Showing posts with label Jury Verdicts. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Jury Verdicts. Show all posts

Wednesday, August 19, 2026

Superior Court Ruling Affects Multi-Million Dollar Jury Verdict


In the case of Newlin v. Vita Healthcare Group, No. 259 EDA 2024 (Pa. Super. Aug. 4, 2026 Olson, J., Dubow, J. & McLaughlin, J.) (Op. by Dubow, J.)(Concurring and Dissenting Op. by McLaughlin, J), the Pennsylvania Superior Court found that a new trial on damages was required in a nursing home death case. The Superior Court’s ruling did away with what remained of a nearly $20 million dollar jury verdict in favor of the Plaintiffs.

In part, the Superior Court ruled that the trial court had erred in its handling of both the $4 million dollar compensatory award and the $5 million punitive damages award.

With regards to the compensatory award, the appellate court ruled that the trial court had erred in agreeing to dismiss two Defendants from the case after the jury’s verdict. According to the Opinion, the jury had not apportioned liability to each Defendant in the verdict slip. The Superior Court noted that the trial court had erred in that the trial court had no basis to determine how much of its award that the jury had intended to apportion to the dismissed Defendant.

Relative to the punitive damages award, the Superior Court ruled, based upon its review of the record, that the Plaintiffs had failed to make a case supporting the punitive damages award.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

The Concurring and Dissenting Opinion issued by Judge McLaughlin can be viewed at this LINK.


Source: Article – “Pa. Appeals Court Wipes Out Nearly $10M In Damages In Nursing Home Death Suit, Remands For New Trial,” By Riley Brennan of the Legal Intelligencer (Aug. 5, 2026).

Wednesday, August 20, 2025

Superior Court Addresses Issues Raised With Respect to Verdict Slip in Med Mal Case


In the case of Hagans v. Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania, No. 536 EDA 2024 (Pa. Super. July 10, 2025 Stabile, J., McLaughlin, J., and Lane, J.) (Op. by McLaughlin, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s rulings relative to a medical malpractice action. The appellate court upheld the trial court’s denial of the medical Defendant’s Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, relative to certain evidentiary rulings, and also upheld the trial court’s rulings related to the Verdict Slip.

This action arose out of alleged medical malpractice related to the birth of the Plaintiff’s child.

Of note, the Superior Court upheld the verdict in favor of the Plaintiffs in this action where the jury’s Verdict Slip demonstrated that it found at least one individual medical provider liable and where the Defendants consistently acknowledged that all providers worked together as a single care team relative to the treatment provided.

The hospital Defendant argued that the Verdict Slip should have been required to ask the jury to evaluate the negligence of each individual Defendant. The defense argued that the Plaintiff bore the burden of proof as to whether each Defendant’s conduct fell below the standard of care. The trial court rejected the hospital’s arguments and affirmed the judgment during post-trial proceeds.

On appeal, the appellate court noted that the review of the Verdict Slip confirmed that the jury found at least one individual Defendant liable for the harm such that there was sufficient evidence to establish the hospital Defendant’s vicarious liability.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert, www.Law.com (July 31, 2025).

Friday, January 3, 2025

Link for the Marhunova v. Fitler Constr. Group Case

Here is the LINK  for the case of Marhunova v. Fitler Constr. Group, May Term, 2022, No. 01520 (C.P. Phila. Co. Dec. 24, 2024 Foglietta, J.), which was highlighted in yesterday's Tort Talk blog post.  In this case, the trial court rejected a challenge by a Defendant to a $68.5 million dollar verdict in a case involving a construction site accident that resulted in the death of the Plaintiff construction worker.

Apologies for any confusion or consternation caused by the Link not being included in yesterday's post.

Thanks for reading Tort Talk.

Multi-Million Dollar Jury Verdict Upheld By Philadelphia Court


In the case of Marhunova v. Fitler Constr. Group, May Term, 2022, No. 01520 (C.P. Phila. Co. Dec. 24, 2024 Foglietta, J.), the trial court rejected a challenge by a Defendant to a $68.5 million dollar verdict in a case involving a construction site accident that resulted in the death of the Plaintiff construction worker.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff's decedent fell from the fifth floor of a building to his death.  Among the claims presented was that the Plaintiff's decedent was not presented with fall protection equipment.

In reviewing post-trial motions, the trial court judge wrote in his Rule 1925 Opinion that the Plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict.  The court noted that the Plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence to enable the jury to make a determination as to who the alleged general contractor on the job was and who, therefore, was responsible for the provision of safety equipment on the site. 

In response to the challenges to the amount of the award, the court otherwise held that there was no evidence that the jury's award resulted from bias, impartiality, prejudice or ill will.  The court instead found that the verdict was supported by the evidence presented and that the verdict was not grossly excessive under the circumstances and, therefore, did not shock the court's conscience.

Anyone wishing to review this decision may click this LINK.

Source:  Article - "Phila. Judge Upholds $68.5M Verdict Over Construction Worker's Death" by Aleeza Furman of The Legal Intelligencer (Dec. 27, 2024).

Source of above image:  Photo by Sylvia Brazzoduro on www.unsplash.com.

Wednesday, July 31, 2024

Trial Court Addresses Fair Scope of Expert Report Rule


In the case of Hamari v. Ford, No. Feb. Term, 2021, 210201504 (C.P. Phila. Co. Jan. 18, 2024 Jacquinto, J.), the court addressed the fair scope rule relative to expert testimony at trial as compared to the pre-trial expert report.

According to the Opinion, in this case, the Plaintiff’s medical expert testified at trial with regards to the Plaintiff’s need for a fusion surgery. The defense asserted that such testimony regarding spinal surgery was outside of the Plaintiff’s expert’s pre-trial report and was therefore in violation of the fair scope rule.

The doctor’s pre-trial expert report provided, “I would recommend that the patient see a spine surgery for further evaluation of his neck symptoms and possible pain management.”

During the doctor’s trial deposition, on direct examination, the doctor testified that, “…the main treatment for this would be a spinal fusion, with plates and screws, at 5 different levels.”

On cross-examination, the expert was questioned with regards to the line quoted above from his expert report. In response to that question, the expert stated that, “Well it’s – that may not be stated clearly. It would be pain management and also seeing a spine surgery. When I send someone to a spine surgery, it’s not just for medication. It’s because I think the patient will ultimately require surgical intervention.”

In determining whether or not the expert’s trial testimony was within the fair scope of his pre-trial report, this trial court relied upon guidance from the Pennsylvania Superior Court case of Woodard v. Chatterjee, 827 A.2d 433, 440 (Pa. 2003) and the terms of Pa. R.C.P. 4003.5(c), for the law on the fair scope rule.

The trial court in this case noted that the fair scope rule favors the liberal discovery of expert witnesses and disfavors unfair and prejudicial surprise at trial. 

However, no specific rule exists as to determining when expert testimony exceeds the fair scope of a pre-trial expert report and that the determination of this issue is to be on a case by case basis.

In this case, the trial court found that it did not abuse its discretion in finding that the Plaintiff’s expert’s trial testimony complied with the fair scope rule. The court held that the testimony did not go beyond the report and was not inconsistent with the report. Rather, the doctor provided a reasonable explanation as to what was contained in the report, which explanation fell under the fair scope rule.

Here, the court felt that the Defendant could have and should have reasonably anticipated the Plaintiff’s expert testimony regarding future spinal surgery from the relevant language in the expert report.

The court also seemingly placed a burden on the defense to conduct additional discovery to gather more information on the Plaintiff’s expert report when the court wrote in this Opinion that the Defendant “failing to conduct discovery to obtain a full explanation of the relevant portion of [the expert’s] report is not the trial court’s error, but the [the Defendant’s]. See Op. at 6.

The trial court ruled that the allowance of the Plaintiff’s expert testimony as the spine surgery was fair under the law cited because any discrepancy between the expert report and the trial testimony did not prevent the Defendant from making any meaningful response and did not mislead the Defendant. The trial court reiterated that the Defendant could have sought clarity of the relevant portion of the expert report in discovery before receiving such elaboration during the cross-examination at the trial deposition. 

The trial court did not provide any further guidance on how such discovery on an expert's opinion could have been completed under the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure.

In concluding its statements on this issue, the trial court stated that the allowance of the Plaintiff’s expert’s testimony complied with the fair scope rule and Pennsylvania law such that there is no mistake made at trial by the court.  The trial court ruled that there was, therefore, no need for a new trial as requested by the defense.

In this decision, the trial court otherwise ruled that it did not abuse its discretion or err when it denied the Defendant’s post-trial motions seeking a new trial due to an allegedly excessive verdict and/or with regards to the trial court’s denial of the Defendant’s request for an remittitur.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Court of Common Pleas Case Alert at www.law.com
(July 10, 2024).

Source of above image:  Photo by Sora Shimazki on www.pexels.com.



Thursday, May 16, 2024

Issues Surrounding a Zero Verdict That Was Never Read Out Loud in Open Court


In the case of Shook v. Lehigh Valley Restaurant Group, Inc., No. 1861 EDA 2023 (Pa. Super. April 4, 2024 Dubow, J., King, J., and Lane, J.) (Op. by Dubow, J.), the court reversed a trial court Order ordering a new trial on damages.

In this case, the Superior Court noted that the jury verdict in the trial below was never actually read out loud in open court before the trial court rejected the zero verdict returned by the jury.  According to the record from the trial court proceedings, the original zero verdict was never announced in court, the jury was not polled and the verdict was not properly recorded. 

As such, the Superior Court found that there was nothing for the trial court to reinstate. Accordingly, the Superior Court noted that a jury verdict that was never read out in open court is not a verdict that could be reinstated by the court.

In the end, the trial court’s ordering of a new trial was reversed and the trial court was instructed to review the issues presented on remand only if the Plaintiff actually preserved the same.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

I thank Attorney James MBeck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Friday, December 29, 2023

Superior Court Upholds Defense Verdict Reached By Jury After 14 Minutes in Med Mal Case


In the case of Corey v. Wilkes-Barre Hospital Co., LLC, No. 507 MDA 2021 (Pa. Super. Dec. 11, 2023 en banc) (Op. by King, J.) (Olson, J. Concurring) (Kunselman, J. Dissenting), the Pennsylvania Superior Court addressed numerous issues in a medical malpractice claim in which a nonsuit, in part, had been granted and in which issues were raised with regard to the verdict slip and the short length of time that the jury deliberated before announcing its defense verdict.

With respect to the Plaintiff’s post-trial challenges in regards to the identity of the parties on the verdict slip, it was noted that the trial court had confirmed that Plaintiff’s counsel failed to object to the verdict slip when the trial court had provided an opportunity to the attorneys, immediately prior to the slip being provided to the jurors, to note any objections. The trial court had indicated that, when asked if counsel was satisfied with the verdict slip, Plaintiff’s counsel answered in the affirmative.

On appeal, the Plaintiff had also complained that the jury returned a verdict within only fourteen (14) minutes after the case had been given to the jury for a decision. The Plaintiff argued that the Plaintiff did not believe that the short conference by the jury resulting the verdict should had been considered “deliberations.”

The appellate court disagreed and rejected the Plaintiff’s request that the case be remanded to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether an improper outside influence, or other misconduct, influenced the jury’s deliberation. The appellate court found that the trial court had correctly determined that the Plaintiff failed to offer any good reason to justify further inquiry into the validity of the verdict.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Concurring Opinion by Judge Olson can be viewed HERE.  The Dissenting Opinion by Judge Kunselman can be viewed HERE.


Source: Article – “Rejecting Verdict Slip and Jury Deliberation Challenges, Superior Court Affirms Nonsuit for Northeast PA Hospital” By Riley Brennan of the Pennsylvania Law Weekly (Dec. 12, 2023).

Friday, September 29, 2023

Jury's Zero Verdict Upheld



In the case of Derry v. Blackman, No. 3:21-CV-01744 (M.D. Pa. June 30, 2023 Mehalchick, J.), the court ruled that a jury’s zero verdict in a conceded liability case was not against the weight of the evidence.

The court emphasized that the record in the case confirm that the existence, severity and alleged cause of the Plaintiff’s alleged injuries were all disputed.

Judge Mehalchick reiterated the rule of law that a jury is free to decide which side’s witnesses are credible.

The court also noted the general rule of law that, even if a jury found that a Plaintiff did actually suffer some pain or discomfort as a result of an accident, the jury could conclude that the injuries were not significant enough to warrant compensation.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Monday, August 7, 2023

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Addresses Standard for Determining Constitutionality of Punitive Damages Awards


In its recent Pro-Plaintiff decision in the case of Bert Company v. Turk, No. 13 WAP 2022 (Pa. July 19, 2023) (Op. by Donohue, J.) [Numerous Concurring Opinions written by numerous Justices], the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered United States Supreme Court precedent in addressing the constitutionality of an award of punitive damages by a civil jury in Pennsylvania. 

More specifically, the court addressed the ratio calculation, that is, the appropriate ratio calculation measuring the relationship between the amount of punitive damages awarded against multiple Defendants who are found to be joint tortfeasors, and the compensatory damages awarded.

The court noted that the ratio is one of the considerations utilized in assessing whether an award of punitive damages is unconstitutionally excessive.

This matter arose out of a business dispute in which the Plaintiffs claimed that the Defendants had poached employees from the Plaintiff’s business as an attempt to harm the Plaintiff’s business.

The jury awarded 11.2 times as many dollars for punitive damages as it did for compensatory damages. More specifically, the jury’s verdict awarded $250,000.00 in compensatory damages as well as a total of $2.8 million dollars in punitive damages. The jury split the damages between the four (4) Defendants.

The Defendants based their 11.2 ratio on the cumulative punitive damages against all four (4) Defendants. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined that this was an incorrect calculation.

In its decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that the Pennsylvania Superior Court calculated a punitive to compensatory damages ratio using a per-Defendant approach, as calculated by the trial court, rather than a per-judgment approach.

In its own decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court generally endorsed the per-Defendant approach as being consistent with federal constitutional principles that require consideration of a Defendant’s due process rights.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court additionally concluded that, under the facts and circumstances of this case, it was appropriate to consider the potential harm that was likely to occur from the concerted conduct of the Defendants when determining whether the measure of punishment was both reasonable and proportionate. 

As such, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the Order of the Superior Court.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source: Article - “Pa. High Court Adopts Per-Defendant Calculation of Punitive - To - Compensatory Damages Ratio.” By Aleeza Furman of the Pennsylvania Law Weekly (July 19, 2023).

Based on this decision by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, some commentators have noted that the ability of defendants to challenge the amount of punitive damages awarded, and other commentators have indicated that, now, "the sky's the limit" in terms of the amount of punitive damages that Plaintiffs can recover in a personal injury case.  See "'Sky's The Limit':  Pa. Justices' Punitive Damages Ruling Creates Uncertainty for Defendants." By Aleeza Furman of the Pennsylvania Law Weekly (July 24, 2019).


Thursday, May 25, 2023

New Trial Granted After Jury Awarded Zero Damages


In the case of Giko v. Calgiano, No. 1262 EDA 2022 (Pa. Super. March 29, 2023 Lazarus, J., Nichols, J., and McCaffery, J.) (Op. by Lazarus, J.) [non-precedential], the Pennsylvania Superior Court concluded that a jury’s award of $0 damages was against the weight of the evidence and, as such, the appellate court remanded the case for a new trial limited to damages.

According to the Opinion, this case arose out of a rear-end motor vehicle accident.

At trial, the jury found that the Plaintiff had sustained injuries in the accident and that the Defendant was 75% liable. However, the jury awarded $0 in damages.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff declined treatment at the scene and proceeded to work. Later that day, however, the Plaintiff’s supervisor suggested that the Plaintiff leave work early and get treatment for complaints of neck and back pain.

The Plaintiff reported to an Urgent Care Center and was prescribed medication and advised to use ice and heat. Shortly thereafter, the Plaintiff began a course of physical therapy.

The Plaintiff also eventually underwent bilateral sacroiliac joint injections. She additionally had EMG and MRI testing for complaints of neck and back pain. The Plaintiff’s overall medical bills were noted to be in excess of $26,000.00.

Based upon the evidence in the record, the Superior Courtfound that the jury’s finding that the Plaintiff’s harm was not compensable was against the weight of the evidence. The court held that the award of $0 damages bore no reasonable relationship to the alleged losses suffered.

While the court recognized that not every injury results in compensable pain and that a jury may decline an award of compensation for pain and suffering if the jury determines that the discomfort suffered by the Plaintiff was the sort of “transient rub of life” for which compensation is not warranted, here, the court found that the record confirmed that the Plaintiff had indeed sustained pain and suffering and that the general proposition that victims of accidents must be compensated for all that they suffer from the tort of another warranted the granting of a new trial.

Accordingly, the Superior Court found that the jury’s award of $0 damages was against the weight of the evidence. As such, the court reversed the trial court’s decision and remanded the case for a new trial limited to damages only.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this non-precedential decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Dale G. Larrimore of the Philadelphia law firm of Larrimore & Farnish, LLP, for bringing this case to my attention.

Thursday, October 13, 2022

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Applies General Verdict Rule to Uphold Verdict In Favor of Plaintiff


In the case of Estate of Cowher v. Kodali, No. 77 MAP 2021 (Pa. Sept. 29, 2022) (Op. by Dougherty, J.), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reviewed waiver issues with respect to an appeal from the entry of a jury verdict.

According to the Opinion, the jury in this medical malpractice case awarded the Plaintiff a lump sum amount of damages under the Pennsylvania Survival Act and did not itemize the amount of pain and suffering damages or other components of its lump sum award.

During the course of the appellate history in this case, the Pennsylvania Superior Court had granted certain Defendants a new trial on the survival damages based upon those Defendants' claims that the admission of the Plaintiff’s expert testimony on the pain suffering issues was erroneous.

The issue before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was whether the Defendants had waived their right to a new trial under the general verdict rule.

According to the Opinion, the general verdict rule applies and mandates a finding of a waiver of issues for appeal when a general verdict rests upon both valid and invalid grounds, and the appellant challenging the verdict failed to request a special verdict slip at trial that would have clarified the basis of the verdict.

In this case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that those circumstances existed in this case and, as such, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held, under the general verdict rule, that the Defendants had waived their request for a new trial. As such, the Superior Court’s Order for a new trial was reversed.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by Justice Mundy can be viewed HERE.


Source: “Daily Opinion Summaries” from www.justia.com

Thursday, May 13, 2021

Defense Verdict Secured by Cummins Law in Lackawanna County Rear End Accident Case




Pleased to report that I secured a defense verdict in a rear end auto accident case yesterday in Lackawanna County.  

Negligence was admitted, causation was disputed.  The details follow:


Cholewka v. Restaino


Defense Verdict in a Rear End Accident Case



Date of Verdict: May 13, 2021


Court and Case No: C.P. Lackawanna, No. 2016-CV-3842


Judge: Margie Bisignani-Moyle


Type of Action: Third Party Auto Negligence


Injuries: Plaintiff alleged bilateral shoulder injuries.


Defense Counsel: Daniel E. Cummins of Cummins Law


Comment:



This personal injury civil litigation trial was held with Covid-19 social distancing measures in place in the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas.

The jury selection took place in a ballroom at the Scranton Cultural Center. All of the participants wore masks at these proceedings and the jurors were spread out in the large room. Attorneys were permitted by the Court to take off their masks when asking questions of the jurors. Sheriff’s deputies carried a microphone on a long handle and held the microphone up to the jurors’ mouths when they answered questions.

Once the jury of 12, plus two alternates, was selected the trial moved to Judge Margie Bisignani-Moyle’s courtroom on the second floor of the Lackawanna County Courthouse. The jurors were spread out in the area that used to be the gallery of the courtroom. The witness testified from what was the jury box. The jurors could either look at the witness directly or also see the witness more close up from TV monitors in the courtroom. The witnesses were allowed to take off their masks when testifying and the attorneys were allowed to take off their masks when speaking.

There were six men and six women on the jury.  Most of the jurors appeared to range in age from 45-59.  Two of the jurors appeared to be in their 30s.

One of the out-of-town lay witnesses for the defense was not able to get out of work to attend the trial.  The court accomodated the request to allow for that witness to be presented via Zoom.  The digital trial presentation company, Exhibit A, who was retained by the defense at trial assisted with that Zoom presentation.

This third party personal injury litigation matter arose out of a minor low speed, low impact rear-end tap of a motor vehicle incident that occurred almost (7) years ago at approximately 11:57 a.m. on July 2, 2014 on Jefferson Avenue in Scranton, Lackawanna County, Pennsylvania.

The then 55 year old Full Tort Plaintiff, Ronald Cholewka, was a front seat restrained passenger in a 2014 Chrysler 300 driven by a Paul Phillips. The Plaintiff’s vehicle was on Jefferson Avenue in Scranton, Pennsylvania and was stopped at a red light at the intersection of Mulberry Street. The Plaintiff was being driven by a car service to a medical appointment relative to his prior history of over 30 years of treatment for neck and back pain complaints dating back to a 1988 motor vehicle accident. The Plaintiff’s pre-existing conditions had also been aggravated as a result of a prior 1995 accident as well. 

At the same time and place, the Defendant, Theresa Restaino, was stopped in her 1999 Buick LeSabre on Jefferson Avenue behind the vehicle in which the Plaintiff was located. When the light turned green, Ms. Restaino thought that the vehicle(s) ahead of the one in which the Plaintiff was located had started to move. The Defendant took her foot off her brake but did not apply the gas. The Defendant allowed her vehicle to roll forward and the front of her vehicle tapped the rear of the vehicle in which the Plaintiff was located.

The Defendant described the impact as minimal and confirmed that her airbag did not deploy. Ms. Restaino also confirmed that she did not see any damage to the front of her vehicle or the rear of the vehicle in which the Plaintiff was located. The Defendant also confirmed that she did not require any repairs to her vehicle after the accident. Moreover, Ms. Restaino was not injured and required no treatment.

At the time of the accident, two friends of the Defendant located in a vehicle to the rear of the Defendant as they were following the Defendant to a location at the time. Those two witnesses testified at trial that they saw the Defendant’s vehicle roll forward but that any contact was so subtle that they asked each other if the Defendant's vehicle had even contacted the vehicle ahead. Those witnesses testified that they got out of their vehicle and went up to the two involved vehicles and confirmed that neither vehicle had any visible damage.

Photographs confirmed that there was no visible damage to either vehicles.


The driver of the vehicle ahead described the impact as significant but admitted that there was no damages to the vehicles as a result. That witness, who was admittedly not injured in the accident, passed away prior to trial from unrelated conditions. His deposition was read to the jury at trial.

The Plaintiff never got out of the vehicle at the scene. He asserted that he felt a pop in his back from the impact which he described as significant. He alleged that he could not feel his legs and thought that he had been paralyzed. He was removed by an ambulance crew and transported to the local emergency room. He was eventually treated and released.

At trial, the Defendant accepted responsibility for causing the accident but challenged the issues of causation and disputed whether the Plaintiff had been injured at all.

This Plaintiff had an extensive prior medical history that includes unrelated, multiple surgeries to many parts of the Plaintiff’s body and extremities. The Plaintiff’s prior medical history was also positive for conditions of an insulin dependent diabetes and coronary artery disease.

The Plaintiff confirmed that he had been totally disabled since 1988 for his persistently painful and limiting neck, back, and knee conditions, which disability continued up to the time of the subject accident. It was the Plaintiff’s allegation at his deposition in this matter that his neck and mid-back conditions had quieted down in the years leading up to this subject 2014 accident. However, he admitted that he was still having significant issues with regards to his low back in terms of pain and limitations by the time this accident occurred.

As noted, after the accident, the Plaintiff remained in the vehicle until help arrived. He was eventually assisted by the ambulance crew, placed on a stretcher and transported to the nearby Community Medical Center emergency room, a few blocks away.

Following the accident, the Plaintiff continued with his same pre-accident treaters for his ongoing neck and back pain.

Approximately two years and four months after the accident, the Plaintiff visited an orthopedic surgeon for treatment of left shoulder complaints. At that visit, the Plaintiff advised that doctor that his shoulder complaints had begun a few weeks before that visit. The Plaintiff also confirmed that he had not had any recent injuries.

Although the Plaintiff alleged in his Complaint that he was making claims for neck and back injuries, and did not mention any shoulder injuries in his Complaint, at trial, he stipulated to the granting of the Defendant’s non-suit motion on his neck and back claims as he wanted to instead pursue a claim for shoulder injuries.

After he rested his case at trial, the Plaintiff was allowed to amend his Complaint over the Defendant’s objection to instead state that he was pursuing a claim for bilateral shoulder injuries that required multiple surgical procedures which did not resolve his complaints. The Plaintiff’s theory was that he had sustained a left shoulder injury in the subject car accident but that his shoulder pain had been masked by his neck pain. The Plaintiff also asserted that his right shoulder problems, which had allegedly developed from overuse due to his left arm being in a sling from his surgeries, was also related back to the car accident.

The court denied the defense’s motion for a non-suit on the Plaintiff’s claims of shoulder injuries and allowed the case to proceed.  The court noted that the defense had defended against the Plaintiff's claims of shoulder injuries during the Plaintiff's case-in-chief and was, therefore, not prejudiced by the allowance of this amendment.

The Plaintiff relied upon the office notes of his shoulder surgeon as well as upon the reports of a PIP IME doctor, both of whom had opined in multiple records that the Plaintiff’s shoulder complaints were due to the subject accident. Rather than calling those out-of-state doctors as experts at trial, Plaintiff’s counsel retained a local physiatrist, Dr. Michael Wolk, to testify for the Plaintiff.

The defense confirmed on cross-examination of the Plaintiff’s medical expert that the Plaintiff’s surgeon, the PIP IME doctor, and the Plaintiff’s expert were all advised by the Plaintiff that the subject accident involved a high speed rear end accident. The defense also confirmed that the Plaintiff’s expert had not been provided with all of the medical records and also had not been provided with any films to review. It was additionally confirmed that the Plaintiff’s expert was not provided with any photographs of the vehicles to review or any of the deposition transcripts of the parties or witnesses.

The defense also asserted at trial that the Plaintiff regularly treated with his many pre-accident doctors following this accident and, for two and half years, never mentioned his shoulders as being problematic. With respect to the Plaintiff’s theory that his left shoulder pain being masked by his neck pain, the defense showed through the records that the Plaintiff’s primary complaints of pain were not only to the right side of his body but were also down in the mid-back area.

The defense called orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Thomas Allardyce, as an expert witness. Dr. Allardyce had issued an IME report in which he opined that the Plaintiff had sustained a soft tissue back injury as a result of the accident. The defense medical expert also opined that the Plaintiff’s alleged shoulder injuries and treatment were not related to the incident. The defense expert also confirmed that right-sided mid-back pain would not mask left shoulder pain or prevent a person from realizing that they had a left shoulder injury.

At trial, neither the Plaintiff’s expert nor the defense expert were questioned with respect to whether the subject accident impacted the Plaintiff’s neck and back condition. Rather, the Plaintiff’s expert limited his opinion to confirming that the Plaintiff’s shoulder complaints and concluded that they were related to the accident. The Plaintiff’s expert also testified that, due to the Plaintiff’s ongoing shoulder problems, the Plaintiff would require ongoing treatment into the future that would cost over $875,000.00.

The defense purposely avoided having the the IME doctor testify as to his IME opinion that the Plaintiff had sustained a minor soft tissue injury to his mid-back as a result of the incident.  Plaintiff's counsel did not bring this out on cross-examination.  Rather, the defense focused the questioning of the defense expert on that expert's opinion that the Plaintiff's shoulder injuries were not related to this accident.

The defense medical expert expanded upon his opinion that the Plaintiff’s shoulder complaints, treatments and surgeries were not related to the subject accident. The defense expert additionally opined that the Plaintiff’s bilateral shoulder conditions instead involved degenerative joint disease and degenerative rotator cuff tears that were all unrelated to the subect accident.

At trial, it was the defense assertion that this matter arose out of a tap incident from seven years ago.  The defense theory was that this matter involved a fender bender incident as a result of which neither fender was bent and no one was injured.  

The defense also asserted that it defied common sense to assert that the Plaintiff's shoulder complaints, which did not appear in the records until a first note that was from two years and four months after the accident, were related to this minor incident.

In terms of the Plaintiff's argument that the Plaintiff was an Eggshell Plaintiff, the defense argued in closing argument that even Humpty Dumpty sat on a high wall and had a great fall.  Analogizing to this case involving a tap of an incident and an over 2 year gap in any complaints by the Plaintiff, it would have been as if Humpty Dumpty were sitting on the ground and rolled onto his side and was attempting to assert that two cracks on his shoulders that had appeared two years after the fact related back to the time he had rolled onto his side two years before.

The Defendant was covered by an automobile insurance liability policy providing liability limits of $100,000 per person, $300,000 per occurrence.

Over the years prior to trial, the Plaintiff continually demanded the policy limits. On the eve of trial, the Plaintiff demanded $75,000. The defense had a long-standingin offer of $20,000 to settle on the table.

At trial, liability was admitted. The jury deliberated for only 35 minutes before returning its verdict in favor of the Defendant after finding that the Defendant’s negligence was not a factual cause of the Plaintiff’s alleged injuries.



The defense retained Exhibit A to assist with a visually compelling powerpoint presentation to drive the defense theory home to the jury.  I thank Leah Kane, JP Cardoni, and Joe Cardoni for their excellent work and highly recommend their services for digital trial presentations and videotaped trial depositions.




Sunday, February 14, 2021

Mixed Signals on How Juror Attitudes Have been Impacted by the COVID-19 Pandemic


Here is a LINK to one columnist's references to research and thoughts on how the COVID-19 pandemic may affect jury attitudes in the future.

In her article entitled "How will the 'Anthony Faucci effect' influence jurors?" by Debra Cassens Weiss published on the ABA Journal's website recently on February 4, 2021, the author notes conflicting signals on how jurors may rule in personal injury cases as jury trials open back up across the country.

In the end, while some trends may emerge in juror attitudes, it appears that proceeding to verdict will remain rife with uncertainty.


Tuesday, April 14, 2020

Verdict Overturned As Excessive



The non-precedential decision of Kimble v. Laser Spine Institute, No. 617 EDA 2019 (Pa. Super. April 9, 2020 Nichols, J., Murray, J., and Colins, J.) (Mem. Op. by Murray, J.)(Nichols, J., Dissenting), arose out of a case in which a $10 million dollar verdict was entered in a medical malpractice matter.  The Pennsylvania Superior Court remanded the case for a new trial on the issue of damages based upon a finding that the verdict may have been excessive under the case presented.

The appellate court faulted the trial court for allegedly not fully examining the evidence in the record against the applicable shocks the consciousness standard of review.

Significantly, the appellate court also appeared to overturn the verdict below, in part, based upon a finding that the reversal was appropriate after comparing the verdict in this case to verdicts in other cases.

The decision is also noteworthy in its reaffirmation that trial court judges and appellate court judges will look for and rely upon waivers of appellate issues in order to preserve the validity trial court rulings during the course of a trial.

For example, this case provides the valuable lesson that counsel should not only submit proposed points for charge but should also seek out concrete rulings from the trial court on whether or not the trial court judge is granting or denying such proposed points for charge.

In this case, propose points for charges were submitted but the trial court generally noted that it only used standard suggested jury instructions.  No ruling was requested or made on certain proposed points for charge that were submitted for the court's review.  On appeal, any issues raised with respect to these proposed points for charge were found to have been waived as there was no concrete trial court decision granting or denying these proposed points.

In another example of the court looking for and finding a waiver of certain issues on appeal, this decision is additionally notable for the lesson it provides that, in order to confirm the right to pursue a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict at the conclusion of a trial, a defendant should (1) submit a proposed point for charge for a binding instruction in favor of the defense, (2) move for a non-suit at the close of the Plaintiff's case, and (3) move for a directed verdict at the close of the entire case in order to pursue a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

Anyone wishing to review this decision may click this LINK.

Source:  Article - "Pa. Appeals Court Slashes Award;  Finds Jury Went Too Far With $10 Million Dollar Verdict" by Max Mitchell in the Pennsylvania Law Weekly (April 9, 2020).

Thursday, February 20, 2020

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Addresses Proper Application of Fair Share Act



In the case of Roverano v. John Crane, Inc., No. 26 EAP 2018 (Feb. 19, 2020 Mundy, J.), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the Fair Share Act, 42 Pa. C.S.A 7102, required a factfinder to apportion liability on a percentage, as opposed to per capita, basis in strict liability asbestos actions.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff, William Roverano, was allegedly exposed to a variety of asbestos products from 1971 to 1981 in the course of his employment as a helper and a carpenter with PECO Energy Company. Additionally, he allegedly smoked cigarettes for approximately thirty years. In November 2013, Roverano was diagnosed with lung cancer in both lungs. 

In 2014, Roverano brought a strict liability lawsuit against various defendants asserting that exposure to their asbestos products caused his lung cancer. His wife, Jacqueline Roverano, filed a loss of consortium claim. 

Before trial, several defendants filed a Motion In Limine seeking a ruling that the Fair Share Act applied to asbestos cases. The issues raised in that Motion gradually made its way up the appellate ladder to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. 

The Supreme Court concluded the Act’s plain language was consistent with per capita apportionment in asbestos cases, the Act does not specifically preempt Pennsylvania common law favoring per capita apportionment, and percentage apportionment in asbestos cases was impossible to execute. 

Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court’s Order, which had vacated the trial court’s judgment and remanded this case for a new trial to apportion damages on a percentage basis. 

Additionally, the Supreme Court considered whether the Act required a factfinder to apportion liability to bankrupt entities that had previously entered into a release with the Plaintiff. In this regard, the Court concluded that, upon appropriate requests and proofs, bankruptcy trusts that were either joined as third-party defendants or that had entered into a Release with the plaintiff should be included on the verdict sheet for purposes of liability only. 

In the end, this case was remanded to the trial court to consider whether the parties submitted sufficient requests and proofs to apportion liability to the settled bankruptcy trusts.

The Majority Opinion can be viewed HERE.

Justice Wecht's Concurring Opinion can be viewed HERE.

Chief Justice Saylor's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion can be viewed HERE.

I send thanks to Attorney Kenneth Newman of the Pittsburgh Office of Thomas, Thomas & Hafer for noting this case.

Tuesday, January 28, 2020

Pennsylvania Superior Court Provides Guidance to Trial Courts on What To Do (And What Not To Do) if Jury Returns a Zero Verdict



In the case of Avery v. Cercone, 2019 Pa. Super. 366 (Pa. Super. Dec. 23, 2019 Kunselman, J., Bender, J., and Musmanno, J.) (Op. by Kunselman, J.), the court reversed in part and vacated in part the lower court’s decision on the Plaintiff’s post-trial motions in a case in which the jury awarded damages for economic damages but zero dollars for the Plaintiff’s pain and suffering claim. 

The court reaffirmed the rule of law that a jury is always free to award zero dollars on a pain and suffering claim. However the court noted that, in some instances, such a verdict can be against the weight of the evidence, particular where the injury is not contested by the defense. 

The appellate court noted that the trial court erred by providing an additional jury instruction suggesting that the weight of the evidence did not support the jury’s initial verdict. Providing the jury with such an instruction invades the province of the jury. 

The Superior Court held that the trial court should have let the verdict stand and left it to the Plaintiff to file post-trial motions to challenge the verdict as being against the weight of the evidence. 

 As such, the revised verdict was found to be in error and was vacated. The case was remanded back to the trial court to determine whether the verdict was indeed against the weight of the evidence under the “shocks the judicial conscience” standard. 

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Jury Comes Back with $20,000 Verdict After First Handing Down Zero Verdict




Here is a case that highlights the uncertainty associated with sending a jury back out to deliberate further after they have entered a zero ($0) in an admitted liability case.

In the case of Vella v. Hopkins, No. 16-S-1314 (C.P. Adams Co. Aug. 12, 2019 Campbell, J.), the court denied a Plaintiff’s Motion for a New Trial after finding that the jury did not ignore the court’s jury instructions and that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence.

This matter arose out of a motor vehicle accident. At trial, the Defendant admitted liability such that the only issue at trial was on damages. The court also noted that, although medical experts for both the Plaintiff and the Defendant agreed that the Plaintiff had sustained some level of injury, the experts disagreed on the extent of injury.

The jury initially returned a verdict of zero ($0) for all damages alleged.

The court ordered the jury to return to its deliberations because the parties had stipulated that the Defendant was at fault for causing the accident and, in the eyes of the court, the jury had to award at least some damages.

After a further short deliberation, the jury returned with a verdict in favor of the Plaintiff for Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00). The verdict included damages for past, present, and future pain and suffering but did not provide any award for loss of earning capacity or disfigurement.

In a post-trial motion, the Plaintiff sought a new trial on damages under an argument that the jury had ignored the court’s instructions and that the final verdict was so low that it was against the weight of the evidence. The Plaintiff argued, in part, that the jury did not carefully consider damages the second time around during deliberations because it spent no more than fifteen (15) minutes before returning with its $20,000.00 verdict.

The court held that the length of time that the jury spent deliberating did not serve to nullify the award. The trial court also noted that it had polled the jurors after they returned from their final deliberations and that the required number of jurors were in agreement regarding the amount of damages.

The court otherwise found that the verdict did not shock one’s sense of justice and, therefore, the Plaintiffs claim that it was entitled to a new trial based upon the weight of the evidence was rejected. The court found that the verdict had a reasonable relationship to the evidence presented, particularly where the experts differed on the extent of injury.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


To review an article on the law of litigating a zero verdict, please click HERE.




Friday, September 6, 2019

ARTICLE: "Litigating the Zero Verdict" by Daniel E. Cummins and Stephen T. Kopko


Here is a LINK to the Pennsylvania Lawyer magazine article written by Daniel E. Cummins and Stephen T. Kopko both of the Scranton insurance defense firm of Foley, Comerford & Cummins entitled "Litigating the Zero Verdict."

The article provides an overview of the propriety or impropriety of zero verdicts by juries under different circumstances in personal injury matters.  The article also reviews the variety of arguments that can be raised by both sides in support of either affirming or overturning such a verdict based upon the facts of the case.

We thank Patricia Graybill, the editor of the Pennsylvania Lawyer magazine for selecting this article for publication.

To review additional zero verdict cases here on Tort Talk, please click HERE.

Wednesday, February 13, 2019

New Trial Granted in Post-Koken UIM Zero Verdict Case


In the Post-Koken case of Singer v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., No. 2015-CV-2859 (C.P.  Lacka. Co. Jan. 24, 2019 Gibbons, J.), the court addressed a Plaintiff's post-trial motion for a new trial after the entry of a zero verdict by the jury.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff had previously settled with the third party tortfeasor and this matter involved a jury trial on the Plaintiff's claims against the UIM carrier.  The Plaintiff asserted that the jury's verdict of $0 bore no rational relationship to the evidence produced at trial, and defied common sense and was shocking.

The court noted that liability was admitted in this rear end accident matter.  The court also noted that it was uncontested by both the Plaintiff's experts and the Defendant's experts that the Plaintiff had sustained a cervical sprain strain as a result of the accident.  The Plaintiff's experts additionally testified that this type of injury resulted in pain for the Plaintiff.  The Defense expert also agreed that this type of injury ordinarily takes six to twelve months to resolve.

The court reviewed other zero verdict cases and noted that under the law, a cervical sprain/strain injury is a type of objective injury that normally involves pain and suffering.  Without noting any of the other evidence that was presented at trial, the court in Singer concluded that, based on the experts' testimony, the jury had no reason to believe that [the Plaintiff] did not suffer pain.  The court also noted that there was no evidence that the Plaintiff had a pre-existing condition or injury prior to the accident which could have been a cause of his alleged pain.

As such, the court ruled that the jury's decision to disregard what the trial court judge viewed as the uncontested evidence of the Plaintiff's injury and to award zero damages for pain and suffering constituted, in the court's eyes a decision that bore no rational relationship to the evidence produced at trial.  Accordingly, the trial court judge found that the jury's verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence.

The court therefore set aside the jury's verdict and awarded the Plaintiff a new trial.

Anyone wishing to review this Opinion may click this LINK.

Friday, January 25, 2019

Zero Verdict in Dog Bite Case Upheld on Appeal (Non-Precedential)


In a non-precedential decision issued by the Pennsylvania Superior Court in the case of Anthony v. Rizzo, No. 1067 M.D.A. 2017 (Pa. Super. April 3, 2018 Bowes, J., Murray, J., and Blatt, J.) (Non-precedential Op. by Murray, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the trial court decision by the Honorable Lesa S. Gelb following an appeal from the judgement entered in favor of the Defendants after a jury awarded the Plaintiff $0 damages in this negligence cause of action arising out of an alleged dog bite by a poodle.  

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff was employed as a house cleaner for the Defendants.   The Plaintiff had walked up to the Defendant’s car in which a poodle was located, unrestrained and in the rear seat with the windows opened.  As the Plaintiff approached the car, the dog “came into contact” with the Plaintiff’s right forearm. 

 The Opinion indicates that the Plaintiff was treated for what was described as a dog bite which involve an avulsion, or tearing of the skin, on the Plaintiff’s right forearm. The Plaintiff treated with her family doctor who cleaned the area, applied steri-strips, prescribed antibiotics, and administered a tetanus shot.    The Plaintiff had a follow-up visit with the family doctor one (1) month later at which point the Plaintiff's injury was noted to appear to be healing. The Plaintiff was not referred to any plastic surgeon to discuss any scarring-related issues.

As reflected on the verdict slip, the jury found that the Defendants were negligent and that the negligence of the Defendant was a factual cause of the Plaintiff’s harm.   However, the jury also attributed 50% of the causal negligence to the Plaintiff.  As for damages, the jury wrote down $0 on the verdict slip.  

The Plaintiff raised two (2) issues on appeal, first the Plaintiff asserted that the trial court committed an error in denying the Plaintiff’s Motion to Preclude a Verdict Slip Question and Jury Instruction on factual cause when it was not disputed that the Plaintiff had suffered some injury as a result of the accident.

The Plaintiff’s second issue was whether the trial court committed an error of law in denying the Plaintiff’s Motion for a new trial on damages since the jury’s verdict was so contrary to the evidence that it shocked one’s sense of justice.  

As to the first issue, the Superior Court stated that its review of the trial court’s jury instruction on factual cause revealed that that instruction was nearly identical to the Pennsylvania Standard Jury Instruction.   As such, the Superior Court found that the trial court provided an adequate instruction for factual cause to sufficiently guide the jury in its deliberation.   The Superior Court also noted that, even if an error had occurred in this regard, such error would be harmless because the jury found that the Defendant’s negligence was indeed a factual cause of the Plaintiff's harm in any event.  

 The appellate court also rejected the Plaintiff’s contention that the jury’s verdict was against the weight of the evidence.   Given that the appellate court agreed that the Plaintiff did not offer sufficient evidence in support of a claim for “compensable” pain, there was no need to overturn the decision below.   This was particularly so in this case where the Plaintiff had not presented any expert medical testimony about her alleged pain and suffering and where the Defendants asserted that the Plaintiff had suffered a mere scratch that represented a minor injury.  

As such, the Plaintiff’s appeal was denied and Judge Gelb’s decision below was affirmed by the Pennsylvania Superior Court. 

Anyone wishing to review this non-precedential decision by the Pennsylvania Superior Court, may click this LINK.

The trial court decision in this matter by Judge Lesa Gelb of the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas may be viewed at this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney Stephen T. Kopko of my office for bringing this decision to my attention.