

The court denied the Petition under the primary rationale that the Defendants had waived its right to compel arbitration by availing itself of the judicial process. The court noted that, here, there was a significant delay of over one year before the Defendant sought to compel arbitration. Given the delay and the active litigation in the lawsuit, including the filing of earlier Preliminary Objections by the Defendant, the trial court found a waiver of the right of the Defendant to request arbitration.

In so ruling, the trial court did not reach the Plaintiffs’ other arguments that the arbitration clause in the nursing home agreement was unenforceable under the doctrines of procedural and substantive unconscionability, and/or the argument that the person who had signed the arbitration agreement did not have the power to bind the decedent to the arbitration agreement.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source of image:  Photo by Matthius Zomer on www.pexels.com.

Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (Feb. 12, 2026).

Trial Court Addresses Duty of Counsel To Act Reasonably in Moving Forward With Discovery and Depositions

In the case of Knick v. Lehigh Valley Hospital, No. 2024-CV-3016 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Jan,. 30, 2026, Nealon, J.), the court addressed a second Motion filed by a Plaintiff to extend the deadlines for the completion of discovery and expert discovery, and to postpone the scheduled trial date, in a medical malpractice case.

In this Opinion, the court noted earlier admonitions from the court directing the parties to promptly initiate and complete their pre-trial preparations.

In their filings on this Motion, each party claimed that the opposing party was the reason for the delay. 

The court noted, however, that defense counsel produced emails and other communications between counsel reflecting that the Plaintiff made no attempt to schedule a single deposition for the first fourteen (14) months that the case was pending and that defense counsel had made many attempts to schedule depositions only to have Plaintiff’s counsel claim that they were unavailable and, on another occasion, to cancel the depositions that had been scheduled for mutually convenient dates.

The court noted that litigants and their counsel have an obligation to act reasonably in scheduling and conducting discovery depositions, and when attorneys are unavailable to complete pending legal matters in a timely fashion, the Rules of Professional Conduct require them to either (a) decline additional work, (b) seek assistance or (c) withdraw and allow another attorney to complete the work.

Ultimately, the court granted the Plaintiff’s Motion to Extend partially by allowing for deadlines to be modified in a limited fashion. However, the request to postpone the July of 2026 trial date was denied.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

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Summary Judgment Granted in Supermarket Slip and Fall Case

In the case of Jordan v. Brown’s Superstores, Inc., Aug. Term 2023, No. 02262 (C.P. Phila. Co. Dec. 5, 2025 Yu, J.), the court issued a Rule 1925 Opinion requesting the Superior Court to affirm the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in a slip and fall case involving a Plaintiff who allegedly slipped and fell on pieces of watermelon on a supermarket floor.

The trial court noted that the Plaintiff did not present any evidence that the Defendant had created the hazard. The Plaintiff also did not produce any evidence that the store had any actual knowledge of the pieces of watermelon being on the floor prior to the Plaintiff’s fall.

Moreover, no evidence was produced that would enable the Plaintiff to prove constructive notice on the part of the store. More specifically, there is no evidence presented as to how the pieces of watermelon came to be on the floor, or how long they had been present.

In addition to entering summary judgment for these reasons, the court also noted that the Plaintiff did not file any response to the Motion.

The court noted that the Plaintiff’s failure to respond to the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment provided an independent procedural basis to support the granting of the summary judgment motion under Pa. R.C.P. 1035.3(d).

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source of image: Photo by Shamblen Studios on www.unsplash.com.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (Feb. 12, 2026).

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Court Rules that Placement of Wet Floor Signs Constitute Adequate Warning

In the case of Pitts v. Sonesta Intern. Hotel, Corp., No. 231002600 (C.P. Phila. Co. Nov. 24, 2025 Moore, J.), the trial court issued a Rule 1925 Opinion requesting the Superior Court to affirm the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of a hotel in a case where a Plaintiff slipped and fell on a wet floor in the hotel’s foyer area.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff slipped and fell in an area where a maintenance worker for the hotel had recently mopped the floor but had also put out yellow caution signs. Videos surveillance footage confirmed that the maintenance worker had put the signs out.

According to the Opinion, during her testimony, the Plaintiff acknowledged the presence of the signs inside the foyer. However, the Plaintiff claimed that she did not see the signs before she slipped and fell.

At trial, the court granted the defense Motion for a Non Suit on the basis that there was no genuine issue of material fact to be resolved by the jury once the Plaintiff rested and given that the Plaintiff had failed to establish a right to relief.

The court emphasized that, in Pennsylvania, a business owner had a duty to maintain a reasonably safe property and must either fix dangerous conditions or warn invitees about them.

The court additionally noted that invitees are expected to be aware of their surroundings in order to appreciate possible dangers and also to appreciate warnings of any hazards.

Here in this case, the court found that, by clearly placing the yellow “Wet Floor” signs on the floor in the hotel foyer, the Defendant had adequately warned the Plaintiff about the possibility of the foyer floor being slippery.

The court emphasized that the Plaintiff acknowledged the presence of the wet floor signs inside the foyer before she walked into the area. On cross-examination at trial, the Plaintiff agreed that she had seen at least one (1) of the yellow signs before she entered the foyer and prior to falling down. The trial court noted that, even viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff, it was the trial court’s opinion that the Plaintiff had failed to meet her burden of proving that the Defendant was liable for her fall.

Notably, the court noted in its Opinion that the placement of yellow warning signs in and around the foyer was conduct that established that the Defendant had adequately warned the Plaintiff of the dangers of the wet floor.

The court rejected the Plaintiff’s suggestion that the hotel should have also have had someone standing near the foyer to tell customers inside the hotel that the floor was wet. The court found that this was not a reasonable requirement and that the law does not require a business owner to undertake such unreasonable measures to warn of hazards on the property.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (March 5, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by Sandiyu Nuryono on www.pexels.com.

Watch Out For That Hole That is Open and Obvious

In the case of Harris v. Hutchinson Sportsman’s Club, No. 1007 WDA 2025 (Pa. Super. Feb. 4, 2026 Stabile, J., Murray, J., and Beck, J.) (Op. by Murray, J.), the Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s entry of summary judgment under the open and obvious doctrine in a case involving a Plaintiff who crashed his bike on a road owned by the Defendant.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff testified that he noticed a “giant hole” in the road and attempted to avoid it as he was operating his son’s electric bike.

The Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Plaintiff was aware of the road conditions and that they were open and obvious.

The Superior Court agreed with the trial court’s finding that the Plaintiff had failed to establish a case of negligence. The appellate court noted that the trial court had properly found that the conditions on the road were open and obvious, and that the Plaintiff was aware of the conditions, thereby negating any duty on the part of the landowner to warn or protect the Plaintiff.

The Superior Court also agreed with the trial court that the Plaintiff’s inability to pinpoint the cause of his bike accident with his testimony further undermined the Plaintiff’s negligence claim.

As such, the Superior Court upheld the entry of summary judgment, finding that the Plaintiff did not meet his burden of proof on his negligence claim.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert (Feb. 24, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by KBO Bike on www.unsplash.com.

Superior Court Addresses Discoverability of Internal Post-Incident Investigative Reports in Medical Malpractice Case

In the case of Griffin v. The Bryn Mawr Hospital, No. 3361 EDA 2024, 2026 Pa. Super. 53 (Pa. Super. March 19, 2026 Bowes, J., Murray, J., and Beck, J.) (Op. by Beck, J.) (Concurring and Dissenting Op. by Murray, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court addressed whether four internal documents created by the medical providers after the hospital allegedly mishandled fetal remains were protected from disclosure under Pennsylvania’s Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error Act (MCARE) and the Federal Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act.

According to the Opinion, the case arose out of a lawsuit filed by parents who alleged that the hospital mistakenly cremated the placenta instead of their fetus and later admitted to a “mix up.”

During discovery, the hospital withheld four internal reports tied to its investigation. The hospital asserted that these documents were privileged patient-safety materials generated as part of its compliance and internal review processes.

In its Opinion, the court addressed how far hospitals can shield internal investigation documents from discovery under the above-referenced state and federal patient-safety laws.

The Superior Court majority ruled that the documents were not protected under MCARE. The court found that the MCARE statute applied only to events involving direct patient care and not post-treatment conduct. The court here found that the allegations in this case did not implicate any medical treatment issues.

With regards to the application of the federal law, the federal law under the PSQIA, this court entered a split decision. The court held that three of the documents at issue were shielded under the broader scope of the PSQIA law because they were created as part of the hospital’s internal patient safety evaluation system.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of the Majority's decision may click this LINK.

Judge Murray's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion can be viewed HERE.

Source: Article – “Pa. Superior Court Splits On MCARE Patient-Safety Privilege Case,” By Tristin Hoffman of The Legal Intelligencer (March 25, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by RDNE Stock Project on www.pexels.com.

Defendant's Forum Non Conveniens Argument Rejected in Medical Malpractice Case Filed in Philadelphia

In the case of Miller v. Jackson, May Term, 2024, No., 240503457 (C.P. Phila. Co. Dec. 17, 2025 Cohen, J.), the court denied a Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss a case based upon the forum non conveniens doctrine in a medical malpractice case.

According to the Opinion, this case arose out of medical treatment that took place in the state of Delaware.

After the lawsuit was filed in Philadelphia County, the Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss based upon the doctrine of forum non conveniens, arguing that the case should be heard in Delaware where the events occurred.

After the court allowed discovery on the motion, the case came up for a decision.

The Plaintiffs asserted that the individual Defendants resided in Pennsylvania and a foundation related to the matter conducted significant operations in patient interactions in Pennsylvania, which allegedly established a public interest in the case being decided in Pennsylvania.

The Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas denied the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss after finding that the Defendants had failed to provide “weighty reasons” to justify the dismissal and transfer of the case.

The court noted, in part, that while the events regarding the medical treatment occurred in the State of Delaware, Pennsylvania still had a substantial connection to the case due to the residency of the individual Defendants in Pennsylvania and the operations of the foundation taking place in Pennsylvania.

The court additionally noted that the Defendants’ arguments focused on county-level convenience rather than a state-level analysis, which is required for forum non conveniens consideration.

The court otherwise determined that the increased travel time for witnesses to come to Philadelphia was not significant enough to warrant dismissal, especially since many of the witnesses were based in Philadelphia.

The trial court otherwise denied the Defendants’ request for a certification of the issues for an interlocutory appeal found that the issues at hand involved a discretionary matter of convenience and not any controlling question of law. The court additionally found that an immediate appeal would not materially advance the termination of the case but would instead delay the proceedings.

Overall, the court found no compelling reasons supporting the disturbance of the Plaintiffs’ choice of forum. As such, the case was allowed to proceed in Pennsylvania.

In this Rule 1925 Opinion, the court requested the Superior Court to affirm its decisions as noted above.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (Feb. 26, 2026).

Philadelphia County Court Grants Defendant's Request To Transfer Med Mal Case to a Different County

In the case of McDonald v. York Hospital, Oct. Term 2023, No. 2872 (C.P. Phila. Co. Dec. 11, 2025 Bright, J.), the court issued a Rule 1925 Opinion requesting the Superior Court to affirm the trial court’s decision to transfer a medical malpractice case from Philadelphia County to York County.

According to the Opinion, the case arose out of an alleged medical malpractice from a heart surgery that took place in York County, Pennsylvania.

After the Plaintiff filed suit in Philadelphia County, the issue of venue eventually came before the trial court.

The Defendants argued that their business activities in Philadelphia County were incidental and not sufficient to establish venue.

The court found that the Defendant’s contacts with Philadelphia County were primarily educational and incidental, thereby not meeting the quality and quantity of contacts required to establish venue under Pa. R.C.P. 2179(a)(2).

The court determined that the Defendants’ core mission was to provide healthcare services in Central Pennsylvania and that any affiliations with any Philadelphia institutions was not essential to this mission.

As such, the court sustained Preliminary Objections filed by the Defendants regarding venue and transferred the case to York County where the cause of action arose and where the Defendants had their principal place of business.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (Feb. 26, 2026).

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Court Dismisses Case Where Plaintiff Attempted to File a Second Amended Complaint Long After Deadline To Do So

In the case of Coble v. Edrington, No. 2024-CV-00521 (C.P. Dauph. Co. Feb. 13, 2026 Engle, J.), the court granted a Defendant’s Preliminary Objections filed against a Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint on the basis that the Plaintiff failed to obey the court ordered deadline within which to file the Second Amended Complaint.

According to the Opinion, the case arose out of a breach of contract claim.

Under an Order dated April 18, 2025, the court had granted Plaintiff leave to file a Second Amended Complaint within twenty (20) days.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff did not file their Second Amended Complaint until October 6, 2025, which was approximately 151 days after the court ordered deadline.  Also, the Second Amended Complaint was filed only after the Defendant moved to dismiss the case for failure to prosecute.

After the Second Amended Complaint was filed, the Defendant then responded with various Preliminary Objections, which included a challenge to the timeliness of the pleadings.

The court sustained the Preliminary Objection under Pa. R.C.P. 1028(e) relative to the untimeliness of the Second Amended Complaint. The Second Amended Complaint was dismissed with prejudice.

The court rejected the Plaintiff’s arguments and emphasized that the parties are not able to extend court-imposed deadlines without court approval.

The court otherwise noted that a trial court may dismiss an untimely Amended Complaint with prejudice for failure to comply with a court ordered deadline. The court noted that, while actual prejudice may be factor in some cases, it is not always required, particularly when the delay is significant and unjustified.

Here, the court found that the delay of approximately 151 days after the court ordered deadline for the filing of an Amended Complaint was excessive and unjustified. As such, their Preliminary Objection was sustained and the Second Amended Complaint was dismissed with prejudice.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Stephen M. Hickey of the York, PA law firm of Griffith, Lerman, Lutz & Schieb for bringing this decision to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Markus Winkler on www.unsplash.com.

Trial Court Dismisses Case for Lack of Timely and Proper Service of Process

In the case of Coleman v. Ducon, Jan. Term 2024, No., 2722 (C.P. Phila. Co. Dec. 19, 2025 Roberts, J.), the trial court issued a Rule 1925 Opinion requesting the Superior Court to affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the action as a result of the Plaintiff’s failure to make a good faith effort to complete service upon the Defendants.

According to the Opinion, this matter arose out of a motor vehicle accident.

The court noted that the Plaintiff failed to serve either of the Defendants within thirty (30) days of filing the Complaint. Thereafter, the Plaintiff reinstated the Complaint on three (3) occasions over the next year.

Thereafter, the court sustained Preliminary Objections that raised the failure to properly complete service of process. The Plaintiff’s Complaint was dismissed on the basis that the claims were barred by the statute of limitations due to the fact that the Plaintiff had failed to make a good faith effort to complete service.

More specifically, with respect to one Defendant, the Plaintiff had failed to take any action to attempt to serve the Complaint over an eleven (11) month period.

As to the other Defendant, while the Plaintiff had attempted, through a Delaware County Sheriff, to serve that Defendant, that effort at service was unsuccessful in March of 2024. However, the Plaintiff did not file the Delaware County Sheriff’s Affidavit of Non-Service until December of 2024.

The Plaintiff’s next attempt to serve that particular Defendant, according to the docket, was not until seven (7) months later in July of 2025, at which point the Plaintiff improperly served that Defendant in a manner in which the Delaware County Sheriff was not involved.

Overall he court found that the unexcused delay in completing proper service justified the dismissal of the claims.

In this Rule 1925 Opinion, the trial court requested the Superior Court to affirm its decision.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (Feb. 26, 2026).

Superior Court Affirms Philadelphia Trial Court's Decision to Slash $25 Million Punitive Damages Award in Trucking Accident Case

In its non-precedential decision in the case of Clemmons v. Lehr, No. 1426 EDA 2024 (Pa. Super. Feb. 27, 2026 Olson, J., Dubow, J., and Beck, J.)(Mem. Op. by Olson, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court upheld a Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas decision to slash a $25 million dollar punitive damages award down to just $1 million dollars based on the “interests of justice and constitutional considerations.”

In its decision, the appellate court also found that questions remained regarding how much the Plaintiff should be awarded in this regard. The appellate court provided instructions to the trial court to re-evaluate its decision after finding that the trial court failed to consider all compensatory damages awarded, including for loss of consortium, when reviewing the validity of the punitive damages claim.

On appeal, the court noted that the current status of Pennsylvania law requires that, if a compensatory damages award includes a recovery for a claim of loss of consortium, the trial court must consider the entire compensatory award when assessing the ratio between the compensatory award and the punitive damages award entered by a jury.

In this case, a Philadelphia County jury returned an award of $26.2 million dollars, which included $25 million dollars in punitive damages, in a rear-end trucking accident case in which the Plaintiff claimed that he sustained injuries to his head, neck and back as a result.

On appeal, the Superior Court determined that the entry of punitive damages was warranted by the evidence presented but agreed with the trial court that the ratio between the punitive damages award and the compensatory damages award was unduly excessive. 

Pointing to the United States Supreme Court’s 2003 holding in the case of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Campbell, in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits “the imposition of grossly excessive or arbitrary punishment on a tortfeasor,” and that “few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive damages and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process.” 

Here, the Pennsylvania Superior Court determined that the decision to reduce the punitive damages award to $1 million dollars based upon a 2:1 multiplier was incorrect because the trial court had only considered the $500,000.00 in compensatory damages awarded to the injured party Plaintiff and improperly excluded the $700,000.00 loss of consortium damages that was awarded to the wife from the calculations. The court noted that, in committing this error, the trial court erroneously inflated the ratio of the punitive damages award awarded.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this non-precedential decision may click this LINK.


Source: Article – “In Case With Slashed $25M Verdict, Pa. Appeals Court Wades Into Constitutionality Of ‘Excessive” Punitive Awards,” By Riley Brennan The Legal Intelligencer (March 2, 2026).

Factual Issues on Question Presented Compel Superior Court To Quash Appeal Under the Collateral Order Doctrine

In the case of Hailu v. Giorgio Fresh Company, No. 2988 EDA 2024 (Pa. Super Feb. 25, 2026 Lazarus, P.J., Panella, P.J.E., and Sullivan, J.) (Op. by Panella, P.J.E.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court quashed an appeal under the collateral order doctrine in a third party claim arising out of a work injury.

More specifically, the Superior Court quashed an appeal from a trial court’s denial of summary judgment under which a Defendant had asserted worker’s compensation immunity under the borrowed employee doctrine.

The Defendant employer was arguing that, with respect to the Plaintiff’s work place accident, the Plaintiff, who had been hired as a temporary employee from a staffing company should be considered to be a “borrowed employee” and that, therefore, the Defendant employer was immune from suit under the provisions of the Worker’s Compensation Act, which provided for the exclusive remedies to injured parties for work place injuries.

After the trial court denied the Defendant’s Motion without an Opinion, the Defendant filed an appeal and asserted that the Order was a collateral order capable of being appealed under Pa. R.A.P. 313. The Defendant asserted that the issue of whether the Plaintiff was a borrowed employee was separable from the main cause of action and was too important to be denied immediate review given that the issues involved immunities afforded under the Worker’s Compensation Act.

The Superior Court disagreed. The Superior Court found that the Defendant’s appeal did not present a purely legal question, but rather a factual one regarding whether the Defendant employer had sufficient control over the Plaintiff employee’s work, which was central to the determination of whether the borrowed employee doctrine applied.

The Superior Court noted that the trial court had ruled that the evidence was insufficient to establish the borrowed employee doctrine such that there was an indication that further factual development was necessary at the lower court level.

The Superior Court ultimately concluded that the issue of whether the Plaintiff was a borrowed employee required a fact-based inquiry, which was not a suitable topic for collateral review of a matter on appeal. Accordingly, the Superior Court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to review the interlocutory order of the trial court.

Consequently, the appeal was quashed with the Superior Court emphasizing that the collateral order doctrine must be narrowly applied in order to prevent the erosion of the final order rule regarding appeals.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert, www.Law.com (March 17, 2026).

Source of image: Photo by Jim Wilson on www.unsplash.com.

Plaintiffs Secure Split Decision on Statute of Limitations Issues in a Professional Negligence Case

In the case of Boyanowski v. Carl J. Babushko, CPA, P.C., No. 2021-CV-1975 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Feb. 12, 2026 Nealon, J.), the court addressed a statute of limitation issue in a professional negligence claim filed by taxpayers against their former accountant and his employer for allegedly failing to timely prepare and file their individual and business tax returns.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiffs asserted causes of action for “professional negligence,” “negligence,” and “breach of contract.”

The court noted that, even when viewing the case in a light most favorable to the Plaintiffs as required by the standard of review, the record shows that, for more than two (2) years prior to the commencement of the action, the Plaintiffs had actual or constructive knowledge that the accountant had failed to timely file their tax returns due to alleged accountant malpractice. Accordingly, the court dismissed the claims in professional negligence and negligence.

However, relative to the breach of contract claims, the court found that there were triable issues of fact as to whether the parties’ words and course of conduct created an enforceable contract under which the accountant and his employer allegedly agreed to timely file the Plaintiffs’ federal and state tax returns. As such, the Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to the breach of contract claim was denied.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source of image:  Photo by Recha Oktaviani on www.unsplash.com.

U.S. Supreme Court Weighs In On a Pennsylvania Civil Litigation Matter

In the case of Galette v. NJ Transit, Nos. 24-1021, 24-1113 (U.S. March 4, 2026) (Op. by Sotomayor, J.), the United States Supreme Court ruled that New Jersey Transit is not entitled to interstate sovereign immunity. With this decision, the United States Supreme Court overruled the decision entered in the case by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

The United States Supreme Court held that the New Jersey Transit Corp. was not an arm of the state. In so ruling, the United States Supreme Court recognized a state’s choice to create a legally separate entity from itself via a corporate form.

Given the finding that New Jersey Transit was not an arm of the state, the court ruled that interstate sovereign immunity did not apply.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: Article – “US Supreme Court Rules NJ Transit Is Not Entitled To Interstate Sovereign Immunity,” By Tristin Hoffman of The Legal Intelligencer (March 4, 2026).

Article: The Rise and Fall of The Gist of The Action Doctrine

Here is a LINK to the latest edition of the Pennsylvania Bar Association Quarterly which contains an article written by my son, Daniel E. Cummins, Jr. and myself entitled "The Rise and Fall of the Gist of the Action Doctrine." The article can be found on p. 118 of this edition.

My son, Daniel, is currently finishing up his second year at Virginia Law School where he is currently serving as one of the Articles Editors for the Virginia Law Review. He is set to work as a Summer Associate this summer with Cozen & O'Connor in their Philadelphia office. He is also looking forward to his clerkship with Federal Middle District Court Judge Joseph F. Saporito, Jr. after he graduates from law school next year.

As noted in the article, the gist of the action doctrine prevents plaintiffs from bringing both a breach of contract claim and a negligence claim based on an alleged breach of the same duty.

The article reviews the centuries of jurisprudence behind the gist of the action doctrine as compared to the recent Pennsylvania Superior Court decisions that call into question the continuing validity of the doctrine. The article also predicts further anticipated developments in the law going forward.

Daniel and I send thanks to Professor Emeritus Robert E. Rains of the Dickinson School of Law, who is the Editor of the Pennsylvania Bar Association Quarterly, for selecting this article for publication and for editing it into a better article.  We also thank Tina R. Schreiber for her editorial assistance on the article.



I also proudly note that I am referenced the first article listed in this edition. That article, written by Joel Fishman, Ph.D., M.L.S. and entitled "The Pennsylvania Bar Association Quarterly: A 10-Year History Volumes 87-96 (2016-2025)," references two past PBA Quarterly articles of mine on pages 80-81 as part of the history of this periodical. I thank Professor Rains for selecting those articles for publication as well.

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Court Rules Plaintiff Cannot Insert Into Written Settlement Agreement a Term That Was Not Contemplated in Previous Oral Settlement Agreement

In the case of Liberty Prop. Ltd. P’ship v. Kendall Heaton Assocs., Inc., No. 2947 EDA 2024 (Pa. Super. Feb. 27, 2026 Olson, J., Dubow, J. and Beck, J.) (Op. by Olson, J.), the Superior Court upheld and affirmed a trial court’s enforcement of a oral settlement agreement reached by the parties in a civil litigation matter.  

In this case, the Plaintiff sought to insert an additional term in an effort to restrict the scope of the written release after the oral settlement contemplated releasing all known and unknown claims.

According to the Opinion, this matter arose out of construction litigation.

The Plaintiff was a developer that had contracted with several parties, including the Defendant, for construction services.  During construction, the Plaintiff discovered design defects that lead to additional costs. After attempts to resolve these issues through a Mediation failed, the Plaintiff filed a lawsuit for breach of contract and professional negligence.

During the course of the litigation, the parties reached a settlement during negotiations participated in by the Plaintiff’s in-house representatives, including an attorney, as well as outside counsel for the Plaintiff. Once that oral agreement to settlement was reached, the Defendant’s attorney confirmed the terms of that settlement via an email.  Plaintiff’s counsel acknowledged the email as representing the Plaintiff's understanding of the agreement as well.

However, the Plaintiff later sought to exclude latent defects from the final written settlement agreement, which was a term that was not part of the original oral settlement agreement.

Thereafter, when the parties could not resolve their dispute over the terms of the settlement agreement, the Defendant filed a Motion to Enforce the original settlement agreement. The Plaintiff filed a cross-Motion requesting the court’s enforcement of the different version of the settlement that the Plaintiff desired. 

The trial court granted the Defendant’s Motion relative to the original oral settlement agreement and denied the Plaintiff’s Motion to seeking to change that agreement under a written settlement agreement.

The Superior Court found that the trial court had properly ruled that the parties had reached an enforceable oral settlement agreement, which was not contingent upon the confirmation of the terms in a written document. The court additionally found that the agreement included a mutual release of all known and unknown claims related to the construction project in exchange for the monetary settlement payment.

The appellate court otherwise determined that the Plaintiff’s attempt to alter the agreement in the written settlement agreement to exclude latent defects was an additional term that was not part of the original settlement agreement.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of the Majority decision may click this LINK.  The dissenting Opinion by Judge Dubow can be viewed HERE.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert, www.Law.com (March 17, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by Radisson US on www.unsplash.com.

Appellate Court Addresses Jerk and Jolt Doctrine With Respect to Bus Passengers

In the case of Musser v. SEPTA, No. 60 C.D. 2025 (Pa. Cmwlth. Feb. 27, 2026 Cohn Jubelirer, P.J., Fizzano Cannon, J., and Tsai, J.) (Op. by Fizzano Cannon, J.), the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court affirmed a trial court’s denial of a Plaintiff’s post-trial motions in a matter involving a Plaintiff who was injured when a SEPTA bus began to move before the Plaintiff had sat down, as a result of which, the Plaintiff allegedly fell and was injured.

The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s provision of instructions to the jury that, under Pennsylvania law, a bus operator has no obligation to wait until boarding passengers are seated before proceeding from a stop.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff alleged that, as she was seating herself, the bus restarted with an “aggressive” motion, causing her to fall. SEPTA presented contrary evidence, including a video of the incident. A defense verdict was entered by the jury and the Plaintiff appealed.

The court noted that the Plaintiff’s claims were based upon the jerk and jolt doctrine, which holds that a common carrier may be liable if a Plaintiff is injured due to a sudden, unusual or extraordinary jerk or jolt of the vehicle. However, the court noted that, under the doctrine, merely restarting a bus before a passenger is seated is not considered negligence unless the passenger requests the driver to wait. Here, there was no such request noted in the evidence. Rather, the Plaintiff only asserted that the restart was a sudden jolt.

On appeal, the appellate court found no abuse of discretion by the trial court in its evidentiary rulings. The appellate court also found that the trial court was appropriate in clarifying to the jury that merely restarting the bus before a passenger is seated did not, in and of itself, constitute negligence under the jerk and jolt doctrine.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert, www.Law.com (March 17, 2026).