Attorney Faulted For Submitting Brief with AI Hallucinations

Examples of attorneys getting trouble for utilizing AI tools for legal research and then not checking the accuracy of the information gathered has occurred in Pennsylvania.  Inaccurate information secured from AI sources are known as hallucinations.

In the Pennsylvania federal court case of Jakes v. Youngblood, No. 2:24-cv-1608 (W.D. Pa. June 26, 2025 Stickman, J.), the court faulted an attorney for submitting briefs with wholly fabricated quotations from case law, including fabricated quotations from this court’s own prior Opinion. 

The court faulted that attorney for not only failing to offer any explanation for the deficiencies and fabrications in his own brief, but for also attacking the content of the opposing party’s brief, which the court noted did not contain any fabricated quotations or misrepresented case law. 

The court also noted that, “[e]ven more outrageously,” a review of the AI-happy attorney’s reply brief demonstrated that that brief also contained fabricated quotes and misrepresented case law.

The court noted that it found it to be “very troubling” that, when accused of serious ethical violations, the attorney at fault “chose to double down” and not admit to wrongdoing. 

In the end, the court noted that it viewed the attorney’s “conduct as a clear ethical violation of the highest order.” 

In its Opinion, the court noted that the attorney at fault had filed a Withdrawal of Appearance in response to the issues presented.

This Pennsylvania federal court cited to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 as confirming that attorneys have legal and ethical duties owed to the court in terms of filings presented to the Court. The court also cited to Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3 regarding candor toward a tribunal.

In its Opinion, the court presumed that the at fault attorney’s briefs were constructed by generative artificial intelligence utilized by the attorney, rather than an effort by the attorney to personally construct false and misleading information. Regardless, the court noted that the attorney still had an ethical obligation under Rule 11 and the state’s professional canons to review every document submitted to the court under their name and signature in order to ensure the accuracy of the document.

The court also noted that, an attorney who signs and files a brief authored by a non-lawyer, such as a paralegal or an intern or a clerk, is personally responsible for all that the filing contains. The court noted that the same rule applies to the use of artificial intelligence.

In the end, the Jakes court dismissed the filings presented by the at fault attorney and ordered that attorney to show cause as to why his filings should not be viewed as having violated Rule 11 and Pa. RPC 3.3.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK

Source of image:  Photo by Igor Omilaev on www.unsplash.com.

Another Pennsylvania Attorney Sanctioned by Court for Submitting Inaccurate Citations Apparently Secured From AI Resarch

In another Pennsylvania case involving an attorney utilizing AI hallucinations in a court filing, the court issued sanctions.

In Bevins v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., No. 25-576 (E.D. Pa. April 10, 2025 Baylson, J.), the attorney provided the court with case citations in court filings that were inaccurate and did not lead the reader to any identifiable court Opinion. The court noted that, based upon its search, it could not locate a case relative to the two citations at issue and/or could not detect a possible typographical error relative to the citation provided.

When the court ordered the attorney to provide an explanation, the attorney asserted that the inclusion of the incorrect citations was unintended given that he planned to replace the wrong cite with a proper one but failed to do so in his final draft. The court noted its concern as to why the attorney was silent as to his act of providing the court with case citations to decisions that did not exist and, as such, the court noted that it was “unconvinced by counsel’s explanations.”

The court referred to Rule 11 and sanctioned the attorney. The court also referred the matter to the State Bar.

Moreover, the court struck the attorney’s appearance in the case.  The attorney was ordered to advise the client of the sanctions and the fact that, should the Plaintiff chose to refile her case, she must find new counsel.

Anyone wishing to review the court's decision in Bevins may click this LINK.  The Court's companion Order can be viewed HERE.

Third Circuit Addresses AI Hallucinations in Court Filing

In the case of McCarthy v. U.S. DEA, No. 24-2704 (3d Cir. July 21, 2025) (Op. by Chung, J.) (not precedential), the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in a case involving issues arising from the Drug Enforcement Administration revoking a Certificate of Registration to the Plaintiff who was a P.A. the court chastised the Plaintiff’s attorney for relying upon “summaries” of eight (8) previous DEA adjudications that the attorney secured through research on an artificial intelligence tool. 

The court confirmed that the Plaintiff’s counsel acknowledged that seven (7) of the summaries were inaccurate and the eighth did not exist. The attorney further acknowledged to the court that he “never took care to confirm the accuracy of the summaries or even that the decisions existed.”

The court confirmed that it would not consider this faulty portion of the Plaintiff’s attorney’s Brief.

In this decision, the court also noted that it was separately ordering Plaintiff’s counsel to show cause why he should not be sanctioned for his conduct “particularly for his lack of candor to the court.” See Op. at 7 n. 5.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Superior Court Upholds Application of Regular Use Exclusion

In the case of Erie Insurance Exchange v. Russo, No. 1138 MDA 2024 (Pa. Super. July 22, 2025 Murray, J., King, J., and Stevens, P.J.E.) (Op. by Stevens, P.J.E.), the court affirmed the trial court’s decision in a declaratory judgment action brought by the UIM carrier denying UIM coverage through the application of the regular use exclusion present in the Plaintiff’s automobile insurance policy.

This matter arose out of a motor vehicle accident that occurred during the course and scope of the Plaintiff’s employment. At the time of the accident, the Plaintiff was operating a vehicle that had been supplied by his employer.

After recovering UIM benefits under his employer’s policy, the Plaintiff sought UIM benefits under his personal automobile insurance policy. 

The personal automobile insurance carrier filed this declaratory judgment action and asserted that the regular use exclusion supported a denial of the requested coverage.

The trial court had otherwise ruled that there was no “stacked” underinsured motorist coverage available on the Plaintiff’s personal automobile insurance policy atop of the UIM benefits recovered under the Plaintiff’s employer’s vehicle policy.

The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s finding that the Plaintiff was not an “insured” under the employer’s policy for purposes of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law. As such, the Plaintiff could not “stack” benefits under his personal automobile insurance policy in any event.

The Superior Court emphasized that merely receiving UIM coverage for injuries sustained as an occupant in a first priority vehicle does not make one “an insured” under that vehicle’s policy such that the person would then be entitled to stack one’s personal automobile policy UIM coverage.

Accordingly, the appellate court ruled that, because the Plaintiff was not entitled to stack his personal policy UIM coverage with the UIM coverage he received from his employer’s policy, the Plaintiff could not establish any error in the trial court’s declaration that there existed no UIM coverage available to the Plaintiff under his personal automobile insurance policy.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert,” www.Law.com (Aug. 13, 2025).

Trial Court Confirms That a Corporation Cannot Assert the Fifth Amendment, But a Corporate Representative Can

In the case of L.V. v. Water Gap Capital Partners, LLC, No. 1189-CV-2025 (C.P. Monroe. Co. June 3, 2025 Zulick, P.J.), the court denied a Defendant’s Motion to Stay a civil litigation matter in order to protect the Fifth Amendment rights of their employees and corporate representatives.

The court reviewed the law regarding the assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The court noted that it is well-settled that a corporate Defendant may not assert the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 

However, a corporate representative is permitted to assert the privilege if answers in litigation may tend to incriminate the representative personally. However, if the representative whom the corporate appoints to act on its behalf asserts the Fifth Amendment privilege, the corporation must appoint someone else to respond on its behalf unless the corporation can show that there is no corporate representative who could furnish the discovery without the possibility of self-incrimination.

Here, the court noted that certain Defendants were corporate Defendants. Those corporate Defendants did not have the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination available to them.

The court did otherwise note that, as noted above, the corporate Defendants did have a right to appoint a representative to speak on their behalf under the parameters of the law.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source: “The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert,” www.Law.com (July 10, 2025).

Judge Terrence R. Nealon of Lackawanna County Addresses Law Regarding Parties Intervening Into a Lawsuit

In the case of Helring v. Scranton Police Pension Board, No. 2024-CV-7781(C.P. Lacka. Co. July 9, 2025 Nealon, J.), the court addressed the ability to the City of Scranton to intervene into an action regarding a dispute over police pension benefits.

While the case was pending, the City of Scranton filed a Petition to Intervene as a party, which intervention request was opposed by the former police officer, but not the Scranton Police Pension Board.

In his decision, Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas provided a thorough overview of the Rules of Civil Procedure and Pennsylvania law regarding intervention in an action under Pa. R.C.P. 2327(4).

The court found that, after reviewing the facts of the case before it, as applied to the applicable law, the City’s interest in preventing the violation of its ordinances provided the City with grounds to intervene in the action.

The court also noted that none of the three (3) discretionary bases for refusing intervention as set forth under Pa. R.C.P. 2329 existed in the matter.

Accordingly, the court granted the City’s Petition to Intervene.


Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Court Refuses to Strike a Discontinuance Entered in a Medical Malpractice Case

In the case of Eubank v. Ing, Nov. Term, 2023, No. 0926 (C.P. Phila. Co. Feb. 7, 2025 Bright, J.), the trial court issued a Rule 1925 Opinion requesting the Superior Court to affirm the trial court’s denial of a Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike a Discontinuance that was filed in a medical malpractice action.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff alleged that his former attorney acted without the Plaintiff’s understanding or consent when the attorney filed the Discontinuance.

However, evidence was produced from the former attorney that specifically confirmed that the Plaintiff gave authorization to the former attorney to discontinue the matter.

Accordingly, the trial court concluded that the Discontinuance was not filed without the Plaintiff’s consent. The court also found that there were no grounds to support any finding of any confusion or misunderstanding by the Plaintiff about what was taken place relative to the filing of the Discontinuance.

The court ruled that, where a party fails to show that the entry of a Discontinuance with the result of fraud, imposition, or mistake, it is not an abuse of discretion by the trial court to deny a Petition to Strike a Discontinuance.

Moreover, the trial court noted that the Plaintiff commenced the lawsuit within the two (2) year statute of limitations but then discontinued the matter. It was noted that the Plaintiff’s Petition to Strike the Discontinuance was not filed until after the expiration of statute of limitations. The court found this to be an additional reason for the Superior Court to find that there was no abuse of discretion by the trial court to deny the Plaintiff’s request to reopen the matter.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert,” www.Law.com (June 11, 2025).

Source of image:  Photo by Wesley Tingey on www.unsplash.com.  

Trial Court Grants Motion to Bifurcate Compensatory and Punitive Damages Phases of Medical Malpractice Trial

In the case of Leber v. Frattali, No. 2023-CV-1442 (C.P. Lacka. Co. 2025 Powell, J.), the court addressed a Plaintiff’s Motion to Bifurcate the trial of a medical malpractice and wrongful death case into separate trials, one for the liability and compensatory damages aspect of the case, and whether the Defendants acted with reckless indifference, and a second trial relative to the amount of any punitive damages that should be awarded.

Judge Mark Powell disagreed with the defense argument that the issues were too interwoven and that bifurcation would cause prejudice.

Relying upon Pa. R.C.P. 213(b), the court exercised its discretion to bifurcate after finding that bifurcation served the issues of convenience, the avoidance of prejudice, and the promotion of the efficiency of the proceedings.

The court found that the bifurcation of the trial as requested by the Plaintiff would promote judicial economy and would avoid the prejudicial introduction of the Defendants’ financial condition during the compensatory phase of the case. The court also therefore found that a bifurcation of the trial would allow for a more orderly presentation of the evidence.

Judge Powell also emphasized that bifurcation under the circumstances presented was reasonable, facilitated potential settlement talks, would realize cost savings, and promoted the issue of fairness. As such, the Motion to Bifurcate was granted.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Trial Court Requests Superior Court to Affirm Dismissal of Case Based on Plaintiff's Failure to Complete Service in a Good Faith and Timely Fashion

In the case of Vargas v. United Modular Enterprises, LLC, No. 2022-CV-05051 (C.P. Bucks Co. April 7, 2025 McMaster, J.), the court issued a Rule 1925 Opinion requesting the appellate court to affirm the trial court’s sustaining of the Defendant’s Preliminary Objections and dismissal of the Plaintiff’s Complaint with prejudice on the basis of the expiration of the statute of limitations and the Plaintiff’s failure to complete service in a timely and good faith fashion.

According to the Opinion, this case involved a tractor trailer that allegedly collided with the Plaintiff’s vehicle. The accident occurred on February 20, 2019.

Although the Plaintiff filed an original Complaint on February 12, 2021, which was eight (8) days before the statute of limitations expired, the court ruled that the Plaintiff ultimately did not make a good faith effort to complete service.

The court noted that the record confirmed that the Plaintiff’s attorney did not give the Complaint to the Bucks County Sheriff and serve the Complaint on the Defendant’s until July 14, 2021, which was five (5) months after the statue of limitations had expired.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (July 17, 2025).

Superior Court Affirms Award of Delay Damages Where Trial Court Carved Out The Time Period of The Covid-19 Pandemic

In the case of Heffelfinger v. Shen, No. 681 MDA 2024 (Pa. Super. July 21, 2025 Murray, J., King, J., and Stevens, P.J.E.) (Op. by Stevens, P.J.E.), the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s entry of a judgment on a jury verdict in favor of the Plaintiffs in the amount of $11.4 million in a claim by a Plaintiff that the medical Defendants failed to diagnose or treat the Plaintiff’s oral cancer.

Of note, on appeal, the Superior Court held that the trial court did not err in imposing an award of delay damages where the trial court expressly stated that its award in this regard did not include the COVID-19 judicial emergency period in mid-2020. 

In addition to affirming the trial court's award of delay damages, the Superior Court went on to note that, regardless, the COVID-10 pandemic and the ensuing judicial emergency did not serve to diminish the rights of Plaintiff to be made whole or create an unjust windfall in favor of Defendant tortfeasors.

The court otherwise held on appeal that the Plaintiff’s evidence at trial amply supported the jury’s award of over $11.4 million dollars in compensatory and punitive damages.

The Superior Court otherwise affirmed the trial court’s decision in concluding that the jury’s verdict was not against the weight of the evidence.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert,” www.Law.com (Aug. 6, 2025).

Source of image:  Photo by Nick Fewings on www.unsplash.com.

Motion To Compel Arbitration Denied Where Unclear that Plaintiff Was On Notice of the Arbitration Clause

In the case of Bradsher v. Segway, Inc., No. 2:25-CV-02782-JMY (E.D. Pa. July 17, 2025 Young, J.), the court denied Defendant Segway Inc.’s Motion to Compel Arbitration following an accident during which the Plaintiff was injured while utilizing a Segway.

After the Plaintiff filed suit, alleging claims for strict liability, negligence, and breach of warranty, the Defendant Segway filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration, alleging that the Plaintiff was bound by a valid and enforceable Arbitration Agreement.

After reviewing the matter, the court denied the Motion to Compel Arbitration after finding that the Arbitration Agreement was not enforceable as it was unclear as to whether the Plaintiff had been properly informed of and had notice of the agreement.

The court noted that further discovery was required to determine whether or not the Plaintiff received notice of the Arbitration Agreement.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Court's companion Order can be viewed at this LINK.

Source: Article: “Differing Versions of Segway’s Arbitration Agreements Clear Path For Liability Suit,” By Riley Brennan The Legal Intelligencer (July 18, 2025).

Source of image:  Photo by Jan Bochen on www.unsplash.com.

Nursing Home Arbitration Agreement Ruled Uneforceable

In the case of Gratalo v. Kingston SNF Healthcare, LLC, No. 2024-CV-04585 (C.P. Luz. Zo. April 25, 2025 Saylor, S.J.), the court found an arbitration agreement unenforceable relative to the admissions of an adult individual with down syndrome into a nursing home by his mother.

The court noted that the Defendants did not provide evidence to show that the family was properly advised as to the applicability and the parameters of arbitration agreement. The court also noted that the arbitration agreement was not conspicuously displayed in the documents.

Given the substantiative unconscionability of the arbitration agreement, the court found that the agreement was unenforceable. As such, the court rejected the Defendant’s efforts to have this case taken out of the litigation and put into an arbitration.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this detailed Order without any Opinion may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Thomas J. Foley, III of the Foley Law Firm in Scranton for bringing this decision to my attention.

Source of image: Photo by Alena Darmel on www.pexels.com.

Article: AI and Its Proper Use in the Practice of Law

The below article written by both myself and my son, Michael, entitled "AI and Its Proper Use in the Practice of Law" appeared in the August 14, 2025 edition of the Pennsylvania Law Weekly and is republished here with permission.   Michael is a computer science and philosophy major at Ursinus College with a focus on AI research.

Expert Opinion  Artificial Intelligence


AI and Its Proper Use in the Practice of Law

August 14, 2025, Pennsylvania Law Weekly

By

Daniel E. Cummins

Michael Cummins

While many articles on AI and the law have shouted “AI is coming! AI is coming!” like Paul Revere galloping through the night, very few of those articles actually provide advice on how to incorporate AI into your law practice.

With this article by a practicing attorney and a budding computer scientist, information is provided not only on the basic terms of art relative to AI and its uses, but advice is also provided on the nuts and bolts of how to begin to properly utilize AI as part of your practice.

Duty to be Competent With Technology

Under Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct 1.1, lawyers are required to continue to work to maintain and improve their competency in the practice of law. Rule 1.1 states, in part, that the provision of competent legal representation to a client “requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”

This rule has been construed to require attorneys to remain competent with advancements in technology that can improve one’s ability to represent clients. As such, it is not only good for one’s practice to begin the process of becoming proficient in the use of AI in your practice, some may argue that it is required under the rules of ethics.

Common AI Terms to Know

Here are some common terms related to AI that attorneys should know and understand:

Algorithm—A process or set of instructions written by a computer programmer to be followed by a computer.

Artificial intelligence—The development of a series of algorithms that instruct computers to complete tasks which typically require human intelligence, reasoning, and understanding, including visual and audio perception, speech recognition, decision making, etc.

Machine learning/deep learning—Machine learning is a branch of AI which focuses on enabling computers to learn from data and improve their performance without explicit, ongoing programming. Deep learning is a form of machine learning where the computer utilizes multiple layers of processing in order to extract even more information from data.

Large language model (LLM)—A type of AI which utilizes deep learning to process and can generate human language by recognizing patterns and associations. Such AI models are described as "large" due to the massive data sets containing billions of words and parameters. ChatGPT and Gemini are examples of Large Language Models

ChatGPT—An AI tool developed by OpenAI to engage in written conversations with humans to answer questions, complete tasks or follow prompts. You can try it for free at www.chat.com.

Gemini—An AI tool developed by Google very similar to ChatGPT that can generate responses to queries by pulling information from the internet and presenting it in a conversational manner to the reader.

Hallucinations—Hallucinations occur when an AI model produces a response that is factually incorrect and/or nonsensical, but is supported by the existing data that the AI was trained on. This can occur due to datasets that are poorly gathered and maintained or incomplete. Examples of hallucinations would be ChatGPT providing case citations that are inaccurate or even totally fabricated.

AI Is Just Guessing

While it is a common misperception to say that ChatGPT "knew" the answer or that Google AI Overview "understood" what you were searching for, that is actually far from the truth.

Artificial intelligence is essentially a prediction algorithm using an unimaginable number of parameters and associations to give the appearance of knowledge; in other words, AI platforms such as ChatGPT or Google’s Gemini give you their best guess at what you would want to hear based on your prompt and the data it was trained on.

On many occasions, an AI platform may produce a result that is factually correct since it has been trained only on the adequate data for a specific need. However, if it is asked a question or prompted on something that it has not been trained on, there is a good chance it may hallucinate and give a false response. Since AI is predictive in nature, it will only ever give you its "best" response possible within the limitations of the tool. Of course, AI can never give a "truthful" response because truth is foreign to predictive AI.

A good analogy is to think of AI as a contestant on Final Jeopardy. The contestant (AI) is given a query or a prompt. The contestant (AI) then searches through the recesses of his or her mind and knowledge (the data it was trained on) in the hopes of coming up with the correct response. The contestant (AI) provides the response, not knowing if it is a correct response. The only difference between the contestant and AI is that the contestant may give up and admit they do not know the answer; AI will always generate its "best guess" even if it has been trained on none of the relevant information.

Nuts and Bolts of How to Use AI

For instructions on how to try out AI, we will use the most popular AI tool at the moment, ChatGPT.

ChatGPT is free to try out. There are more detailed uses of ChatGPT that you could pay to utilize but, at least for now, anyone can use the basic form of ChatGPT for free.

You can find ChatGPT at www.chat.com. When you go to the site, a box may pop up asking you to log in or sign up, but that is not necessary. You can click “Stay logged out” instead.

You can utilize ChatGPT to conduct a search like you would on Google, but be sure to verify and triple check the responses. You can also give ChatGPT an “assignment” such as following examples:

Research the current status of the law on Limited Tort in Pennsylvania and include case citations;

Draft a Brief outlining the Hills and Ridges Doctrine in Pennsylvania and include case Citations

Draft Interrogatories applicable to a fire loss subrogation case

Provide deposition questions applicable to a dog bite case

ChatGPT will search within its pretrained database for information and will respond with detailed information in response to the queries.

It is crucial to keep in mind that the most important practice to follow when using AI is to verify everything it generates. Whether you are asking it to give you a starting point for research, assist with discovery efforts, or draft documents, you should double check every aspect of its output for hallucinations, that is, for inaccurate, inapplicable or even false information.

How you prompt AI, or submit your queries, is also very important as it can assist in generating more accurate and beneficial responses. When writing prompts, giving the AI context as to your goals and relevant background information is very important. Clarity is also important, and, therefore, breaking down a singular prompt into multiple parts with clear instructions can also yield better results.

Ultimately, AI should be used as more of a tool to assist in menial tasks, rather than a one-stop-shop to replace human ingenuity. To paraphrase what one judge wrote in an Opinion involving an AI issue, the use of artificial intelligence also requires the use of human intelligence.

As noted in greater detail below, the reliance upon artificial intelligence to complete legal research without also verifying the veracity of the citations through other trusted resources is not only dumb, but can also land you in hot water.

Hallucinations All Around the World

Attorneys and judges from all around the world have begun to utilize AI to assist with their legal research and brief writing. As such, a few of those attorneys and judges have been getting in trouble for failing to check the validity and accuracy of the legal citations secured through the use of AI platforms prior to filing documents of record.

An attorney/computer data scientist located in Paris, France by the name of Damien Charlotin has created a worldwide scorecard of sorts documenting cases from around the world where attorneys have been sanctioned for filing briefs and other documents with a court that contain AI hallucinations, or case citations that are improper, invalid, or just fabricated.

As noted on the compilation created by Charlotin, not only lawyers, but judges have also been tripped up by the use of AI. In Georgia, it took an appeals court to reveal that, not only did an attorney in the lower court, but also the lower court itself, had relied upon and cited to bogus case citations secured via AI research. In that case of Shahid v. Esaam, 2025 Ga. App. LEXIS 299, at *3 (Ga. Ct. App. June 30, 2025), the Georgia court of appeals struck the lower court order, remanded the case and sanctioned the attorney involved.

More recently, a New Jersey district court judge withdrew his decision in the biopharma securities case of In Re CorMedix Securities Litigation, 2:21-CV-14020 (D. N.J. July 22, 2025 Neals, J.), after the lawyers involved in the case complained that his opinion contained numerous errors, including made up quotes, misstated case outcomes and incorrect case citations, all presumably secured from research on an AI platform. The court withdrew its published decision and noted that another opinion and order would be issued.

With regards to attorneys running afoul from the use of AI research in their filings, according to the above scorecard, as of July 25, 2025, there were at least 230 cases from around the world where a court had determined that a filing contained AI produced hallucinated content, typically fake citations. Of the 230 instances from around the world, 130 of those cases were found in the United States. Of those numerous cases found in the United States, at least four cases arose in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

Attorneys From Pennsylvania Who Hallucinated

As noted, the filing of court documents containing hallucinations in the form of faulty or fake legal citations has led to sanctions in at least four Pennsylvania cases. The Pennsylvania federal courts who have addressed these issues have found that the submission of court filings with faulty citations amounts to violations of Fed.R.C.P. 11 (by signing a filing, an attorney certifies the accuracy of the legal arguments contained therein), and violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct 1.1 (Competency) and 3.3 (Candor Towards a Tribunal).

In the nonprecedential decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in the case of McCarthy v. U.S. DEA, No. 24-2704 (3d Cir. July 21, 2025 Chung, J.)(Not Precedential), the court addressed the DEA’s revocation of a physician’s assistant’s certificate of registration. The petitioner’s attorney was caught having submitted a filing that relied, in part, on “summaries” of eight previous DEA adjudications in support of arguments on behalf of the petitioner.

After it was determined that seven of the summaries were inaccurate and that the eighth decision did not even exist, the petitioner’s attorney acknowledged the same and admitted that the summaries had been secured through research on an AI tool. The court confirmed in its decision that the petitioner’s attorney confirmed that “he never took care to confirm the accuracy of the summaries or even that the decisions existed.” See McCarthy at p. 7. The court ruled that it would not consider the portion of the brief that contained the hallucinated information and issued a separate Order requiring the at fault attorney “to show cause why he should not be sanctioned for his conduct, particularly for his lack of candor to the court.”

In the separate case of Bunce v. Visual Technology Innovations, No. 2:23-CV-01740 (E.D. Pa. 2025 Kai, J.), a defense attorney admittedly utilized ChatGPT to draft his filings at issue relative to a discovery issue. The filings submitted by the defense counsel contained fake citations that could not be located on trusted resources.

The court in Bunce found violations of Fed.R.C.P. 11 and sanctioned counsel. While the court emphasized that nothing in Rule 11 prohibits use of AI in the practice of law, Rule 11 makes clear that an attorney who signs a filing is responsible for verifying the accuracy of the legal and factual claims contained within the filing.

In the case of Jakes v. Youngblood, No. 2:24-cv-1608 (W.D. Pa. June 26, 2025 Stickman, J.), the court faulted an attorney for submitting briefs with wholly fabricated quotations from case law, including fabricated quotations from this court’s own prior opinion. The court also noted that, “even more outrageously,” a review of the attorney’s reply brief filed in the same case revealed that that brief also contained fabricated quotes and misrepresented case law.

The court noted that it found it to be “very troubling” that, when accused of serious ethical violations, the attorney at fault “chose to double down.” In the end, the court noted that it viewed the attorney’s “conduct as a clear ethical violation of the highest order.” In its opinion, the court noted that the attorney at fault had filed a withdrawal of appearance.

This Pennsylvania federal court cited Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3 (Candor Toward Tribunal) as confirming that attorneys have legal and ethical duties owed to the court. The court noted that, an attorney who signs and files a brief authored by a nonlawyer, such as a paralegal or an intern or a clerk, is personally responsible for all that the filing contains. In the end, the Jakes court dismissed the filings presented by the at fault attorney and ordered that attorney to show cause as to why his filings should not be viewed as having violated Rule 11 and Pa. R.P.C. 3.3.

In another Pennsylvania case involving an attorney utilizing AI hallucinations in a court filing, the court issued sanctions. In Bevins v. Colgate-Palmolive, No. 25-576 (E.D. Pa. April 10, 2025 Baylson, J.), the attorney in trouble had provided the court with case citations that were inaccurate and did not lead to any identifiable court opinions. The court noted that, based upon its research, it could not locate a case relative to the two (2) citations at issue and could not detect a possible typographical error in the citations provided.

When the court ordered the attorney to provide an explanation, the attorney asserted that the inclusion of the incorrect citations was unintended given that he planned to replace the wrong citation with a proper one but failed to do so in his final draft. The court noted its concern as to why the attorney was silent as to his act of providing the court with case citations to decisions that did not even exist and, as such, the court noted that it was “unconvinced by counsel’s explanations.”

This court also referred to Rule 11 and sanctioned the attorney. The court additionally referred the matter to the state bar, struck the attorney’s appearance in the case, thereby actually removing the attorney from the case. The court further ordered the attorney to advise the client of the sanctions and the fact that, should the Plaintiff choose to refile her case, she must find new counsel.

The above court decisions confirm that the use of unverified AI legal research in court filings could lead to serious sanctions if hallucinated citations or quotes or summaries are utilized. As one court noted, confirming the validity of one’s legal research and case citations is one of the most basic requirements that has always been present in the practice of law. The decisions on this issue confirm that the courts will rightfully take a hard stance against attorneys who submit hallucinated content to the court. Such a hard stance is required to protect the integrity of the record and the court system as a whole.

Anticipated Rules of Court on the Use of AI

With the rise of the use of AI in the practice of law, the federal and state courts have begun to take steps to promulgate rules and parameters to monitor the same.

In innovative fashion, U.S. District Court Judge Karoline Mehalchick of the Middle District of Pennsylvania crafted a civil practice order on the use of generative artificial intelligence, which appears to be the first of its kind at least in Pennsylvania.

Under that order, issued in all of Mehalchick’s civil cases, attorneys who utilize AI in the drafting of any of their court filings are required to file a certification with the court that identifies what AI platform was utilized, delineates what portion of the filing contains AI generated content, and certifies to the court that the filing attorney checked the accuracy of the AI generated content, including all references to case citations and legal authority.

In her order, Mehalchick also directs that the parties review the joint formal opinion of the Pennsylvania Bar Association and the Philadelphia Bar Association on the “Ethical Issues Regarding the Use of Artificial Intelligence.”

On the state court level, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court created the advisory committee on artificial intelligence in the Pennsylvania courts in order to monitor the use of AI in the court system. One possible recommendation that may come out of the advisory committee might be for the promulgation of a statewide rule of civil procedure on the use of AI in the practice of law, particularly with regards to court filings.

As the future continues to arrive, it is anticipated that the attorneys and judges in Pennsylvania will continue to adapt and the practice of law, hopefully, will improve as a whole.

Daniel E. Cummins is the managing attorney at Cummins Law where he focuses his practice on motor vehicle and trucking liability cases, products liability matters, and premises liability cases. He also serves as a mediator for the Federal Middle District Court and for Cummins Mediation. He is additionally the sole creator and writer of the Tort Talk Blog at www.TortTalkcom. Michael Cummins, Daniel's son, is a computer science and philosophy major at Ursinus College with a focus on researching artificial intelligence.

Reprinted with permission from the July 24, 2025 edition of the "The Pennsylvania Law Weekly © 2025 ALM Global Properties, LLC. All rights reserved. Further duplication without permission is prohibited, contact 877-256-2472 or asset-and-logo-licensing@alm.com.

Trial Court Requests Superior Court To Grant New Trial in Medical Malpractice Case Due, in Part, To Juror Accessing Plaintiff's Attorney's LinkedIn Profile

In the case of Hernandez v. Temple University Hospital, Oct. Term, 2021, No. 01422 (C.P. Phila. Co. March 21, 2025 Hill, J.), the trial court issued a Rule 1925 Opinion requesting the Superior Court to affirm the trial court’s ordering of a new trial at the request of the hospital Defendants in a medical malpractice action for various reasons.

According to the Opinion, this matter involved a Plaintiff who was shot in the neck at a party and then received treatment at various medical facilities. At some point, after extensive treatment, the injured party was discharged.

The Plaintiff then had mashed potatoes with a meal at home and developed difficulty breathing. He was brought to an emergency room in cardiac arrest.

There was a clinical presentation of the patient as being consisted with airway occlusion caused by eating thick foods.

The Plaintiff alleged various physical and traumatic brain injury as a result.

Of note, the court in this Opinion urged the Superior Court to dismiss the cross motions of the parties after the trial court had granted the hospital’s Motion for a New Trial, in part, because the court and counsel had discovered, after the jury trial had concluded, that one of the jurors had accessed the LinkedIn profile of the Plaintiff’s attorney during trial, which action violated the court’s instructions to the jurors.

The court noted that jurors may not consider information secured outside that information that was presented during trial and that is beyond a juror’s common knowledge. The court also noted that jurors are not permitted to contact counsel during the course of the trial.

The trial court found that a new trial was warranted when there was a reasonably likelihood of prejudice and when the harmlessness of such contact is not shown.

Given that this information about the juror accessing the Plaintiff’s attorney’s social media was not known to the court or counsel until after the verdict was rendered, it was not possible for the court to inquire what, if any, information that juror had learned from the LinkedIn page or what, if any, effect this information may have had over the jury deliberations.

The court found that this basis, alone, was sufficient to support the granting of the hospital’s request for a new trial.

The court addressed other issues in its Opinion as well.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (July 23, 2025).

Superior Court Addresses Issues Raised With Respect to Verdict Slip in Med Mal Case

In the case of Hagans v. Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania, No. 536 EDA 2024 (Pa. Super. July 10, 2025 Stabile, J., McLaughlin, J., and Lane, J.) (Op. by McLaughlin, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s rulings relative to a medical malpractice action. The appellate court upheld the trial court’s denial of the medical Defendant’s Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, relative to certain evidentiary rulings, and also upheld the trial court’s rulings related to the Verdict Slip.

This action arose out of alleged medical malpractice related to the birth of the Plaintiff’s child.

Of note, the Superior Court upheld the verdict in favor of the Plaintiffs in this action where the jury’s Verdict Slip demonstrated that it found at least one individual medical provider liable and where the Defendants consistently acknowledged that all providers worked together as a single care team relative to the treatment provided.

The hospital Defendant argued that the Verdict Slip should have been required to ask the jury to evaluate the negligence of each individual Defendant. The defense argued that the Plaintiff bore the burden of proof as to whether each Defendant’s conduct fell below the standard of care. The trial court rejected the hospital’s arguments and affirmed the judgment during post-trial proceeds.

On appeal, the appellate court noted that the review of the Verdict Slip confirmed that the jury found at least one individual Defendant liable for the harm such that there was sufficient evidence to establish the hospital Defendant’s vicarious liability.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert, www.Law.com (July 31, 2025).

Federal Court Addresses Scope of Permissible Liability Expert Testimony in a Products Liability Case

In the case of Borden v. Mainline Conveyor Systems, Inc., No. 4:23-CV-01486 (M.D. Pa. July 21, 2025 Mehalchick, J.), the court addressed Motions In Limine filed by a Plaintiff in a products liability case that sought, in part, to preclude certain testimony by a defense engineering expert.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff was working for a container company when he stepped on a mesh belt conveyor that activated and threw him off, resulting in injuries. 

The Plaintiff sued the conveyor belt manufacturer, claiming that the company was strictly liable for manufacturing a defective and unreasonably dangerous device.

The court otherwise rejected the Plaintiff’s Motion In Limine to preclude the defense from pursuing an assumption of risk defense. 

Here, the court found that there were issues of fact regarding whether or not the Plaintiff was required by his employer to walk over the conveyor belt and whether the Plaintiff was aware of the risk that the conveyor belt would be inadvertently activated. Given these issues of fact, the defense was permitted to proceed with its assumption of the risk defense.

In her Opinion, Judge Mehalchick limited the Defendant’s liability expert’s opinion and ruled that the defense expert would not be permitted to testify regarding the import of a contract between certain parties relative to the machine at issue, in terms of which company was responsible for certain actions. The court found that such testimony would be impermissible interpretation of a contract by the expert rather than the offering of an opinion on customs and practices within the conveyor manufacturing industry.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: Article: “Engineering Expert’s Testimony Improperly Waded Into Contract, Pa. Fed. Judge Rules In Products Liability Dispute,” By Riley Brennan of the Legal Intelligencer (July 21, 2025).

Court Addresses Whether Topic of Expert Opinion Is Outside Scope of Understanding of Lay Jurors

In the case of Dragann v. Florey Lumber Co., No. 2020-CV-4118 (C.P. Lacka. Co. July 18, 2025 Nealon, J.), the court addressed a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by an Additional Defendant relative to a Joinder Complaint. 

According to the Opinion, this case arises out of issues related to the construction of a residential home. More specifically, after the Plaintiffs moved into the home, issues allegedly arose with regard to the white limestone that had been utilized as part of the construction of the exterior of the home. The Plaintiffs alleged that the limestone had deteriorated, which allowed for water infiltration.

One of the original Defendants asserted a claim against an Additional Defendant and asserted that, due to the original Defendant’s lack of prior experience in using limestone on exterior surfaces on homes in Northeastern Pennsylvania, that original Defendant allegedly relied upon the Additional Defendant and its expertise with limestone to determine whether and how the limestone could be installed safely in the climate of Northeastern Pennsylvania.

The claim in the original Defendant’s Joinder Complaint sounded in negligent misrepresentation against the Additional Defendant.

Judge Nealon provided a current overview of the status of the law pertaining to negligent misrepresentation claims.

One of the essential questions in this case was whether expert testimony is required to sustain a negligent misrepresentation claim. The court noted that the litigants did not produce any precedent in this regard and that the court’s own research revealed that such expert evidence is generally unnecessary.

The court noted that, the subject matter at issue was not so related to a particular science, profession, business or occupation as to be beyond the ordinary knowledge or information customarily possessed by the average layperson or juror. Accordingly, the court ruled that no expert report was required in order to establish a case of negligence on the part of the Additional Defendant.

Rather, the court found that jurors would be capable of determining whether the Additional Defendant’s representative made the alleged representations regarding the suitability of exterior limestone in the local climate, that the Additional Defendant failed to conduct a reasonable investigation as to the truthfulness of those representations, that the original Defendant justifiably relied upon the misrepresentations and that the original Defendant’s justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentations ultimately caused the harm alleged by the homeowners.

Accordingly, based on the above law and findings, the court denied the Additional Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Third Circuit Addresses Issues As To When Expert Testimony Is Required in Gun Discharge Case

In the case of Slatowski v. Sig Sauer, Inc., No. 24-1639 (3d Cir. Aug. 1, 2025 Krause, J., Bibas, J., and Montgomery-Reeves, J.) (Op. by Bibas, J.), the court affirmed the district court exclusion of the Plaintiff’s expert witnesses on the issue of causation but reversed the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in a case involving a federal immigration agent who was injured when he went to grab a gun from his holster and the gun fired a bullet into his hip and thigh.

The appellate court ruled that the trial court had properly excluded the Plaintiff’s expert testimony about what caused the gun to fire accidentally.

However, the court overruled the district court’s entry of summary judgment which was based on the district court’s finding that the Plaintiff could not proceed to a jury without expert testimony.

The appellate court noted that, given the other admissible evidence in the case, a jury would be able to determine what caused the gun to fire. As such, the entry of summary judgment was overruled.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: Article – “Lack of Causation Experts Does Not Knock Out Plaintiff’s Defective Gun Design Claims, 3rd Circuit Rules,” By Aleeza Furman The Legal Intelligencer (August 1, 2025).

City Ruled Protected by the Immunity Afforded Under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act

In the case of Cruz v. City of Scranton, No 2024-CV-7644 (C.P. Lacka. Co. July 28, 2025 Moyle, J.), the court granted a Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in a case in which the Plaintiff sued the City of Scranton relative to the police department’s handling of the Plaintiff’s stolen motorcycle.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff reported that her motorcycle was stolen. The Scranton Police Department was later informed by the Reading Police Department that the motorcycle was located at an auto facility in Reading, PA.

According to the Opinion, the Scranton Police Department allegedly never notified the Plaintiff of the location of her motorcycle. The motorcycle was thereafter declared to be abandoned and accumulated impound fees. Thereafter, the Plaintiff received a bill from the auto company indicating that she owed over $15,000.00 for impound and storage fees.

In response to recieving this bill, the Plaintiff sued the City of Scranton for negligence.

The Defendant asserted immunity under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act found at 42 Pa. C.S.A. §8542.

While the court agreed that the City of Scranton Police Department was required by law to notify the Plaintiff regarding the recovery of the Plaintiff’s motorcycle by the Reading Police Department, the court ruled that the City of Scranton was granted immunity under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act.

The court rejected the Plaintiff’s attempt to assert that the case fell under the exception to immunity relative to the care, custody, or control of personal property exception. The court rejected the Plaintiff’s argument that the receipt of information regarding the status of the Plaintiff’s motorcycle constituted control over the Plaintiff’s personal property.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Paul Walker of the Clarks Summit, PA law firm of Walker Law LLC, for bringing this decision to my attention.

Court Addresses Liability of Store To Customer Attacked By Assailant After Leaving the Store

In its non-precedential decision in the case of Borth v. Alpha Century Security, Inc., No. 2044 EDA 2022 (Pa. Super. Aug. 1, 2025 Lazarus, P.J., Beck, J., and Stevens, P.J.E.) (Mem. Op. by Lazarus, P.J.) (non-precedential), the Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed a trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of Rite Aid and certain security companies in a lawsuit arising out of an incident during which the Plaintiff was assaulted by an individual at a location over 700 feet from the Rite Aid store.

According to the ruling, the assailant had been seen following the Plaintiff in the store and then left the store shortly after the Plaintiff left.  The record indicated that the security guards allegedly noticed this activity.

The appellate court ultimately ruled that the Defendants owed the Plaintiffs the duty owed to any business invitee, which was to take reasonable precautions against harmful third party conduct that might be reasonably anticipated.

The Superior Court additionally noted that, while it agreed with the trial court’s determination that Rite Aid’s duty to protect its invitees “does not extend to an area beyond its parking lot, city blocks from its location,” the Superior Court disagreed that it necessarily followed, under the facts in this case, that the subject attack was unforeseeable as a matter of law or that the criminal act of the assailant was a superseding event. See Op. at 8-9. 

The court noted that, although the Plaintiff was no longer on Rite Aid property when she was attacked by the assailant, it was not entirely clear whether Rite Aid’s precautions, or the security company Defendants’ actions, were reasonable and/or sufficient under the circumstances.

In this regard, the court noted that the Rite Aid store was in possession of reports putting the store on notice of crimes in the area. Moreover, there is evidence in this case that the representatives of the security company in the store was suspicious of the assailant in terms of his following the Plaintiff in the store and also leaving the store without buying anything shortly after the Plaintiff left the store.

In the end, the Superior Court reversed the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of the Defendants.

Anyone wishing to review this non-precedential decision of the Superior Court may click this LINK.

Source of image:  Photo by Rayner Simpson on www.unsplash.com.

I send thanks to Attorney Thomas G. Wilkinson, Jr. of the Philadelphia office of Cozen & O'Connor for bringing this case to my attention.

Allegations of Recklessness Allowed To Proceed in Motor Vehicle Accident Case

In the case of Marcinkevich v. Stevens, No. 24-CV-1826 (C.P. Lacka. Co. July 31, 2025 Gibbons, J.), the court overruled a Defendant’s Preliminary Objections filed against allegations of recklessness and for punitive damages in a standard motor vehicle accident case not involving any outrageous facts.

The court ruled that, because recklessness is a condition of the mind that, under this court’s reading of Pa. R.C.P. 1019(b) can be alleged generally where an underlying claim of negligence is pled, the court allowed these allegations to proceed into the discovery phase of the case.

The Court also allowed the claims for punitive damages to proceed as well.   

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Superior Court Rules that Default Judgment Against Defendant Should Have Been Opened

In the case of Lines v. Timothy Britton Const. Servs., Inc., No. 948 W.D.A. 2024 (Pa. Super. July 1, 2025 Bowes, J., Olson, J., and Bender, P.J.E.) (Op. by Bowes, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court addressed the proper procedure relative to a Petition to Strike and/or Open a Default Judgment. In the end, the court reversed a trial court’s Order dismissing a Defendant’s Petition to Strike and/or Open a Default Judgment.

This matter arose out of a lawsuit brought by a homeowner against the Defendant for breach of contract and violation of consumer protection law claims.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff’s Complaint did not contain a required Notice to Defend. When the Defendant made no response, the Plaintiffs ultimately obtained a default judgment. The Defendant then petitioned to strike and/or open the judgment based upon the deficiencies with the Plaintiff’s Complaint.

With the parties’ consent, the trial court struck the initial default judgment and granted the Defendant leave to file a responsive pleading. Thereafter, the Defendant failed to file a pleading and the Plaintiffs again secured a default judgment. The Defendant then petitioned to strike and/or open the second default judgment due to the Plaintiff’s failure to provide the notice required under Pa. R.C.P. 237.1.

The Plaintiffs argued that, given that they had previously provided their Rule 237.1 notice before the entry of the first default judgment, no new notice was required. 

 The trial court dismissed the Defendant’s Petition to Strike and/or Open and the Defendant then appealed.

The Superior Court held that the trial court erred in entering a second default judgment against the Defendant where notice pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 237.1 was missing. The appellate court ruled that the initial Rule 237.1 notice was not still in place by the time the second default judgment was entered. 

The appellate court also noted that the trial court’s extension of time to answer, which was issued after the entry of the initial default judgment, also did not comport with the requirements set forth under Pa. R.C.P. 237.6.

The appellate court otherwise also noted that the trial court’s agreed extension Order did not state that a failure to timely respond could result in another default judgment. As such, the appellate court ruled that, absent compliance with Rule 237.6, a default judgment could not be entered absent a new 10-Day Notice as required under Rule 237.1.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert, www.Law.com (July 16, 2025).

Superior Court Rules that Forum Selection Clause in Informed Consent Form is Enforceable in Medical Malpractice Cases

In the medical malpractice case of Somerlot v. Jung, No. 2578-EDA-2024 (Pa. Super. July 30, 2025 Lazarus, P.J., Kunselman, J., and King, J.) (Op. by Kunselman, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the validity of forum selection clauses in informed consent forms.

According to the Opinion, in this personal injury action, the Plaintiff had undergone treatment with certain medical providers and, under the contract entered into with those medical providers, the Plaintiff agreed that any litigation would be pursued solely in Bucks County.

Yet, the Plaintiff brought this personal injury lawsuit in Philadelphia County.  The medical Defendant filed Preliminary Objections asserting improper venue.

The Superior Court affirmed the decision of the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas transferring the case to Bucks County based upon the forum selection clause.

The Superior Court upheld the general principle of contract law that the parties are free to pre-select among all possible proper venues as to which venue would be utilized to decide any legal disputes that might arise between them. Accordingly, the Superior Court affirmed the lower court’s decision.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source of image:  Photo by Etactics Inc. on www.unsplash.com.

Superior Court Addresses Discoverability of Documents Under Patient Safety and Healthcare Quality Improvement Act in a Med Mal Case

In the case of Boyle v. Mainline Health, Inc., No. 2454 EDA 2023 (Pa. Super. July 17, 2025 Lazarus, P.J., King, J., and Lane, J.) (Lane, J., Concurring and dissenting)(Maj. Op. by King, J.), the Superior Court ruled that reports created for the hospital’s patient safety organization constituted “deliberation or analysis of” the patient safety evaluation system. As such, the court ruled that these reports were privileged under the Patient Safety and Healthcare Quality Improvement Act. 

This case arose out of a medical malpractice lawsuit by the Plaintiffs seeking compensation for birth injuries sustained by their child.

During the course of discovery, the Defendants produced a privilege log regarding certain documents. The Plaintiff followed a discovery motion in response. The trial court granted the Plaintiff’s Motion.

On appeal, the Superior Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. As part of the ruling, the Superior Court noted that the Defendants had a patient safety plan, which established a patient safety committee under MCARE.

The court found other documents that were not privileged given that those documents did not arise from a matter reviewed by the patient safety committee.

However, noted above, the court did find that certain other documents fell within the scope of the statutory privilege provided under the Patient Safety and Healthcare Quality Improvement Act.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK. The concurring and dissenting Opinion issued by Judge Lane can be viewed HERE.


Source: “The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert,” www.Law.com (Aug. 6, 2025).

Judge Powell of Lackawanna County Rules on Medical Practice Pleading Isssues

In the case of Menon v. Geisinger Wyoming Valley Medical Center, No. 2024-CV-7436 (C.P. Lacka. Co. June 23, 2025, Powell, J.), Judge Mark Powell of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas overruled various Preliminary Objections filed by the different medical Defendants to the Plaintiff’s medical malpractice Complaint.

This medical malpractice action arose from the death of a full-term newborn baby.

Relative to the Plaintiff’s claims of negligent infliction of emotional distress related to alleged negligent care during the late pregnancy stage and the delivery, the Defendants filed a demurrer. The Defendants asserted that the Plaintiffs failed to allege a contemporaneous sensory perception of the harm-producing event as required under Sinn v. Burd and Bloom v. Regional Medical Center.

The court disagreed and ruled that the Plaintiffs sufficiently pled a continuous traumatic sequence of events that included direct observation of the newborn’s distress and death. The court cited to the case of Neff v. Lasso, for the proposition that concept of sensory perception in this context under Pennsylvania law is not limited to visual observation but also includes awareness through experience and presence.

Judge Powell also overruled the Defendants’ objections regarding the lack of specificity with respect to the allegations of negligence and agency claims contained in the Complaint. The court held that, under Pennsylvania’s fact-pleading standard, Plaintiffs are not required to identify every employee and are not required to site specific hospital policies at issue at the pleadings stage.

Rather, the court found that, in this case, the Plaintiffs’ detailed allegations provided the Defendants with adequate notice of the claims presented. The court noted that the identity of unnamed agents could be ascertained through discovery efforts.

In this regard, the court emphasized that, in medical malpractice cases, Defendants typically control the relevant records and personnel information.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source: Lackawanna Jurist, Vol. 126, No. 27 (July 4, 2025).

Court Addresses Medical Charting Issues in a Medical Malpractice Case

In the case of Creech v. Piotr F. Zembrzuski, No. 2024-CV-9004 (C.P. Lacka. Co. July 21, 2025, Nealon, J.), the court overruled Preliminary Objections filed against a medical malpractice Complaint in a wrongful death litigation.

According to the Opinion, a mother commenced this lawsuit against various healthcare providers for treating her daughter. The mother alleges that the healthcare providers failed to timely and properly diagnose the Plaintiff’s decedent’s deteriorating medical conditions.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff-mother asserted, among other claims, that the healthcare providers failed to timely and appropriate document the daughter’s findings and that their violation of the medical records documentation obligation prevented the mother from identifying in the Complaint each hospital agent who allegedly negligently treated the daughter.

The hospital Defendants filed a demurrer to the medical record charting allegations on the ground that the mother did not cite any statute, regulation, or other law that was allegedly violated or that supported the imposition of civil liability for untimely or inadequate medical entries.

The medical providers also sought to dismiss one hospital Defendant on the basis that it was merely a holding company which cannot be liable unless the mother pierced the corporate veil.

The court overruled the Preliminary Objections.

Judge Nealon noted that, under Pennsylvania law, physicians are obligated to make timely entries in a patient’s medical record that accurately, legibly, and completely reflect specific information regarding patient evaluation and treatment. The court noted that those charting requirements have been recognized as establishing standards of care and conduct for physician.

Accordingly, the court found that the mother’s allegations related to the hospital Defendants’ alleged violations of those medical records documentation standards were relevant to the Plaintiff’s negligent claims.

With regard to the claim against the alleged holding company, the court ruled that the mother had specifically alleged that the alleged holding company owned and operated the subject hospitals, employed the physicians and other professionals who treated the decedent, and provided medical care and services to the decedent.

Under the standard of review that requires the court to accept the Plaintiff’s factual allegations as true, and which prohibits the hospital Defendants from presenting a speaking demurrer, the court held that the Defendant’s Preliminary Objections should be overruled.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Superior Court Upholds a Forum Selection Clause Found in Consent To Treatment Form in Medical Malpractice Case

In the medical malpractice case of Somerlot v. Jung, No. 2578-EDA-2024 (Pa. Super. July 30, 2025 Lazarus, P.J., Kunselman, J., and King, J.) (Op. by Kunselman, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the validity of forum selection clauses in a medical consent form.

According to the Opinion, in this personal injury action, the Plaintiff had undergone treatment with certain medical providers and, under the contract entered into with those medical providers, the Plaintiff agreed that any litigation would be pursued solely in Bucks County.

The Plaintiff brought this personal injury lawsuit in Philadelphia County.

The Superior Court affirmed the decision of the Philadelphia County Court transferring the case to Bucks County based upon the forum selection clause.

The Superior Court upheld the general principle of contract law that the parties are free to pre-select among all possible proper venues as to which venue would be utilized to decide any legal disputes that might arise between them. Accordingly, the Superior Court affirmed the lower court’s decision.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Summary Judgment Granted in Amusement Ride Case

White Water Landing Log Flume - Dorney Park

In the case of Tepox v. Six Flags Entertainment Corp., No. 2024-CV-2312 (C.P. Lehigh Co. May 16, 2025 Pavlack, J.), the court granted summary judgment in a case where a Plaintiff, while at an amusement park, was hit by water while walking over a bridge built over a log flume water ride 

The court noted that the bridge was designed for people to both observe the ride and to get wet by the splash the ride creates.

The court ruled that the no-duty rule/inherent risk doctrine applicable to amusement park accidents supported the entry of summary judgment in this case. 

The court noted that spectators and patrons assume certain risks when participating in amusements such that no duty exists on the part of the Defendant to protect against those risks.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.