Showing posts with label Limited Tort. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Limited Tort. Show all posts

Tuesday, September 2, 2025

Who Bears the Burden of Proving a Plaintiff is Covered by the Limited Tort Option?


In the case of Rogers v. Blair, No. 2:24-CV-01534-ETH (E.D. Pa. July 28, 2025 Hey, M.J.), a federal magistrate judge addressed the issue of how to resolve a dispute over whether or not a motor vehicle accident Plaintiff was covered under the limited tort option.

In this matter, on the issue of whether the Plaintiff was covered under the limited tort option or the full tort option, the record revealed that the only evidence in the case was that the Plaintiff testified at his deposition that he was unsure as to which coverage he selected.

The court ruled that, because the issue of the limited tort defense is considered an affirmative defense, Defendants bear the burden of proving a limited tort election. In this regard, the court cited to the case of Sanderson v. Cruz, U.S., 88 F. Supp. 2d 388, 392 (E.D. Pa. 2000). The court also noted that a Plaintiff’s uncertainty as to which coverage he or she may have selected is not determinative on the issue. In this regard, the court cited with a “see” signal Vaughan v. Williams, 725 EDA 2023, 2024 WL 1231352, at *3-5 (Pa. Super. 2024) (affirming trial court’s decision finding that Plaintiff elected limited tort as a matter of law, focusing its analysis on the signed tort election form and associated policy documents, as opposed to phone call transcripts and oral statements).

In this Opinion, the court noted that the Plaintiff’s decision to raise this limited tort election issue through a Motion In Limine rather than through an earlier a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, combined with the absence of the relevant insurance documents, rendered the resolution of this matter ill-time given that it was presented on the eve of trial. 

As such, the judge denied the Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine to have the Plaintiff deemed to be full tort as a matter of law.  Presumably, the defense was going to be permitted to present evidence a trial through an insurance representative as to the Plaintiff’s election of a limited tort choice.

In another decision of note in this Opinion, the court barred a Defendant in a rear-end motor vehicle accident from arguing at trial that the Plaintiff was not injured in the accident given that both parties had acknowledged, through expert testimony, that the Plaintiff had indeed sustained some form of injury.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The court's companion Order can be viewed HERE.


Source: “Article – “Defendant Can’t Argue Rear-End Crash Didn’t Result In Injuries, Pa. Fed. Court Rules Citing Defense Expert Report” By Riley Brennan The Legal Intelligencer (July 30, 2025).

Source of image:  Photo by Niki Nikitaxnikin on www.pexels.com.

Thursday, February 6, 2025

Vehicle Damages Photos From Accident Were Not Authenticated and, Therefore, Not Allowed


In the case of Moore v. Nordland, June Term, 2020, No. 01679 (C.P. Phila. Co. Nov. 19, 2024 Turner, J.), the court issued a Rule 1925 Opinion asking the Superior Court to affirm the trial court Order denying the Defendant’s Motion for Post-Trial Relief following a motor vehicle accident.

A primary issue in this case raised by the Plaintiff was whether the court erred in precluding photographs of the vehicle that were involved in the accident.

According to the Opinion, during cross-examination, both Plaintiffs confirmed that they could not recall or remember if the photographs of the vehicles presented to them fairly and accurately depicted the condition of the vehicles following the accident. Accordingly, the court found that, based upon the testimony of the Plaintiff, the Defendant was unable to authenticate the photographs.

During the direct examination of the Defendant, defense counsel again attempted to authenticate the photographs. However, when asked whether the photographs depicted the way to the Plaintiff’s vehicle following the accident, the Defendant testified, “Yes, I mean, there’s nothing different from what I’m seeing in these pictures compared to what I saw there on Cheltenham Avenue,” where the accident happened. The Defendant also testified that the photograph of the Plaintiffs’ vehicle “looks like the exact same vehicle that I was in the accident with that afternoon–evening.”

The trial court judge wrote in her Opinion that the Defendant failed to testify that the photographs fairly and accurately depicted the vehicles following the accident. Rather, the Defendant only testified that the vehicle in the photograph was the same vehicle he was in the accident with. The court noted that the Defendant was unable to confirm that the photographs fairly and accurately depicted the damage, or lack of damage, to the vehicles following the accident.

Based upon the testimony of all of the parties, the court found that the photographs were not properly authenticated and, as such, did not allow the Defendant to admit the photographs into evidence or to publish them to the jury.

In so ruling, the court cited to “Pa. R.E. 901(a), which pertains to authentication of evidence. The court additionally cited to the case of Com. v. Loughnane, 128 A.2d 806, 814 (Pa. 2015), for the proposition that a photograph “may be authenticated by testimony from a person who has sufficient knowledge that the photograph fairly and accurately reflects what the proponent is purporting the photograph to reflect.” 

Here, the court noted that, while photographs of vehicles were certainly relevant, and may be admissible, in this case, the Defendant failed to properly authenticate the photographs. The court additionally noted that, “most importantly,” there was no testimony as to who took the photographs, when the photographs were taken, and whether any repair work had been done to the cars following the accident but before the photos were taken.

Also of note with regards to this decision, the court found that the Plaintiffs’ testimony regarding the accident, their injuries, and the residual impact of the injuries on the injured Plaintiff’s life, along with the Plaintiff’s expert testimony, provided the jury with sufficient testimony and evidence to make a determination as to whether or not the limited tort Plaintiffs’ injuries were “serious” such that the pierced the limited tort threshold.

Here, there is evidence that the Plaintiffs sustained soft tissue injuries to her cervical, thoracic, and lumbar spine regions along with disc protrusions and herniations in her neck and mid-back and low back. The court also noted that the Plaintiffs testified in detail as how the injuries impacted their everyday lives.

Accordingly, the trial court requested the appellate court to affirm the trial court’s denial of the Defendants’ Motion for Post-Trial Relief in this regard.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (Jan. 16, 2025).

Source of image:  Photo by Victor Moragriega on www.pexels.com.

Wednesday, February 5, 2025

Trial Court Judge Creates a Remedy for a Bad Limited Tort Election Form


In what appears to be the first decision of its kind, in the case of Thomas v. Nguyen, No. 231003324 (C.P. Phila. Co. Jan. 30, 2025 Padova, J.), the court agreed with a Limited Tort Plaintiff that a tort election form provided by the carrier was defective and that, therefore, the Plaintiff should have the remedy of being deemed to be a Full Tort Plaintiff instead.

In this case, the Plaintiff argued that a Liberty Mutual Insurance standard Tort Election Form that Liberty Mutual had secured from the Plaintiff and which purported to indicate that the Plaintiff had knowingly elected the Limited Tort option, was defective. The Plaintiff argued that the form was defective in that it deviated, in several areas, from the language required by 75 Pa. C.S.A. §1705(a) for such tort election forms.

The trial court judge agreed with the Plaintiff and found not only that the tort election form was defective, but that its defective nature rendered the form invalid, which therefore rendered the Plaintiff a Full Tort Plaintiff.

The court rejected the defense argument that the statute at issue did not provide for any remedy for instances in which a tort election form is different from the language required by the statute.

As stated, the court in this case found that the discrepancies were sufficient in quantity and quality to allow the court to rule that the Plaintiff in this case should be deemed to be a Full Tort Plaintiff. The trial court stated that, here, the Plaintiff was not making a free and informed choice as to the tort election where the carrier’s form did not include alll of the required statutory language, most crucially when describing the parameters of the Limited Tort option to a customer purchasing automobile insurance.

The court stated that the statute at issue, 75 Pa. C.S.A. §1705(a)(3), is clear that, when no tort election is made the insured is presumed to have chosen the Full Tort option. Here, the court found that, given that the Plaintiff had signed a Limited Tort option form without being accurately informed as to the meaning of a limited tort election by way statutorily prescribed language, the Plaintiff effectively made no valid tort election under the statute.

The court rejected the defense argument that the deviations from the statutory language were de minimus. 

The court also noted that, if an insurance company was permitted to deviate from the language required by the language when describing the tort options, and still have the insured’s subsequent choice constitute a valid tort election form, then the statutory provisions §1705 would have no effect.

As such, the court granted the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and provided the remedy not found in the statute that, where the language of the tort election form so substantially deviates from the statutorily required language for such forms, an insured customer of the insurance company should be deemed to be covered by the Full Tort option even though the Limited Tort Option was selected on the form.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney John H. Aitchison, of the law office of Steven L. Chung, in Philadelphia for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Cytonn Photography from www.pexels.com.

Tuesday, April 5, 2022

Plaintiff Driving Uninsured Vehicle Found To Be Full Tort Because Involved in Accident With a Vehicle Registered in Another State


In the case of Devoue v. American Sitework, LLC, No. 2:20-CV-06003-KSM (E.D. Pa. March 4, 2022 Marston, J.), the court addressed whether or not a Plaintiff should be considered to be a limited tort Plaintiff or a full tort Plaintiff under a given set of circumstances.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff was driving an uninsured vehicle when he was allegedly injured in an accident that occurred when pebbles allegedly fell from the back of the Defendant’s vehicle which was registered in New Jersey.

Ordinarily, under Pennsylvania law, the Plaintiff would be deemed to be a limited tort Plaintiff under §1705(a)(5) because he was the owner of a registered but uninsured vehicle.

However, in this case, the court held that, in the third party case, the Plaintiff would be considered a full tort Plaintiff under §1705(d) because the Plaintiff was allegedly injured as a result of the alleged negligence of a driver of a vehicle that was registered in another state. As such, the court ruled that the Plaintiff need not show that he sustained a serious injury in order to cover non-economic damages.

A review of the court’s detailed Order revealed that the court came to this conclusion through its construction of the statutory language.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Scott B. Cooper of the Harrisburg, PA law firm of Schmidt Kramer P.C., for bringing this case to my attention.


Source of image:  Photo by Michael Fousert on www.unsplash.com.

Tuesday, September 28, 2021

Summary Judgment Denied in Limited Tort Case


In the case of Cialella v. Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 10469-CV-2018 (C.P. Lawr. Co. June 10, 2021 Motto, J.), the court denied a Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment based upon limited tort defenses in a motor vehicle accident case.

The court ultimately ruled that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether or not the Plaintiff has sustained a serious injury.

According to the record before the court, the Plaintiff’s treating doctors diagnosed the Plaintiff with a cervical radiculopathy, cervicalgia, a lumbosacral strain, rotator cuff tendonitis, and a transient synovitis. During the course of her care, the Plaintiff received injections to treat the injuries to her cervical spine, elbow, and shoulder.

The Plaintiff’s medical expert also offered his opinion that the Plaintiff sustained permanent injuries and that she would require future treatments, including an annual radiofrequency ablation procedures and three (3) cervical epidural steroid injections every year for her cervical spine complaints.

The trial court in this matter reviewed the factors set forth under the care of Washington v. Baxter, 719 A.2d 733 (Pa. 1998).

In addition to reviewing the Plaintiff’s injuries and treatment, the court also noted that, after the accident, the Plaintiff had to quit her job as a housekeeper due to her limitations that prevented her from performing her duties. The Plaintiff did return to a part-time housekeeping job but alleged that she was limited to part-time work due to her left arm issues. The Plaintiff additionally testified that she could no longer enjoy her hobby of painting with arm pain.

As noted above, the court found that genuine issues of material fact prevented the entry of summary judgment on the limited tort defense.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions.” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (Sept. 7, 2021).


Source of image:  Photo by Jackson Simmer on Unsplash.com.

Thursday, May 13, 2021

Issues of Fact Preclude Entry of Summary Judgment in Limited Tort UIM Case



In the case of Depretis v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 2:20-CV-02193-JP (E.D. Pa. April 14, 2021 Padova, J.), the court denied a carrier’s Motion for Summary Judgment based upon the Plaintiff’s selection of the limited tort option in an underinsured motorist benefits matter.

After reviewing the current status of the law regarding the standard of review with respect to the limited tort question and whether or not a Plaintiff sustained a serious injury as a result of the subject accident, the court rejected the defense argument that the Plaintiff’s case, at best, only showed that the Plaintiff suffered a minor aggravation of pre-existing injuries to his neck and shoulder. The defense argued that, although the Plaintiff testified as to an aggravation of his previous injuries to his neck and shoulder, the medical records allegedly showed that the Plaintiff was suffering from the same impairments shortly before the accident occurred.

The defense also asserted that the absence of any evidence showing any serious damage to the Plaintiff’s vehicle (a dent to the rear bumper that the Plaintiff did not have repaired) supported the defense argument that the Plaintiff did not suffer any serious impairment of bodily function as a result of the subject accident. The court noted that it would draw an adverse inference that the Plaintiff’s vehicle did not sustain serious damage given that the Plaintiff failed to produce photographs of the vehicle’s damages and failed to explain the reason for his failure to produce that information.

The defense additionally relied upon an IME report in support of its limited tort defense.

The court noted that the Plaintiff had otherwise presented sufficient medical evidence and testimony to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether or not he sustained a serious injury as a result of the subject accident. As such, the question was left for the jury to consider.


Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions.” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (April 29, 2021).

Wednesday, May 12, 2021

Lycoming County Court Precludes Expert Testimony Regarding Future Medical Expenses in MVA Case; Also, Limited Tort Motion Denied



In the case of Swank v. Greenaway, No. 19-CV-1830 (C.P. Lyc. Co. March 15, 2021 Linhardt, J.), the court issued a detailed Order regarding issues raised in Pre-Trial Motions In Limine by a Defendant in a limited tort motor vehicle accident case.

On one issue, the Defendants sought to preclude two of the Plaintiff’s expert witnesses from testifying at trial regarding the estimated cost of future care. The Defendants asserted that these experts based their opinions on insufficient methodology and data that was inherently unreliable. More specifically, the Plaintiff’s experts projected the future costs of the Plaintiff’s medical procedures based solely upon pricing data secured from Fairhealth.org.

The court noted that Fair Health was a non-profit entity that collected data and managed a database of privately billed health insurance claims. The court held that the data at issue could not be the sole basis for an expert opinion on future medical costs given the issues with how Fair Health came to reach its final calculations and data.

As such, the Defendant’s Motion In Limine regarding information secured from Fairhealth.org was granted.

In the Defendant’s second Motion In Limine, the Defendants sought to preclude the Plaintiff from pursuing non-economic damages based upon an argument that the Plaintiff had elected the limited tort option and had not established that a serious injury had been suffered.

The court noted that the Plaintiff alleged that she sustained a herniated disc and shoulder injuries as a result of the accident, which injuries allegedly affected her ability to perform her everyday activities including chores, self-care, hobbies, personal relationship activities, and work activities.

The court denied this Motion and stated that the issues should have raised by way of a Motion for Summary Judgment. In any event, the court found the factual issues led the court to conclude that reasonable minds on a jury could differ on the issue of whether or not the Plaintiff sustained a serious injury. As such, the Defendant’s second Motion In Limine was denied.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions.” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (April 6, 2021).






Tuesday, March 2, 2021

Plaintiff's Securing of Retroactive Full Tort Coverage After an Accident Allowed To Stand



In the case of Maola v. Monsour, No. 10337 of 2019, C.A. (C.P. Lawr. Co. Dec. 16, 2020 Motto, P.J.), the court addressed various limited tort issues.

The first issue the court addressed was whether the Plaintiff was covered by the limited tort option.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff had full tort coverage under her initial automobile insurance policy. When the Plaintiff later changed insurance agents, the Plaintiff expressed that she wished to continue to have full tort coverage. However, the form signed by the Plaintiff included a limited tort election.

The Plaintiff did not discover this mistake until after the accident. She contacted her carrier to see what can be done to remedy that situation. The Plaintiff was advised by the carrier that she could obtain full retroactive coverage if she paid the back premiums and executed a full tort election form. The Plaintiff complied with these requirements and the carrier provided her with full tort coverage that was retroactive to the date prior to the subject accident.

In this matter, the defense asserted that the retroactive application of full tort coverage was not permissible after an accident had already occurred.

The Plaintiff responded by asserting that she had complied with the terms set by her own insurance carrier such that she should be entitled to full tort coverage.

The court acknowledged that Pennsylvania case law holds that a limited tort elector was generally prohibited from retroactively obtaining full tort coverage after an accident had occurred. 

However, in this matter, the Plaintiff’s carrier was not necessarily prohibited from providing the Plaintiff with retroactive full tort coverage. In this case, the Plaintiff offered evidence that she had explicitly requested her new insurance agent to provide her with full tort coverage and that the issuance of a limited tort policy was based upon a mistake. The court also emphasized that the record established that it was the Plaintiff’s intention to have full tort coverage and that she met her own insurance company’s requirements for that retroactive coverage.

As such, Judge Motto found that the Plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of full tort coverage at the time the accident occurred. Accordingly, the court ruled that the Plaintiff was a full tort Plaintiff relative to this matter. 

The court also noted that the Plaintiff had offered sufficient evidence to allow her claim of serious injury to proceed to a jury in any event. The Plaintiff allegedly experienced neck, chest, knee, shoulder, and ankle pain. She also underwent multiple types of diagnostic testing and therapy. The record further established that the Plaintiff had continuously reported her pain as being severe and she offered testimony as to how the pain affected her activities of daily living.

The court emphasized that the focus of the limited tort question was not on the injuries themselves but upon how the injuries affected the Plaintiff’s ability to perform her everyday activities.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions.” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (Feb. 2, 2021).

Monday, October 19, 2020

Superior Court Upholds Jury's Verdict for Future Medical Expenses in Limited Tort Case Even Though No Serious Injury Found


In the Non-precedential decision in the case of Darwish v. Einspahr, No. 2588-EDA-2019 (Pa. Super. Sept. 24, 2020 Bowes, J., Shogan, J., and Pellegrini, J.) (Mem. Op. by Bowes, J.) [non-precedential], the Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed a trial court decision that had found that the $50,000.00 verdict on future medical expenses in a limited tort motor vehicle accident case was proper even though the jury did not find serious impairment. 

The trial court had vacated and molded the jury verdict in favor of the Plaintiff from an award of $50,000.00 to $0. As noted, on appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court vacated that ruling and remanded the case for entry of judgment on the jury’s verdict. 

In its Opinion, the Superior Court affirmed that the jury found that the limited tort Plaintiff did not suffer a serious impairment of body function, but had awarded the Plaintiff $50,000.00 in economic damages to compensate her for future medical expenses. 

Following the trial, the Defendant asserted that the award of future medical expenses should be overturned because the evidence presented to the jury in that regard was speculative and that the jury’s award of such money was against the weight of the evidence, equivocal, and contrary to law. The Defendant also asserted that, since the jury determined that the Plaintiff did not sustain a serious impairment of a bodily function, the jury’s award of future medical expenses was grossly excessive and shocked one’s sense of justice. As noted, the trial court agreed and reduced the verdict to zero. 

In its Opinion on appeal, the Superior Court started with a note that the law favors jury verdicts and restricts trial court judge’s abilities to mold a verdict. 

The Superior Court rejected the trial court’s notation that, since there was no evidence of past medical expenses, the likelihood that the Plaintiff would incur in future medical expenses was “speculative.” The Superior Court noted that, often times, in motor vehicle accident cases, there are no claims for past medical expenses as the same are typically precluded. The court additionally noted that there was considerable evidence in this matter for the jury to conclude that the Plaintiff was injured and would require treatment in the future. 

Also, the Pennsylvania Superior Court noted that the question of whether the Plaintiff sustained a serious impairment of a bodily function was a separate question as to whether or not the Plaintiff had sustained injuries requiring future treatment. The Superior Court again noted that sufficient expert medical evidence was produced by the Plaintiff in support of the future medical expenses claim.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this Non-precedential decision may click this LINK.


It is noted that there are reports that a motion will be filed with the Superior Court to request that this decision be reissued as a precedential decision.

Wednesday, May 27, 2020

Summary Judgment Granted in Limited Tort Case in Monroe County



In the case of Schmidt-Ramirez v. Burger,  (C.P. Monroe Co. N0. 9595-CV-2015 (C.P. Monroe Feb. 27, 2020 Williamson, J.), Judge David J. Williamson granted a defendant's summary judgment motion in a Limited Tort case.

According to the Opinion, the Limited Tort Plaintiff claimed that she suffered a concussion as a result of a 2014 motor vehicle accident that resulted in continuing symptoms, including headaches.  The Plaintiff also claimed that she had difficulty thinking, was "scatter brained," which affected her school work and job prospects.

However, the Court noted that the record confirmed that the Plaintiff was able to complete high school and earn a degree from Pace University.  The Plaintiff also confirmed during her deposition that she was gainfully employed.

The court also noted that the record revealed that the Plaintiff had not treated in the past six years for her complaints.

In granting the defense motion on the Limited Tort issue, Judge Williamson also noted that the Plaintiff did not present any expert testimony regarding the alleged long-term effects of the Plaintiff's concussion and how it allegedly affected her life.

Notably, Judge Williamson also rejected the Plaintiff's constitutional challenge of the Limited Tort law in Pennsylvania.

Anyone wishing to review this decision may click this LINK.

Source:  Article:  "Auto Accident Case Dismissed for Failure to Prove Serious Injury" by P.J. D'Annunzio of the Pennsylvania Law Weekly (March 24, 2020).

Thursday, April 30, 2020

Summary Judgment in a Limited Tort Case Upheld on Appeal



In non-precedential decision in the case of Francisco v. Ludwig, No. 689 MDA 2019 (Pa. Super. March 25, 2020 Lazarus, J., Stabile, J., and Dubow, J.) (Mem. Op. by Lazarus, J.) (non-precedential), the court affirmed the entry of summary judgment by the trial court in favor of a Defendant who was involved in a nine (9) vehicle chain reaction collision. 

The summary judgment motion is based, in part, on the fact that the Plaintiff had failed to timely respond to the moving Defendant’s New Matter and Request for Admissions such that all averments and requests contained therein were deemed admitted. The Plaintiff did eventually file a Reply to the New Matter and Responses to the Request for Admissions. 

After finding that the Plaintiffs’ Reply and Responses were untimely, the court deemed the pertinent factual issues to be admitted and, as a result, granted the summary judgment motion and dismissed the Plaintiff’s case. On appeal, this decision was affirmed by the Superior Court. 

The court noted that the Plaintiff’s procedural missteps in the case, included the waiver of certain issues on this appeal, could not be saved by an application of Pa. R.C.P. 126 which calls for the liberal construction of the Rules of Civil Procedure. 

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney Walter A. McClatchy, Jr., of the Philadelphia law firm of Walter A. McClatchy, Jr. & Associates, for bringing this case to my attention. 

Thursday, April 2, 2020

Summary Judgment Denied in Limited Tort Case



In the case of Braniff v. Hartjei, No. 11022-CV-2017 (C.P. Lawrence Co. Aug. 12, 2019 Cox, J.), the court denied a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment based upon the Plaintiff’s election of the Limited Tort option.

After reviewing the law of the case of Washington v. Baxter, the court in this Braniff case noted that the Plaintiff alleged that the accident caused bulging discs and a radiculopathy with respect to her cervical spine. It was noted that the Plaintiff’s cervical spine range of motion decreased following the accident. The Plaintiff additionally complained that she could no longer sit or stand for prolonged periods of time.

The Plaintiff also asserted that her ability to ride in a car was hampered. She additionally noted that her ability to perform the duties of her job, which required her to train other people, was limited.

At her deposition, the Plaintiff also noted that she had difficulty performing her household chores, such as doing the laundry. She additionally testified to having to give up some of her recreational activities.

The court also noted that the Plaintiff was continuing to receive treatment for her injuries from the accident and that surgery was a possibility in her future.

In denying the Defendant’s limited tort Motion for Summary Judgment, the court emphasized that the focus of the inquiry was not on the injuries themselves, but on how the injuries affected the Plaintiff’s bodily functions. The court additionally reaffirmed the rule of law that any alleged impairments did not have to be permanent in order to be considered serious in the context of a limited tort case.

As the court found that reasonable minds could differ on the issue of whether the Plaintiff had sustained a serious injury or a substantial body impairment as a result of the accident, the Motion for Summary Judgment was denied.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (Feb. 11, 2020).

*     *     *     *     *

CONTACT CUMMINS LAW TO DEFEND YOUR LIMITED TORT CASE
www.CumminsLaw.net

dancummins@CumminsLaw.net






Friday, July 12, 2019

ARTICLE: Quandary on Whether Limited Tort or Full Tort Applies to Uber Drivers



The below article of mine was published in the July 2, 2019 edition of the Pennsylvania Law Weekly and is republished here with permission:

Quandary on Whether Limited Tort or Full Tort Applies to Uber Drivers



By Daniel E. Cummins | June 27, 2019
Pennsylvania Law Weekly

As the use of Uber and Lyft rideshares become more prevalent in Pennsylvania, it is more likely that motor vehicle accidents involving such drivers will increase and thereby give rise to novel issues of law.

One such issue is whether an Uber or Lyft driver who has elected the limited tort option under his own personal automobile insurance policy will be deemed to be a full tort plaintiff if he is involved in an accident while driving as an Uber or Lyft driver. The quandary in this regard is whether the Uber or Lyft driver’s use of his own personal vehicle for business purposes triggers an exception to the limited tort option.

Limited Tort

Under the tort option statute found at 75 Pa.C.S.A. Section 1705, carriers are required to secure from their customers a written election of either full tort coverage or limited tort coverage whenever a personal automobile insurance policy is sold.

Full tort coverage, sold at a higher premium, allows an insured to pursue a claim for noneconomic damages, otherwise known as pain and suffering damages, without regard for the types of injury sustained by the plaintiff.

On the other hand, with limited tort coverage, an insured will pay a lower premium but, in exchange, agrees that he cannot recover pain and suffering damages unless and until the injured insured shows that he has sustained a serious injury as a result of the accident. A serious injury in this context is a injury that results in a substantial impairment of a body function, serious permanent disfigurement or death.

The grey area for Uber and Lyft drivers is this—where person has chosen the limited tort alternative, there is an exception to the rule where that driver is operating a commercial vehicle as opposed to a “private passenger vehicle.” The question as to whether the use of a personal vehicle as an Uber or Lyft vehicle changes that private vehicle into a commercial vehicle has not been answered by the statutory law or the courts of Pennsylvania to date.

Status of Uber or Lyft Drivers

The legal issue of the tort option coverage applicable to Uber and Lyft drivers is complicated by the fact that such drivers use their personal vehicles in different capacities at different times. The lingo in the field is that Uber and Lyft drivers have different periods, or types, of driving statuses.

Period 1 is considered to be when the driver is driving their vehicle only in a personal capacity and without regard to the fact that they, at other times, are “on the app” and looking for fares to pick up as Uber or Lyft drivers.

Period 2 is when an Uber or Lyft driver is “on the app” and ready and willing to pick up a fare to drive somewhere but has not yet been summoned and when the driver has been summoned and is on the way to pick up the fare.

Period 3 is considered to be when the Uber or Lyft has a customer in the car as a passenger.

Statutes on Uber/Lyft Insurance

The statutory law pertaining to the mandatory requirements for insurance coverages for Uber and Lyft drivers can be found at both 66 Pa.C.S.A. Section 2601, et al., and 53 Pa.C.S.A. Section 57A01, et al., and is titled “Transportation Network Companies.”

The new law defines what a transportation network company is and identifies the relevant driver(s) included under the ambit of the statute. This new law also outlines a list of qualifications and standards that the company must meet before being permitted to operate in the commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

In addition, the law provides for the mandated minimums for liability insurance coverages and first-party benefits coverages depending on which scenario applies.

These scenarios include where the driver of the vehicle does not have passengers and is logged into the transportation network company network (presumably applying to the situation where the driver is on the way to pick up a fare), and where the driver of the vehicle does have passengers.

It is suggested that automobile accident litigators should review these statutes to become aware of these mandatory minimum liability coverages and first-party insurance coverages. These coverages were reviewed in a Nov. 16, 2017, Pennsylvania Law Weekly article titled “New Law: Mandated Coverages for Uber and Lyft Vehicles” by Daniel E. Cummins and Stephen T. Kopko.

According to Uber’s website, companies that are issuing these types of insurance policies include, at a minimum, James River Insurance Co., Progressive, Allstate and Farmers Insurance.

What the new law does not cover is the limited tort vs. full tort question for the separate insurance policies that are issued specifically for Uber and Lyft drivers over and above the personal automobile insurance such drivers may already have on their vehicles.

As such, there may be certain Uber and Lyft drivers who have elected the limited tort option under their personal automobile insurance policy and who have additional insurance Uber or Lyft-type policies for their commercial or business use of their vehicle that are silent on the tort option question.

A Requirement of Statutory Construction

Given that there is no statutory law or case law on point to answer the question presented, it appears that, if faced with the issue of whether an Uber or Lyft driver who has elected the limited tort option should nevertheless be considered a full tort plaintiff, the courts will have to engage in a construction of the statutes in place as compared to the insurance policies in question.

To the extent that a review of this question of law requires the court to interpret Pennsylvania’s Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law, the courts can be guided by the Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S. Sections 1501-1991.

Pursuant to the Statutory Construction Act, the object of all statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the General Assembly’s intention. When the words of a statute are clear and free from ambiguity, the letter of the statute is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.

Turning to the applicable statutes, under 75 Pa.C.S.A. Section 1705(d)(3), it is provided that “an individual otherwise bound by the limited tort election shall retain full tort rights if injured while an occupant of a motor vehicle other than a private passenger motor vehicle.”

Under 75 Pa.C.S.A. Section 1702, a ‘private passenger motor vehicle’ is defined as a “four-wheel motor vehicle, except recreational vehicles not intended for highway use, which is insured by a natural person and … is a passenger car neither used as a public or livery conveyance nor rented to others …”

Under these statutory provisions, it is likely that a court would rule that a car or truck used by an Uber or Lyft driver is obviously a “four-wheel motor vehicle” that is “insured by a natural person” by virtue of the driver’s personal automobile insurance coverage. See 75 Pa.C.S.A. Section 1702.

However, according to the same statutory language, the vehicle would fall out of the scope of the definition of a private passenger vehicle whenever that vehicle is “used as a public or livery conveyance.” A livery is otherwise known as a vehicle for hire.

Therefore, it would appear that, if faced with the issue, the courts could find that, although an Uber or Lyft driver had selected the limited tort option under their own personal policy, such a driver would nevertheless be deemed to be a full tort plaintiff if involved in an accident while the driver had a passenger in the car as a paying fare on a particular trip.

However, a wrinkle in this regard is that it could also be argued that, once the car is being used as a livery or a hired car, then that vehicle would fall within a business use exception under the personal automobile insurance policy such that that personal policy would not be applicable to the accident.

This would leave the plaintiff with only the Uber or Lyft liability policy in place under which no tort option election is apparently required. Such a plaintiff driver may then arguably have no tort option election in place and may, as a result, be found to be covered by the full tort option.

It also appears that, if a limited tort Uber or Lyft driver, was not “on the app” and was driving their vehicle solely for personal reasons, that driver would still be a limited tort plaintiff if involved in an accident on that particular trip.

Other grey areas in this regard involve those cases where the Uber or Lyft driver is driving around while “on the app” waiting for a fare to contact them for a ride as well as when the Uber or Lyft driver has received a message from a fare and is on the way to pick up that person for a ride. The courts may struggle with these scenarios in determining whether that Uber or Lyft driver should be deemed a limited tort or full tort plaintiff where that driver had previously elected the limited tort option.

In the end, it will surely be interesting to see how these novel areas of law pertaining to motor vehicle accidents involving Uber and Lyft drivers begin to play out in the courts across the commonwealth.

Daniel E. Cummins is a partner in the Scranton law firm of Foley, Comerford & Cummins where he focuses his practice in automobile accident litigation matters.

Copyright 2019. ALM Media Properties, LLC. All rights reserved.

Monday, June 25, 2018

Limited Tort Motion for Summary Judgment Denied in Lawrence County

In the Lawrence County case of Mason v. Petrone, No. 11084-CV-2016 (C.P. Lawrence Co. May 17, 2018 Motto, P.J.), President Judge Dominick Motto of the Lawrence County Court of Common Pleas denied a limited tort Motion for Summary Judgment.   In this regard, the court ruled that there were issues of fact that were best left for a jury to determine.  

The court additionally ruled that the Plaintiff was not barred from seeking damages for pain and suffering under the Tort Claims Act on the basis that she allegedly did not have evidence of a permanent injury.  In this regard, the court again noted that issues of fact remain and also emphasized that the expert reports were not yet due in the case.  

This matter arose out of a motor vehicle accident during which the Plaintiff struck by an operator who was responding to an emergency at the time of the accident.  

Among other injuries, the Plaintiff suffered a fractured ankle and bruising along the right side of her back. The Plaintiff primarily treated with an orthopedic surgeon and underwent physical therapy.  

After reviewing the settled law pertaining to the need of a Plaintiff to prove a permanent injury in a case against a government agency, as well as the current status of limited tort law in Pennsylvania, the court denied the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment in these respects.

Anyone wishing to read this case may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney Garth Gartin, Esquire of the Pittsburgh office of Simon and Simon, P.C. for bringing this case to my attention. 




Tuesday, May 15, 2018

Limited Tort Motion for Summary Judgment Denied in Lackawanna County

In his recent Opinion in the case of Borick v. Manley, No. 2013-CV-994 (C.P. Lacka. Co. April 4, 2018 Gibbons, J.), Judge James A. Gibbons of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas denied a Defendant’s Limited Tort Motion for Summary Judgment.  

According to the Opinion, the defense argued that the Plaintiff did not sustain any serious injury as a result of the accident.  In support of this argument, the defense asserted that the Plaintiff did not lose consciousness as a result of the accident and that no airbag deployed.   It was also asserted that the Plaintiff refused an ambulance at the scene of the accident.  The defense additionally noted that the Plaintiff left the scene of the accident and proceeded to drive to work, after which she subsequently had her mother drive her to the emergency room.  

The defense also asserted that the Plaintiff was diagnosed in the emergency room with only cervical and thoracic strain injuries.   Thereafter, the Plaintiff underwent diagnostic studies, including x-rays, MRIs, and an EMG test, all of which returned normal results.  

Although the defense conceded that the Plaintiff continued to assert ongoing and chronic neck and back pain, it was the defense position that the Plaintiff’s allegations alone coupled with a lack of long-term diagnosis confirmed by any medical record, rendered the Plaintiff’s case barred by her Limited Tort selection.   As additional support for its argument, the defense also pointed to its IME report.  

In opposition, the Plaintiff emphasized the injuries and treatment alleged and also asserted that the injuries sustained were serious injuries as allegedly demonstrated by the impact of the accident upon the Plaintiff’s life.   In particular, the Plaintiff asserted that, following the accident, she was unable to work in her position as a pharmacy technician and/or as a bartender, given that she was allegedly no longer able to remain on her feet for extended periods of time due to her injuries.   The Plaintiff additionally noted difficulties in driving, lifting, exercising, performing household activities, walking her dog, and other activities of daily living.  

Judge James A. Gibbons
Lackawanna County
Based upon the record before it, and viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party as required by the Motion for Summary Judgment standard of review, Judge Gibbons found that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the Plaintiff sustained a serious injury.   As such, the court denied the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and allowed the case to proceed to trial.  

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


    

Wednesday, December 27, 2017

The 2017 TORT TALK TOP TEN



Here is the annual 2017 Tort Talk Top Ten--an annual listing of notable cases and important trends in Pennsylvania civil litigation law over the past year as highlighted in Tort Talk blog posts:

1.         Elements of a Bad Faith Claim
In its decision in the bad faith case of Rancosky v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., No. 28 WAP 2016 (Pa. Sept. 28, 2017), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, for the first time, considered the elements of a bad faith claim under 42 Pa.C.S.A. Section 8371.

The Supreme Court adopted the two-part test enunciated in the case of Terletsky v. v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 649 A.2d 680 (Pa. Super. 1994), which provides that a plaintiff must present clear and convincing evidence of (1) that the carrier did not have a reasonable basis for denying benefits under the policy, and (2) that the carrier knew of or recklessly disregarded its lack of a reasonable basis.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court went on to confirm that evidence of a motive of self-interest or ill will was not a prerequisite for a Plaintiff to prevail on a statutory bad faith claim. 

The Majority Opinion written by Justice Baer can be reviewed HERE.

Chief Justice Saylor's Concurring Opinion can be viewed HERE.

Justice Wecht's Concurring Opinion can be viewed HERE.


2.         Evidence of Intoxication




In the case of Coughlin v. Massaquoi, No. 32 EAP 2016 (Pa. Sept. 28, 2017), which arose out of a motor vehicle v. pedestrian accident matter, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declined to adopt a bright-line rule of predicating the admissibility of a person's blood alcohol content (BAC) on the existence of independent corroborating evidence of intoxication.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the admissibility of BAC evidence remains within the trial court's discretion based upon the general rules of admissibility found in the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence 401-403, and the trial court's related assessment of whether the evidence establishes the party's unfitness to act in light of the alleged intoxication.

The Court's Majority Opinion, Concurring Opinion, and Dissenting Opinion can be viewed at this LINK.


3.         Attorney-Client Privilege

In the case of BouSamra v. Excela Health, 2017 Pa. Super. 66 (Pa. Super. March 13, 2017 Bowes, Stabile, Musmanno, J.J.) (Op. by Bowes, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the granting of a motion to compel surrounding a memorandum prepared by counsel for the defendant that was shared with an outside public relations firm.

The court found that the attorney/client privilege for that memorandum was waived when the client shared the Memorandum with the outside public relations firm.  It was noted that the public relations firm was not a part of the team offering legal advice.  

The court also found that the work product protection was waived for the same reason.  

In its opinion, the Pennsylvania Superior Court stated that the waiver doctrine analysis is essentially the same for both the attorney/client privilege and the work product privilege.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.   


4.         Use of Powerpoint at Trial

In the case of W.C. v. Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 2017 Pa. Super. 356 (Pa. Super. Nov. 13, 2017 Panella, Ransom, Fitzgerald, J.J.) (Op. by Panella, J.), the court ruled that allowing counsel to use powerpoint slides as a visual aid during closing argument was not an abuse of discretion by the trial court.   This was particularly so given that the court found that the slides did not misrepresent the evidence presented at trial.

The Superior Court also held that the powerpoint slides were permissible in the Closing Argument even though the slides had not been admitted into evidence.

Notably, the court also held that opposing counsel had no right to review the materials used in an opponent’s closing argument prior to the presentation of the same.  

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


5.         Dead Man’s Rule

The Pennsylvania Superior Court’s provided its latest take on the Dead Man’s Statute, 42, Pa. C.S.A. 5930 in the case of Davis v. Wright, 2017 Pa. Super. 48 (Pa. Super. Feb. 27, 2017 Shogan, Ott, J.J., Stevens, P.J.E.)(Op. by Stevens, P.J.E.).

In this matter, arising out of a fatal motor vehicle accident, the Pennsylvania Superior Court found that Dead Man’s Statute was not waived by the Defendant’s participation in discovery when no depositions or Interrogatories were completed.  

The court additionally noted that this defense under the Dead Man’s Statute did not need to be raised as an affirmative defense in a New Matter pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 1030 in order to be preserved.  
Moreover, the court otherwise noted that the issues of negligence in this automobile accident case could not be established by the testimony of a police officer who did the accident report but who had no independent recollection of the incident.   

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


6.         Statute of Limitations for a UM Arbitration Case



In the case of Bristol v. Erie, No. 124 MAP 2016 (Pa. Nov. 22, 2017) (Maj. Op. by Mundy, J.) (Wecht, J., Dissenting) the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the statute of limitations in an uninsured motorist case does not begin to run until there is an alleged breach of the insurance contract, i.e., the denial of a claim or a refusal to arbitrate.

 This was a 6-1 decision with Justice David Wecht dissenting on procedural grounds.

The Court delineated the specific issue before it as involving the question of when the statute of limitations begins to runs for a court action in an uninsured (UM) motorist claim arising out of an automobile insurance policy containing an arbitration agreement. 

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that this was an issue of first impression in its Court.

The Bristol decision reverses the Pennsylvania Superior Court's previous ruling in Hopkins v. Erie, which held that the statute of limitations in an uninsured motorist (UM) benefits claim begins to run on the date of the accident.

In its analysis, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that the mandates of Pennsylvania statute of limitations law provide that the statute of limitations begins to run from the time a cause of action accrues or arises. 

The Supreme Court noted that a cause of action in a UM context accrues or arises when a carrier is alleged to have breached its contract of insurance.  The Court more specifically held that an uninsured motorist (UM) claim begins when a carrier denies the claim or refuses to arbitrate.

Given that the carrier had not denied coverage or refused to arbitrate in this particular case, the court ruled that the lower courts had erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the carrier on its statute of limitations argument.

The Majority Opinion from Bristol can be read HERE.

Justice Wecht's Dissenting Opinion can be viewed HERE.


7.         Cell Phone Use in a Motor Vehicle Accident



Another recurring issue in civil litigation matters that continued over the past year is the extent to which cell phone use by a defendant during the course of an accident can support a claim for punitive damages.

In a detailed Order issued by Judge Kimberly J. McFadden of the Northampton County Court of Common Pleas in the case of Figueroa v. Ferraira, No. C-48-CV-2017-833 (C.P. Northampton Co. June 8, 2017 McFadden, J.), the court allowed a claim punitive damages to proceed beyond the Preliminary Objections stage in a case where the Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant rear ended the Plaintiff's vehicle at a red light at an excessive rate of speed and while texting.

The court noted that the defense retained the right to revisit the issue at the summary judgment stage should it be determined that the Plaintiff had not produced evidence in support of this claim.

Anyone wishing to review this decision may click this LINK.

In the Federal Court case  of Knecht v. Balanescu, No. 4:16-CV-00549 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 2017 Mehalchick, Mag. J.), the court held that evidence of a plaintiff’s cell phone use and texting was sufficiently close to the accident as to be admissible at trial.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


8.         Limited Tort

In its latest review of limited tort law in the case of Vetter v. Miller, 2017 Pa. Super. 64 (Pa. Super. March 10, 2017) (Ransom, J., Ford Elliot, P.J.E., Stephens, P.J.E.) (Op. by Ransom, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the trial court's decision that a Plaintiff's insomnia did not amount to a serious impairment of a body function for a limited tort Plaintiff under the facts presented.  


This decision was also notable for the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s analysis of what types of motor vehicle accident related criminal charges may be admissible in a subsequent civil case.   The court noted that all motor vehicle code violations are not of equal gravity.  

The court in Vetter more specifically noted that, while evidence of a conviction of driving while intoxicated may be admissible if supported by ample evidence of intoxication, a guilty plea of driving with a suspended license was only a summary offense that should not have been admitted in the court below.

 Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK. 

9.         Post-Koken Issues

A number of recurring issues in Post-Koken automobile accident matters continued to be litigated across the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 

There continues to be an almost equal split of authority amongst the trial courts across Pennsylvania on whether a Post-Koken litigation should be severed or bifurcated into two separate matters, one being the third party negligence action and the second being the breach of contract UIM litigation. 

The trend in the non-bad faith cases appears to be to allow the cases to remain together during the course of discovery but there remains a split of authority on whether the cases should be bifurcated for purposes of trial.

To date, other than the Pennsylvania Superior Court case of Stepanovich v. McGraw and State Farm, which touched upon the issue but did not definitively decide the issue, there has been no appellate guidance on the issue of severance or bifurcation.  The Stepanovich decision suggests, but did not decide, that Post-Koken claims could be tried together. 

Unfortunately, in 2014, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court inexplicably denied allocatur in Stepanovich, thereby squandering a great opportunity to provide the bench and the bar with much needed guidance on important Post-Koken issues.

In Post-Koken cases involving bad faith claims, there is still no appellate guidance on severance or bifurcation and/or stay orders relative to the bad faith claims.  There is a split of authority amongst the trial courts, but the federal courts seem to be trending towards denying motions to sever and stay bad faith claims.

Please check out the Tort Talk Post-Koken Scorecard at this LINK to review the cases in this regard.


10.       Jury Instructions in Post-Tincher Products Liability Cases

Here is a LINK to a set of Products Liability Suggested Standard Jury Instructions drafted by members of the Products Liability Committee of the Pennsylvania Defense Institute and which has been published in the October, 2017 edition of Counterpoint, a PDI publication.   The Committee was led in this regard by William J. Ricci, Esquire, C. Scott Toomey, Esquire, and James M. Beck, Esquire.

These suggested jury instructions were drafted in response to the proposed instructions for products cases issued in the summer of 2016 by the civil instructions subcommittee of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court Committee for Proposed Standard Jury Instructions.


The debate over proper instructions for products cases arises out of the differing opinions as to the import and analysis of the Tincher v. Omega Flex case.