Showing posts with label Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. Show all posts
Wednesday, December 10, 2025
Court Strikes Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim But Allows Punitive Damages Claim to Proceed In Premises Liability Case
In the case of Abda v. Keystone Klub Keyser Oak, LLC, No. 2024-CV-7649 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Nov. 20, 2025 Nealon, J.), Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas overruled a Preliminary Objection in the nature of a demurrer filed against the Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages but sustained Preliminary Objections in the nature of a demurrer filed against the Plaintiff’s claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress in a personal injury case.
According to the Opinion, a customer at a skill-based games venue sued the Defendant entertainment lounge for negligence and sued its owner for assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress after the owner allegedly attacked and injured the customer on the premises.
In support of his claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the customer alleged that the owner later used his vehicle to cause damage to the grounds of the customer's residence and shouted profanities at the customer’s minor son in the process.
In response to the Complaint, the owner Defendant filed demurrers, including with respect to the Plaintiff’s demand for punitive damages. The Defendant asserted that the Plaintiff failed to allege specific facts to support a finding of willful or wanton misconduct.
The Defendant also filed a demurrer against the claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
In his Opinion, Judge Nealon noted that claims of willful or wanton misconduct may be averred generally under Pa. R.C.P. 1019(b).
The court additionally held that a demand for punitive damages is not governed by the “material facts” pleading requirement found under Pa. R.C.P. 1019(a) because a demand for punitive damages does not constitute a “cause of action.” Instead, a demand for punitive damages is viewed merely as an element of damages that is incidental to an underlying cause of action.
Here, where the customer stated a prima facie claim for assault and battery against the owner and had generally alleged willful and wanton misconduct by the owner, the court found support for overruling the demurrer to the claim for punitive damages.
With respect to the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the court found that the Plaintiff’s Complaint did not describe conduct that was so outrageous in nature and extreme in degree so as to exceed all bounds of decency and be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized society. Accordingly, in the absence of such facts, the court sustained the Defendant’s demurrer to the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.
Monday, June 30, 2025
Nursing Home's Effort to Have Lawsuit Dismissed By Virtue of an Arbitration Clause Denied
In the case of Perry v. Saber Healthcare Holdings, LLC, No. 2024-CV6608 (C.P. Lacka. Co. June 6, 2025 Nealon, J.), Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas addressed various Preliminary Objections filed in a nursing home malpractice case.
According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff sustained injuries as a result of a fall. Thereafter, the Plaintiff, through his daughter pursuant to her Power of Attorney, asserted claims of negligence, breach of contract, and other claims against the facility.
Among other issues, the Defendant facility raised Preliminary Objections asserting that the cause of action filed was required to instead be submitted to binding arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement executed by the daughter at the time the father was admitted to the facility.
The court ruled that, since the Power of Attorney that the father provided to his daughter expressly stated that the daughter was not authorized to enter into any arbitration agreement on his behalf with any skilled nursing facility or personal care home, the daughter could not bind her father to any arbitration agreement.
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| Judge Terrence R. Nealon Lackawanna County |
Accordingly, Judge Nealon found that there was no enforceable arbitration agreement in place. As such, the Preliminary Objection seeking to have this case transferred to arbitration was overruled.
The court otherwise ruled that certain negligence allegations submitted on behalf of the Plaintiff were not barred by the gist of the action doctrine even though some of the claims presented in this case were based in contract. The court found that the claim for negligent hiring, supervision and retention were collateral to the contract and not contingent on the breach of any terms of the admission agreement.
The court otherwise sustained the demurrer filed against the Plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress given that the Complaint did not allege conduct that was so outrageous in character and extreme in degree as to exceed all possible bounds of decency and be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.
Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.
Wednesday, January 29, 2025
Plaintiff's Claims For Tortious Interference with a Dead Body Kept Alive
In the case of McGee v. Bowser, No. 838 EDA 2023 (Pa. Super. Dec. 30, 2024 Olson, J., Sullivan, J., and Bender, J.)(Op. by Olson, J.), the Superior Court affirmed in part and reversed in part a trial court’s sustaining of Preliminary Objections in a case involving a Plaintiff’s decedent being moved from his original gravesite without consent.
According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff pled that the Defendant’s conspired to move the decedent from his original gravesite without consent or notice. The Plaintiff also alleged that the disinterment permit had been improperly granted.
Reviewing the claims before it, the appellate court ruled that the Plaintiff had indeed stated a valid claim for tortious interference with a dead body under the elements noted in the Restatement §868.
However, the court found that the Plaintiff’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim failed. The court noted that such a claim requires that a Plaintiff be present when the tort occurred.
However, the appellate court did allow the Plaintiff’s negligent infliction of emotional distress claim brought against the cemetery for breach of fiduciary duty to proceed given that that claim did not require a contemporaneous observation.
Relative to a civil conspiracy claim asserted by the Plaintiff, the court confirmed that a civil conspiracy claim is a derivative claim and that, given that some of the Plaintiff’s other substantive claims were reinstated, the civil conspiracy claim would likewise be allowed to proceed.
On the issue of the Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages, the appellate court noted that such damages are permitted on a lesser standard of outrageousness in cases involving the mistreatment of corpses.
Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.
I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.
According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff pled that the Defendant’s conspired to move the decedent from his original gravesite without consent or notice. The Plaintiff also alleged that the disinterment permit had been improperly granted.
Reviewing the claims before it, the appellate court ruled that the Plaintiff had indeed stated a valid claim for tortious interference with a dead body under the elements noted in the Restatement §868.
However, the court found that the Plaintiff’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim failed. The court noted that such a claim requires that a Plaintiff be present when the tort occurred.
However, the appellate court did allow the Plaintiff’s negligent infliction of emotional distress claim brought against the cemetery for breach of fiduciary duty to proceed given that that claim did not require a contemporaneous observation.
Relative to a civil conspiracy claim asserted by the Plaintiff, the court confirmed that a civil conspiracy claim is a derivative claim and that, given that some of the Plaintiff’s other substantive claims were reinstated, the civil conspiracy claim would likewise be allowed to proceed.
On the issue of the Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages, the appellate court noted that such damages are permitted on a lesser standard of outrageousness in cases involving the mistreatment of corpses.
Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.
I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.
Source of Image: Photo by Scott Rodgerson on www.unsplash.com.
Monday, July 15, 2024
No Loss of Consortium Claims Recognized for Injury to Pets
In the case of Witters v. Smith, No. 1:23-CV-1441 (M.D. Pa. June 10, 2024 Connor, J.), the court granted in part and denied in part a Motion to Dismiss in a case involving claims of intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress relative to the shooting of the Plaintiff's dog.
In this matter, the only injury claimed was to the Plaintiff’s dog. In this case, members of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole allegedly entered the Plaintiff's backyard without their permission and shot their pet dog. The Plaintiff's pursued various claims.
The court ruled the Pennsylvania law requires that both intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims require that the Defendant caused some physical harm to the Plaintiffs. Here, no physical harm to the Plaintiffs was alleged.
The court additionally ruled that the law of loss of consortium claims does not extend to the loss or injury to pets of a plaintiff.
Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.
I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.
The court additionally ruled that the law of loss of consortium claims does not extend to the loss or injury to pets of a plaintiff.
Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.
I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.
Source of image: Photo by Charles Deluvio on www.pexels.com.
Tuesday, May 10, 2022
Proper Jurisdiction for Social Media Defamation Claim Reviewed
With regard to the jurisdiction issue, the court found that the defendant allegedly directed allegedly defamatory messages to a person within the jurisdiction, with the intent to damage the reputation of another person also in that jurisdiction. The court found that the defendant had therefore been involved in activity expressly directed at the jurisdiction such that the exercise of personal jurisdiction was proper over the case presented.
Relative to a statute of limitations issues raised by one of the Defendants, the court noted that the limitations period began to run when defamatory material was published.
The court also noted that the Plaintiff’s lack of knowledge as to the Defendant’s identity could not support an application of the discovery rule under the facts presented in this case.
However, the court found that the Plaintiff had sufficiently pled a claim of fraudulent concealment by alleging that the Defendant had provided false information when registering on the social media platforms on which the allegedly defamatory material was allegedly published. As such, the court allowed discovery on this issue before making a determination as to whether the doctrine of fraudulent concealment could serve to toll the statute of limitations on some of the Plaintiff’s claims in this matter.
The court additionally dismissed the Plaintiff’s claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress after finding that this claim failed because the Plaintiff had not alleged any physical injury connected to or caused by the Plaintiff’s alleged emotional distress.
The court also found that the Plaintiff’s claims for civil conspiracy failed because the Plaintiff had not alleged that all members of the purported conspiracy shared a common purpose, but rather, merely alleged that they took acts that furthered the alleged purpose of the conspiracy.
Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK. The Court's companion Order can be viewed HERE.
Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions.” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (April 6, 2022).
The court additionally dismissed the Plaintiff’s claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress after finding that this claim failed because the Plaintiff had not alleged any physical injury connected to or caused by the Plaintiff’s alleged emotional distress.
The court also found that the Plaintiff’s claims for civil conspiracy failed because the Plaintiff had not alleged that all members of the purported conspiracy shared a common purpose, but rather, merely alleged that they took acts that furthered the alleged purpose of the conspiracy.
Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK. The Court's companion Order can be viewed HERE.
Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions.” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (April 6, 2022).
Thursday, August 29, 2019
Judge Brann of Federal Middle District Issues Opinion Addressing Motions to Dismiss and/or Stay in College Hazing Case
In the case of Piazza v. Young, No. 4:19-cv-00128
(M.D. Pa. Aug. 27, 2019 Brann, J.), the court addressed various Motions to
Dismiss and Motions to Stay in a civil lawsuit arising out of the fatal
injuries sustained by a student at Penn State allegedly as a result of hazing
activities in a fraternity. The court
granted the motions in part and denied the motions in part.
Of note, with respect to those fraternity brothers
Defendants who were under the age of 21, the court allowed the claims of the
Plaintiff to proceed against those underaged Defendants under the Plaintiff’s
theory of recovery to hold the Defendants liable for breaching an alleged
protective duty that the Defendants, as fraternity members, allegedly owed to
the Plaintiff’s son, a fraternity pledge.
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| Judge Matthew W. Brann M.D. Pa. |
In this regard, Judge Brann refused to apply the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court’s decision in the case of Kapres v. Heller, 640 A.2d 888
(Pa. 1994) in as an expansive manner as requested by those moving Defendants
who were under the age of 21. Under the
Kapres case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court generally ruled that
individuals under the age of 21 cannot be held liable under the social host
doctrine to a guest or third party injured on the premises relative to the
service of alcohol.
The court in this Piazza case refused to read the Kapres
case as immunizing the fraternity Defendants in this case from alleged
liability for their otherwise allegedly wrongful conduct that involved the provision
of alcohol. See Op. at
16-18. The court also noted that an
expansive reading of the Kapres decision in the context of this case
would not serve to further the social utility of the Pennsylvania statutes
against hazing activities.
However, the court did otherwise note that the Plaintiff’s
separate claim for negligence per se relative to the service of alcohol
asserted against the fraternity Defendants who were under the age of 21 should
be dismissed under the rationale of the Kapres case.
This Opinion is also notable for the court’s review of the
law pertaining to allegations of breach and causation, hazing allegations,
allegations of civil conspiracy and claims of battery and intentional
infliction of emotional distress.
The court ruled that those defendants who acted to aid
plaintiff after his accident can be liable under Restatement §§323, 324A for
negligently failing to seek professional medical help. However, the court found that other defendants
who did not act to aid the Plaintiff could not be found to be liable for
failing to render any aid as there is no cognizable duty under these facts to
rescue in the first place.
Judge Brann also found that a negligence per se claim based
upon an alleged violation of Pennsylvania’s anti-hazing statute is a viable
claim.
The Plaintiff’s intentional infliction of emotional distress
claim was dismissed under the rationale that an alleged attempted cover up of
the incident did not amount to an intent to inflict emotional distress on
anyone.
The court additionally denied the Motion to Dismiss the
claims of punitive damages asserted in this matter. The court noted that it has routinely
declined to dismiss punitive damages demands at the Motion to Dismiss stage of
the case and prior to discovery.
Judge Brann also addressed separate Motions to Stay filed by
several Defendants who have been criminally charged arising out of the same
incident.
On this issue, the court reviewed the six (6) factors
required under the case of Barker v. Kane, 49 F.Supp. 3rd
521, 525-26 (M.D. Pa. 2016) and granted this in part and denied it in
part. Essentially, the court denied the
request to stay the matter but crafted the remedy that entitles certain
Defendants to exercise their right against self-incrimination. The court noted that certain Defendants
would not be required to answer any
pleadings or discovery or participate in any depositions that would implicate
their Fifth Amendment Right against self-incrimination by engaging in such
pleadings and discovery.
Anyone wishing to review this decision by Judge Brann may click this LINK.
Labels:
Alcohol,
Civil Conspiracy,
Fraternity,
Hazing,
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress,
Judge Brann,
Negligence Per Se,
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination,
Punitive Damages,
Self-Incrimination
Monday, October 16, 2017
Current Law of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim Reviewed
In his recent decision in the case of Nehme v. Churla, 2017 W.L. 4124460 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Sept. 8, 2017
Nealon, J.), Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common
Pleas addressed the current status of the requirements of a claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress under Pennsylvania law.
The issue arose in a case in which a Plaintiff commenced an
action against his former paramour seeking the repayment of money he loaned to
the Defendant during the pendency of her divorce proceedings against her
ex-husband. The Plaintiff also sought
the return of an engagement ring.
According to the Opinion, the Defendant asserted a
counterclaim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Plaintiff
filed a demurrer to that claim on the grounds of legal insufficiency.
After reviewing the current status of the law of intentional
infliction of emotional distress in Pennsylvania as applied against the facts of the case, the court sustained the
demurrer to the Defendant’s counterclaim.
Anyone wishing to read this Opinion may click this LINK.
Wednesday, September 21, 2016
Superior Court Reaffirms Requirement of Expert Medical Evidence to Support Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claims
In the case of Gray v. Huntzinger, No. 1882 EDA 2015, 2016 Pa.Super. 194 (Pa.Super. Aug. 30, 2016 Gantman, P.J., Lazarus, J., and Platt, J.)(Op. by Lazarus, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court ruled that a trial court erred by not entering a JNOV in favor of a defendant on the Plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.
This case arose out of incidents related to the termination of the Plaintiff from his employment.
The Superior Court noted that the Plaintiff failed to present expert medical testimony at trial in support of the intentional infliction of emotional distress which was a violation of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's ruling in Kazatkzy v. King David Mem'l Park Inc., 527 A.2d 988 (Pa. 1987), in which that Court held that, to the extent the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress was recognized in Pennsylvania, recovery was limited to those cases in which competent medical evidence of emotional distress was presented by the Plaintiff.
Anyone wishing to review the Superior Court's decision in Gray may click this LINK.
Source: "Instant Case Digest," Pennsylvania Law Weekly (Sept. 13, 2016).
This case arose out of incidents related to the termination of the Plaintiff from his employment.
The Superior Court noted that the Plaintiff failed to present expert medical testimony at trial in support of the intentional infliction of emotional distress which was a violation of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's ruling in Kazatkzy v. King David Mem'l Park Inc., 527 A.2d 988 (Pa. 1987), in which that Court held that, to the extent the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress was recognized in Pennsylvania, recovery was limited to those cases in which competent medical evidence of emotional distress was presented by the Plaintiff.
Anyone wishing to review the Superior Court's decision in Gray may click this LINK.
Source: "Instant Case Digest," Pennsylvania Law Weekly (Sept. 13, 2016).
Friday, October 16, 2015
Federal Court Addresses Personal Injury Claims in High School Football Context
With the football season upon us, and interesting decision comes out of the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania in the form of Dorley v. South Fayette Township School District, No. 2:15-cv-00214 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 2015 Hornak, J.).
In this matter, the court addressed various Motions to Dismiss a personal injury claim arising out of injuries allegedly sustained at a local high school football training camp.
According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff, who was an incoming high school freshman, participated in a blocking drill with an upper classman and sustained injuries because of what the Plaintiff alleges was an unconstitutionally dangerous drill and the upper classman’s excessively, aggressive and tortious conduct during and after the drill.
Utilizing 42 U.S.C. §1983, the Plaintiff sued the school district and some of its football coaches, alleging federal and state constitutional claims. The Plaintiff also sued the involved upper classman and his parents under several state law tort claims.
Ultimately, the federal court dismissed the federal claims in their entirety, but would leave for the Plaintiff to amend certain claims. Some of the state law claims were also dismissed.
The Court ruled that, should the Plaintiff decline to amend his Complaint on the federal claims, or such federal claims otherwise subsequently fail, the remaining state claims were to be remanded to the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas.
In his Opinion, Judge Hornak addressed allegations pertaining to 14th Amendment Due Process claims and the application of the qualified Immunity Doctrine, school district liability claims, tort claim for battery, intention infliction of emotional distress, as well as negligence allegations. Also reviewed were claims of negligence and vicarious liability against the parent Defendants.
I send thanks to Attorney Thomas McDonnell of the Pittsburgh law firm of Summers McDonnell for forwarding this interesting decision to my attention.
Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.
In this matter, the court addressed various Motions to Dismiss a personal injury claim arising out of injuries allegedly sustained at a local high school football training camp.
According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff, who was an incoming high school freshman, participated in a blocking drill with an upper classman and sustained injuries because of what the Plaintiff alleges was an unconstitutionally dangerous drill and the upper classman’s excessively, aggressive and tortious conduct during and after the drill.
Utilizing 42 U.S.C. §1983, the Plaintiff sued the school district and some of its football coaches, alleging federal and state constitutional claims. The Plaintiff also sued the involved upper classman and his parents under several state law tort claims.
Ultimately, the federal court dismissed the federal claims in their entirety, but would leave for the Plaintiff to amend certain claims. Some of the state law claims were also dismissed.
The Court ruled that, should the Plaintiff decline to amend his Complaint on the federal claims, or such federal claims otherwise subsequently fail, the remaining state claims were to be remanded to the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas.
In his Opinion, Judge Hornak addressed allegations pertaining to 14th Amendment Due Process claims and the application of the qualified Immunity Doctrine, school district liability claims, tort claim for battery, intention infliction of emotional distress, as well as negligence allegations. Also reviewed were claims of negligence and vicarious liability against the parent Defendants.
I send thanks to Attorney Thomas McDonnell of the Pittsburgh law firm of Summers McDonnell for forwarding this interesting decision to my attention.
Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.
Monday, February 9, 2015
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim Allowed in Med Mal Context
According to a summary of the Opinion, the Defendants filed Preliminary Objections to the Plaintiff’s Complaint alleging, in part, that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had not adopted a tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress and that, in any event, the Plaintiff did not set forth allegations of outrageous conduct to support such a claim.
Judge Cox noted that the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is set forth in the Restatement (Second ) of Torts §46. Although the trial court agreed that the tort had not been explicated accepted, or rejected, by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, appellate case law, including cases from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the Pennsylvania Superior Court and the Third Circuit consistently addressed the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress despite the fact that the Supreme Court had not officially adopted the Restatement standard. Accordingly, there is no indication in the case law that the Plaintiff asserting such a claim had been precluded from recovery other than for an inability to set forth adequate facts or proof in support of such claims.
As such, Judge Cox ruled in Young that the Plaintiff was permitted to attempt to prove such a claim. The court went on to note that the Plaintiff had asserted sufficient facts that, if proven, would sustain a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The underlying facts in this case involved a hospital staff member and/or a doctor who informed the Plaintiff that her child was stillborn after a birthing procedure when, in fact, the Plaintiff gave birth to a health child.
The court additional overruled the Defendant’s Preliminary Objections to the Plaintiff’s for punitive damages on the grounds that the conduct necessary to support the claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress was beyond that which would also entitle Plaintiff to a recovery of punitive damages for other torts.
As such, the trial court overruled the Defendant’s Preliminary Objections in this regard. The court also overruled Preliminary Objections asserted by the Defendants with respect to other issues and also denied other Preliminary Objections asserted.
I do not have a copy of this decision. Anyone wishing to secure a copy of this
decision may contact the Instant Case Service of the Pennsylvania Law Weekly by
calling 1-800-276-7427, providing the above-referenced PICS Case Number and
paying a small fee.
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