Showing posts with label Arbitration. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Arbitration. Show all posts

Sunday, October 25, 2026

It's Gotta Be The Lawsuit: Motion To Compel Arbitration Filed by Defendant Denied After Defendant Participated Extensively in Litigation Process


In the case of Mansur v. Wendy’s, No. 240302951 (C.P. Phila. Co. July 28, 2026 Cohen, J.), the trial court issued a Rule 1925 Opinion outlining the reasons why its Order denying the Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration should be affirmed by the Superior Court.

According to the Opinion, this wrongful death and survival action arose out of the fatal assault of the Plaintiff while working at a Wendy’s Restaurant. The assailant was a former co-employee.

After the Plaintiff’s estate filed suit, the Defendants participated extensively in the pleadings and in discovery efforts. Thereafter, sixteen (16) months into the litigation, the Defendants filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration.

After reviewing the record before it, the trial court denied the Motion, holding that the Defendant had waived its right to Arbitration by actively participating in the litigation proceedings. In this Rule 1925 Opinion, the trial court was requesting the Superior Court to affirm that decision.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Weekly Case Alert, www.Law.com (Oct. 8, 2026).

Thursday, October 22, 2026

Court Finds That Arbitration Clause Found on App Inconspicuous and, Therefore, Unenforceable


In the case of Oakley v. FloatMe Corp., No. 1318 WDA 2025 (Pa. Super. Oct. 1, 2026 King, J., Lane, J., and Panella, P.J.E.) (Op. by King, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed a trial court’s rejection of a Defendant’s efforts to compel arbitration of this civil litigation matter.

According to the Opinion, FloatMe is a Texas-based technology company that makes loans or cash advances to Pennsylvania consumers over the internet.

This matter arose out of a Class Action matter. After suit was filed, the Defendant filed Preliminary Objections in the nature of a Motion to Compel Arbitration.

FloatMe asserted that the Plaintiffs were required to sign up via FloatMe’s App before she could obtain a cash advance. FloatMe asserted that the App prompts the user to answer several questions and request certain information. One of the prompts on the App provides that , by continuing with the application process, the applicant agrees to FloatMe’s terms of service and privacy policy.

FloatMe further maintained that the terms of service button is clickable and directs the user to an online format of the terms and condition. The company further asserted that, if a user clicks the phrase terms and conditions, those terms and conditions allegedly clearly indicate that the agreement contains an Arbitration provision and a Class Action waiver.

The Plaintiff asserted that the App’s lengthy sign up process included “at least 16 screens” for a consumer to navigate before they may obtain a case advance. The Plaintiff noted that, at no point in that process did FloatMe mention Arbitration or the waiver of any constitutional rights, such as the right to a jury trial.

The Plaintiffs asserted that this type of a sign up process is not sufficient to bind users to Arbitration or the waiver of any constitutional rights such as the right to a jury trial. 

The Pennsylvania Superior Court agreed and held that the FloatMe App did not conspicuously inform the Plaintiff of her rights.  Rather, the court found that the application process on the App allowed users to complete their registration without being fully informed of the rights that the applicant is waiving.

As such, the Superior Court held that there was no mutual assent and no valid agreement entered into with respect to Arbitration.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Pa. Super. Blog written by Jon Bruno of Bruno Litigation, LLC in Pittsburgh, PA.


Source of image:  Photo by Brett Jordan on www.unsplash.com.

Monday, August 17, 2026

Superior Court Finds That Defendant Waived Right to Arbitration by Participating in the Litigation Process


In the case of Estate of Smalling v. 2990 Holme Operating, LLC, No. 2172 EDA 2025 (Pa. Super. June 30, 2026 Lazarus, P.J., Sullivan, J., and Stevens, P.J.E.) (Op. by Stevens, P.J.E.), the court affirmed a trial court Order finding that the Defendants had waived the contractual right to compel Arbitration in a wrongful death and survival action by failing to raise a request for Arbitration promptly.

The court also noted that the Defendants had substantially invoked the judicial process by way of participating in the litigation of a lawsuit, including through Preliminary Objections, other pleadings, participating in discovery and also participated in other case management activities before the Defendants sought Arbitration fourteen (14) months into the lawsuit.

As such, the Defendants were found to have waived their contractual right to arbitration.   

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert, www.Law.com (July 24, 2026).

Source of above image:  Photo by Felix Mittermeier on www. unsplash.com.




Tuesday, March 17, 2026

Superior Court Upholds Right to Jury Trial and Rejects Arbitration Clause Relative to Contract Plaintiff Entered Into on Defendant's Website


In the case of Duffy v. Tatum, No. 483 EDA 2025 (Pa. Super. March 3, 2026 Lazarus, P.J., Panella, P.J.E., and Sullivan, J.) (Op. by Panella, P.J.E.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed a trial court’s Order overruling a Defendant’s Preliminary Objections under which the Defendant asserted that a Plaintiff had waived the right to a jury trial by way of an agreement entered into via the Defendant's website.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff had proceeded to the Defendant’s website to book services provided by the Defendant moving company.

On that website, the customer was required to check off a box accepting the Defendant’s terms of services. The customer had the ability to click on an underlined phrase that would take the customer to the Defendant’s Terms of Service by way of a hyperlink. 

On that hyperlink, if the customer accessed it, one of the provisions that would be seen in the language on that page would be an ADR clause for the resolution of any disputes that arose between the parties by way of mediation followed by an arbitration, as opposed to by way of an opportunity for a jury trial in a court of law.

In this matter, the trial court found that the Defendant’s website did not provide a reasonably obvious notice of its Terms of Service to the Defendant’s customers prior to the customer’s purchasing the services offered by the company.  As such, the trial court ruled that the customer had never agreed to waive his constitutional right to a jury trial. As noted, on appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s decision in this regard.

The Superior Court framed the central issue before it as involving “an overarching question of whether a person should be deprived of their constitutional right to a jury trial when they ostensibly enter into an arbitration agreement through hyperlinked Terms of Service on a website that the person never clicked on, viewed, or read.” See Op. at p. 6.

In so ruling, the Pennsylvania Superior Court referred to its prior decisions on this issue in which the court had held that the Pennsylvania State Constitution provides its citizens with the greater protections afforded by the right to a jury trial.

The Superior Court otherwise noted that the “copious use of contracts with restrictive arbitration agreements causes concern, particularly in the context of internet contracts like the one at issue here, where the parties are frequently of unequal bargaining power and one party may be unaware of the significant rights they are waiving simply by using a website to make a purchase or retain services.” See Op. at p. 8.

President Judge Emeritus Panella noted in his Opinion that, in recognition of this reality, Pennsylvania courts have taken a small step towards righting the wrongs of arbitration agreements with respect to wrongful death actions involving negligent nursing center facilities. The court otherwise noted that there is still a need for greater scrutiny regarding a person’s waiver of their constitutional right to a jury trial when it comes to these types of arbitration agreements in other scenarios as well. 

Judge Panella stated that “[t]his need is imperative when there is no genuine effort to inform a purchaser of the terms of the contract before they click on a link or box that purports to generate their agreement to a contract, as the case” was in this matter. See Op. at p. 9.

The court went on to note that it found that it is imperative that, in the context of civil litigation matters, that a person be fully informed of their constitutional right to a jury trial and of the effect of waiving that right. Accordingly, the court held that it is essential that any waiver of the right to a jury trial must be clearly described and evidenced such that the person waiving the right fully understands the right that they are giving up by agreeing to enter into the contract.

In light of its holding that the constitutional right to a jury trial in Pennsylvania should be afforded the greatest protection possibly by the courts of Pennsylvania, the court in this Duffy case enunciated a “strict burden of proof [that its] necessary to demonstrate a person’s unambiguous manifestation of assent to arbitration.” See Op. at p. 15.

More specifically, the court noted that this strict burden of proof necessary to demonstrate a person unambiguous assent to arbitration requires (1) an explicit statement on the registration website and application screens that a consumer is waiving their right to a jury trial when then the person agrees to the seller’s Terms of Service and the registration cannot be completed until the person is fully informed of that waiver, and (2) when the agreements are available for viewing after a user has clicked on a hyperlink, the waiver should be not hidden in the middle of the document, but rather, should appear prominently in bold, capitalized text. See Op. at p. 15.

The court additionally noted that the word “arbitration” must also be clearly defined within the arbitration agreement in addition to being prominently displayed in the language of the contract. See Op. at p. 16.

In the end, in this case, where the customer here never clicked on the Terms of Service and, therefore, never saw the Terms of Service, the court ruled the customer did not unambiguously assent or agree to give up his or her rights to a jury trial in favor of arbitration. 

The Superior Court also ruled that, where the website did not provide a reasonably obvious notice of its Terms of Service, there was no meeting of the minds on a contractual basis relative to the issue of arbitration for the resolution of any disputes. 

As such, the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the lower court's decision and found that the trial court did not err in overruling the Defendant company’s Preliminary Objections on the issues presented.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: Article – “Pa. Superior Court Rules Company’s Terms Didn’t Waive Customer’s Right to Jury Trial” By Tristin Hoffman of The Legal Intelligencer (March 6, 2026).


I also send thanks to Attorney Thomas F. Foley, III of the Foley Law Firm in Scranton, Pennsylvania for making sure that I saw this decision as well.

Source of image:  Photo by Vojtech Okenka on www.pexels.com.

Monday, February 2, 2026

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Finds It Cannot Reach Question of Validity of Uber's Arbitration Clause


In the case of Chilutti v. Uber, No. 58 EAP 2024 (Pa. Jan. 21, 2026) (Op by Brobson, J.), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed a request by Uber to refer a personal injury civil litigation matter to arbitration.

According to the Opinion, a woman who uses a wheelchair sued Uber Technologies, Inc. and others after an incident in which an Uber driver failed to provide her with a seat belt while transporting her in a wheelchair-accessible vehicle, causing her to fall and sustain injuries.

The Plaintiff filed a negligence cause of action in court. Uber responded by filing a Petition to Compel Arbitration, arguing that the Plaintiffs had agreed to arbitrate their claims when they enrolled in Uber’s service.

At the trial court level, the trial court granted Uber’s Petition and ordered the parties to proceed to Arbitration.

At the Superior Court level, the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed and held that there was valid agreement to arbitrate and remanded for further proceedings.

In this decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme court first reviewed whether an Order compelling Arbitration and staying trial proceedings is an immediately appealable collateral Order. The Supreme Court held that such an Order does not meet the requirements for a collateral Order because the issue can be reviewed after the entry of a final judgment and, as such, did not result in irreparable loss if the judicial review is postponed. 

Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the Superior Court’s decision and remanded the case back to the trial court with instructions on how to proceed.

In light of this decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not address the issue of the validity of the Uber Arbitration Agreement or the merits of whether Arbitration could be compelled in cases involving Uber.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: Justia Daily Opinion Summaries, www.justia.com (Jan. 22, 2026).4


Source of image:  Photo by Tingey on www.unsplash.com.

Tuesday, January 6, 2026

Court Rejects Allegations of Fraud Relative to Opposing Counsel Allegedly Meeting Ex Parte With Arbitrator During Lunch Break

In the case of Shannon v. Weis Markets, Inc., No. 1604 MDA 2024 (Pa. Super. Sept. 16, 2025 Panella, P.J.E., Lane, J., and Stevens, P.J.E.) (Op. by Lane, J.), the Superior Court affirmed a trial court’s Order denying a Plaintiff’s Petition to vacate or set aside an Arbitration Award in favor of the Defendant under 42 Pa. C.S.A §7341.

According to the Opinion, this negligence action arose out of a slip and fall in a supermarket. 

After the completion of discovery, the parties agreed to submit the matter to binding Arbitration pursuant to a binding high/low Arbitration pursuant to a written agreement. 

After the Arbitration was completed, the arbitrator determined that the store was not negligent. Consistent with the high/low agreement, the arbitrator entered an award in favor of the Plaintiff in the amount of $75,000.00, which was the low parameter of the high/low agreement. 

Thereafter, the Plaintiff filed a Petition to Vacate or Set Aside the Arbitration Award. The Plaintiff asserted that the arbitrator, Weis’s counsel and a Weis’s corporate representative met privately during a lunch break without the Plaintiff or her counsel present, thereby creating an appearance of “fraud, misconduct, corruption, or other irregularity” resulting in an outcome that was “unjust, inequitable, or unconscionable.”

The trial court denied the Petition and, with this decision, the Superior Court affirmed the denial.

In its Opinion, the Superior Court reaffirmed high burden set by the scope of review relative to an arbitration award.   

In addition to confirming that the Plaintiff never made an inquiry about the alleged meeting and never produced facts to suggest that the arbitrator’s award was influenced by the alleged meeting, the Superior Court held that the mere appearance of impropriety arising from an alleged ex parte contact between an arbitrator and one party’s counsel’s representative, without clear, precise, and indubitable evidence of misconduct or resulting prejudice, is insufficient to support the vacation of a common law Arbitration Award under §7341.

The court additionally noted that the award itself was not inequitable since the Plaintiff received $75,000.00 under the high/low agreement even though the arbitrator found that the store was not negligent.

The Superior Court otherwise found that the Plaintiff had waived the argument that the trial court had abused its discretion by not developing a factual record before entering its decision denying the Petition to Vacate. The appellate court noted that the trial court’s local rules allowed the trial court the discretion to determine whether to issue a Rule to Show Cause based upon the sufficiency of the allegations. The appellate court noted that, since the Plaintiff’s allegations were insufficient, the record did not need further development for a proper decision.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert, www.Law.com (Sept. 30, 2025).


Source of image:  Photo by Rebrand Cities on www.pexels.com.

Tuesday, December 16, 2025

ARTICLE: Out With the Old, In With the New: A Civil Litigation Year-End Review

The below article of mine appeared in the December 11, 2025 edition of the Pennsylvania Law Weekly and is republished here with permission.


Expert Opinion // Civil Procedure

Out With the Old, In With the New: 
A Civil Litigation Year-End Review

By

Daniel E. Cummins

December 11, 2025

Over the past year, there was a steady flow of notable decisions handed down by the various state and federal courts across the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania as another year of civil litigation jurisprudence goes down in the books. Those decisions are reviewed below.

Overall, some old rules have been ousted as no longer viable, and some new rules have been enunciated to guide civil litigation practice going forward.

Readers may secure more details on the decisions summarized below, as well as a copy of the actual court decisions referenced, by going to the Tort Talk Blog and typing the name of the plaintiff into the search box in the upper right-hand corner of the blog.

Good Cause for IME

In a decision that was handed down near the end of the previous year in the case of Verba v. Erie Insurance Exchange, 326 A.3d 973 (Pa. Super. 2024 ), the Pennsylvania Superior Court addressed the standard for determining whether good cause exists to compel the Plaintiff to cooperate with a request for a medical examination under Pa.R.C.P. 4010.

The court noted that the requirement of good cause set forth in Rule 4010 is designed to protect parties against an unwarranted invasion of their privacy and to preclude the use of such a medical examination for improper purposes. Simply put, the court in Verba held that good cause can exist in a pending litigation if there is a controversy, or a dispute between the parties, regarding the validity of the plaintiff’s injury claims.

Allegations of Recklessness

The year 2025 began as 2024 ended—with state trial court judges looking past the fact that Pennsylvania is a fact-pleading state and allowing plaintiffs to plead recklessness and punitive damages claims in complaints with reckless abandon in all personal injury matters regardless of the facts involved. This trend continued throughout this year with trial court judges relying upon the errant Pennsylvania Superior Court decision in the case of Monroe v. CB H20, 286 A.3d 785 (Pa. Super. 2022) (en banc).

While the state trial court judges from all around the commonwealth continued to routinely allow claims of recklessness in every case, at least one federal district court judge said not so fast. In McKinney v. GM, No. 1:24-CV-00140-SPB (W.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2025), Judge Susan Paradise Baxter of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania granted a partial motion to dismiss claims of punitive damages after finding that the plaintiff failed to plead sufficient facts to support a punitive damages claim.

The court noted that allegations of recklessness that could support a punitive damages claim must involve more than claims of ordinary negligence. In McKinney, the court found that the products liability complaint contained no factual allegations identifying the nature of the alleged defect, how the defendant allegedly became aware of it, or what actions the defendant failed to take in conscious disregard of that risk.

Baxter, applying Pennsylvania law, emphasized that punitive damages are to be considered an extreme remedy that are not available for conduct arising from mere inadvertence, mistake or errors in judgment. The court found that the complaint in the McKinney case failed to contain any factual allegations that even suggested that the defendant acted with an evil motive or in conscious disregard of a known risk.

Attorney Discipline

The first notable decision handed down by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court over this past year was handed down in February. In the case of Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Anonymous Attorney, [docket no. withheld by court] (Pa. Feb. 12, 2025), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court clarified the standard of proof for a disciplinary hearing involving allegations of attorney misconduct. The court opted for a higher burden.

According to the opinion, prior to this ruling, the previously accepted standard of proof for disciplinary cases against attorneys was “a preponderance of the evidence through clear and satisfactory evidence.” In this case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the burden of proof of disciplinary cases going forward should be “clear and convincing evidence.”

In ruling in this fashion, the court noted that “attorney disciplinary proceedings are not civil disputes for money damages, and the public’s and the attorney’s interests are not clearly minimal.” The court otherwise noted that “disciplinary proceedings are not strictly civil nor criminal in nature, but rather have been styled as ‘quasi criminal.’” For these reasons, the court chose to go with a higher burden of proof.

New Jury Selection Rule Goes Into Effect

In April, the new Pa.R.C.P 220.3 went into effect on April 1 requiring trial court judges to be present in the courtroom for jury selections in civil cases unless the litigants opt out of the requirement. This rule was set to take effect on April 1, 2025, and can be found under Pa. R.C.P. 220.3.

Avenues of Recovery in Worker’s Compensation Cases Expanded

In May of this year, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court overturned decades of precedent with its decision in the case of Steets v. Celebration Fireworks, (Workers' Compensation Appeals Board), 335 A.3d 1076 (Pa. May 30, 2025), in order to allow a new line of worker’s compensation claims to go forward.

In this decision, the Supreme Court created new law and cleared the way for the estates of those individuals who died as a result of work-related injuries to collect benefits related to claims for disfigurement and injury. The court overturned long-standing case law regarding whether specific loss benefits are payable after an employee’s death from causes related to the work injury.

Archaic Local Rule Overruled

In another decision of note from May of this year, the Superior Court struck down a trial court’s local rule.

In the case of Scheibe v. Woodloch Resort, No. 1478 EDA 2024 (Pa. Super. May 20, 2025), the archaic local rule at issue from the Pike County Common Pleas Court required original signatures on all filings with the court, which did not allow for electronic signatures.

In Scheibe, the Pennsylvania Superior Court noted that the trial court had improperly refused to docket paperwork relative to the initial filing of the lawsuit. The prothonotary had rejected the filing because the documents contained only an electronic signature in violation of the local rules that required original signatures.

The appellate court first confirmed that there was no requirement in the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure for any filing to be hand-signed by a party or their attorney. Rather, the statewide Rules of Civil Procedure contemplated that a “signature” could include a computer-generated signature.

The Superior Court additionally held that, under the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, documents mailed to the prothonotary’s office were deemed to be filed when received by that office as a litigant would have no control over when that office would stamp and process the filing. The Superior Court also confirmed that the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure expressly prohibited the rejection of a filing that complied with the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure where that filing did not meet the requirements of a local rule.

For all of these reasons, the Superior Court agreed that the complaint was timely filed. In the process, the appellate court struck down the archaic local rule of court.

New Cellphone Law

While texting while driving has been banned in Pennsylvania since 2012, in June of this year, a new law went into effect that banned any and all cellphone use while driving on the roads of Pennsylvania. Under certain exceptions noted in the law, a driver may use a cellphone for emergency purposes. A driver may also use a mobile device if they pull off to the side of the road and stop where a vehicle may safely remain in a stopped position.

The law, known as “Paul Miller’s Law,” went into effect on June 5, 2025, and made it illegal to use a cellphone in your hands in any way while driving. The law even prohibits these activities even when one is stopped at a red light or in a traffic jam. Under the language of the law, it appears that an overhead bluetooth system can be used to make calls as long as one uses the buttons on the steering wheel and the dash and not by way of pushing buttons on the cellphone.

For the next year through June 2026, the penalty for a violation will be a written warning. Starting June 5, 2026, the penalty will be a summary offense with a $50 fine, plus court costs and other fees. Moreover, if a driver is convicted of both vehicular homicide and driving while distracted, they may be sentenced up to an additional five years in prison.

Gist of the Action Doctrine

In July, the Pennsylvania Superior Court addressed the viability of the gist of the action doctrine. Under this doctrine, a negligence claim cannot be recast in a complaint as a breach of contract claim and vice versa.

In the case of Swatt v. Nottingham Village, 2025 Pa. Super. 138 (Pa. Super. July 2, 2025) (en banc) (Op. by Kunselman, J.), an en banc panel of the Pennsylvania Superior Court addressed the issue of whether the gist of the action doctrine should continue to be applied to contract actions as it has been for the past 26 years.

This case arose out of a nursing home malpractice claim. The plaintiff filed claims for both malpractice and breach of contract.

Despite a number of prior cases confirming that the gist of the action doctrine does apply as a defense where a breach of contract claim is added to a negligence claim, this en banc panel of the Superior Court concluded, after completing an exhaustive review of the case law allowing for alternative pleadings, that the gist of the action doctrine should no longer apply to prevent the pleading of an alternative breach of contact claim in a negligence action. Rather, the court noted that, under any set of facts, plaintiff could make claims for both negligence and breach of contact in the alternative wherever warranted.

This ruling eradicating this defense could prove important in those cases where a plaintiff’s negligence claim is potentially barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations, but where the plaintiff attempts to keep the lawsuit alive by pleading, in the alternative, a breach of contract claim which has a four-year statute of limitations claim.

Another Archaic Local Rule Overruled

In August, the Superior Court struck down another archaic local rule in its decision in the case of Biros v. U Lock, No. 113 WDA 2024 (Pa. Super. Aug. 1, 2025).

In Biros, the Superior Court vacated a trial court order out of the Westmoreland County Common Pleas Court of in which the trial court had denied, with prejudice, an appellant’s motion to file her Pa. R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal, nunc pro tunc.

The Superior Court noted that, Pa. R.C.P. 205.4(e)(2) bars any refusal by a trial court of an otherwise compliant pleading for filing based upon a requirement of a local rule pertaining to the electronic filing of legal papers. The appellate court found that Westmoreland County’s archaic requirement that notices of appeal could only be filed in person or by mail was such a local rule. Accordingly, the appellate court ruled that the appellant’s initial filing was properly and timely filed and was sufficient to initiate the appeal.

Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens Clarified

In September of this year, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court provided clarity on the test to be applied in reviewing a petition to transfer venue under the doctrine of forum non conveniens in the case of Tranter v. Z & D Tour, No. 32 EAP 2024 (Pa. Sept. 25, 2025) (Op. by Wecht, J.).

This matter arose out of a multi-vehicle collision that occurred in Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania involving a passenger bus and commercial vehicles. The crash resulted in five deaths and numerous injuries. The plaintiffs who resided in various locations across the country and abroad, filed personal injury lawsuits in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas against several corporate defendants, all of which conducted business nationwide. The defendants sought to transfer the cases to Westmoreland County under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.

The Supreme Court held that the Superior Court’s imposition of a “key witness” requirement in the analysis was inconsistent with Pennsylvania precedent on the issue of the type of evidence required to secure a transfer of a matter under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.

The Supreme Court otherwise clarified that a party seeking a transfer of a matter under the doctrine of forum non conveniens must identify the burdened witnesses and provide a general statement of their respective testimony. The Supreme Court confirmed that the petitioner need not show that the testimony of the witnesses is “critical” or “necessary” to the defense. As such, the Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s decision to transfer the cases out of Philadelphia County and to Westmoreland County as a proper exercise of the trial court’s discretion.

Arbitration Clauses and Children

On the same day in September that it issued its decision in the Tranter case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a parent who signs an arbitration agreement cannot bind a nonsigning spouse or a minor child to the terms of that agreement.

The case of Shultz v. Skyzone, No. 25 EAP 2023 (Pa. Sept. 25, 2025) (Op. by Donohue, J.), involved the claims brought on behalf of several minors who were injured at trampoline parks operated by Skyzone in Philadelphia. In each instance, only one parent had signed a “participation agreement, release, and assumption of the risk” on behalf of their child. That agreement contained an arbitration provision waiving the right to sue in court.

After the lawsuits for personal injuries were filed, the defendant filed petitions to compel arbitration, relying upon the signed agreements. The issue was litigated all the way up to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court held that parents lacked the authority to bind a minor to an agreement to arbitrate, as this would deprive the minor of judicial protections and oversight designed to safeguard their interests. As noted above, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court also held that a parent who signs an arbitration agreement cannot bind a nonsigning parent, or minor child, to its terms.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court handed down the same decision on the same date in the consolidated case of Santiago v. Philly Trampoline Park, No. 24 EAP 2023 (Pa. Sept. 25, 2025) (Op. by Donohue, J.).

Statutory Employer Doctrine Upheld

In October, in the case of Yoder v. McCarty Construction, 43 MAP (Pa. Oct. 23, 2025), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reaffirmed the validity of the statutory employer doctrine under the Worker’s Compensation Act and rejected arguments from the plaintiff seeking to abolish this doctrine.

According to the opinion, the plaintiff suffered a workplace injury. The plaintiff was an employee of a subcontractor. The general contractor asserted the defense of statutory employer immunity in the personal injury action arising out of the accident.

The Supreme Court began its decision by reaffirming the law behind the statutory employer doctrine that has been in effect in Pennsylvania since 1930 as enunciated in the case of McDonald v. Levinson Steel, 153 A. 424, 426 (Pa. 1930).

That long-standing law provides that, under Section 203 of the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act), 77 P.S. Section 462, a general contractor that hires a subcontractor to perform work on a jobsite is deemed to be an “employer” of employees of the subcontractor in certain circumstances. In those instances where the subcontractor does not make payment, the general contractor will be considered liable for the worker’s compensation payments. In exchange for this imposition of secondary liability on the general contractor, the act’s statutory employer provision in Section 203 of the act, 77 P.S. Section 52, extends to a general contractor the same tort immunity afforded to the subcontractor of the injured worker in any third-party lawsuit arising out of the same accident.

As noted, at the Supreme Court level in this Yoder case, the court rejected arguments by the plaintiff that the statutory employer doctrine should be rejected or that such immunity should be deemed to be waivable in certain circumstances.

Artificial Intelligence

In the year 2025, courts and litigators found a steady rise in the use of artificial intelligence (AI) in many aspects of the law. AI platforms have begun to be used to assist in the evaluation of cases and also with respect to legal research and brief writing.

Near the end of this year, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued an interim policy to guide judges and court personnel who desired to use AI in their day-to-day work.

This policy allows for judges and court personnel to utilize AI for summarizing documents, conducting preliminary legal research, and drafting initial versions of documents. These rules, which are compiled under a document entitled the “Interim Policy On The Use Of Generative Artificial Intelligence By Judicial Officers And Court Personnel" was set to go into effect on Dec. 8, 2025.

It is anticipated that, in the near future, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court may also come out with rules to guide attorneys on the proper use of AI in the practice of law relative to any filings with the courts.

In the Pennsylvania federal courts, Judge Karoline Mehalchick of the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania has been leading the way by crafting a civil practice order that is issued in all of her matters that requires attorneys to identify any AI-created portions of their court filings and to certify to the court that any citations contained therein have been checked for accuracy.

As noted in the Aug. 14, 2025, the Pennsylvania Law Weekly article titled “AI and Its Proper Use in the Practice of Law,” by Daniel E. Cummins and Michael Cummins, a number of lawyers in Pennsylvania and across the country have been sanctioned for submitting fake legal citations, known as hallucinations, as a result of utilizing AI platforms for legal research and the writing of briefs and not checking the accuracy of such citations. Such issues have caused a need for the above rules as well as a rise in continuing legal education courses designed to educate attorneys to be careful in utilizing these emerging technologies.

New Book

Last but not least, it is noted that, over the past year, the Pennsylvania Bar Institute (PBI) published an e-book titled Raising the Bar: A Practical Guide to the Practice of Law, written by Daniel E. Cummins. The book compiles articles written by me over the past 25 years providing practice and professionalism tips for lawyers and judges, many of which articles were originally published right here in the Pennsylvania Law Weekly. The book is designed to provide lawyers, whether they be new or experienced, with tips and reminders on how to improve their day-to-day practice of law and efforts at a work-life balance.

Daniel E. Cummins is the managing partner at Cummins Law in Clarks Summit, Pennsylvania. Contact him at dancummins@cumminslaw.net.

Reprinted with permission from the December 11, 2025 edition of the "The Pennsylvania Law Weekly © 2025 ALM Global Properties, LLC. All rights reserved. Further duplication without permission is prohibited, contact 877-256-2472 or asset-and-logo-licensing@alm.com.

Thursday, October 2, 2025

PA Supreme Court Rules that Parents Cannot Bind Children to an Agreement to go to Arbitration


In the case of Shultz v. Skyzone, No. 25 EAP 2023 (Pa. Sept. 25, 2025) (Op. by Donohue, J.), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a parent who signs an Arbitration Agreement cannot bind a non-signing spouse or a minor child to its terms.

This matter arose out of claims that several minors were injured at trampoline parks operated by Skyzone in Philadelphia. In each instance, only one (1) parent signed a “Participation Agreement, Release, and Assumption Of The Risk” on behalf of their child, which included an arbitration provision waiving the right to sue in court.

After the injuries, both the signing and non-signing parents, along with the injured minors, filed lawsuits seeking personal injury damages. The Defendant filed Petitions to Compel Arbitration, relying upon the signed Agreements.

The trial court denied these Petitions, finding that the Agreements were enforceable only against the signing parents. The Superior Court affirmed, holding that neither the non-signing parents nor the minors were bound by the Arbitration provisions.

As noted, on further appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the Orders of the Superior Court. The Supreme Court held that parents lacked the authority to bind a minor to an agreement to arbitrate, as this would deprive the minor of judicial protections and oversight designed to safeguard their interests. As noted above, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court also held that a parent who signs an Arbitration Agreement cannot bind a non-signing parent, or minor child, to its terms.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  Justice Brobson's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion can be viewed HERE.


The Pennsylvania Supreme Court handed down the same decision in the consolidated case of Santiago v. Philly Trampoline Park, No. 24 EAP 2023 (Pa. Sept. 25, 2025) (Op. by Donohue, J.). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in this case can be viewed at this LINK.  Justice Brobson's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion can be viewed HERE.


Source: Justia Daily Opinion Summaries, www.justia.com (Sept. 26, 2025).

Source of image: Photo by Ben Moses M on www.unsplash.com.






Monday, September 29, 2025

Court Rejects Medical Malpractice Defendants' Efforts To Have Lawsuit Transferred to Arbitration


In the case of O’Shea v. Loyalsock Rehab Center, LLC, No. 2023-CV-01142 (C.P. Lyc. Co. 2025 Carlucci, J.), the court addressed Preliminary Objections asserted by a Defendant in a nursing home case in which the Defendants, in part, sought to have the matter remanded to arbitration based upon an arbitration clause.

The court overruled the Defendant’s Preliminary Objections in this regard after finding that the arbitration clause was not obvious or conspicuous in the documents.

The court also rejected the request to transfer the case to arbitration givent that the parties had engaged in discovery in two (2) years of litigation before the Defendants ever raised this issue.  The issue was raised when the Defendant's filed Preliminary Objections to a Second Amended Complaint. 

The court noted that it would prejudice the Plaintiff to have to start the entire litigation over in an arbitration proceeding.

The court otherwise noted that the record lacked any evidence to show that the Plaintiff had the authority or any intention to enter into an arbitration agreement.

The court otherwise struck the Plaintiff’s count alleging res ipsa loquitur given that that doctrine was a rule of circumstantial evidence, not a cause of action.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Thomas J. Foley, III of The Foley Law Firm in Scranton, PA for bringing this case to my attention.

Friday, August 22, 2025

Motion To Compel Arbitration Denied Where Unclear that Plaintiff Was On Notice of the Arbitration Clause


In the case of Bradsher v. Segway, Inc., No. 2:25-CV-02782-JMY (E.D. Pa. July 17, 2025 Young, J.), the court denied Defendant Segway Inc.’s Motion to Compel Arbitration following an accident during which the Plaintiff was injured while utilizing a Segway.

After the Plaintiff filed suit, alleging claims for strict liability, negligence, and breach of warranty, the Defendant Segway filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration, alleging that the Plaintiff was bound by a valid and enforceable Arbitration Agreement.

After reviewing the matter, the court denied the Motion to Compel Arbitration after finding that the Arbitration Agreement was not enforceable as it was unclear as to whether the Plaintiff had been properly informed of and had notice of the agreement.

The court noted that further discovery was required to determine whether or not the Plaintiff received notice of the Arbitration Agreement.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Court's companion Order can be viewed at this LINK.

Source: Article: “Differing Versions of Segway’s Arbitration Agreements Clear Path For Liability Suit,” By Riley Brennan The Legal Intelligencer (July 18, 2025).


Source of image:  Photo by Jan Bochen on www.unsplash.com.

Nursing Home Arbitration Agreement Ruled Uneforceable


In the case of Gratalo v. Kingston SNF Healthcare, LLC, No. 2024-CV-04585 (C.P. Luz. Zo. April 25, 2025 Saylor, S.J.), the court found an arbitration agreement unenforceable relative to the admissions of an adult individual with down syndrome into a nursing home by his mother.

The court noted that the Defendants did not provide evidence to show that the family was properly advised as to the applicability and the parameters of arbitration agreement. The court also noted that the arbitration agreement was not conspicuously displayed in the documents.

Given the substantiative unconscionability of the arbitration agreement, the court found that the agreement was unenforceable. As such, the court rejected the Defendant’s efforts to have this case taken out of the litigation and put into an arbitration.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this detailed Order without any Opinion may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Thomas J. Foley, III of the Foley Law Firm in Scranton for bringing this decision to my attention.


Source of image: Photo by Alena Darmel on www.pexels.com.

Monday, June 30, 2025

Nursing Home's Effort to Have Lawsuit Dismissed By Virtue of an Arbitration Clause Denied


In the case of Perry v. Saber Healthcare Holdings, LLC, No. 2024-CV6608 (C.P. Lacka. Co. June 6, 2025 Nealon, J.), Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas addressed various Preliminary Objections filed in a nursing home malpractice case.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff sustained injuries as a result of a fall.  Thereafter, the Plaintiff, through his daughter pursuant to her Power of Attorney, asserted claims of negligence, breach of contract, and other claims against the facility.

Among other issues, the Defendant facility raised Preliminary Objections asserting that the cause of action filed was required to instead be submitted to binding arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement executed by the daughter at the time the father was admitted to the facility.

The court ruled that, since the Power of Attorney that the father provided to his daughter expressly stated that the daughter was not authorized to enter into any arbitration agreement on his behalf with any skilled nursing facility or personal care home, the daughter could not bind her father to any arbitration agreement.

Judge Terrence R. Nealon
Lackawanna County 


Accordingly, Judge Nealon found that there was no enforceable arbitration agreement in place. As such, the Preliminary Objection seeking to have this case transferred to arbitration was overruled.

The court otherwise ruled that certain negligence allegations submitted on behalf of the Plaintiff were not barred by the gist of the action doctrine even though some of the claims presented in this case were based in contract. The court found that the claim for negligent hiring, supervision and retention were collateral to the contract and not contingent on the breach of any terms of the admission agreement.

The court otherwise sustained the demurrer filed against the Plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress given that the Complaint did not allege conduct that was so outrageous in character and extreme in degree as to exceed all possible bounds of decency and be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Thursday, April 3, 2025

Court Finds That Arbitration Agreement on a Website Was Invalid as it Was Not Conspicuously Noted



In the case of W.W. v. Allegheny Health Network, No. 2:23-CV-01163-CCW (W.D. Pa. Feb. 27, 2025 Wiegand, J.), the court denied a Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration of the Plaintiff’s claims after finding that the Arbitration Agreement, which was contained in a document that could be accessed through a link to the Defendant’s website, was not sufficiently conspicuous enough to put the Plaintiff on notice that the Plaintiff was agreeing to Arbitration.

According to the Opinion, in this matter, the Plaintiff alleged that Alleghany Health Network unlawfully collected confidential health information from users to visited the Defendant’s website and then disclosed the visitor’s information to third parties in violation of federal and state law.

In response to the Complaint filed, the Defendant moved to compel Arbitration pursuant to the Arbitration Agreement appearing in the network’s Terms of Service, a link to which appeared on the Defendant’s website.

The court determined that the Arbitration Agreement was not valid because the Plaintiff did not have actual or constructive notice of the agreement.

The Defendant had contended that the continued use of the website by visitors constituted acceptance of the terms of service contained in the link on the website.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff denied ever seeing the terms at issue or clicking the link to the terms of the Arbitration Agreement. As such, the Plaintiff asserted that there was no valid contract because he was never aware of the Arbitration Agreement since he never read, reviewed, or opened the Terms of Service.

In ruling in favor of the Plaintiff, the court noted that the Defendant’s Terms of Service do not require or allow users to ‘signed’ the Terms of Service, thereby calling into question whether or to the Plaintiff ever saw the Terms of Service at issue. The court additionally found that the link itself to the Terms of Service was not sufficiently conspicuous.

The court also noted that the Defendant failed to have an “explicit textual notice” informing visitors to the site that the continued use of the website constituted acceptance of the terms. Here, visitors to the website had to scroll past numerous sections of content to even reach a footer that contained the link to the terms of service. Once a visitor got to that area of the website, the link at issue was one of over forty other links in the footer. As such, the court found that the link at issue and/or the Terms of Service themselves, were not reasonably conspicuous.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source: Article – “Arbitration Agreement Linked On Healthcare Website Isn’t Binding, Fed. Judge Rules,” By Riley Brennan of the Pennsylvania Law Weekly (Feb. 28, 2025).

Source of image:  Photo by Christin Hume on www.unsplash.com.

Wednesday, February 5, 2025

Court Finds Nursing Home Arbitration Agreement to be Unconscionable and, Therefore, Unenforceable


In the case of Harrington v. Kramer, No. 2024-CV-774 (C.P. Luz. Co. Jan. 14, 2025 Gelb, J.), Judge Lesa Gelb of the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas found that the terms of a nursing home Arbitration Agreement was unconscionable and, therefore, unenforceable.

The court also denied Preliminary Objections filed by the Defendants against the punitive damages claims. The court noted that these punitive damages issues could be revisited during the Motion for Summary Judgment stage.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff filed claims for vicarious and direct corporate liability against nursing home Defendants in which the Plaintiff’s decedent resided. The Plaintiffs alleged that the decedent sustained injuries while staying at the Defendant’s premises from which the decedent eventually passed away.

A central issue in the case relative to the arguments addressed in this decision were whether the Plaintiff decedent had sufficient cognitive function and understanding to properly agree to the admission paperwork, which included an Arbitration Agreement. 

There was evidence that the decedent was on medications on her arrival to the nursing home and also that she was forgetful and had a short attention span. The court noted that the nursing home’s admission paperwork at that time was over seventy-five (75) pages in length and the Arbitration Agreement was the second to last document in the packet.

It was additionally alleged that the nursing home did not have any written policies about what the Director of Admissions should do in order to prepare for initial meetings with incoming residents, in part, in terms of determining if a person is competent to sign an arbitration agreement.

Judge Lesa Gelb
Luzerne County


Judge Gelb provided a thorough review of Pennsylvania law regarding the validity and enforceability of arbitration agreements in this context. The court noted that, although Pennsylvania and federal law impose a strong public policy in favor of enforcing arbitration agreements, the enforcement of such an agreement to arbitrate can be denied by a court where the party opposing arbitration proves a contract defense that invalidates the agreement to arbitrate. One such defense to an allegation that a valid arbitration agreement has been entered into is the defense of unconscionability.

The court noted that, to invalidate enforcement of a contract based upon unconscionability, the party challenging the contract must show both an absence of a meaningful choice, referred to as procedural unconscionability and contract terms that are unreasonably favorable to the other party, which is known as substantiative unconscionability. The court noted that these tests are assessed under a sliding-scale approach, with a lesser degree of substantiative unconscionability required where the procedural unconscionability is very high.

Applying the law to the facts of this case, the court found that the Arbitration Agreement at issue was unconscionable and, therefore, unenforceable. The court found that the Arbitration Agreement at issue was equally and procedurally substantively unconscionable.

The court noted that it found that the Plaintiff decedent did not have the legal capacity to sign the Arbitration Agreement based upon the medications that she was prescribed, the notes from the nursing staff as to the decedent’s cognition, and the other circumstances surrounding the agreement. The court also found the agreement itself to be substantively unconscionable because it imposed additional costs on the decedent and her representatives that they would not have in a court of law. The court also found that the Arbitration Agreement favored the nursing home in that it permitted the nursing home to pursue the decedent and/or her representatives for non-payment outside of arbitration.

Due to the above issues, the court held that the Arbitration Agreement was not binding.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Thomas F. Foley, III of the Foley Law Firm in Scranton for bringing this case to my attention.

Friday, December 27, 2024

Arbitration Clause Under an App Ruled Unenforceable

In the case of Pierce v. Floatme Corp., No. GD 24-2169 (C.P. Allegh. Co. Dec. 19, 2024 Hertzberg, J.), the trial court overruled preliminary objections filed by a loan provider called Floatme Corp. in which the loan provider sought to have the class action filed against it dismissed pursuant to an arbitration clause contained within the provisions noted in the smartphone app when customers downloaded the app. 

In so ruling, Judge Hertzberg found that the arbitration provisions were not conspicuous enough for the users of the app so as to uphold any alleged arbitration agreement.  More specifically, the court found that  a "meeting of the minds" on the issue of arbitration was lacking in the case presented.  There was no unambiguous assent to arbitration by the customers in this case.

In his decision, Judge Hertzberg referred to a split Superior Court ruling in the case of Chilutti v. Uber Technologies.  In that Chilutti case, the Superior Court ruled that a binding arbitration agreement found in the Uber app failed to provide sufficient notice to customers that they were, in fact, agreeing to arbitration in the event of disputes and thereby waiving their right to a trial.  That Chilutti case is currently up before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on appeal.

The Tort Talk post on the Chilutti case can be viewed HERE.

A copy of the Pierce v. Floatme Corp. case summarized in this Tort Talk blog post can be viewed at this LINK.

I send thanks to Thomas J. Foley, III if the Foley Law Firm in Scranton, PA for bringing this decision to my attention.

Tuesday, October 29, 2024

U.S. Supreme Court Confirms When Stay Provisions of Federal Arbitration Act Apply


In the United States Supreme Court decision of Smith v. Spizzirri, 601 U.S. 472 (2024), the Court held that, when a federal district court finds that a lawsuit involves an arbitrable dispute, and a party requests a stay pending arbitration, Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 USCS §3, compels the court to stay the proceeding.

The United States Supreme Court additionally held that a federal district court judge does not have discretion to dismiss the suit on the basis that the claims are subject to arbitration.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Thomas J. Foley, III of the Foley Law Firm in Scranton, PA for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Adam Michael Szuscik on www.unsplash.com.
  

Monday, February 5, 2024

Carrier Held Liable in Bad Faith Claim



In the case of Devincenzo-Gambone v. Erie Insurance Exchange, No. 2017-CV-09856 (C.P. Montg. Co. Oct. 12, 2022 Rogers, J.), the court entered a ruling against the carrier in a bad faith after finding that the carrier had recklessly disregarded a reasonable basis to pursue its petition following an Arbitration of a UIM case.

The court found fault with the carrier’s handling of issues regarding a binding Arbitration on the issues of stacking and damages.

The court found that the Plaintiff had presented clear and convincing evidence that the carrier did not act reasonably in investigating, evaluating, and arbitrating the Plaintiffs’ claims and that the carrier lacked a reasonable basis to hold a portion of the Arbitrator’s Award and to file a Petition to Modify or Correct the Award.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney David B. Pizzica of the Philadelphia law firm of the Pansini Law Group/Pansini & Pizzica for bringing this case to my attention.

Friday, November 17, 2023

Defendants' Participation in Judicial Process Results in Waiver of Arbitration Agreement


In the case of Cooper v. Abington Senior Care, LLC, Dec. Term 2020, No. 00765 (C.P. Phila. Co. Aug. 2, 2023 Shreeves-Johns, J.), the trial court issued a Rule 1925 Opinion asking the Superior Court to affirm the trial court’s decision that, in this nursing home negligence action, the Defendants had waived their right to enforce an Arbitration agreement by participating in the judicial process.

According to the Opinion, the Defendants filed a Petition to Compel Arbitration. The trial court denied this petition after noting the other Defendants had gained advantages by participating in the judicial process, including with respect to completing discovery and motions practice. 

More specifically, the Defendants have filed three (3) separate sets of Preliminary Objections. It was only after the third set of Preliminary Objections was overruled that the Defendants finally asserted the issue of Arbitration in their Answer to the Complaint and in a Petition to Compel Arbitration.

Also, the Defendants had not raised the issue of Arbitration in the previously filed Preliminary Objections.

As such, the court ruled that, although there was a valid Arbitration agreement between the parties that may have required certain claims in this litigation to be submitted to Arbitration, the Defendants’ participation in this litigation was held to confirm an acceptance of the judicial process and a waiver of the right to arbitrate.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions.” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (Oct. 23, 2023).


Source of image:  www.unsplash.com.

Monday, August 7, 2023

Is Uber's Arbitration Clause Enforceable?


In the case of Chilutti v. Uber Technologies, Inc., No. 1023 EDA 2021 (Pa. Super. July 19, 2023 en banc) (Op. by McCaffery, J.)(Stabile, J., Dissenting), a split Pennsylvania Superior Court ruled that the Plaintiffs were not bound by arbitration agreement that was contained within a set of hyper linked “terms and conditions” on a website or a smart phone application that they never clicked upon, viewed, or read.  

Such "terms and conditions" contained an arbitration clause relative to any personal injury claims.

In ruling that a plaintiff is not bound by the arbitration clause under the facts and circumstances at issue in this case, a majority of the Pennsylvania Superior Court en banc panel upheld a Plaintiff’s constitutional right to a jury trial in a personal injury matter. 

This case is the first before a Pennsylvania appellate court to examine the waiver of a right to a jury trial in an online agreement.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: Article - “Split Pa. Superior Court Rules Uber’s Arbitration Clause is Unenforceable” by Aleeza Furman Pennsylvania Law Weekly (July 21, 2023).

Source of image:  Photo by Austin Distel from www.unsplash.com.

Friday, June 16, 2023

Article: Pennsylvania Supreme Court Shows Teasing Signs of Moderation


This article of mine was recently published in the Pennsylvania Law Weekly and is republished here with permission.


Pennsylvania Supreme Court Shows Teasing Signs of Moderation


June 01, 2023


By Daniel E. Cummins | June 01, 2023 at 11:34 AM


Over the past five years or so, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has been issuing one decision after another, along with civil litigation rule changes, most, if not all of which, have greatly favored personal injury plaintiffs’ causes.

With these plaintiff-friendly decisions and rule changes handed down by the Supreme Court, there appeared to be no end in sight to the ability of the plaintiffs bar to continue to score drastic changes in the law in favor of efforts to secure compensation for injured parties.

However, as noted below, a couple of recent decisions by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court have tempered this sense of futility for some.

The Pendulum Shift in Favor of Plaintiffs

Over the past several years, the great number of plaintiff-friendly decisions and rule changes issued by the Supreme Court has caused the pendulum of change in Pennsylvania civil litigation precedent to swing so far in favor of plaintiffs that it seems that celebrating plaintiffs attorneys should be ducking so as not to get hit by that pendulum as the good times roll on.

One result of these plaintiff-friendly decisions by the Supreme Court has been that injured parties have realized even wider avenues to secure money in civil litigation matters. Another result is that plaintiffs have been emboldened in their settlement postures with the confidence that, under the current climate, if any legal issues in their case have to go up the appellate ladder to the Supreme Court, the plaintiff will more than likely prevail.

In terms of plaintiff-favorable rule changes in personal injury civil litigation matters, the Supreme Court has expanded the Rules of Civil Procedure relative to the proper venue for medical malpractice actions. This, as expected, has led to an increase of the filings of such cases in Philadelphia County as compared to before.

Another plaintiff-friendly change in the venue rules was handed down by the Supreme Court by way of its decision in the case of Fox v. Smith, 263 A.3d 555 (Pa. 2021). In the Fox decision, the plaintiff was successful in persuading the Supreme Court to rule that internet-based defamation claims can be filed in any county where the defamatory statements were viewed and understood as defamatory.

In another rule change, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upped the maximum limit on the amount of money that a plaintiff can recover in money damages at trial on appeal from an arbitration proceeding.

Other recent plaintiff-friendly decisions by the Supreme Court have been described as resulting in “seismic” changes in decades-long Pennsylvania precedent. For example, in Cagey v. PennDOT, 179 A.3d 458 (Pa. 2018), the plaintiffs bar convinced the Supreme Court to overrule long-standing precedent that limited the liability exposure of PennDOT in personal injury matters. In Balentine v. Chester Water Authority, 191 A.3d 799 (Pa. 2018), the Supreme Court again assisted the plaintiffs bar in generating additional potential lawsuits by overturning 30 years of precedent that had previously upheld governmental immunity in personal injury matters in a more expansive way.

Also, in almost gleeful language in the case of Gallagher v. GEICO, 201 A.3d 131 (Pa. 2019), the Supreme Court overruled the 20 years of precedent that had previously and repeatedly upheld the validity of the household exclusion in the UIM context of personal injury automobile accident matter. As noted below, in a more recent decision on the validity of the household exclusion, that plaintiff-friendly ruling in Gallagher was found to be so inappropriately expansive in its effort to eradicate that exclusion across the board that even the high court acknowledged that it had to draw back on Gallagher a bit.

A Return to Moderation?

In two recent decisions, both of which were expected to result in plaintiff-favorable rulings, the Supreme Court surprised some with opinions that were not plaintiff-friendly.

In the case of Erie Insurance Exchange v. Mione, 289 A.3d 525 (Pa. Feb. 15, 2023), the Supreme Court, without acknowledging that it had attempted to eradicate the household exclusion in UIM cases across the board in the Gallagher v. Geico case, rejected the argument by the plaintiff that the Gallagher decision should be read as having served to invalidate the exclusion in all cases in Pennsylvania. In Mione, the court instead wrote, “We reiterate today that the holding in Gallagher was based upon the unique facts before us in that case, and that the decision there should be construed narrowly.”

The court instead confirmed in the Mione decision that the Supreme Court “continues to reject the view that household vehicle exclusions are ipso facto unenforceable.”

This decision came as a welcome surprise to some and a hopeful harbinger that the court was stepping away from its penchant for decisions that resulted in seismic, plaintiff-friendly changes to long-standing precedent in Pennsylvania law.

In the other example of a recent Supreme Court decision that seemed to indicate that the court may be signaling a return to more balanced application of long-standing law, the court addressed issues of the stacking of UIM coverage in automobile insurance personal injury actions.

In the case of first impression of Franks v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance, No. 42 MAP 2022 (Pa. April 19, 2023) (Op. by Mundy, J.), the court ruled that the removal of a vehicle from a multiple motor vehicle insurance policy, in which stacked coverage had been previously waived through a waiver form executed by the insured, did not require the insurance carrier to secure another written waiver of stacked coverage from the insured under Section 1738(c).

The basic rationale of the court was that Section 1738 requires insurance companies to secure a new written waiver of UIM coverage whenever an insurance policy is purchased. Here, there was a change made to an existing policy. No new policy was purchased. As such, the court found there was no requirement under a plain application of the applicable law for the insurance company to secure a new waiver form.

Might the above decisions by the plaintiff-friendly Pennsylvania Supreme Court be a signal that the pendulum had finally reached its apex and was going to start its descent back toward moderation relative to issues in personal injury civil litigation matters?

Not So Fast

On the heels of the above recent decisions indicating a possible step back toward at least moderate decisions in personal injury civil litigation matters, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court then recently issued yet another very plaintiff-friendly decision in the case of Brown v. City of Oil City, No. 6 WAP 2022 (Pa. May 16, 2023) (Op. by Todd C.J.)(Mundy, J., Dissenting). With this decision, the Supreme Court greatly expanded the ability of plaintiffs to bring lawsuits against construction contractors for personal injuries sustained on a property by allowing such claims to be brought even if the contractor had completed his work on the property years before.

In Brown, the plaintiff allegedly tripped and fell on deteriorated sections of concrete steps outside of a library, which steps had been replaced by a contractor years before the incident. The plaintiff sued the owner of the library as well as the contractors who performed work on the exterior stairs to the library.

The case went up the appellate ladder and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed the scope of Section 385 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which is titled “Persons Creating Artificial Conditions on Land on Behalf of Possessor, Physical Harm Caused After Work Has Been Accepted.”

The issue before the court was whether Section 385 imposed liability upon a contractor to a plaintiff whenever the contractor, during the course of his or her work for a possessor of land, creates a dangerous condition on the land that injures the plaintiff, even though, at the time of the injury, the contractor was no longer in possession of the land, and the possessor of the land was aware of the dangerous condition.

After reviewing the law, the Supreme Court concluded that a contractor may indeed be subjected to liability to plaintiffs under Section 385 under such circumstances. Obviously, this decision is another one in which the Supreme Court once again increased the number of parties plaintiffs may sue and widened the scope of possible monetary recoveries for injured-party plaintiffs.

So You’re Saying There’s a Chance?

One benefit of the two recent moderate decisions issued by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in the Mione case and the Franks case is that those decisions give rise to some uncertainty, however minimal, as to which way the Pennsylvania Supreme Court may rule on a personal injury civil litigation issue before it. While it appears that the Supreme Court will likely remain plaintiff-friendly for the foreseeable future, the two recent decisions in which the defense argument prevailed serves to restore some faith in a belief that a plaintiff-favorable decision on any given issue before the court may not be automatic.

Daniel E. Cummins is the managing partner of the Clarks Summit law firm of Cummins Law, a civil litigation practice. He also conducts mediations of civil litigation matters through Cummins Mediation Services. Cummins is also the sole creator and writer of the Tort Talk Blog (www.TortTalk.com), which is designed to provide continuing updates on important cases and trends in Pennsylvania civil litigation law. He can be reached at dancummins@CumminsLaw.net.