Showing posts with label Wrongful Death. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Wrongful Death. Show all posts

Wednesday, October 28, 2026

Are Settlement Proceeds From a Survival Action Income For Purposes of Determining Child Support Obligations?


In the case of Birkmire v. Zeppieri, No. 802 WDA 2025 (Pa. Super. Oct. 1, 2026 Bender, P.J.E., Lane, J., and Stabile, J.) (Op. by Stabile, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court addressed the issue of survival action settlement proceeds and child support obligations.

According to the Opinion, a mother’s child was tragically killed while walking to a school bus stop.

The mother filed a wrongful death and survival action. The case was eventually settled.

The Plaintiff put 100% of the amount of the settlement as survival damages to the child’s estate.

A family court later determined that the settlement proceeds were income to the mother for purposes of determining the mother’s child support obligation for another child.

In this decision, the Pennsylvania Superior Court vacated the trial court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Pennsylvania Superior Court panel concluded that the settlement proceeds were not income for purposes of determining the mother’s child support obligations.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Pa. Super. Blog written by Jon Bruno of Bruno Litigation, LLC in Pittsburgh, PA.


Source of image:  Photo by Sasun Bughdarya on www.unsplash.com

Tuesday, May 6, 2025

Court Confirms that Wrongful Death Claims are Derivative to Underlying Liability Claims

 In the case of Byers v. Finishing Systems, Inc., No. 1:20-CV-02110 (M.D. Pa. March 31, 2025 Wilson, J.), the court granted summary judgment in a wrongful death case arising out of a products liability claim.

According to this Opinion, the Court had previously granted summary judgment to the Defendants on certain claims but did not grant summary judgment on the Plaintiff's Wrongful Death claims because the Defendant had not asked for it in the motion.

In this decision, the Court treated the more recent filings presented by the defense as adding a request for summary judgment on the Plaintiff's Wrongful Death claims.

The court noted that, where all substantive negligence claims had been dismissed in a given matter, the Plaintiff’s wrongful death claim also necessarily failed as matter of law.  The court affirmed that wrongful death claims are derivative of other substantive causes of action.  


Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.  


Friday, January 3, 2025

Link for the Marhunova v. Fitler Constr. Group Case

Here is the LINK  for the case of Marhunova v. Fitler Constr. Group, May Term, 2022, No. 01520 (C.P. Phila. Co. Dec. 24, 2024 Foglietta, J.), which was highlighted in yesterday's Tort Talk blog post.  In this case, the trial court rejected a challenge by a Defendant to a $68.5 million dollar verdict in a case involving a construction site accident that resulted in the death of the Plaintiff construction worker.

Apologies for any confusion or consternation caused by the Link not being included in yesterday's post.

Thanks for reading Tort Talk.

Multi-Million Dollar Jury Verdict Upheld By Philadelphia Court


In the case of Marhunova v. Fitler Constr. Group, May Term, 2022, No. 01520 (C.P. Phila. Co. Dec. 24, 2024 Foglietta, J.), the trial court rejected a challenge by a Defendant to a $68.5 million dollar verdict in a case involving a construction site accident that resulted in the death of the Plaintiff construction worker.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff's decedent fell from the fifth floor of a building to his death.  Among the claims presented was that the Plaintiff's decedent was not presented with fall protection equipment.

In reviewing post-trial motions, the trial court judge wrote in his Rule 1925 Opinion that the Plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict.  The court noted that the Plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence to enable the jury to make a determination as to who the alleged general contractor on the job was and who, therefore, was responsible for the provision of safety equipment on the site. 

In response to the challenges to the amount of the award, the court otherwise held that there was no evidence that the jury's award resulted from bias, impartiality, prejudice or ill will.  The court instead found that the verdict was supported by the evidence presented and that the verdict was not grossly excessive under the circumstances and, therefore, did not shock the court's conscience.

Anyone wishing to review this decision may click this LINK.

Source:  Article - "Phila. Judge Upholds $68.5M Verdict Over Construction Worker's Death" by Aleeza Furman of The Legal Intelligencer (Dec. 27, 2024).

Source of above image:  Photo by Sylvia Brazzoduro on www.unsplash.com.

Wednesday, December 7, 2022

Court Addresses Proper Damages Recoverable in a Medical Malpractice Action Involving An Older Retired Adult



In the case of Williams v. Glenmaura Senior Living at Montage, LLC, No. 21-CV-1494 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Nov. 4, 2022 Nealon, J.), Judge Terrence R. Nealon addressed the proper damages recoverable and the supporting evidence required in a medical professional liability action involving the death of a retired older adult.

In particular the court addressed this issue in terms of a Plaintiff’s effort to seek to recover damages under the Wrongful Death Act, 42 Pa. C.S.A. §8301, and the Survival Act, 42 Pa. C.S.A. §8302.

After outlining what types of damages are available to be recovered under each of these elements of avenues of damagers,

After reviewing the record before him, the court found that, since the Plaintiff had not produced an expert report to provide the jury with evidence of the effect of productivity and inflation over time, the applicable discount rate required by the law, and the decedent’s personal maintenance cost, for food, clothing, shelter, medical attention, and some recreation, the Plaintiff could not satisfy her burden of proof under the law in order to advance and sustain a claim in the Survival action for the decedent’s loss of earnings or income.

The court further found that the Plaintiff’s intended use of the decedent’s adjusted gross income as the measure of his estate’s recoverable economic damages would erroneously include forms of income that did not arise from the decedent’s intellectual or body laborer and, as such, are not proper items of damages under the Survival Act.

Accordingly, the court ruled that the Defendant’s Motion In Limine to preclude the Plaintiff from pursuing any type of claim for loss of earnings/income at the trial of the case was granted.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Tuesday, July 19, 2022

Arbitration Provision In Nursing Home Agreement Found To Be Unconscionable and Unenforceable


In the case of Kohlman v. Grane Health Care Company, No. 103 WDA 2021 (Pa. Super. July 5, 2022 Kunselman, J., King, J., and Collins, J.) (Op. by Collins, J.), the court affirmed a trial court’s overruling Preliminary Objections asserted by various Defendants that sought to compel arbitration of the claims asserted against them by the Plaintiffs.

This case arose out of medical malpractice claims related to treatment secured by the Plaintiff at a skilled nursing home.

The court noted that, in connection with her admission to the nursing home, the Plaintiff's decedent had signed a number of documents including an arbitration agreement.

After the Plaintiffs filed suit in the Court of Common Pleas, the Defendants filed Preliminary Objections seeking to compel arbitration. The trial court overruled the Defendant’s Preliminary Objections and this appeal resulted.

The appellate court agreed with the trial court that the terms of the arbitration agreement were unconscionable.

The court affirmed despite noting that both Pennsylvania and federal law impose a strong public policy in favor of enforcing arbitration agreements. 

The court also acknowledged that the enforcement of an arbitration agreement may be denied only where the party opposing arbitration proves that a contract defense that applies equally to non-arbitration contracts serves to invalidate the agreement to arbitrate.  In this matter, the contract defense of unconscionability of the contract terms was raised.

The Superior Court noted that, to invalidate or bar enforcement of a contract based on unconscionability, the party challenging the contract must show both an absence of meaningful choice, also referred to as procedural unconscionability, and that the contract terms that are unreasonably favorable to the other party, known as substantive unconscionability. 

The Superior Court additionally noted that procedural and substantive unconscionability are assessed under a sliding/scale approach, with a lesser degree of substantive unconscionability required where the procedural unconscionability is very high.

In this Kohlman case, the appellate court agreed with the trial court findings that the arbitration agreement was procedurally unconscionable because the decedent was in pain and was medicated at the time she signed the arbitration agreement, the decedent was alone when she was asked to sign the arbitration agreement, the decedent had no opportunity to read the arbitration agreement and was not given a copy to review prior to her signing the same, and where the provisions of the agreement were not otherwise fully read or explained to the decedent. The court therefore ruled that the process by which the decedent’s signature was obtained on the arbitration agreement denied the decedent a meaningful choice and, therefore, the arbitration agreement was found to be procedurally unconscionable.

The appellate court also agreed with the trial court finding that, on the issue of substantive unconscionability, the provision in the agreement requiring that the decedent pay one half of the cost of any arbitration, including one half of the arbitrator’s fees, was substantively unconscionable because it imposed additional expenses for bringing a claim that the decedent would not have to bear in a court action. The appellate court agreed that this term of the agreement unreasonably favored the nursing home and, therefore, was sufficient to satisfy the requirement of showing substantive unconscionability, particularly where, as here, the record, according to the appellate court, established that the decedent was not given full information regarding her choices or any opportunity to inform herself of what she was signing.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “Article “Nursing Home Can’t Enforce ‘Unconscionable’ Arbitration Clause and Wrongful Death Suit, P.A. Appeals Court Rules,” by Aleeza Furman. Pennsylvania Law Weekly (July 6, 2022).

Thursday, May 12, 2022

Trial Court Directs Defense Forensic Economist Expert To Issue An Amended Expert Report To Comport With Law on Damages or Be Precluded From Testifying At Trial


In the case of Van Auken v. Saud, No. 20-CV-4717 (C.P. Lacka. Co. April 29, 2022 Nealon, J.), the court addressed several Motion In Limine issues in a medical malpractice action.

This medical malpractice action arose out of a claim against an emergency room physician who allegedly failed to diagnose and treat a minor’s aortic dissection which caused the minor’s death one day later.

The Plaintiff’s filed a wrongful death action seeking damages for their own losses and, in that regard, the parents advanced a claim for the pecuniary value of the services that the decedent would have provided to them. In the survival action, the decedent’s estate sought to recover damages for the decedent’s loss of her future earnings, minus her personal maintenance expenses, during her estimated work life expectancy.

The Plaintiffs filed a Motion In Limine against the opinion of the Defendants Forensic Economists in that the expert excluded health insurance from the fringe benefits calculations for the decedent’s loss of future earnings based upon a rationale that the decedent’s family members did not lose health insurance as a result of the minor’s death. 

The Plaintiffs also objected to the defense forensic economist expert’s inclusion of transportation cost and personal care products and services cost in the estimation of the decedent’s personal maintenance expenses to be deducted against the decedent’s loss of future earnings. The Plaintiffs asserted that Pennsylvania law does not recognize those types of cost as components of a decedent’s personal maintenance expenses.

In addressing this Motion In Limine, the court found that the defense economist expert fundamentally misconstrued the damages recoverable under the Wrongful Death and Survival Act and, as such, the court directed the Defendant’s expert to issue an amended report that complies with Pennsylvania law by including health insurance benefits in the fringe benefits estimation and by excluding the cost for transportation and personal care products and services from the personal maintenance expenses computation. The court held that, if the Defendant failed to submit such an amended report, the expert would be precluded from testifying at trial.

On a separate Motion In Limine filed by the Plaintiffs, the Plaintiffs asserted that the defense medical liability expert witness who expressed opinions regarding the complexities of the treatment involved and the difficulty in recognizing an aortic dissection in pediatric patients, did not opined that any physician complied with or deviated from the applicable standard of care. As such, the Plaintiffs asserted that the medical liability expert witnesses opinions were not relevant to the issues presented.

The court rejected this Motion In Limine filed by the Plaintiff after finding that the opinions expressed and the observations made by the defense pediatric cardiothoracic surgeon were relevant to the medical issues to be considered by the jury. The court also found that this expert possessed the requisite qualification to testify on those medical issues presented. As such, the Plaintiff’s Motion In Limine in this regard was denied.


Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.




Monday, April 26, 2021

Judge Terrence R. Nealon Addresses Claims of Recklessness Under MCARE Act


In the case of Doughitt v. Saber Health Care Group, LLC, No. 20-CV-3136 (C.P. Lacka. Co. April 22, 2021 Nealon, J.), the court addressed issues regarding claims of punitive damages in a medical malpractice action involving Wrongful Death and Survival claims.

This case was brought by an estate and daughter of a former nursing home resident under a medical professional liability claim alleging corporate and individual negligence and recklessness by the Defendants which allegedly resulted in the nursing home resident’s death.

In the Complaint, the Plaintiff confirmed that she was seeking damages under the Wrongful Death Act and the Survival Act, including demands for compensatory and punitive damages.

The Defendants filed Preliminary Objections in the nature of a demurrer seeking to strike the claims for punitive damages on the grounds that those claims were insufficient as a matter of law under §505(a) of the medical care availability and reduction of error (MCARE) Act, 40 P.S. §1303.505(a).

Judge Nealon noted that §505(a) of the MCARE Act is consistent with other Pennsylvania case law governing punitive damages in that the Act provides that punitive damages are recoverable for a healthcare provider’s “willful or wanton conduct or reckless indifference to the rights of others.”

Reiterating his previous rationale as stated in other decisions regarding claims of recklessness, Judge Nealon noted that, although wanton and willful misconduct and recklessness are considered under the law to be conditions of the mind such that they may be averred generally pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 1019(b), the court found that the Plaintiff in this matter still alleged sufficient facts in any event that would factually support a finding of wanton or reckless indifference by the Defendant’s in any event.

More specifically, the court noted that the Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant’s intentionally increased a number of infirm residents with complex health conditions in order to increase their governmental reimbursements, knowingly establish staffing levels that were insufficient, repeatedly ignored staff reports regarding alleged alarming increases in infections and illnesses within the facility, and other allegations.

Judge Nealon went on to note that, generally speaking, in a Survival action, the decedent’s estate is permitted to pursue claims that the decedent could have asserted if he or she had lived. In contrast, the Wrongful Death action is brought by specified relatives of the decedent to compensate those surviving family members for the losses that they have sustained as a result of the decedent’s death.

The court noted that, consequently, the decedent’s estate may recover punitive damages in a Survival action if the decedent could have recovered those types of damages had he or she survived. However, under Pennsylvania, punitive damages are not recoverable in a Wrongful Death action.

As such, the court sustained the Defendant’s demurrer to the punitive damages claims only with respect to the Plaintiff’s punitive damages claims asserted in the Wrongful Death action. The Defendant’s demurrer was overruled in all other respects.


Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Thursday, December 3, 2020

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Addresses Standards for Survival and Wrongful Death Claims



In the case of McMichael v. McMichael, No. 50 and 51 WAP 2019 (Pa. Nov. 18, 2020 Todd. J.), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a trial court abused its discretion in denying a Motion for a New Trial following a jury award of $0 in damages on one of the elements of damages in a wrongful death action. 

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiffs entered in a lease with a Defendant under which the Defendant was to install a natural gas pipeline on the Plaintiff’s property. The lease required that Defendant to hire a company owned by the Plaintiff to perform tree clearing on the property in preparation for the installation of the pipeline.

That landscaping company hired the Plaintiff’s nephew and others to perform the work. While the nephew/decedent was supervising the tree clearing process, he was struck by a tree and fatally injured.

A lawsuit was filed and the case proceeded to trial. The jury ultimately awarded the decedent’s estate $225,000.00 in survival damages, which was reduced to $135,000.00 to reflect the jury’s finding that the decedent was 40% negligent. The court awarded $0 on the wrongful death claim.

Upon review, the Pennsylvania Superior Court concluded that the trial court had erred in denying a new trial with respect to the non-economic damages award. The case was remanded for a new trial limited to the issue of non-economic damages to be potentially awarded to the Plaintiff.

In its decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court provides a nice distinction between survival damages and wrongful death damages.

With regards to the jury’s verdict of $0 in damages for the wrongful death claim, the court noted that it was undisputed that the Plaintiff did not present any evidence of medical, funeral, or estate administrative expenses. The court noted that the Plaintiff’s potential recovery in this regard was therefore limited to the loss of the decedent’s services. The court noted that the Plaintiff had produced evidence in this regard in terms of how the decedent performed home repairs, mowed the lawn, did most of the cooking, and drove his wife to work when the weather was bad. 

It was noted, however, that neither the wife nor any economic expert retained, testified as to an estimate as to the value of these contributions or services, or the cost of hiring somebody else to perform these tasks. 

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that, in the absence of any evidence as to the economic value of these contributions, the jury would have been forced to engage in speculation regarding the value of these services. 

As such, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed with the trial court’s denial of any new trial for any economic damages. 

However, as noted, the request for a new trial with respect to the non-economic damages relative to the wife’s loss of her husband of thirty (30) years was granted.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of the Majority decision may click this LINK.


Justice Mundy's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion can be viewed HERE.

Justice Dougherty's Dissenting Opinion can be viewed HERE

Monday, October 21, 2019

Discovery of Communications With Divorce Attorney Allowed Relative to Loss of Consortium Claims



In the case of Corey v. Wilkes-Barre General Hospital, No. 1980 MDA 2017 (Pa. Super. Sept. 23, 2019 Ford Elliot, J., Gantman, J., Nichols, J.) (Op. by Ford Elliot, J.) (concurring and dissenting Op. by Nichols, J.) the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed a decision by a Luzerne County judge allowing for the disclosure for certain divorce records in a wrongful death lawsuit against a hospital.

According to the Opinion the Plaintiff-wife filed a wrongful death lawsuit against the hospital over the death of her then estranged husband. As part of that lawsuit, the Plaintiff-wife filed a loss of consortium claim.

When the Defendants sought to discovery information contained in the divorce proceedings that were active at the time the estranged husband passed away, the Plaintiffs asserted that any communications between the Plaintiff-wife and her attorney in those proceedings were protected by the attorney/client privilege.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the ruling by a Luzerne County judge that the loss of consortium claim created an exception to the attorney/client privilege relative to the disclosure of the communications between the Plaintiff-wife and her attorney in the separate divorce proceedings.

In its Opinion, the Superior Court emphasized that, in order to recover on a loss of consortium claim, the spouse who brings that claim must demonstrate and injury to the marital relationship that deprives him or her of the companion, society, affection and sexual relations that spouses share prior to the injury and that, but for the injury, the two would have continued to share.

The Superior Court noted that, where an alleged marital injury is suffered during the pendency of a divorce, the spouse bringing a claim for loss of consortium places the marital relationship at issue because, in order to prove a loss of consortium, the divorcing spouse must first prove the existence of consortium.

In this regard, the appellate court noted that a spouse cannot hide behind the attorney/client privilege to protect communications he or she may have had with a divorce attorney when it is that spouse who placed the marital relationship, and consequently, the state of the divorce, at issue in the first place by including the claim for loss of consortium. 

The Superior Court noted that, to rule otherwise and to allow for the privilege to be asserted, would “frustrate the administration of justice by given [the spouse] an unfair advantage and by prejudicing [a Defendant’s] defense of the claim.”

Anyone wishing to review Judge Ford Elliott's Majority Opinion may click this LINK.

Judge Nichols Concurring and Dissenting Opinion can be viewed HERE.

Source: Article: “Court: Divorce Records Discoverable in Cases with Loss of Consortium Claims.” By P.J. D’Annunzio of the Pennsylvania Law Weekly (September 25, 2019).

Tuesday, September 17, 2019

Preliminary Objections Sustained Where Only Conclusory Allegations Set Forth in Dram Shop Action



In the case of Shultz v. Barnes, No. 18-CV-1308 (C.P. Lyc. Co. July 19, 2019 Linhardt, J.), the court sustained several Preliminary Objections filed by a Defendant in a liquor liability motor vehicle accident case given that the Plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to support various claims. 

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff was the administrator of the estate of a decedent who was killed in a motor vehicle accident caused by a tortfeasor driver. The Plaintiff alleged that the tortfeasor driver was driving a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol. 

In addition to suing the driver, the Complaint also identified the company that operated the bar where the tortfeasor driver was drinking prior to the accident as a defendant in this case. The owner and president of that bar was also listed as a defendant.  

 The Defendants filed various Preliminary Objections to the Complaint.  

The court sustained the Defendants’ Preliminary Objections to the count in the Complaint alleging a violation of the Dram Shop Act.  

The defense had argued that the Plaintiff had only provided conclusory allegations that the Defendants knew that the tortfeasor driver was visibly intoxicated while he was at the bar.   The court granted these Preliminary Objections and noted that it was not sufficient for a Plaintiff to simply allege that alcoholic beverages were served to patrons in order to support a Dram Shop action.  

The court noted that the Plaintiff failed to assert any facts regarding the physical appearance of the tortfeasor Defendant driver in terms of whether he was visibly intoxicated or not while he was served at the bar.   Although this Preliminary Objection was sustained, the Plaintiff was granted an opportunity to file an Amended Complaint.  

Relative to the Preliminary Objections filed by the individual Defendant, the court found that the Plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to pierce the corporate veil.   Again, the Plaintiff was granted an opportunity to file an Amended Complaint in this regard.  

The court also sustained Preliminary Objections to the Plaintiff’s wrongful death claim given that that claim was brought not only on the Plaintiff’s behalf but also on behalf of entities who were allegedly entitled to damages for reasonable hospital, nursing, and medical expenses, as well as funeral expenses, burial expenses and other losses.  The court noted that, under the Rules of Civil Procedure, such allegations were improper in a wrongful death claim.  As such, the Preliminary Objections in this regard were sustained.   Again, the Plaintiff was granted leave to file an Amended Complaint.

Lastly, the court also sustained Preliminary Objections to the allegations of recklessness and the claims for punitive damages under a finding that the Plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to support these allegations.   The court noted that, should discovery later reveal facts supporting an award of punitive damages on separate claims, the Plaintiff would be allowed to seek an amendment at that time.   

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions.” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (August 27, 2019).    

Monday, March 12, 2018

Superior Court Affiims That Discovery Rule Does Not Extend Statute of Limitations in Wrongful Death/Survival Actions (Non-Precedential)

Tort Talkers may recall the prior Tort Talk post on the decision of Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas in the case of Estate of Marsh v. Lizza, No. 2106-CV-2812 (C.P. Lacka. Co. March 1, 2017 Nealon, J.) in which the court granted Preliminary Objections of a Defendant in a case where a Plaintiff attempted to substitute another party in a reissued Writ of Summons without the consent of the opposing parties or court and beyond the applicable statute of limitations in this wrongful death and survival action.  

As an update, it is noted that the Pennsylvania Superior Court has affirmed the trial court’s decision in a non-precedential Opinion under the caption of Marsh v. Lizza, No. 532 MDA 2017 (Pa. Super. Feb. 13, 2018 Olson, J., Dubow, J., and Strasberger, J.) (Non-Precedential Mem. Op. by Olson, J.).

Notably, in affirming the trial court’s decision, the Pennsylvania Superior Court agreed that the 2-year statute of limitations applicable to wrongful death and survival actions under 42 Pa. C.S.A. §5524(2) may not be extended by the discovery rule, and that the latest date on which the statute of limitations begins to run for wrongful death and survival claims is the date of the decedent’s death.  

Accordingly, the Superior Court found that, as a matter of law, the trial court properly sustained a Defendant’s Preliminary Objections and struck the Complaint.  

 Anyone wishing to review the Pennsylvania Superior Court's Non-Precedential Decision in this case may click this LINK.

Thursday, February 8, 2018

Judge Gelb Addresses Issue of Apparent First Impression Relative to Umbrella Policy

In the case of Charles v. USAA, No. 7106 - CV - 2016 (C.P. Luz. Co. March 3, 2017 Gelb, J.), Judge Lesa Gelb of the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas ruled in favor of the carrier in a declaratory judgment action filed by a Plaintiff seeking a decision regarding the applicability of a personal umbrella policy to wrongful death claims arising out of a motor vehicle accident as asserted by the children of decedent, Janice Lewis, against her husband (deceased), the owner of the policy.

According to the Opinion, the decedent, Janice Lewis, was a passenger in a vehicle driven by her husband, Kenneth Lewis, when that vehicle was involved in an accident with another vehicle.  Both Janice and Kenneth Lewis were fatally injured in the accident.

At the time of his death, Kenneth Lewis was insured by USAA  through automobile, homeowners, and personal umbrella insurance policies.  The Plaintiffs submitted various claims to USAA for consideration.

USAA agreed to tender the limits under the automobile insurance policy.

However, USAA advised that it would not extend benefits for the death of Janice Lewis under the personal umbrella policy of Kenneth Lewis.  The carrier pointed to an Exclusion in the umbrella policy for the bodily or personal injury of any insured under the policy.  The Plaintiffs argued that none of the wrongful death beneficiaries were "insureds" under the umbrella policy and that they were, therefore, not subject to the Exclusion and should be entitled to recover under that policy.

The issue came before the court on cross motions for summary judgment.

After reviewing applicable Pennsylvania law concerning the construction of insurance policy contracts as applied to the provisions at issue in this case, Judge Gelb ruled that the language of the umbrella policy, including the definition of "bodily injury" and the relevant Exclusion against recovery by insureds, when reviewed in conjunction with the nature of the Pennsylvania Wrongful Death Statute, compelled her decision to uphold the carrier's denial of coverage.

More specifically, the court noted that the covered bodily injury in this case, as per the policy provisions, is that of the decedent, Janice Lewis, who was an insured under the umbrella policy.  Therefore, under the clear and unambiguous language of the umbrella policy, the Exclusion against coverage for bodily injury incurred by an insured was applicable to preclude coverage under the facts presented.

Judge Lesa Gelb
Luzerne County
Judge Gelb also noted that, under Pennsylvania law, while a wrongful death action is not derivative of the decedent's rights, it is derivative of the decedent's injuries.  Accordingly, the court reiterated that it followed that, as the wrongful death action in this matter arose out of a bodily injury occurring to an insured, coverage for the same under the umbrella policy was precluded by the Exclusion noted.

The court also dealt with an apparent issue of first impression raised by the Plaintiffs.  The Plaintiffs alleged that the Lewis's children suffered emotional harm resulting from their mother's death, which is a recoverable element of damages pursuant to the Wrongful Death Statute, which claim allegedly should serve to trigger coverage under the umbrella policy.

However, Judge Gelb noted that the Plaintiffs did not allege any physical injury to the children from which the emotional harm allegedly manifested.  It was emphasized that the protections of the umbrella policy required a physical injury in order to trigger coverage and the only physical injury or injuries at issue in this case were those of the deceased mother, who as an insured, was excluded from coverage under the personal umbrella policy.

As such, the court granted the carrier's motion for summary judgment and denied the Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.

Anyone wishing to review this decision by Judge Gelb may click this LINK.

Tuesday, January 16, 2018

A Primer on Complaint Drafting by the Superior Court




In the case of Bouchon v. Citizen Care, Inc., 2017 Pa. Super. 379 (Pa. Super. Dec. 6, 2017 Stabile, Olson, Strassburger, J.J.) (Op. by Stabile, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court provided lessons on the proper drafting of a Complaint in a civil litigation matter.  

Among the tips provided by the Superior Court in this decision is that a Plaintiff must plead claims separately against each Defendant.   The court noted that only claims against jointly liable Defendants may be pled together under certain circumstances.  The court noted that pleadings claims against separate and distinct Defendants together makes it impossible for each Defendant to properly respond.   As such, the court noted that multiple use of “and/or” and references to “Defendants” globally  render the Complaint unanswerable and are, therefore, improper.  

The court also noted that a Plaintiff is required to denominate the claims as wrongful death claims or survival actions in the Complaint.    The court noted that the nature of each claim must be specifically identified under Pa. R.C.P. 1019.  Moreover, wrongful death and survival actions are required to be labeled as such under Pa. R.C.P. 1020.  

The court additionally noted that wrongful death and survival actions must be brought by a personal representative of the deceased, and not merely by a statutory beneficiary.  

The court otherwise noted that claims of negligence, corporate negligence, and vicarious liability are separate causes of action.   It was additionally noted that “Damages” is not a proper separate cause of action.  

In the end, the court did provide the Plaintiff with another opportunity to amend and refile their Complaint.   

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  

I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck, of the Philadelphia office of Reed Smith for bringing this case to my attention.  


Thursday, March 30, 2017

Party May Not Substitute Another Party in a Reissued Writ of Summons Without Consent of Opposing Parties or Leave of Court

In his recent decision in the case of Estate of Marsh v. Lizza, No. 2016-CV-2812 (C.P. Lacka. Co. March 1, 2017 Nealon, J.), Judge Terrance R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas addressed a Plaintiff’s attempt to substitute another party in a reissued Writ of Summons without the consent of the opposing parties or the court.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff commenced this wrongful death and survival action against her sister alleging negligent conduct which allegedly caused their mother’s death on July 28, 2013.  

The initial Writ of Summons and the three (3) ensuing reissued Writs of Summons identified the mother’s estate as the named Plaintiff.   Without securing the Defendant’s consent or seeking leave of court, the Plaintiff changed the identity of the named Plaintiff sua sponte on the fourth reissued Writ by substituting himself individually for his mother’s estate.

The Defendant-sister filed Preliminary Objections asserting that a party cannot substitute a different party as the Plaintiff under Pa. R.C.P. 1033 without first obtaining the consent of all parties or leave of court.   The Plaintiff’s sister sought to strike the amended Writ of Summons that was served upon her as well as the Complaint that was subsequently filed.

In reply, the Plaintiff contended that the acceptance and filing of the amended Writ of Summons by the Lackawanna County Clerk of Judicial Records constituted approval by the court under Rule 1033.   The Plaintiff also asserted that the Complaint could substitute a new Plaintiff without the Defendant’s consent or leave of court since the two (2) year statute of limitation period had not yet expired due to the operation of the “discovery rule” which allegedly extended that limitation.  

Judge Terrence R. Nealon
Lackawanna County
Judge Nealon rejected the Plaintiff’s contention and sustained the Defendant’s Preliminary Objections.   In so ruling, the court noted that the Clerk of Judicial Records serves a purely ministerial, administrative role with respect to civil filings and lack the authority to evaluate the merits of a litigant’s pleadings or to decline to accept and process a party’s filing.   Since the Clerk of Judicial Records did not possess or exercise any judicial powers, the court found that the Clerk did not have any authority under any statute or rule of court to grant leave of court to amend the pleadings under Rule 1033 in order to substitute a different named Plaintiff.  

Judge Nealon also ruled that, inasmuch as the two (2) year statute of limitations applicable to wrongful death and survival actions under 42 Pa. C.S.A. §5524(2) may not be extended by the discovery rule, the Plaintiff’s Complaint was filed after the two (2) year statute of limitations had expired such that the Plaintiff was not at liberty to substitute a new party in that pleading absent the consent of all parties or leave of court.  


Accordingly, the court ruled that the amended Writ of Summons and the Complaint filed in this case were both nullities for substituting a different party and, therefore, the Defendant’s Preliminary Objections seeking to strike those pleadings was sustained.  

Anyone wishing to read this Opinion by Judge Nealon may click this LINK.

UPDATE:  Judge Nealon's decision was affirmed by the Pennsylvania Superior Court on February 3, 2018 in a Non-Precedential Decision that can be viewed HERE.

Thursday, December 29, 2016

Superior Court Upholds Waiver Form in Wrongful Death/Survival Action Claim



In its recent decision in the case of Valentino v. Philadelphia Triathlon, LLC, No. 3049 EDA 2013 (Pa. Super. Nov. 15, 2016)(en banc) (Op. by Olson, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court ruled that summary judgment was properly entered against a wrongful death claim based upon the decedent’s execution of a liability waiver.  

This matter arose out an incident during which the Plaintiff’s decedent participated in a triathlon in Philadelphia.  The decedent signed a waiver form when he signed up to participate in the event.  

During the event, the decedent never completed the swimming portion of the competition and his body was recovered from the Schuylkill River on the day after the incident.  

The decedent’s widow pursued wrongful death and survival claims.  

The trial court initially sustained Defendant’s Preliminary Objections, ruling that the Plaintiff had failed to plead reckless or intentional conduct by the Defendant.  

The trial court later granted summary judgment on the remaining claims, finding them to be barred by the liability waiver executed by the decedent.   On appeal, the Plaintiff challenged all of the trial court’s decisions.  

The Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s rulings in sustaining the Defendant’s Preliminary Objections to the Plaintiff’s claims of punitive damages.   The court noted that punitive damages are only proper for a Defendant who had a subjective appreciation of the risk of harm to the Plaintiff and acted, or failed to act, in conscious disregard of that risk.

Here, the court found that the Plaintiff’s Complaint merely alleged inadvertence, mistake, or error in planning and supervising the triathlon course.  

With respect to the trial court’s entry of summary judgment, the Superior Court found no genuine issues of material fact with regards to the decedent’s execution of the Waiver Agreement.   The court also rejected the Plaintiff’s contention that the Defendant’s alleged reckless or intentional conduct defeated the decedent’s waiver of liability.  In this regard, the Superior Court noted that the trial court had previously ruled that the Plaintiff had failed to assert viable reckless or intentional conduct claims.  

The Superior Court also rejected the Plaintiff’s argument that the decedent’s waiver did not waive the decedent’s separate wrongful death claim.   The court ruled that wrongful death claims, while belonging solely to a decedent’s heir, are still derived from the same conduct that caused the decedent’s death.  Accordingly, the liability waiver was found to also extend to the wrongful death claim because such action requires tortuous conduct and was therefore subject to the same substantive defenses, such as the decedent’s execution of a liability waiver as to the decedent’s own tort claim.  


Anyone wishing to review a copy of the Majority's decision may click this LINK.
 
Judge Kate Ford Elliott's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion can be viewed HERE.
 
 
For another Superior decisions previously entered in this same case, click this LINK.
 
To view other Tort Talk posts on cases involving Waiver of Liability Forms, click HERE
 

 

Source:  “Digest of Recent Opinions.”  Pennsylvania Law Weekly (December 6, 2016)


 

Wednesday, May 11, 2016

Judge Williamson of Monroe County Keeps Nursing Home Personal Injury Case in Court in Light of 'Unconsionable' Arbitration Clause



In the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas case of Santiago v. Whitestone Health Care Group, LLC, No. 5281 Civil 2015 (C.P. Monroe Co. Williamson, J.), Judge David J. Williamson of the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas addressed various issues surrounding an arbitration agreement in a lawsuit between a decedent’s family and a nursing home facility.  

The central issue before the court is whether the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the matter due to an arbitration agreement entered into by the parties when the decedent moved into the nursing home.  The court denied the Defendant’s Preliminary Objections and rejected the argument that the trial court lacked jurisdiction.  

Judge David J. Williamson
Monroe County
In so ruling, Judge Williamson noted that arbitration clauses in contracts are not applicable to wrongful death actions. 

As such, the court found that the Defendants failed to show that either the patient/decedent signed the arbitration agreement or that an agency relationship existed between the patient/decedent and the person who signed the arbitration agreement, who was the decedent’s daughter.  

Judge Williamson stated that there can be no “knowing waiver” of a right to a jury trial by a patient who is unable to review and sign such a document such as the decedent herein who presumably was not competent to sign the document.  

Rather, for an agent to sign and bind the patient, the agent must have the authority to do so by righting or by acts or by conduct clearly implying an agency relationship.  Finding that the Defendant’s failed to present any such evidence that the daughter was authorized to bind her mother to the arbitration agreement and the resulting waiving of a right to a jury trial, the court found that the Defendants failed to meet their burden of proof on the issue of an agency relationship.  

Judge Williamson reiterated that the arbitration agreement cannot apply to the wrongful death claim and also ruled that the survival claim should not be severed.  

The court therefore found that the Defendants were barred from enforcing the arbitration agreement given that the matter before the court involved both wrongful death and survival claims.   See Op. at 3-4 citing Taylor v. Extendicare Health Facilities, Inc., 1313 A.3d 317 (Pa. Super. 2015), allocator granted, 122 A.3d 1036 (Pa. 2015).  

Judge Williamson reasoned that the Pennsylvania courts have ruled that a wrongful death action, under Pennsylvania statutory law, is a matter in which the trial court maintains jurisdiction even in the face of a valid binding arbitration agreement because a wrongful death claim accrues after the decedent’s death with beneficiaries who are not a party to arbitration agreement.   Here, Judge Williamson stated that even if the Defendants argue that the decedent’s daughter is a beneficiary who signed the arbitration agreement, the daughter was not a party to the arbitration agreement as she allegedly signed on behalf of the patient/decedent.  

Judge Williamson also noted that Pennsylvania cases have upheld a finding that a survival action should not be severed from a wrongful death action for purposes of arbitrating the survival action alone.   Accordingly, the court found that the arbitration agreement had no binding effect in this case on either the wrongful death or the survival action.

Lastly, the court found that the arbitration agreement before it was unconscionable in that it was unreasonably favorable to the drafter of the agreement.  

For these reasons, the court overruled the Defendant’s Preliminary Objections and allowed the case to remain within the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas as opposed to arbitration.  

 

Anyone desiring a copy of this decision may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.  I send thanks to Attorney David A. Miller, Esquire of the Frackville, Pennsylvania office of Michael J. O’Connor and Associates, LLC for bringing this case to my attention.  
 
 
 

Friday, January 29, 2016

Impact of Waivers Executed By Decedent in Wrongful Death Claims Revisited by Superior Court

In its recent decision in the case of Valentino v. Philadelphia Triathlon, LLC, No. 3049 EDA 2013 (Pa. Super. Dec. 30, 2015 Ford Elliot, P.J.E., Olson, and Wecht, JJ.) (Opinion by Ford Elliot, P.J.E.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court addressed issues surrounding waiver or release forms as applied to wrongful death claims.  

This matter arose out an incident during which the Plaintiff’s decedent participated in a triathlon in Philadelphia.  The decedent signed a waiver form when he signed up to participate in the event.

During the event, the decedent never completed the swimming portion of the competition and his body was recovered from the Schuylkill River the day after the incident.  

Wrongful death and survival claims were pursued by the decedent’s widow.   The case was eventually concluded at the trial court level by way of the entry of a summary judgment based upon the waiver executed by the decedent. The Plaintiff’s estate appealed.  

On appeal, the Superior Court reviewed Pennsylvania law with respect to punitive damages claims and found that the trial court properly dismissed such claims at the Preliminary Objections stage given that the Plaintiff had alleged facts supporting claims for ordinary negligence.   Given that there were no facts to support a claim of outrageous behavior or conscious disregard for the risks confronted by triathlon participants, the appellate court ruled that the trial court properly dismissed the Plaintiff’s allegations of outrageous conduct and, therefore, had also properly struck the claim for punitive damages.  

On the waiver/release issue, upon which the trial court had granted summary judgment, it was noted that only the Plaintiff’s decedent had signed a release or waiver form when entering the competition.  

On appeal, the Plaintiffs initially argued, in part, that a Plaintiff cannot contractually waive liability for reckless or intentional conduct and that, as a result, any waiver executed in this case was invalid.  

The Pennsylvania Superior Court noted that, since it had already determined in this matter that the Plaintiff did not state valid claims involving reckless or intentional conduct, the Plaintiff’s contention in this regard could not serve to disturb the trial court’s ruling.  

The Plaintiff also asserted that, pursuant to the prior appellate court decision in the case of Pisano v. Extendicare Homes, Inc., 77 A.3d 651 (Pa. Super. 2013), appeal denied, 86 A.3d 233 (Pa. Super. 2014), cert. denied, 134 S.Ct. 2890 (2014), a decedent’s waiver is ineffective as to third-party wrongful death claims. 

The appellate court found that the Plaintiff’s argument regarding the Pisano case to be dispositive.  The court determined that the Plaintiff’s widow could maintain a wrongful death cause of action and is not bound by the decedent’s release given that the Plaintiff pursuing the case was not a signatory of that waiver form.  

Similar to the finding in the Pisano case, the court ruled that a waiver form was not binding on the representative of the decedent’s estate as wrongful death claims are not considered to be derivative of the decedent’s rights under Pennsylvania law.   Rather, the right of action belongs to the statutory wrongful death claim claimants, not the decedent.

In the court in this Valentino case went on to note, as explained in the Pisano decision, that, in Pennsylvania, survival and wrongful death actions are separate and distinct and that wrongful death lawsuits are not merely derivative of the rights of the decedent.  

Accordingly, following the Pisano case, the Valentino court concluded that the decedent’s release agreement/waiver form signed when entering the competition did not bind the Plaintiff’s widow/representative of his estate and did not preclude her from bringing a wrongful death action.  

Rather, as confirmed by Pisano, the wrongful death action is an independent cause of action, created by statute, and is not to be considered to be derivative of the decedent’s rights at the time of death.   The release agreement/waiver form was noted to only be between the decedent and the competition and was found to have no effect on the decedent’s non-signatory heirs, including the Plaintiff’s decedent’s widow, who brought this lawsuit.  

As such, the underlying claim was allowed to proceed.
 
Anyone wishes to review the majority Opinion of Superior Court Judges Ford Elliot and Wecht, may click this LINK.

The dissenting Opinion of Judge Olson can be viewed HERE. 

 I send thanks to Attorney James Beck of the Philadelphia office of Reed Smith for bringing this case to my attention.