Showing posts with label Future Medical Expenses. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Future Medical Expenses. Show all posts

Wednesday, March 5, 2025

Federal Court Addresses Recoverability of Future Medical Expenses in a Motor Vehicle Accident Case


In the case of Morris v. Sutton, No. 2:23-CV-02806-GAM (E.D. Pa. Feb. 19, 2025 McHugh, J.), an Eastern Federal District Court judge ruled that 75 Pa. C.S.A. §1722 did not bar the recovery of future medical expenses under the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law.

Judge Gerald A. McHugh noted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not yet addressed this particular issue. However, the judge noted that other court decisions that he had reviewed that considered similar arguments has concluded that §1722 does not apply to future medical expenses that have not yet been incurred. As such, the judge held that §1722 has no applicability to future medical expenses.

Judge McHugh noted that §1722 provides that individuals injured in a motor vehicle accident, who have other sources of insurance to cover their medical expenses, are barred from recovering certain benefits that are “paid or payable.”

The Plaintiff argued in this case that given that the future medical bills have not yet been incurred, it was speculative as to whether or not such future medical bills will be “payable” under any applicable insurance.

The judge agreed with this speculation argument. The court noted that “[f]rom a practicable perspective, it is not just the existence of coverage for future medical expenses that is speculative, but also the terms of any such coverage and how it would apply, as changes in eligibility and changes in the terms of coverage such as deductible sand co-pays are impossible to predict.”

In rendering his decision, Judge McHugh referred to the Pennsylvania Superior Court decision in the case of Farese v. Robinson, 222 A.3d 1173, 1189 (Pa. Super. 2019). In that case, the Pennsylvania Superior Court concluded that damages for future medical care were not limited by the MVFRL’s containment provisions under a different provision of the law.

In the end, the court denied the Defendant’s Motion to Preclude the Plaintiff from introducing evidence of future medical expenses by finding that §1722 does not apply to future medical expenses as a matter of law.

As an aside here, it is noted that the court in Morris apparently was not provided by counsel, and did not find on its own, the decision of Orzel v. Morgan, No. 03-CV-4929 (C.P. Lacka. Co. 2003 Nealon, J.), by Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas. In that decision, Judge Nealon addressed, in part, a defense argument that §1722 precludes the Plaintiff from recovering damages for future medical bills since those costs were payable by her then existing private health insurance. Judge Nealon noted that, instead, the Plaintiff’s future medical expenses award would only be molded to the extent that Plaintiff had first party medical benefits coverage remaining under her own automobile insurance policy.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of Morris decision may click this LINK.


Anyone wishing to review other similar decisions on this issue of whether a motor vehicle accident Plaintiff can recover future medical expenses may click this LINK to get to other Tort Talk blog posts on other such cases. Those Tort Talk blog posts should have links to those other decisions.


Source: Article: “Cost Containment Provision Doesn’t Bar Recovery For Future Medical Expense, Pa. Fed. Judge Rules” by Riley Brennan of the Pennsylvania Law Weekly (Feb. 20, 2025).


Source of image:  Photo by Jennifer Uppendahl on www.unsplash.com.

Monday, November 11, 2024

Court Rules That Defense Can Challenge Life Expectancy With Evidence of Plaintiff's Alcohol Abuse


In the case of Mackey v. Chipotle, No. 2:23-cv-00519-GAM (E.D. Pa. Oct. 16, 2024 McHugh, J.), the court addressed the admissibility of a Plaintiff’s history of alcohol consumption as part of a defense to a Plaintiff’s future economic damages claims in a personal injury matter.

This case arose out of a trip and fall event.

Before the court was a motion by the Plaintiff to preclude any introduction of the Plaintiff’s history of alcohol consumption. The Plaintiff was asserting that this evidence was irrelevant and prejudicial.

The Defendant contended that the Plaintiff’s consumption was relevant to the Plaintiff’s projected life expectancy and that the evidence also provided an explanation for a subsequent fall unrelated to the Plaintiff’s physical limitations.

After reviewing the evidence presented and weighing the probative value against the prejudicial impact of that evidence as required by Federal Rule of Evidence 403, the court concluded that the Plaintiff’s history of alcohol consumption was admissible as to the Plaintiff’s evidence of his life expectancy, but inadmissible for any other purpose. 

The court noted that, because life expectancy is the single most critical determinant of the estimated future damages, factors that may influence one’s life expectancy are “highly relevant” under Rules of Evidence.

While noting that evidence of alcohol consumption can create a risk of unfair prejudice under the Rules of Relevance, the court found that the evidence in this context did not substantially outweigh the highly probative value that the evidence of alcohol consumption had on the Plaintiff’s life expectancy and future damages. 

Accordingly, the evidence of Plaintiff’s alcohol consumption, which court to the Opinion was significant on a daily basis, was allowed to be introduced for the jury’s assessment in determining life expectancy. The court noted that it would provide a cautionary instruction with the intent of attempting to limit any possible prejudice.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Court's companion Order can be viewed HERE.


Source: Article – “‘Well-Documented’ Medical Records of Alcohol Consumption Rates Maybe Considered For Life Expectancy Costs, Judge Finds.” By Riley Brennan. Pennsylvania Law Weekly (Oct. 18, 2024).

Source of image:  Photo by Clam Lo from www.pexels.com.

Tuesday, August 6, 2024

ARTICLE: Appellate Guidance Needed on Out-of-State Medical Expenses in Motor Vehicle Accident Cases

This article of mine was recently published in the Pennsylvania Law Weekly on July 26, 2024 and is republished here with permission.


Appellate Guidance Needed on Out-of-State Medical Expenses in Motor Vehicle Accident Cases


By Daniel E. Cummins | July 26, 2024 


Issues regarding the recoverability of medical expenses charged by out-of-state medical providers for treatment following a Pennsylvania motor vehicle accident are often disputed.

One such issue concerns whether medical expenses for treatment rendered to a person outside of Pennsylvania following a motor vehicle accident are even recoverable in a Pennsylvania motor vehicle accident lawsuit given the cost containment provisions of Pennsylvania’s Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL).

A second related issue is whether, if such out-of-state past medical expenses are recoverable, do those past medical expenses have to be reduced in accordance with Act 6 of Pennsylvania’s MVFRL as set forth in 75 Pa.C.S.A. Section 1797 before they can be presented to, or awarded by, a jury.

While there is a lack of appellate guidance on these issues, a few notable decisions have been handed down by Pennsylvania trial court judges across the commonwealth.

Are Out-of-State Past Medical Expenses Even Recoverable?

In the case of Scheid v. Gabrell, No. 1009-CV-2000 (C.P. Pike Co. 2005), the late Judge Joseph F. Kameen Jr. of the Pike County Court of Common Pleas addressed the issue of whether medical expenses incurred by a Pennsylvania resident plaintiff for treatment rendered by an out-of-state doctor in that other state was recoverable at a motor vehicle accident trial. In this regard, Kameen had to address which state’s law to apply.

The applicable Pennsylvania statutory law in this regard is found in the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law at 75 Pa.C.S.A. Sections 1720 and 1722. These statutes, when read together, prohibit claims for past medical expenses arising out of a motor vehicle accident where the person seeking damages is eligible for other insurance coverage to cover the same expenses.

After completing a conflicts of law analysis, the trial court in Scheid chose to apply Pennsylvania law. Kameen went on to rule that, given the preclusion against recovery of medical expenses in motor vehicle accident cases as found under 75 Pa.C.S.A. Section 1720 and 1722 of Pennsylvania’s Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law, the plaintiff was not permitted to pursue past medical expenses damages at trial.

In so ruling, the court in Scheid relied, in part, on the federal district court decision in the case of O’Malley v. Vilsmeier Auctions Co., 986 F. Supp. 306 (E.D.Pa. 1997). In O’Malley, the court ruled that Section 1722 of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law could not preclude an out-of-state insurer from obtaining subrogation against their out-of-state insureds. The court ruled in this fashion after finding that the prohibition against subrogation contained in section 1720 could not be applied to out-of-state insurers in their dealings with out-of-state insureds.

In Scheid, the court was instead faced with a Pennsylvania plaintiff who was involved in a Pennsylvania accident with a Pennsylvania defendant. The plaintiff who lived close to one of the borders of Pennsylvania, crossed state lines to treat with medical providers located outside of Pennsylvania. The plaintiff claimed that her out-of-state medical providers were asserting liens and were looking to be paid for the treatment that was rendered.

Prior to trial, the defense filed a motion in limine seeking to preclude the plaintiff from recovering the claimed medical expenses given the prohibition under Pennsylvania law that precluded any medical provider from seeking subrogation for medical expenses in a Pennsylvania motor vehicle accident matter and which law also therefore precluded the plaintiffs from recovering such medical expenses at trial as a result.

The trial court in Scheid agreed with the defense and the Pennsylvania resident plaintiff’s claims for medical expenses were precluded from being presented at trial.

Contrary results have been reached by Pennsylvania courts in this regard where the plaintiff is not a resident of Pennsylvania.

In the federal court case of Armstrong v. Antique Automobile Club of America, 670 F. Supp. 2d 387, 394 (M.D. Pa. 2009), the court ruled that the anti-recovery provisions of Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law found under Sections 1720 and 1722 did not apply in action to recover for injuries sustained by a motor vehicle accident plaintiff who was a resident of Texas and who was insured by an out-of-state insurer for medical expenses. In that case, the plaintiff had presented evidence that her out-of-state insurer had contractual right of subrogation as to payments for medical expenses that it had paid.

In so ruling, the Armstrong court, in part, relied upon the decision of Gagnon v. Lemoyne Sleeper, 1:CV-0502081, 2008 WL 5061677 at *3 (M.D. Pa. 2008) for the proposition that Sections 1720 and 1722 cannot be applied against an out-of-state insurer with out-of-state insureds. See also Abed-Rabuh v. Hoobrajh, No. 3:17-CV-15, 2019 WL 4935208, at *2 (W.D. Pa. July 2, 2019); Serrano v. Cowles, No. CIV.A. 06-5075, 2008 WL 4442532, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2008).

The above trial court decisions support the notion that, where the plaintiff is an out-of-state resident, that the plaintiff will be able to present evidence of, and recover for, his past medical expenses for out-of-state treatment. However, a Pennsylvania resident plaintiff, who treats outside of Pennsylvania, might not be able to cover those past medical expenses under the applicable law. Whether this is a fair application of the law or not may be the subject of future decisions on the issue.

Do Out-of-State Past Medical Expenses Have to be Reduced?

Another issue involving expenses for out-of-state treatment following a motor vehicle accident that occurred in Pennsylvania is whether such expenses must be reduced Act 6 of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law, 75 Pa.C.S.A. Section 1797, before such expenses are presented to a jury for consideration. That issue was just recently addressed, as a matter of first impression, by Judge Alan D. Hertzberg of the Allegheny County Common Pleas Court in the case of Yurek v. Bower, No. GD18012387 (C.P. Allegh. Co. July 3, 2024).

In the case of Yurek, Hertzberg issued a Rule 1925 opinion following a motor vehicle accident and, as part of the post-trial issues presented, considered the issue of whether medical bills related to treatment provided to the plaintiff by an out-of-state doctor are subject to reduction under Act 6.

Hertzberg wrote that neither party provided him with any appellate case law on the issue and the judge also noted that he could not locate an appellate decision addressing this topic.

According to the opinion, following the subject accident, the plaintiff underwent a cervical spine fusion surgery which was performed in Florida.

The case eventually went to trial and, as part of the verdict, the jury awarded $150,000 in past medical expenses, most of which was related to the cost of the surgical treatment that took place in Florida.

During the post-trial proceedings, one of the issues raised was the trial court’s refusal to reduce the amount of the past medical expenses award any more than down to the figure of $148,000, which was the actual cost of the surgery plus the surgical center’s charges.

The defense asserted that the trial court erred in denying the defense motion to mold the jury’s $150,000 past medical expenses award down to $9,882.00 under an application of Act 6 of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law, 75 Pa. C.S.A. Section 1797(a).

Section 1797 of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law allows for a recovery of medical bills at up to 110% of what Medicare would pay a provider for the same service.

According to the opinion, at trial, Hertzberg allowed the plaintiff to introduce the total amount of the medical bills into evidence without any Act 6 reduction. However, the court also confirmed at trial that it would consider a for a post-trial motion requesting a molding of any medical expenses award downward under Act 6. The court stated that it took this approach based upon the Superior Court’s decision in the case of Pittsburgh Neurosurgery Associates v. Danner, 733 A.2d 1279, 1285 (Pa. Super. 1999), which allowed for medical bills to be presented at trial in full, subject to potentially being molded in a post-trial proceeding.

In the Yurek case, the court emphasized that, during trial, the treating doctor from Florida testified that he was not licensed in Pennsylvania and that he did not perform any medical work in Pennsylvania.

There was testimony that there were allegedly no doctors in Pittsburgh who would do the type of cervical spine fusion surgery that the Florida doctor performed on the plaintiff in Florida. The Florida doctor also testified that he charged $120,000 for performing the surgery. An additional $28,000 was charged by the surgical center. As such, the total expenses for the treatment performed in Florida was $148,000.

In his decision, Hertzberg noted that his review of the evidence led him to conclude that, at least $148,000 of the $150,000 award of past medical expenses appeared to be related to the treatment provided by the Florida doctor in Florida.

The judge agreed with the plaintiff’s argument that, because the Florida doctor was not a Pennsylvania licensed provider, the expenses related to the treatment provided by that out-of-state doctor was not subject to reduction under Act 6 of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law.

Hertzberg reasoned that the express language of “cost containment” provision in the MVFRL, 75 Pa.C.S.A. Section 1797(a), which is applicable to medical expenses in a motor vehicle accident case, “twice references medical bill amounts ‘applicable in this commonwealth under the Medicare program.’” Hertzberg noted that this language signaled to him that the statute’s application was limited to only apply to Pennsylvania licensed providers.

In so ruling, Hertzberg also reviewed a regulation regarding the act that was issued by the insurance department. Those regulations, found at 31 Pa. Code Section 69.11 provide, in pertinent part, that the cost containment or payment limitation provisions apply to care rendered by Pennsylvania licensed providers. As such, Hertzberg used this additional analysis to find that Act 6 reductions did not apply to the care rendered by the doctor at issue in this case where the doctor at issue was not a Pennsylvania licensed provider, where the treatment did not take place in Pennsylvania, and where the treatment rendered was not available in Pennsylvania.

Based on the above limited case law, it appears that an out-of-state plaintiff injured in a Pennsylvania accident but treated by out-of-state doctors is not subject to Pennsylvania’s prohibition against the recovery of past medical expenses in a motor vehicle accident lawsuit. However, where the plaintiff is a Pennsylvania resident, at least one trial judge has ruled that Pennsylvania law applies as does the prohibition.

On the issue of whether medical expenses charged by an out-of-state doctor for out-of-state treatment must be reduced under Pennsylvania’s Act 6 provisions, at least one trial court judge has ruled that such expenses do not have to be reduced.

Until appellate guidance is provided it appears that the trial court judges and the bar will have to continue to find their way by reviewing the above cases as a starting point in the continuing debate and analysis of these types of issues.

Daniel E. Cummins is the managing partner of the Clarks Summit law firm of Cummins Law, a civil litigation practice. He also conducts mediations of civil litigation matters through Cummins Mediation Services. Cummins is also the sole creator and writer of the Tort Talk Blog (www.TortTalk.com), which is designed to provide continuing updates on important cases and trends in Pennsylvania civil litigation law. He can be reached at dancummins@cumminslaw.net.


Reprinted with permission from the July 26, 2024 edition of the Pennsylvania Law Weekly (c) 2024 ALM Global Properties, LLC.  All rights reserved.  Further duplication without permission is prohibited, contact 877-256-2472 or asset-and-logo-licensing@alm.com.

Tuesday, November 9, 2021

Expert Testimony By Nurses on Future Medical Expenses Allowed


In the case of Jones v. Nicolani, No. CV-2018-007110 (C.P. Del. Co. Oct. 4, 2021 Eckel, J.), the court denied a Defendant’s Motion In Limine filed in a motor vehicle accident seeking to preclude the testimony of two (2) of the Plaintiff’s experts, who were registered nurses who were retained by the Plaintiff to testify as to the estimated future medical costs the Plaintiffs may incurred as a result of the accident.

The Defendants asserted that certain medical cost projections from which these experts’ opinions derived were based upon a source, known as “Context4Healthcare,” that, according to the Defendant, was similar to another source (Fairhealth.org) that had been found by two other courts to be unreliable.

The court in this matter reviewed the record before it, including the Plaintiff’s arguments that the Plaintiffs’ experts had relied upon other sources as well to render their opinions.  In the end, the court noted the Plaintiff's experts had relied upon multiple sources of information and that the Defendants were free to cross-examine these experts on their reliance upon the data in question.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney Joshua D. Baer and Attorney Andrew Baron, both of Simon & Simon, P.C. in Philadelphia for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Tingsley Law Firm on unsplash.com.
 

Wednesday, May 12, 2021

Lycoming County Court Precludes Expert Testimony Regarding Future Medical Expenses in MVA Case; Also, Limited Tort Motion Denied



In the case of Swank v. Greenaway, No. 19-CV-1830 (C.P. Lyc. Co. March 15, 2021 Linhardt, J.), the court issued a detailed Order regarding issues raised in Pre-Trial Motions In Limine by a Defendant in a limited tort motor vehicle accident case.

On one issue, the Defendants sought to preclude two of the Plaintiff’s expert witnesses from testifying at trial regarding the estimated cost of future care. The Defendants asserted that these experts based their opinions on insufficient methodology and data that was inherently unreliable. More specifically, the Plaintiff’s experts projected the future costs of the Plaintiff’s medical procedures based solely upon pricing data secured from Fairhealth.org.

The court noted that Fair Health was a non-profit entity that collected data and managed a database of privately billed health insurance claims. The court held that the data at issue could not be the sole basis for an expert opinion on future medical costs given the issues with how Fair Health came to reach its final calculations and data.

As such, the Defendant’s Motion In Limine regarding information secured from Fairhealth.org was granted.

In the Defendant’s second Motion In Limine, the Defendants sought to preclude the Plaintiff from pursuing non-economic damages based upon an argument that the Plaintiff had elected the limited tort option and had not established that a serious injury had been suffered.

The court noted that the Plaintiff alleged that she sustained a herniated disc and shoulder injuries as a result of the accident, which injuries allegedly affected her ability to perform her everyday activities including chores, self-care, hobbies, personal relationship activities, and work activities.

The court denied this Motion and stated that the issues should have raised by way of a Motion for Summary Judgment. In any event, the court found the factual issues led the court to conclude that reasonable minds on a jury could differ on the issue of whether or not the Plaintiff sustained a serious injury. As such, the Defendant’s second Motion In Limine was denied.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions.” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (April 6, 2021).






Monday, October 19, 2020

Superior Court Upholds Jury's Verdict for Future Medical Expenses in Limited Tort Case Even Though No Serious Injury Found


In the Non-precedential decision in the case of Darwish v. Einspahr, No. 2588-EDA-2019 (Pa. Super. Sept. 24, 2020 Bowes, J., Shogan, J., and Pellegrini, J.) (Mem. Op. by Bowes, J.) [non-precedential], the Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed a trial court decision that had found that the $50,000.00 verdict on future medical expenses in a limited tort motor vehicle accident case was proper even though the jury did not find serious impairment. 

The trial court had vacated and molded the jury verdict in favor of the Plaintiff from an award of $50,000.00 to $0. As noted, on appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court vacated that ruling and remanded the case for entry of judgment on the jury’s verdict. 

In its Opinion, the Superior Court affirmed that the jury found that the limited tort Plaintiff did not suffer a serious impairment of body function, but had awarded the Plaintiff $50,000.00 in economic damages to compensate her for future medical expenses. 

Following the trial, the Defendant asserted that the award of future medical expenses should be overturned because the evidence presented to the jury in that regard was speculative and that the jury’s award of such money was against the weight of the evidence, equivocal, and contrary to law. The Defendant also asserted that, since the jury determined that the Plaintiff did not sustain a serious impairment of a bodily function, the jury’s award of future medical expenses was grossly excessive and shocked one’s sense of justice. As noted, the trial court agreed and reduced the verdict to zero. 

In its Opinion on appeal, the Superior Court started with a note that the law favors jury verdicts and restricts trial court judge’s abilities to mold a verdict. 

The Superior Court rejected the trial court’s notation that, since there was no evidence of past medical expenses, the likelihood that the Plaintiff would incur in future medical expenses was “speculative.” The Superior Court noted that, often times, in motor vehicle accident cases, there are no claims for past medical expenses as the same are typically precluded. The court additionally noted that there was considerable evidence in this matter for the jury to conclude that the Plaintiff was injured and would require treatment in the future. 

Also, the Pennsylvania Superior Court noted that the question of whether the Plaintiff sustained a serious impairment of a bodily function was a separate question as to whether or not the Plaintiff had sustained injuries requiring future treatment. The Superior Court again noted that sufficient expert medical evidence was produced by the Plaintiff in support of the future medical expenses claim.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this Non-precedential decision may click this LINK.


It is noted that there are reports that a motion will be filed with the Superior Court to request that this decision be reissued as a precedential decision.

Friday, February 14, 2020

ARTICLE: POST-KOKEN UPDATE

Here is a copy of an article of mine that was published in the January, 2020 edition of Counterpoint, the official publication of the Pennsylvania Defense Institute. 

A copy of any of the opinions noted can be secured by typing the case name into the Search Box in the upper right hand corner of the Tort Talk Blog at www.TortTalk.com.  This will take you to the Tort Talk post(s) that review the case searched in which you will find a Link to the Opinion.



POST-KOKEN UPDATE


By



Daniel E. Cummins



Daniel E. Cummins is the managing partner of the Clarks Summit, PA law firm of Cummins Law. He is also the writer of the Tort Talk Blog and provides mediation services through Cummins Mediation.


Bifurcation of Trial

In the Post-Koken case of Pena v. Van Blargen and State Farm, No. 10185-CV-2016 (C.P. Luz. Co. Oct. 1, 2019 Gartley, J.), Judge Tina Polachek Gartley of the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas denied a tortfeasor Defendant's Motion to Bifurcate the Trial of third party negligence claims from the breach of contract and bad faith claims asserted against the UIM carrier. The decision was issued by Order only.

Effect of Third Party Release

In the case of Bonk v. American States Ins. Co., No. 3:18-CV-2417 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 1, 2019 Caputo, J.), the court declined to preclude a Plaintiff from pursuing a UIM claim based upon the language of the Release that the Plaintiff executed in the companion third party case.

The UIM carrier in this case argued that, because the third party Release referred to a release of liability in favor of “any and all persons” that Release amounted to a blanket barring of all claims given that the UIM claim was not exempted out.


More specifically, the Release at issue confirmed that the Plaintiff “release[d] and forever discharge[d] [the tortfeasor] and any other person, firm, or corporation charged or chargeable with responsibility of liability” from any and all claims and causes of actions arising out of the subject incident.

While the court agreed that the UIM carrier was indeed a firm or corporation, the court felt that the UIM carrier had not established how it had been “charged or chargeable with responsibility of liability” with respect to the third party matter. The court emphasized that the UIM carrier did not cover the tortfeasor. The language in the Release was read by the court as applying only to those parties that would be held accountable for causing the accident.

Notably, Judge Caputo declined to follow the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas decision in the case of Crisp v. Ace American Ins. Co., No. 150902953 (C.P. Phila. Co. 2017).
The court in this Bonk case noted that the language in the Release in the Crisp case released “any and all persons or entities whatsoever,” making that Release distinguishable in the court’s eyes from the Release in the Bonk case before it.

Effect of Third Party Release

In the case of Lane v. USAA General Indem. Co., NO. 18-537 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 18, 2019 Surrick, J.), the UIM carrier argued that a general release signed in a third party claim can be used by the underinsured motorist carrier to release an underinsured motorist claim, even when the UIM carrier paid no consideration.

The Plaintiff executed a release in the third party action which included language releasing “any other person, firms or corporations liable or who might be claimed to be liable.” The Court noted that the Release did not identify the UIM insurer directly.

In rejecting the carrier's position , the District Court relied, in part, upon the Pennsylvania Superior Court's decision in Sparler v. Fireman’s Ins. Co. of Newark, N.J., 521 A.2d 433 (Pa. Super. 1987), allocator denied, 540 A.2d 535 (Pa. 1988). The District Court noted that, “[u]nder Sparler, Plaintiff’s general release…..will not preclude Plaintiff from pursuing the present action against Defendant for UIM benefits because the executed release did not contain language unequivocally discharging Defendant from its contractual obligation to provide UIM benefits to Plaintiff.”

The District Court finds that the carrier's reliance on Buttermore v. Aliquippa Hosp., 561 A.2d 733 (Pa. 1989) to be distinguishable because Buttermore did not involve UIM benefits.
The Court also rejected the UIM carrier's reliance on the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas case of Crisp v. ACE Am. Ins. Co., 2017 Phila Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS 125 (Phila. Cnty. C.C.P. 2017) is because that case was not binding precedent.

Household Exclusion

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Gallagher v. Geico, 201 A.3d 131 (Pa. 2019), which served to invalidate the Household Exclusion in automobile insurance policies, was relied upon in a recent Lebanon County case to deny a Defendant carrier's Preliminary Objections.

In the case of Loose v. Pennsylvania National Mutual Insurance, No. 2019-00664 (C.P. Leb. Co., Oct. 23, 2019 Kline, J.), the court denied Penn National’s Preliminary Objection in a case in which a Plaintiff sought to a ruling to find the household exclusion invalid under the Gallagher decision.


In the Loose case, the Plaintiff was injured after being in an accident while on her husband’s Geico insured motorcycle. The Plaintiff received the underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage on the motorcycle.

The Plaintiff then made a claim on her personal UIM policy with Penn National that had stacked coverage.

Penn National attempted to limit Gallagher to the facts of the case, i.e., efforts to recover UIM coverage under two separate policies that had been issued by the same carrier. The trial court in Loose rejected the carrier's efforts to limit the scope of the Gallagher case.

Rather , the trial court in Loose held “that Gallagher's conclusion invalidating the Household Vehicle Exclusion as violative of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law shall be permissibly extended and applied as precedent to the issue at bar.”

It therefore appears, at least in Lebanon County where the Loose case was handed down, that having different companies providing UIM coverage under a given set of facts does not change the result that the Household Exclusion is invalid as a being violative exclusion is not valid. The trial court is now following the federal courts on this issue.

Household Exclusion

The Superior Court’s recent decision in the case of Kline v. Travelers, No. 104 MDA 2019 (Pa. Super. 2019 McLaughlin, J., Ford Elliott, P.J.E., Gantman, P.J.E.)(Op. By Gantman, P.J.E.), involved both the Sackett stacking issue as well as the issue of the retroactive effect of the Pennsylvania’s eradication of the household exclusion in the Gallagher v. GEICO decision.

The trial court had ruled in favor of the insured on the Sackett issue but against the insured on the household exclusion issue.  Travelers appealed the Sackett issue, and the insured appealed the household exclusion issue.

In this Kline case, the Superior Court found in favor of the insured on both issues, vacated the lower court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.

The case involved issues surrounding whether the Plaintiff-insured was entitled to stack his UIM coverage on two vehicles that had been added to his policy prior to the accident where the carrier did not secure new waiver of stacking forms from him. Another issue was whether the Plaintiff-insured was able to further stack coverage under a policy separately issued to his mother. As such, there were inter-policy and intra-policy stacking questions at issue in this case.

With regards to the Plaintiff-insured's own policy, the Court in Kline ruled that prior precedent under the Bumbarger supported its decision that the Plaintiff should be permitted to stack the coverages under his own policy.

Relative to the Household Exclusion and the retroactive effect of the Gallagher decision, the Court in Kline ruled that, as a general rule, appellate courts are required to apply the law as it exists as of the time of appellate review before the court. After applying the law of Gallagher, the court in Kline ruled that the Gallagher case rendered the Household Exclusion invalid such that the Plaintiff-insured could pursue stacked coverage that included the coverage under his mother's policy.

Future Medical Expenses

For the first time in a precedential Opinion, the Pennsylvania Superior Court addressed, in the case of Farese v. Robinson, 2019 Pa. Super. 336 (Pa. Super. Nov. 8, 2019 Lazarus, J., Kunselman, J., and Colins, J.)(Op. by Colins, J.), the somewhat recurring issue of whether a claim for future medical expenses in an automobile accident case must be reduced in accordance with the cost containment provisions under Act 6 (75 Pa.C.S.A. Section 1797) of Pennsylvania's Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL).


In this motor vehicle accident case, the jury entered a verdict in excess of $2.5 million dollars, of which $900,000 was an award for future medical expenses.

In the end, the Court in Farese held that future medical expenses did not need to be reduced in accordance with Act 6 before being presented to the jury. See p. 21-26 of Opinion.

Overall, the Court is Farese concluded that the limitations placed upon medical providers in terms of what they could charge for treatment of motor vehicle accident injuries (i.e., Act 6 reduced amounts) simply did not apply to claims for future medical expenses.

It is noted that this decision did not affect the rule of law that past medical expenses have to be reduced in accordance with Act 6 before being presented to a jury.

Friday, February 7, 2020

ARTICLE: Auto Decisions in 2019 Show That the Plaintiff's Day Has Come

This article of mine was recently published in The Pennsylvania Law Weekly and is republished here with permission:



Auto Decisions in 2019 Show That the Plaintiff’s Day Has Come

By Daniel E. Cummins | January 30, 2020


The past year was a banner year for the plaintiffs bar in terms of decisions from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court allowing for greater avenues of recovery. As a consequence, the past year will also turn out to be a boon for the auto accident defense bar in terms of more business with the need for further litigation going forward on recurring issues of note. In the end, with the decisions handed down over the past year by the appellate courts in this context, the days of cost containment are fading in the rear view mirror to the detriment of all Pennsylvania drivers who face the prospect of increased automobile insurance premiums down the road ahead.

The plaintiffs bar’s organized effort in past years to get their favored judicial candidates onto the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s bench is paying off in spades. The now more liberal, judicially activist court has been tossing the doctrine of stare decisis out the window and is instead relying upon soft, amorphous public policy rationales to cut down long-standing precedent and create new law with abandon, and at times, even with a vengeance. With several decisions over the past year, the Supreme Court has rewritten parts of the General Assembly’s Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL) with little regard for the checks and balances put in place by the Pennsylvania Constitution that places the law-making duties solely with the legislature.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s penchant for rewriting Pennsylvania law in the place of the legislature’s duty to do so has advanced so far to the point that even Justice David Wecht has strongly cautioned his counterparts in his increasingly frequent dissenting opinions that the majority’s “freewheeling and unwarranted invocation of ‘public policy,’” particularly in motor vehicle accident cases, “risks an appearance of jurisprudence that is arbitrary, unprincipled and ultimately illegitimate.” See Sayles v. Allstate, No. 58 MAP 2018 (Pa. Nov. 20, 2019).

Indeed, a new era of plaintiff-favorable jurisprudence is emerging in Pennsylvania that will alter how many important aspects of automobile accident claims will be handled in the future.

Seismic Changes in Motor Vehicle Accident Law

The year started off the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s earthquake of a decision in the case of Gallagher v. Geico, 201 A.3d 131 (Pa. Jan. 23, 2019), in which the court shook up the motor vehicle accident litigation world and held that the household exclusion contained in a Geico policy violated the MVFRL because it served as a “de facto waiver” of stacked coverage. In a stunning example of its judicial activism in favor of plaintiffs causes, the court noted that its decision in Gallagher not only applied to that case, but should also be read to eradicate the household exclusion across the board.

Over the course of the year, the scope of the Gallagher decision was expanded further by other federal and state courts in Pennsylvania. Just recently, in the case of Kline v. Travelers, No. 104 MDA 2019 (Pa. Super. Nov. 19, 2019), the Pennsylvania Superior Court ruled that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in Gallagher should be read to apply retroactively. This decision is important to the plaintiffs bar as it confirms that the already filed class action lawsuit, in which plaintiffs have asserted that they have been wrongfully denied coverage by the application of the household exclusion in prior claims, may proceed forward.

The plaintiffs bar scored yet another victory at the Pennsylvania Supreme Court level with in Sayles. The Sayles case involved the long-standing practice of automobile insurance companies periodically requesting its insureds to attend a medical exam in first party (PIP) medical benefits claims as required by the terms of the insurance policy.

The court, relying in part on alleged public policy concerns, accepted the plaintiffs’ argument in Sayles that such policy terms requiring insureds to submit to an exam or exams at the request of the carrier irreconcilably conflicted with 75 Pa.C.S.A. Section 1796 of the MVFRL, which is titled “mental or physical examination of a person.”

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, rejected the current practice of PIP insurers requesting its insureds to attend a medical examinations as per the provisions of the insurance policy agreed to by the parties and ruled that insurers must, instead, file a motion with a trial court judge and demonstrate good cause to support the request for the exam. Under this ruling, it will now be a trial court judge who will select the medical examiner and who will also set the parameters of the exam.

In light of the Sayles decision, motor vehicle accident litigators and trial court judges can unfortunately now expect a flood of motions followed by petty litigation over the selection of an appropriate doctor and the parameters of the exam. Unfortunately, in its haste to effectuate this change in the law, the Supreme Court in Sayles failed to provide trial court judges with any guidance on how to decide these more specific issues.

Over the past year, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did rule in favor of an auto accident law defense position put forth in at least the case of Safe Auto Insurance v. Oriental-Guillermo, 26 MAP 2018 (Pa. Aug. 20, 2019). In this case, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s decision upholding the validity of Safe Auto’s unlisted resident driver exclusion.

Under this exclusion, Safe Auto excluded from coverage under its policy those individuals who resided with the Safe Auto insured, but who was not related to the insured and who were not listed on the Safe Auto policy as additional drivers.

The Supreme Court agreed that this insurance contract provision was not ambiguous, did not violate Pennsylvania’s Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law, and did not violate Pennsylvania’s public policy.

Future Medical Expenses Claims in Auto Cases

Another notable appellate decision under Pennsylvania’s Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law was the case of Farese v. Robinson, 2019 Pa. Super. 336 (Pa. Super. Nov. 8, 2019).

In Farese, the Superior Court addressed the somewhat recurring issue of whether a claim for future medical expenses in an automobile accident case must be reduced in accordance with the cost containment provisions found under Act 6, 75 Pa.C.S.A. Section 1797, of the MVFRL.

In this motor vehicle accident case, the jury entered a verdict in excess of $2.5 million, of which $900,000 was an award for future medical expenses. The defendant had objected at trial to the plaintiff being permitted to argue to the jury the total amount of alleged future medical expenses anticipated as a result of the accident, as opposed to the plaintiff being limited to only asserting an Act 6 reduced amount of such expenses.

On appeal, the court in Farese held, in what appears to be the first appellate decision of its kind, that future medical expenses need not be reduced in accordance with Act 6 before being presented to the jury at trial.

As such, in motor vehicle accident cases, plaintiffs will now be allowed to put into evidence the full amount of future medical expenses their experts claim that the plaintiff will allegedly incur if they continue to treat after the litigation is concluded or settled, as opposed to the reduced amounts. This decision did not alter the rule under Act 6 requiring that past medical expenses be reduced.

Intoxication Evidence

In 2019, the Pennsylvania Superior Court provided its latest pronouncement on the admissibility of intoxication evidence in motor vehicle accident cases. In Livingston v. Greyhound Lines, No. 318 EDA 2017 (Pa. Super. April 29, 2019 Colins, J., Lazarus, J., Kunselman, J.) (Op. by Colins, J.), the Superior Court reiterated the rule of law that evidence of alcohol or drug consumption by a person involved in an accident is admissible only where there is evidence that reasonably shows intoxication and unfitness to engage in the activity at issue at the time of the accident.

The Superior Court noted that even an admission by the tortfeasor of admitted alcohol or drug use is subject to being excluded from evidence where the plaintiff fails to present evidence of chemical testing sufficient to show intoxication, or where the Plaintiff fails to present any other evidence of impairment. 

Trends in Auto Law Cases Over the Past Year

It has been over a decade since the Koken decision was handed down and there is still no body of appellate decisions to provide guidance to the trial courts and the bar on how to handle the variety of issues that arise from the pleadings stage to trial in motor vehicle accident cases involving both a tortfeasor defendant and an insurance company co-defendant. The lack of appellate decisions may be due, in large part, to the fact that most of these cases are being resolved through ADR proceedings at the trial level.

A continuing trend to watch in post-Koken matters is whether the trial courts will allow these types of cases that are heading to trial to proceed as a single trial of all claims, or will instead bifurcate these cases into separate trials, with one the trial proceeding against the tortfeasor and a separate trial with a separate jury proceeding against the insurance company providing the UIM benefits. The primary rationale in favor of bifurcation is that the third-party tortfeasor defendant would be protected from having to sit before the jury with an insurance company as a co-defendant and face the inherent prejudice created by such a scenario.

In the absence of any concrete appellate guidance, the trial courts continue to struggle with this issue so much so that the answer to whether any given case will be bifurcated may depend upon in which county court the case is pending, and possibly even which county court judge is deciding the issue.

In one example of a bifurcation decision from the past year, Judge Tina Polachek Gartley of the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas denied a tortfeasor defendant’s motion to bifurcate the trial of third-party negligence claims from the breach of contract and bad-faith claims asserted against the UIM carrier the post-Koken case of Pena v. Van Blargen and State Farm, No. 10185-CV-2016 (C.P. Luz. Co. Oct. 1, 2019).

A listing of some of the various county court decisions on this issue and other notable post-Koken issues can always be freely accessed on the post-Koken scorecard on the Tort Talk blog, which can be found at www.TortTalk.com.

Allegations of Recklessness/Punitive Damages

It has been long held under Pennsylvania law that punitive damages may only be pursued in motor vehicle accident cases involving outrageous facts. In Pennsylvania auto accident cases, punitive damages claims have largely been limited to cases involving DUI drivers, tractor trailer drivers, and, at times, to cases involving drivers who were using a cellphone at the time of an accident. For a recent decision of note in this regard from last year, see Santiago v. Yates, No. 2018-CV-4504 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Feb. 14, 2019 Nealon, J.).

There has recently developed two lines of decisions in Pennsylvania on whether allegations of recklessness should be stricken from complaints filed in ordinary motor vehicle accident cases. One line of Pennsylvania trial courts have ruled that, if there are not sufficient facts pleaded in the complaint to establish the outrageous conduct to support a punitive damages claim, then the allegations of recklessness should be stricken by way of preliminary objections.

The second line of cases, as evidenced in the decision in Nebesky v. Pagnotti, No. 2019-CV-3170 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Aug. 15, 2019 Gibbons, J.), hold that averments of recklessness are allegations pertaining to the state of mind of a defendant that, under the Rules of Civil Procedure, are permitted to be pleaded in a more liberal fashion. Courts ruling in this fashion will typically deny preliminary objections in this regard but also rule that the issue can be revisited at the summary judgment stage.

How a given court will rule on these types of preliminary objections will depend upon in which county the case is pending and how the judges in that county have ruled in the past.

Auto Law Cases to Watch

This article ends where it began. Just as they went after the household exclusion in the Gallagher line of cases, the plaintiffs bar has its sights set on cutting down the validity of the regular use exclusion. That exclusion holds that a carrier need not provide coverage when an insured was involved in an accident while operating a vehicle that was regularly available for the insured’s use but which was not covered under the insurance policy at issue.

The plaintiffs bar has been arguing, in part, that the application of the regular use exclusion also violates the statutory mandates requiring that the carrier secure executed forms for the rejection of stacked UM/UIM coverage from its insureds. Another argument has been made under the same public policy references that have proved successful with the Supreme Court in the past.

The defense bar rebuffed these arguments in the case of Barnhart v. Travelers, No. 2:19-CV-00523-MJH (W.D. Pa. Oct. 28, 2019 Horan, J.). Yet, in the case of Rush v. Erie Insurance Exchange, No. C-48-CV-2019-1979 (C.P. Northampt. Co. Oct. 1, 2019 Baratta, J.), the court accepted the plaintiff’s argument and denied a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by the carrier with respect to a regular use exclusion.

It is anticipated that the plaintiffs bar may try to push either of these cases (and any other plaintiffs’ causes) up the appellate ladder to secure their desired ruling from the liberal and judicially activist Pennsylvania Supreme Court. It is anticipated that the plaintiffs bar will rely upon public policy arguments given that there are decades of precedent already on the books upholding the regular use exclusion. It remains to be seen in this regard whether the battered and beaten down doctrine of stare decisis will make a comeback or not.



Daniel E. Cummins is a partner in the Scranton law firm of Cummins Law where he focuses his practice in automobile accident litigation matters.



Monday, November 11, 2019

Pennsylvania Superior Court Rules that Future Medical Expenses Claims Need Not Be Reduced by Act 6


For the first time in a precedential Opinion, the Pennsylvania Superior Court addressed, in the case of Farese v. Robinson, 2019 Pa. Super. 336 (Pa. Super. Nov. 8, 2019 Lazarus, J., Kunselman, J., and Colins, J.)(Op. by Colins, J.), the somewhat recurring issue of whether a claim for future medical expenses in an automobile accident case must be reduced in accordance with the cost containment provisions under Act 6 (75 Pa.C.S.A. Section 1797) of Pennsylvania's Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL).

In this motor vehicle accident case, the jury entered a verdict in excess of $2.5 million dollars, of which $900,000 was an award for future medical expenses.

In the end, the Court in Farese held that future medical expenses did not need to be reduced in accordance with Act 6 before being presented to the jury.  See p. 21-26 of Opinion.

Although the Pennsylvania Superior Court noted that it came to its decision "pursuant to [its] review of all available writings" or decisions on this issue, the Court did not review the decision by Judge Terrence R. Nealon in the Lackawanna County case of Orzel v. Morgan (in which I was the defense counsel).  Here's a LINK to a 2011 Tort Talk blog post in which the Orzel case was reviewed and analyzed along with the Kansky case out of the Federal Middle District Court of Pennsylvania.  It is questionable at best as to whether the Pennsylvania Superior Court would have reached a different decision in the Farese case even if they had reviewed the same as part of their analysis.

Overall, the Court is Farese concluded that the limitations placed upon medical providers in terms of what they could charge for treatment of motor vehicle accident injuries (i.e., Act 6 reduced amounts) simply did not apply to claims for future medical expenses.

Anyone wishing to review the Farese decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney Scott B. Cooper of the Harrisburg, PA office of Schmidt Kramer for bringing this decision to my attention.

Monday, April 22, 2019

Several Notable Civil Litigation Decisions Pertaining to Expert Testimony


Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas recently issued several decisions of note heading into a medical malpractice trial in the case of The Pennsylvania Trust Co. v. Wilkes-Barre Hosp. Co., LLC, et al., No. 17 - CV - 4655 (C.P. Lacka. Co. April 12, 2019 Nealon, J.).

The case arose out of claims of alleged negligent neonatal care.  Plaintiff's counsel in the case was Attorney Matthew A. Casey of Ross Feller Casey, LLP out of Philadelphia.

Reduction of future medical costs to present value prohibited

In a decision found at this LINK, Judge Nealon addressed issues pertaining to the reduction of future medical expenses to present value.  In this matter, the Plaintiff asserted a pre-trial objection to the defense economists expert from repeatedly referencing the amounts of future medical and/or life care costs in terms of the present value of the costs.

Judge Terrence R. Nealon
Lackawanna County
After pointing to 80 years of Pennsylvania precedent, as well as MCARE precedent, confirming that future medical cost claims are not to be reduced to present value in (non-automobile accident) civil litigation matters, the court granted the Plaintiff's motion in limine in this regard and held that the defense economist expert was precluded from referencing the reduction of the Plaintiff's future medical and/or life care costs to present value.

Expert testimony on need for future medical care allowed

Under a separate detailed Order found at this LINK, Judge Nealon addressed the issue of the presentation of expert testimony on likelihood of future medical care.  The defense objected to the Plaintiff's expert's proposed testimony in this regard as speculative and inappropriate.  Citing to a number of cases, the court overruled the defense's objection and allowed the opinion on the basis that experts are permitted to offer their opinions as to the future treatment required by a Plaintiff's injury or condition based upon facts in evidence that the jury would be warranted in relying upon.

References to learned treatises is hearsay in Pennsylvania state court (but allowed in a limited fashion)

In yet another pre-trial detailed Order found at this LINK, the court addressed objections by the Plaintiff to the defense expert's plan to reference medical publications in his opinion.

The court pointed out that, unlike the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence do not recognize an exception to the hearsay rule permitting the admission of a learned treatise as substantive evidence on a limited basis.  Judge Nealon even pointed to a Superior Court decision from a week ago in which that Court held that reading a passage from a treatise into evidence in an effort to prove the truth of the matter asserted therein amounts to inadmissible hearsay which is not changed by the fact that the passage is read by an expert.  See Order at p. 2 citing Hassel v. Franzi, 2019 WL 1512346 at *5 (Pa.Super. 2019).

Yet, the court also noted that experts may refer to treatises to explain the reasoning behind the expert's opinion as long as limiting instructions are provided by the court to ensure that the reference to the treatise does not come in as substantive evidence on the point made.

As such, Judge Nealon crafted a result in this matter by granting part, and denying in part, the Plaintiff's motion.  Under the Order, the defense expert would be permitted to reference certain treatises or publications but the court would issue limiting instructions to confirm that the referenced passages were not coming into the case before the jury as substantive evidence.

Friday, January 18, 2019

Personal Injury Medical Expenses and Wage Loss Evidentiary Issues Addressed by Pennsylvania Superior Court


In the case of Mader v. Duquesne Light Co., No. 609 W.D.A. 2018 (Pa. Super. Nov. 30, 2018 Murray, Bender, Shogan, J.) (Op. by Murray, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court addressed several trial issues pertaining to damages in a personal injury matter.   In the end, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part the trial court’s granting of post-trial motions after a verdict in favor of the Plaintiff.  

The court noted that Stipulations between the parties as to the amount of recoverable medical expenses are binding upon the court as well as upon the parties reaching such a stipulation. As such, the Superior Court ruled that an award of stipulated medical expenses was supported by the record.

The court also found that the jury’s award for future medical expenses was reasonable, even though it was closer to the projections offered by the defense in evidence.  

The Superior Court noted that the jury apparently resolved the conflicts in the testimony and found the Defendant’s evidence on future medical expenses to be more credible.   As such, the Superior Court found that the trial court’s granting of a new trial based upon alleged inadequacy of the future medical expenses award was an abuse of the trial court’s discretion.  

The court also noted that the granting of a new trial on one category of damages does not, in and of itself, justify a new trial on a different category of damages.   

In that regard, relative to the wage loss claims, the Superior Court found that, since the experts of both parties testified as to the Plaintiff’s inability to perform his job following the accident, the court found that the jury’s failure to award any lost wages to the Plaintiff justified a new trial in this particular category of damages.  

While the Superior Court found that an alleged failure on the part of the Plaintiff to seek alternative employment following an accident and thereby mitigate the damages alleged, can justify a lower award for wage loss, such evidence did not support a finding that the Plaintiff should not be awarded any wage losses at all.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK. 

I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia offices of Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention. 

Tuesday, October 30, 2018

Recoverability of Future Medical Expenses in an Auto Accident Case Addressed


A number of civil litigation trial issues were reviewed in the case of Farese v. Robinson, No. April Term 2015 1084 (C.P. Phila. Co. Sept. 6, 2018 Kennedy, J.), including the issue of how to handle a claim for future medical expenses in a motor vehicle accident matter.  

The case arose out a rear-end motor vehicle accident.   The case proceeded to trial and a jury entered a verdict in excess of $2.5 million dollars in favor of the Plaintiff.   The Defendants filed post-trial motions which brought about this Rule 1925 Opinion by the trial court judge.  

With respect to the Plaintiff’s claims for future medical expenses, defense asserted that a new trial on damages was necessary given that the Plaintiffs introduced evidence concerning future medical costs without reducing those costs in accordance with the cost containment provisions of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (“MVFRL”), or Act 6.  

The trial court rejected the Defendant’s position as well as the defense’s reliance upon the case of Pittsburgh Neurosurgery Assoc’s v. Danner, 733 A.2d 1279 (Pa. Super. 1999), as the court found that that case was limited by the Superior Court to an application to past medical bills that had already been incurred by an injured party for treatment that had already been provided.  

Instead, the trial court relied upon the case of Moorehead v. Crozer Chester Medical Center, 765 A.2d 786 (Pa. 2001).  Also, the trial court also noted that the medical bills in this case that were presented to the jury had apparently already been subjected to the cost containment provisions of the MVFRL.   

The trial court in this case of Farese noted that its Opinion was that future medical costs are not considered “payable” within the meaning of §1722 or §1797 of the MVFRL.    The court believed that to claim that bills for medical services not yet performed should be considered “capable of being paid” in this context, “creates an unpersuasive logical fallacy.”   The court noted that, to rule otherwise, would create confusion as any medical service not yet performed would be considered “payable.”  

This particular court believed that future medical costs can only exists as being “not payable” under §1797.  

Practically speaking, the trial court found that the Plaintiff’s expert life care planner had properly opined as to the future cost of medical care under the “usual and customary charge(s)” mandated by 75 Pa. C.S.A. §1797(a).   The expert offered his opinion at trial that life care planners base protections on future medical care upon the usual and customary costs going into future because it is too speculative to know what reimbursements will be from month-to-month.

In entering its ruling, the Farese court pointed to the Federal Middle District Court decision of Kansky v. Showman, No. 3:09-cv-1863, 2011 WL 1362245 (M.D. Pa. April 11, 2011 Munley), in which that Federal District Court held that future medical bills are not “payable” as future medical payments are not currently outstanding and able to be paid and given that Defendants cannot guarantee that any future medical expenses will in fact be paid.    That court ruled that the payment of future medical expenses is merely speculative as a carrier could become bankrupt or could deny future medical bills for a variety of reasons.  [However, neither the Farese court nor the Kansky court pointed out that whether a Plaintiff will actually undergo future medical treatment once they settle their case or secure a verdict is speculative as well].   

The Kansky court held that, because the insurance benefits are not necessarily due and owing at the time of a trial and given that nothing could compel a carrier to pay a lump sum for future medical expenses, a Plaintiff’s future medical bills cannot be considered to be “payable” under Act 6.  

The Farese court followed this reasoning in its own decision and denied the defense’s request for a new trial based upon the handling of the future medical expenses claim at trial.  

Here is a LINK to the "Future Medical Expenses" Label, which can always be freely access down the right hand column of the Tort Talk Blog at www.TortTalk.com to access blog posts on this particular troublesome and unsettled topic.

The Farese decision is also notable in that the trial court held that the expert testimony offered by the Plaintiff from a neuro-radiologist was not considered to be cumulative when compared to the other expert medical evidence offered by the Plaintiff.   The court felt that the expert’s expertise in the area of neuro-radiology allowed that doctor to provide a nuanced opinion of the injuries sustained by the Plaintiff that better explained the injuries to the jury in a manner different then that from the Plaintiff’s other medical experts.  

The Farese court also addressed the issue of Defendant’s Motion for Remittitur against the Plaintiff’s substantial verdict.   In this regard, the court provided a detailed analysis of the current state of Pennsylvania law in addressing claims that a jury’s verdict is allegedly excessive.  

In the end, this court found that the jury’s award for damages was not excessive and did not shock the judicial conscience.  

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  

Source:  “Digest of Recent Opinions” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (Oct. 16, 2018).   

Monday, January 30, 2017

Another Court Applies Collateral Source Rule to Attempted References to Affordable Care Act in Civil Litigation Matters

In a recent decision out of the Western District Federal Court of Pennsylvania in the case of Welker v. Carnevale, No. 3:14-cv-149 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 13, 2017 Gibson, J.) (Mem. Op.), the court granted a Plaintiff’s Motion to Preclude the defense from presenting expert opinions and calculations based upon the Affordable Care Act with respect to the Plaintiff’s alleged damages for future life care cost.  

The Plaintiffs, relying upon several decisions from the state and federal courts, asserted that evidence of coverage under the Affordable Care Act is barred by the collateral source rule.  

The defense argued that the collateral source rule is inapplicable to the Affordable Care Act and that the decision cited by the Plaintiff was not binding upon this court.   The Welker court noted that while, to date, Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not weighed on this particular issues, several other courts upheld that calculations related to the Affordable Care Act are barred by the collateral source rule under Pennsylvania law.  The Welker court cited with a “see” signal the cases of Bernheisel v. Mikaya, No. 3:13-cv-01496, 216 W.L. 4211897 (M.D.  Pa. 2016); Cordes v. United States, No. 2:13-cv-547, 215 W.L. 10986360 (W.D. Pa. 2015); Deeds v. Univ. of Pennsylvania Medical Center, 110 A.3d 1009, 1013, reargument denied (2015) appeal dismissed sub. nom.  Deeds ex rel. Renzulli v. University of Pennsylvania Medical Center, 128 A.3d 764 (Pa. Super. 2015).  

While the Welker court agreed that none of these cases were binding upon it, nor was the issue discussed in any great detail in any of those opinions, the Welker court still found the decision to be instructive and was not persuaded that these decisions were wrongly decided.   

In a footnote, the Welker court also noted that the decisions issued in the above cited cases were issued prior to recent political events “which cast the long-turn existence of the ACA into doubt.   The case for excluding calculations based upon the ACA is only stronger now.”  

 
Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  

 
I send thanks to Attorney Scott Cooper of the Harrisburg office of Schmidt Kramer for sending this case to my attention. 

 

 

Monday, December 12, 2016

Federal Middle District Court Judge James M. Munley Addresses Admissibility of Insurance Information at Post-Koken Trial

In his recent December 8, 2016 Opinion in the case of Rodkey v. Progressive Direct Ins. Co., No. 3:16-CV-454 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2016 Munley, J.), Judge James M. Munley addressed the issue of the admissibility of insurance information at a Post-Koken trial.

This matter arose out of an uninsured motorist claim brought by a Plaintiff who was allegedly the victim of a hit-and-run accident.

In pre-trial motions in limine, the defense sought to preclude evidence of the amounts of premiums the Plaintiff had paid for her uninsured motorist benefits insurance as well as evidence of the amount of uninsured motorists benefits available under the policy.  The court denied both motions and ruled that the Plaintiff was allowed to present this evidence at trial.

The court found such evidence to be relevant to the breach of contract claim stated.  Judge Munley also rejected the defense argument that the admission of such evidence would cause confusion and/or be prejudicial. The court felt that any potential confusion or prejudice could be addressed by way of jury instructions and argument of counsel.

The court otherwise ruled on a separate motion that the plaintiff would be allowed to pursue a recovery of her co-pays and deductible related to medical expenses as those expenses were not "paid or payable" as defined by Pennsylvania's Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility law.

Anyone wishing to review Judge Munley's decision in the Rodkey case may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Scott Cooper of the Harrisburg, PA law firm of Schmidt Kramer for bringing this decision to my attention.


To view another, prior decision by Judge James M. Munley in the case of Noone v. Progressive on the admissibility of insurance information in Post-Koken trial matters, click HERE.

To view an Eastern District Federal Court decision in the case of Lucca v. GEICO going the other way and ruling that such information was not admissible, click HERE.

With this split of authority, the hope remains that this issue, and other important Post-Koken issues will go up the appellate ladder and become the subject of published appellate court opinions to provide guidance to the bench and the bar.


Friday, November 4, 2016

Judge Nealon of Lackawanna County Addresses Admissibility of Affordable Care Act to Challenge Claim of Future Medical Expenses in a Malpractice Action

In his recent decision in the case of Vaccaro v. Scranton Quincy Hospital Company, LLC, No. 2014-CV-7675 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Oct. 24, 2016 Nealon, J.), Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas addressed the issue of the admissibility of the Affordable Care Act to challenge a Plaintiff’s future life care plan damages evidence.  

This matter pertains to an obstetrical and hospital negligence claim.   The Defendant-obstetrician filed a Motion In Limine seeking leave of court to introduce evidence and cross-examine the Plaintiffs’ economic damages experts on the provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, which requires individuals to purchase health insurance and establish limits for annual out-of-pocket expenses.

The defense asserted that these new health insurance provisions provide grounds to reconsider and renounce the common-law collateral source rule that bars evidence of any payments made by a collateral source on behalf of a Plaintiff.  

Judge Nealon noted that, although Section 508(a) of the MCARE Act generally bars a Plaintiff from recovering damages for past medical expenses that are covered by a collateral source Section 509, governing claims for future medical expenses, does not contain comparable language abrogating the collateral source rule for future medical expenses claims.  

Judge Nealon also noted that the only relevant appellate precedent issued by the Pennsylvania Superior Court in the case of Deeds v. University of Pennsylvania Medical Center, 110 A.3d 1009 (Pa. Super. 2015), appeal dismissed, 128 A.3d 764 (Pa. 2015),  resulted in a decision that referenced to the Affordable Care Act’s provisions in malpractice litigation constitutes “a patent violation of the collateral source rule.” 

Accordingly, Judge Nealon denied the Defendant’s Motion In Limine.  


Anyone wishing to review Judge Nealon's decision in Vaccaro may click this LINK.

Wednesday, July 15, 2015

Quoted in a Recent Article in The Legal Intelligencer on the Impact of Obamacare On the Defense of Medical Expenses Claims in Civil Litigation Matters


Here is a LINK to a recent July 2, 2015 Legal Intelligencer article by Max Mitchell entitled "Can Affordable Care Act Ruling Help the Defense Bar?"

The article outlines the debate on the possible effect of the United States Supreme Court's ruling upholding the validity of Obamacare upon the ability of defense counsel in civil litigation matters to attack claims for recoveries for future medical expenses by asserting that the Plaintiff may have health insurance pursuant to Obamacare.

If you are unable to access the article online, please let me know at dancummins@comcast.net and I will email you a copy.

Wednesday, July 1, 2015

Judge Mariani Reviews Propriety Award of Meds and Wages in a Premises Liability Personal Injury Case

In Wright v. Cacciutti, 3:12-cv-1682 (M.D. Pa. June 11, 2015 Mariani, J.), Judge Robert D. Mariani ruled on post-trial motions in a premises liability personal injury case and covered several important damages issues.

The court ruled that, under the Moorehead line of cases, the jury's award for past and future medical expenses could not be upheld given that the plaintiff had failed to establish the reasonable value of such expenses at trial.  The court noted that the plaintiff failed to offer either evidence of the actual cost of any past medical expenses, or proof of the reasonableness of those expenses.   As such, the jury's award in this regard was rejected as being impermissibly based upon pure speculation.

This Wright decision is also notable for the court's striking of the jury's award of damages for future medical care.  In this matter, the plaintiff did not introduce any evidence of the cost of future medical treatment, or expert testimony as to the necessity of any future medical care.  Judge Mariani noted that the issue of whether or not future medical care is necessary under the circumstances requires expert testimony in order to present this type of claim to a jury.  

Judge Mariani also upheld the settled rule that a plaintiff's own testimony is sufficient to support a claim for lost income, and may be used by the jury to infer an amount of future lost income.  

Anyone wishing to review this decision by Judge Mariani, may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney Jim Beck of the Philadelphia office of Reed Smith.  Attorney Beck is the creator of the excellent Drug and Device Law Blog which can be viewed HERE.


 

Friday, April 10, 2015

Recurring Medicare Liens and Settlement Payment Issue Arises Again

In a Memorandum  Opinion out of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Villare v. GEICO Casualty Company, NO. 14-2288 (E.D. Pa. March 24, 2015 Baylson, J.), the court addressed a Plaintiff’s Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement where the carrier was insisting upon confirmation with respect to any Medicare Liens prior to releasing the settlement draft.

Following a settlement conference the parties settled an underinsured motorist (UIM) for $100,000.  The letter confirming the settlement included an agreement “to satisfy any and all liens being asserted in this matter with these settlement funds.”  After the Release was sent, a dispute arose as to whether the insurance company could require that confirmation be obtained that there is no Medicare lien and that no Medicare liens will exist in the future. 

The Plaintiff filed a motion to enforce the settlement when the carrier would not settle the case without the letter. The Plaintiff provided an agreement to indemnify and hold harmless and also affidavits pertaining to the Medicare issue. 

The court granted the Plaintiff's motion to enforce the settlement.  Interestingly, at footnote 5 the court noted that if the carrier "seeks certainty that Medicare will never assert a lien, the Court is doubtful that Medicare could or would provide such a guarantee with regard to the unknown, hypothetical costs for future medical care that may or may not occur.” 

Anyone desiring a copy of this decision may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.

I send thanks to Attorney Scott Cooper of the Harrisburg, PA law firm of Schmidt Kramer for bringing this case to my attention.


Commentary:

This decision supports an argument that requests for confirmation of possible future Medicare liens will not be upheld.  This decision also appears to be another example of a type of case were the court will not allow a payment of a settlement amount to be held up by a demand for the production of a Final Medicare Lien Letter first if that contingency was not a part of the pre-settlement negotiations. 

Keep in mind, however, that other court decisions have held that where the carrier makes specific demands, during the course of settlement negotiations, that a Final Medicare Lien Letter will have to be produced prior to the issuance of a settlement draft, such a demand will be upheld as a part of the meeting of the minds in the settlement process.

For other Tort Talk blog posts on this recurring issue, click HERE.


Friday, March 20, 2015

Judge Kosik of PA Federal Middle District Court Addresses Interplay Between Future Medical Expenses Claim and Medicare

As Tort Talkers may recall, a hot topic trending right now under Pennsylvania civil litigation law is the interplay between alleged damages for future medical care and the collateral source doctrine.
 
For other Tort Talk posts covering this area of the law click HERE and HERE.

This issue came up in the Federal Middle District of Pennsylvania case of Coyne v. Midland Steel Warehouse, No. 3:13-CV-02728 (M.D.Pa. Feb. 20, 2015 Kosik, J.), in which the Plaintiff’s expert intended to offer testimony that Plaintiff’s gross future medicals were around $150,000. 
 
However, according to defense counsel, at the time of the accident, and obviously going forward, Plaintiff, due to her age, was Medicare eligible.  Defense counsel reported that Medicare had actually paid for the Plaintiff's medical care up to the time of trial and was asserting a lien for a fraction of the gross cost. 

Based upon this scenario, the defense filed a Motion in Limine in which the following issues were raised. 
 
First, the defense sought to have the alleged future medicals capped to the Medicare amount.
 
Second, and in the alternative, permission was requested by the defense to cross-examine the Plaintiff’s expert on the Medicare amount.
 
Third, the defense additionally requested permission to produce a rebuttal expert to discuss the Medicare pricing of the alleged future medical care.

According to the copy of the Order only (without Opinion) secured from this case, Judge Kosik granted the defense motion in part and permitted the defense to cross-examine the Plaintiff’s expert and/or call a Medicare expert. 
 
According to defense counsel, the case settled on the eve of trial.
 
The prevailing defense counsel on the motion in Coyne was Attorney John Croumer of the Lancaster, PA office of Post & Schell and I send thanks to him for bringing this notable decision to my attention.
 
Anyone desiring a copy of the Order in question, may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.