Showing posts with label Cummins. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Cummins. Show all posts

Friday, October 23, 2026

Still Time To Register For CLE

 

On November 5, 2026, Daniel E. Cummins, Esq. of Cummins Law and Neil T. O'Donnell of O'Donnell Law will be presenting a CLE program entitled "2026 Civil Litigation Update With Practice Tips" at the Lackawanna County Bench Bar Conference set to take place at the Hilton Scranton Hotel and Conference Center.

Attendance at the Lackawanna County Bench Bar Conference is open to members of the Lackawanna Bar Association Conference and will be held in person.

Please consider registering to attend the upcoming November 5, 2026 Lackawanna County by utilizing this LINK.


Please also note that a version of this presentation may also be offered on Zoom through another sponsor in the near future. Details to follow.

Friday, October 9, 2026

Presenting Civil Litigation Update at Upcoming November 5, 2026 Lackawanna County Bench Bar Conference

On November 5, 2026, Daniel E. Cummins, Esq. of Cummins Law and Neil T. O'Donnell of O'Donnell Law will be presenting a CLE program entitled "2026 Civil Litigation Update With Practice Tips" at the Lackawanna County Bench Bar Conference set to take place at the Hilton Scranton Hotel and Conference Center.

Attendance at the Lackawanna County Bench Bar Conference is open to members of the Lackawanna Bar Association Conference and will be held in person.

Please consider registering to attend the upcoming November 5, 2026 Lackawanna County by utilizing this LINK.


Please also note that a version of this presentation may also be offered on Zoom through another sponsor in the near future. Details to follow.

Tuesday, September 1, 2026

ARTICLE: Pa. Rules of Civil Procedure Should be Amended to Allow for Email as a Permissible Means of Communication Across the Board

The below article of mine was recently published in the August 27, 2026 edition of the Pennsylvania Law Weekly.


Pa. Rules of Civil Procedure Should be Amended to Allow for Email as a Permissible Means of Communication Across the Board

August 27, 2026

By

Daniel E. Cummins














Would you believe, in this digital day and age, that Pennsylvania lawyers, if they so desired, can refuse to communicate via email with other lawyers in personal injury lawsuits? That such an attorney could insist that written communications between counsel be by regular mail or fax only? Sounds absurd, doesn't it?

Well, believe it or not, the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure currently allow attorneys to take such a position and some are doing so.

Generally speaking, the applicable Rules of Civil Procedure in this regard do allow for the service, or communication, of legal papers other than original process by fax machines and emails, but only where the parties have agreed to such communication methods or where an email address and/or fax number was included in the attorney’s provided contact information in an entry of appearance or on prior legal papers filed by that attorney in the matter.

It is rare, but some attorneys, having an apparent fear of technology and just to be irksome, refuse to communicate with opposing counsel via email in civil litigation matters. Instead, they insist that all written communications be made via letters sent by regular mail or by fax.

This issue may also come up in other scenarios. Some attorneys resort to utilizing the applicable rules in this regard as a vexatious weapon when they get cornered in one aspect or another in a case. For example, even after earlier communicating in a case with opposing counsel via email, the nonmoving attorney faced with a motion to compel may assert that the motion should be denied on the basis that the non-moving attorney never agreed to communicate via email. Their silly, but possibly hyper-technically correct argument then becomes that they were never properly served with the motion, or even the discovery requests at issue, because the requests were provided to them via email.

Now that we are more than a quarter of a century into the 21st century, the time has come for a change with respect to the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure regarding the service of legal documents other than the original process. These rules on the permissible methods service of legal papers have become outdated and result in inefficiency and unnecessary costs.

In a land of paperless law offices, where the overwhelming majority of lawyers and their staff, like the rest of society, use email as the preferred form of communication, the Rules of Civil Procedure should be amended to allow for the use of email as a permitted means of communication.

With email as a quick, valid alternative, the archaic requirement under the rules requiring law firms to use paper for the time-consuming and annoying process of printing out letters in order to send them by fax is just silly. Moreover, a requirement that volumes and volumes of papers be utilized to produce discovery responses, medical records, exhibits, or motions and briefs that can be easily and freely delivered electronically is needlessly time-consuming and costly. The need to buy reams of paper and pay postage to send volumes of paper enclosures when such items can be sent efficiently and free of charge via email is totally unnecessary. The time for change to the rules applicable to service of legal papers has arrived.


Applicable Rules of Civil Procedure


Under Rule of Civil Procedure 440, which is titled “Service of Legal Papers Other Than Original Process,” the service of legal papers other than original process is only by way of hand delivery, regular mail, or facsimile. Notably, that Rule does not allow for communication by way of email. As such, it appears that Pa.R.C.P. 440 has become archaic in this digital age where communications by email have become the norm in all walks of life.

Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 205.4, which covers the “Electronic Filing and Service of Legal Papers,” touches upon the issue of communications by email.

Under Pa.R.C.P. 205.4(g)(1)(ii), attorneys are allowed to serve documents, other than original process, by fax or email, but only in limited circumstances. That rule provides that email can only be used in civil litigation matters where the parties have agreed to such a communication method or where an email address has been included by the attorneys involved on their entries of appearance or in the contact information included in any prior legal paper filed by the attorneys in the action.

Rules Are Slow to Catch Up With the Times


History shows that the amendments to the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure typically take a while to catch up with the change in time of the various types of communication that have developed over the years. Take for example, the rise of communication by facsimile machines. Commentators note that the use of facsimile machines came into vogue in the early 1980s.

Yet, although the use of fax machines became common in the early 1980s, the amendments of Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure regarding the service of legal papers other than original process did not allow for the use of facsimile transmission to serve such papers until approximately 1993 in the federal courts and 1998 in the Pennsylvania state courts.

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended in 1993, which was approximately 13 years after the use of fax machines to communicate became the norm.

It took even longer in the Pennsylvania state courts for the Rules of Civil Procedure to catch up. It was not until Aug 3. 1998, that a specific amendment was made to Pa. R.C.P. 440 to allow for fax communications. At the time of that amendment, service by facsimile transmission became permissible only where the attorneys agreed to utilize that form of communication or where an attorney had provided a fax number in a filed entry of appearance.

Commentators have otherwise noted that the use of email became standard business practice during the 1990s. By the late 1990s, the use of email widely replaced the use of faxes as the commonly utilized form of quick written communications.

However, it was not until several years later until 2001 that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended to allow for service by electronic means, including email, provided that the recipient gave written consent to such communications in advance.

As the technology evolved, these Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were further amended to authorize electronic service through the court’s electronic/filing system as a uniform national practice. These amendments took place on Dec. 1, 2018, which was nearly 20 years after the use of email seemed to become the norm as a form of communication in the world.

With regards to the even slower evolution of the separate Pennsylvania state Rules of Civil Procedure, those rules were amended to allow for service of papers other than original process by email only if an email address was explicitly included on a prior entry of appearance or legal paper filed in the action by the recipient attorney, or by the written agreement of the parties. As noted above, these allowances were permitted under Pa. R.C.P. 205.4(g), which went into effect on July 1, 1999.

Currently in Pennsylvania, there are only a number of county courts that utilize electronic filing. As such, there is no uniform, statewide allowance for service of legal papers other than original process through county court electronic filing systems.

In fact, some of the county court electronic systems that have been adopted do not even have a mechanism under which an electronically filed document submitted to the court is also automatically served on the parties involved in the action. This leads to uncertainty in the bar as some attorneys assume that, if a county court has electronic filing, there must also be electronic service of any documents filed on all counsel in all instances.

In the end, since it went effective over a quarter of a century ago, Pa.R.C.P. 205.4 has not been amended to allow for email to be freely utilized as a valid form of communication in all civil litigation matters in all instances.

Using the Rules as a Weapon


While almost all attorneys across the commonwealth of Pennsylvania appear to be willing and able to utilize email as a proper means of communication, believe it or not, there are still some holdouts who still inexplicably refuse to utilize email for communications with opposing counsel during the course of the litigation.

There are also other attorneys who resort to using the technicalities in the current Rules of Civil Procedure to assert, after the fact, that they have not been properly served with legal papers or communications in accordance with the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure because the document was served by email as opposed to being sent via fax or regular mail.

More specifically, such a scenario can arise when an attorney is hit with a motion to compel and is facing trouble or sanctions in light of the same. Such an attorney, in addition to having already failed to comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure in other aspects, may also resort to asserting that they were not properly served with either the discovery requests or the motion to compel at issue because it was served upon them by email.

Some attorneys making this argument do so, even though that attorney may have already otherwise previously communicated by email for every other aspect of the case. Yet, suddenly, when such attorneys are faced with the threat of a motion, all of a sudden, assert that they never agreed to accept email service of documents. They may also point out that they did not include their email address to their contact information listed in any entry of appearance or previous filing they submitted to the court.

Such hyper-technical positions do not further the proper practice of law and the rules should be changed to prevent such arguments.

Time for a Change


Given that the federal courts have a nationwide rule in place that recognizes email as a valid form of communication and a valid form of service of documents other than original process, the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure should also be amended and updated to allow for the same.

Currently, even though the use of email has become universal in both society and the legal field over the past 25 years, the current wording of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure provides that email is a proper form of communication in civil litigation only if the parties agree to the same or if the opposing party had included their email address in their contact information in their entry of appearance or in some other filing with the court.

The Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure should be amended to make it permissible, across the board, for litigating attorneys to communicate with one another via email, including with respect to the service of legal documents other than service of process. In its present form, the wording of the Rule is subject to possible abuse. Perhaps the Civil Rules Committee of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court can review this need for an update to Pa.R.C.P. 205.4 and work towards such a change.

Furthermore, now that email has become the ordinary means of communication in society, there would be no harm caused by such an amendment. Rather, such an amendment would further the interests of efficiency and the reduction of costs in civil litigation matters. It can be easily predicted that, if a survey were to be taken of the members of the Pennsylvania civil litigation Bar on the topic, there would be overwhelming support for an amendment of the rules to allow for the use of email communications as permissible and acceptable.

Last but certainly not least, an amendment to the above Rules of Civil Procedure allowing for the use of email as a valid form of communication in all aspects of civil litigation would make the rules consistent with recent changes in the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct placing an affirmative duty on all Pennsylvania attorneys to maintain their competence which includes keeping up with the use of technology in the practice of law for the benefit of their clients.



Daniel E. Cummins is the managing partner at Cummins Law in Clarks Summit, Pennsylvania. He is also the sole creator of the Tort Talk blog at www.TortTalk.com.  Contact him at dancummins@cumminslaw.net.


Reprinted with permission from the August 27, 2026 edition of the "The Pennsylvania Law Weekly © 2026 ALM Global Properties, LLC. All rights reserved. Further duplication without permission is prohibited, contact 877-256-2472 or asset-and-logo-licensing@alm.com.

Friday, August 21, 2026

Named "LAWYER OF THE YEAR" for Insurance Law in Northeastern Pennsylvania By the BEST LAWYERS IN AMERICA Directory

 

Proud to note the notification received yesterday from The Best Lawyers in America Directory confirming that I have been named the 2027 "Lawyer of the Year" for Insurance Law in Northeastern Pennsylvania.

The Directory noted that this is a particularly meaningful distinction in that it is awarded to individual lawyers who recieved the highest overall peer feedback in a specific practice area and geographic region.

The Directory also noted that I will be recognized in the 2027 Edition of The Best Lawyers in America for my work in Insurance Law as well as in Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants.  I am additionally proud to note that this is the 16th year in a row that I have been so recognized in the Directory.

I am grateful for all of my clients who have entrusted their matters to me for handling and I thank all those fellow members of the bar and the judiciary who have pushed me to provide the best legal services possible.



Wednesday, July 15, 2026

The Beginning of the End? Pennsylvania Supreme Court Agrees to Address Whether the Gist of the Action Doctrine Remains Valid Law

According to a July 14, 2026 article by Riley Brennan in The Legal Intelligencer entitled "Pa. High Court to Revisit 'Gist of the Action' Doctrine for Legal Malpractice Cases, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has agreed to address the ongoing validity of the doctrine in the case of Poteat v. Asteak.

Pennsylvania Supreme Court

As Tort Talkers may recall, my son, Daniel, Jr. (now about to enter his third year at Virginia Law where he is an Articles Editor on the Virginia Law Review) and I recently published a timely article in the April, 2026 edition of the Pennsylvania Bar Association Quarterly entitled "The Rise and Fall of the Gist of the Action Doctrine," in which the history of the doctrine was analyzed and and predictions were made regarding possible further developments in the law with respect to the doctrine.

We again thank Professor Emeritus Robert E. Rains of the Dickinson School of Law and Editor of the Quarterly for selecting this article for publication and for his excellent editorial assistance.

Here is the prediction from the end of the article with regards to the future of the gist of the action doctrine:


Thus, Swatt and Poteat appear to herald the beginning of the end of the gist of the action doctrine as a defense in Pennsylvania civil litigation matters. If and when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has another opportunity to consider the validity of the gist of the action doctrine, it can be reasonably anticipated that the Supreme Court will finally swat the remaining mist of this doctrine into oblivion as contrary to the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. Moreover, most of the current Justices on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court will also likely see the purpose of the gist of the action doctrine in maintaining the conceptual differences between tort and contract actions as less important than allowing injured parties to explore all potential theories of recovery available under the law.

With the anticipated downfall of the gist of the action doctrine, negligence and breach of contract will no longer be viewed as causes of action encompassing different types of wrongs that have to be kept apart. Rather, these types of claims will be viewed as parts of a menu of numerous options from which plaintiffs may select when deciding how to proceed with a lawsuit, including the option of proceeding with both types of claims in a single lawsuit. The anticipated total eradication of the defense of the gist of the action doctrine will therefore serve to expand the avenues of recovery for injured parties in Pennsylvania. However, until such time that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court again addresses the viability of the gist of the action doctrine and provides clarity and guidance, the courts and members of the bar will be left to grapple with implications of the Superior Court’s recent decisions on the doctrine.


To view the entire article, please click this LINK to the Tort Talk post on the article and then click the Link within that post to view the article.

Monday, June 29, 2026

Article: Remedies for Late Payment of Settlement Funds

The below article of mine recently appeared in the June 18, 2026 edition of the Pennsylvania Law Weekly and is republished here with permission.


Remedies for Late Payment of Settlement Funds

June 18, 2026

By

Daniel E. Cummins


In most instances, once a civil litigation matter is settled, the defendant’s liability insurance carrier promptly issues payment. In this regard, the carrier has an interest in both protecting its insured in this regard and in closing out another file. However, in rare instances, a settlement payment may be delayed for an inordinate period of time for one reason or another.

When a settlement payment is delayed, plaintiffs have options to compel the production of the settlement payment or to secure sanctions against the defendant relative to the delay. Most settlement agreements themselves outline when payment is due. And, whether or not there is such a provision in a release regarding the timing of a payment, plaintiffs also have the benefit of the mandate under Pa.R.C.P. 229.1, which requires that the settlement payment be “delivered … within 20 calendar days from the defendant’s receipt of an executed release.”

In terms of the status of Pennsylvania law in this regard, it is often said by many that, if one needs a thorough overview of the current status of a particular area of the law, one should look for a decision on the issue written by Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas. This advice holds true with Nealon’s recent opinion in the case of Hill v. Riverside Healthcare and Rehabilitation Center, No. 2023-CV-3399 (C.P. Lacka. Co. May 22, 2026 Nealon, J.), in which Nealon addressed the topic of remedies available to a plaintiff under Pa.R.C.P. 229.1 where a defendant fails to produce a settlement payment in a timely fashion after the receipt of an executed release.

According to the opinion, this matter involved a professional liability action against the health care and rehab center. The plaintiff’s decedent’s had been a patient at the defendant’s facility. The defendant facility owner at issue in this case eventually became insolvent and filed for bankruptcy.

During the course of this litigation, the parties agreed to participate in a settlement conference with a private mediator. Prior to the mediation, the defendant’s attorney confirmed in writing that the parent and affiliate entities of the defendant were insolvent and in bankruptcy proceedings. Defense counsel also confirmed that, as such, the defendant would not be able to satisfy the first $75,000 of any settlement as that represented the amount of the defendant’s deductible, but that any obligation above that amount would be covered by the defendant’s liability insurance policy.

As a result of the mediation, the parties reached a settlement agreement for a net payment of $175,000. The total amount of the party’s settlement was actually $250,000 but the plaintiff agreed to waive the defendant’s payment of its $75,000 deductible. The net settlement payment of $175,000 was to be paid entirely by the defendant’s liability insurance carrier.

The court’s opinion emphasized that the insurance company’s adjuster had agreed to the settlement without any indication of any coverage issues existing between the defendant and its insurance company.

After the settlement, the plaintiff proceeded to court on a petition for court approval of the settlement in this death case. The court granted the Plaintiff’s petition and approved the settlement. The parties then executed the settlement agreement.

Plaintiff’s counsel then sent the signed release, the court order approving the settlement and other closing documents to the defendant’s counsel and requested the settlement payment.

In his opinion in this Hill case, Nealon emphasized that noticeably absent from the settlement agreement was any indication or even a suggestion that a coverage issue may exist between the defendant and its insurance company. Nor was there any reference that any such coverage issue needed to be resolved before the plaintiff would receive the settlement payment.

Thereafter, when plaintiff’s counsel wrote for the status of the settlement check, defense counsel indicated that there was some issue that the adjuster had to work out. Again, there was no reference made to any insurance coverage issues.

The opinion of the court noted facts that showed that the plaintiff’s attorney showed great patience and was more than accommodating in his repeated efforts to secure the production of the settlement check over the next several months. After several months then went by with no production of the settlement check, counsel for the plaintiff filed a motion under Pa.R.C.P. 229.1 relative to the defendant’s failure to produce the settlement check in a timely fashion after the production of the executed release.

Judge Nealon reviewed Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 229.1 which governs the prompt delivery of settlement funds within 20 days of the receipt of an executed release by the defendant.

The rule otherwise provides that, if court approval of the settlement is required, the mandated 20-day time period under Rule 229.1 does not become operative until the settlement is so approved.

Nealon noted that, under Rule 229.1, if a defendant fails to timely deliver settlement funds, a plaintiff has the right to seek either of two remedies. First, a plaintiff can seek to invalidate the settlement agreement and request that the matter return to the trial list. Second, a plaintiff can seek certain sanctions against the defendant.

The court in Hill noted that, if the plaintiff opt to pursue sanctions against the defendant, Rule 229.1(e) directs the plaintiff to file an affidavit “attesting to nonpayment,” and to submit six items for the court’s review with the affidavit. Among the documents to be submitted with the affidavit are a copy of “any document evidencing the terms of the settlement agreement,” a copy of “the executed release,” a copy of “a receipt reflecting delivery of the executed release,” a certification by counsel “the applicable interest rate,” and “that the affidavit and accompanying documents have been served on the attorneys for all interested parties.” Lastly, also attached to the affidavit should be “the form of order prescribed by subdivision (h)” of Pa.R.C.P. 229.1 for execution by the court.

Nealon additionally noted that the type of sanctions allowed in this instance are spelled out under Pa.R.C.P. 229.1. More specifically, under Rule 229.1(g), if the court determines that a defendant has failed to deliver the settlement funds within 20 days and there is no material dispute as to the terms of the settlement or the terms of the release, the court “shall impose sanctions in the form of interests calculated at the rate equal to the prime rate as listed in the First Edition of the Wall Street Journal published for each calendar year for which interest is awarded, plus 1%, not compounded, running from the 21st day to the date of delivery of the settlement funds, together with reasonable attorney fees incurred in the preparation of the affidavit.”

Nealon otherwise ruled in the Hill case that the fact that the insurance company’s noncompliance with the payment requirement may be attributable to a post-settlement assertion of a potential coverage issue did not warrant the denial of the plaintiff’s request for sanctions relative to the failure of the carrier to produce the settlement check within 20 days of the production of the executed release.
Conclusion

The Hill decision written by Judge Nealon provides thorough guidance on the steps to take in securing sanctions relative to a late payment of settlement funds required by an executed release.

As evidenced by plaintiff’s counsel’s actions in the Hill case, it is advisable for the plaintiff to show some patience while repeatedly requesting, in writing, the settlement payment once the mandated 20-day time period has expired for the timely production of the check. By showing some patience and creating a written record of repeated requests for the production of the check, the plaintiff will be able to bolster their request for sanctions as opposed to the case where a plaintiff runs to the courthouse on a motion for sanctions on the 21st day after the release was received by the defense counsel.

Daniel E. Cummins is the managing partner at Cummins Law in Clarks Summit, Pennsylvania. Contact him at dancummins@cumminslaw.net.




Reprinted with permission from the June 18, 2026 edition of the "The Pennsylvania Law Weekly © 2026 ALM Global Properties, LLC. All rights reserved. Further duplication without permission is prohibited, contact 877-256-2472 or asset-and-logo-licensing@alm.com.

Thursday, April 2, 2026

Article: The Rise and Fall of The Gist of The Action Doctrine



Here is a LINK to the latest edition of the Pennsylvania Bar Association Quarterly which contains an article written by my son, Daniel E. Cummins, Jr. and myself entitled "The Rise and Fall of the Gist of the Action Doctrine." The article can be found on p. 118 of this edition.

My son, Daniel, is currently finishing up his second year at Virginia Law School where he is currently serving as one of the Articles Editors for the Virginia Law Review. He is set to work as a Summer Associate this summer with Cozen & O'Connor in their Philadelphia office. He is also looking forward to his clerkship with Federal Middle District Court Judge Joseph F. Saporito, Jr. after he graduates from law school next year.

As noted in the article, the gist of the action doctrine prevents plaintiffs from bringing both a breach of contract claim and a negligence claim based on an alleged breach of the same duty.

The article reviews the centuries of jurisprudence behind the gist of the action doctrine as compared to the recent Pennsylvania Superior Court decisions that call into question the continuing validity of the doctrine. The article also predicts further anticipated developments in the law going forward.

Daniel and I send thanks to Professor Emeritus Robert E. Rains of the Dickinson School of Law, who is the Editor of the Pennsylvania Bar Association Quarterly, for selecting this article for publication and for editing it into a better article.  We also thank Tina R. Schreiber for her editorial assistance on the article.



I also proudly note that I am referenced the first article listed in this edition. That article, written by Joel Fishman, Ph.D., M.L.S. and entitled "The Pennsylvania Bar Association Quarterly: A 10-Year History Volumes 87-96 (2016-2025)," references two past PBA Quarterly articles of mine on pages 80-81 as part of the history of this periodical. I thank Professor Rains for selecting those articles for publication as well.

Wednesday, March 11, 2026

Article: How To Bypass an Impasse At Mediation

Here is a LINK to my article entitled "How To Bypass an Impasse at Mediation" which has just been published in the March/April edition of the Pennsylvania Lawyer magazine.

With this article I gathered lessons from my experience as a certified Federal Middle District Court Mediator and as a private Mediator with Cummins Mediation in order to provide tips on how to get past those difficult times at Mediation where there seems to be no way to move forward with the negotiations.  The hope is that these suggestions will enable you to realize more success at more Mediations.

Proud to note that this is my 200th published article.  Hope you enjoy it and that it helps you with your practice.

Should you ever need assistance with trying to bring a case of yours to a close through a Mediation, please consider Cummins Mediation.




570-319-5899

dancummins@cumminslaw.net

Friday, March 6, 2026

Abington Heights High School Mock Trial Team Wins District Championship

2026 Abington Heights Mock Trial Team
From L. to R.: Mark Barbrack, Christopher Cummins, Aaliya Murray, Nolan Moore, Amishi Amit, Leen Abughnia, Chase Roberts, Jasleen Montesino, Henry Mahoney, Hatice Kucak, Sadie Robson, Grace Bennett, Ananya Phadke, Gabe Westgate, Eloise Giroux

Proud to note that the Abington Heights High School Mock Trial Team from Clarks Summit, Lackawanna County won the 2026 District Championship Trial last night and are on their way to the Regional Championship!

The Team is made up of a great bunch of very bright and polite students who work hard and support one another.  Very proud of all of the students on the team, including my son, Christopher.

The coaches and advisors for the team include my wife, Anne Cummins, myself Dan Cummins, Jody Healey, Esq. and Denise Bennett.  We are all so proud of the hard work these students have put in towards the success of the program.


The Mock Trial case this year was an interesting medical malpractice case involving a defendant family doctor's alleged failure to diagnose the plaintiff's medical condition.

The Finals Trial was presided over by The Honorable Judge Terrence R. Nealon who did an excellent job allowing the kids to argue their objections while providing them lessons on the law with his rulings.  Sending thanks to Judge Nealon for donating his time and expertise to the competition.

Also sending thanks to all the jurors who volunteered their time to serve last night and to those who volunteered through out the season.  The competition cannot succeed without those local lawyers, paralegals, law office staff members, and others who are willing to volunteer.  Thank you.

Also sending thanks to the Lackawanna Bar Association and its Executive Director, Lee Ann Munley, as well as Kaitlin McDonough of that office for all their time and work to make the program a success.

Sending great thanks to the District Coordinator for the Mock Trial Competition, Mackenzie Wilson, a great attorney with Munley Law, for donating all of her time and hard work to make the local competition a success.

Let's go Comets!  Keep soarin' onto the Regionals!  So proud!

Wednesday, February 18, 2026

Pennsylvania Lawyer Magazine Recognized on a National Level


An article of mine was featured in The Pennsylvania Lawyer magazine over the past year, which magazine was awarded a 2025 Luminary Award from the National Association for Bar Professionals!

My article entitled "Use of Exhibits in Opening Statements is Allowed" appeared in the May/June 2025 edition of the magazine. Here is a LINK to the Tort Talk post on that article, which post contains a link to the article.

I send thanks to Patricia Graybill, the editor of The Pennsylvania Lawyer magazine for agreeing to publish the article. I also extend my congratulations to her for receiving this recognition for the excellent work she has done for years with the magazine for the Pennsylvania Bar Association.

If you are interested in authoring an article, contact the Pennsylvania Bar Association via email at: editor@pabar.org.




Tuesday, January 27, 2026

ARTICLE: Preserving Confidentiality When Using AI Platforms

 The below article of written by myself and my son, Michael appeared in the January 22, 2026 edition of the Pennsylvania Law Weekly and is republished here with permission.


Michael is a Computer Science major focusing on Artificial Intelligence studies at Ursinus College outside of Philadelphia, PA. He provided the insight on the computer science aspects of the article and I focused on the legal points included in the article.




Expert Opinion/Legal Ethics and Attorney Discipline



Preserving Confidentiality When Using AI Platforms

By

Daniel E. Cummins & Michael J. Cummins


As the use of artificial intelligence (AI) rises in the practice of law, so does the concern for preserving confidentiality. Whether it be preserving one’s own client’s confidentiality as required by the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Responsibility, or preserving the confidentiality of records related to an opposing party under the requirements of HIPAA, counsel must be careful.

This is particularly so with the rising trend of automation through the use of AI platforms for completing tasks such as streamlining review and summarization of documents, including medical records, in the practice of law. In this day in age, lawyers can upload documents to an AI platform and have the platform review the records and create a summary of the same. In fact, some insurance carriers are beginning to mandate that their defense counsel do so. This practice raises ethical and confidentiality concerns.


The Requirement of Confidentiality


Under Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6, attorneys are required to protect the confidentiality of certain information that they are handling. Under Rule 1.6, titled “Confidentiality of Information,” it is provided, in pertinent part, that “a lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation … .”

The commentary to the rule notes that the rule of confidentiality “contributes to the trust that is the hallmark of the client-lawyer relationship.” With confidentiality, a client is encouraged to communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer on the subject matter of the representation. The rule also emphasizes that the lawyer may not disclose confidential information provided to the lawyer by the client except as authorized or required by the Rules of Professional Conduct or some other pertinent law.

As such, utilizing an AI platform that results in the inadvertent disclosure of a client’s private information could land an attorney in hot water with an unforgiving Disciplinary Board.


HIPAA Violations and Enforcement


In addition to attorneys needing to protect the private information of their own clients, lawyers also have to be careful with the confidential information of opposing parties, such as medical records of an opposing party.

HIPAA requires both physical and digital safeguards for patient data. In addition to mandating that medical files should not be left unattended in public areas, the law also requires that private health information must be stored digitally in a secured fashion that prevents unauthorized viewing.

The requirement of keeping an opposing party’s medical records private is mandated by HIPAA. Under the relevant law, failure to comply with HIPAA can result in civil and criminal penalties.

If a HIPAA complaint describes an action that could be a violation of the criminal provisions of HIPAA, the office for civil rights under the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services may refer the complaint to the Department of Justice for an investigation.

Criminal charges typically only arise where an individual “knowingly” obtains and/or discloses individually identifiable confidential health information. The question of whether such criminal penalties could be extended to lawyers handling medical records in a civil litigation matter is subject to dispute. The HIPAA law appears to limit criminal penalties to certain entities within the health care field. Yet, HIPAA also covers third parties that handle private health information on behalf of covered entities, including law firms assisting with medical-related legal matters.

In terms of any noncompliance that may result in the imposition of civil money penalties, the Secretary of the Health and Human Services Department has the discretion in determining the amount of the penalty based upon the nature and extent of the violation and the nature and the extent of the harm resulting from the violation. Civil penalties can range from $100 to $50,000 per violation, with additional penalties for repeat violations.

Based upon the stiff HIPAA penalties that can result from violating client confidentiality or the privacy of third parties, attorneys must be very careful in the use of artificial intelligence when using such platforms to review and summarize medical records and other private information that may arise in a civil litigation matter.


Local AI versus Third-Party AI


When utilizing an AI chatbot, such as Chat-GPT or Google’s Gemini, it may appear that it is entirely personalized and private to yourself. In reality, when utilizing any form of cloud based large-language models (LLM), there is a high risk that the company that provides the model will save, maintain, and even train future models based upon the data the user inputs.

In other words, if you provide a document for Chat-GPT to summarize or prompt a question, you are giving permission for OpenAI, the company that developed and owns Chat-GPT, to save and use that document or question for future training purposes. In addition to utilizing the information or documentation to train the model, this also leaves your documents vulnerable in the case of a data breach of the model provider.

However, this does not mean that this technology is completely useless. If you want to utilize an AI tool without the potential data security risks, you can locally host one within your organization.


How to Create Your Own Safe AI Platform


Using a designated device or server, you can download a model (there are free or pay-to-use options), design an interface for your organization, and run the model locally.

Once the model is running within your network, it will not even require an internet connection, meaning that all data and documents provided to the model will remain safely within your control within your office.

In order to take advantage of such a strategy, a law firm would likely need to hire an AI consultant company or professional to set up, design, and secure the system within one’s own office. There are also options to enter enterprise agreements with companies like OpenAI to establish a business relationship which does not allow them to retain the user input and data for training purposes.


Conclusion


While the use of AI platforms to automate certain tasks in a law office, such as the review and summarization of medical records, provides certain challenges, those challenges are not insurmountable.

Certain vendors who subpoena medical records for law firms have begun to provide AI generated summaries of medical records. Steps should be taken by law firms to ensure that these vendors are utilizing closed AI platforms that protect the confidentiality of the documents.

For those law firms that wish to begin to utilize AI platforms in-house, IT professionals can be retained to assist those firms in creating AI programs that prevent the information being handled from being disclosed outside of the office.


Daniel E. Cummins is the managing attorney at Cummins Law where he focuses his practice on motor vehicle and trucking liability cases, products liability matters, and premises liability cases. He also serves as a mediator for the Federal Middle District Court and for Cummins Mediation. He is additionally the sole creator and writer of the Tort Talk Blog at www.TortTalk.com. 

Michael Cummins, Daniel's son, is a computer science and philosophy major at Ursinus College with a focus on researching artificial intelligence.




Reprinted with permission from the January 22, 2026 edition of the "The Pennsylvania Law Weekly © 2026 ALM Global Properties, LLC. All rights reserved. Further duplication without permission is prohibited, contact 877-256-2472 or asset-and-logo-licensing@alm.com.

Tuesday, December 16, 2025

ARTICLE: Out With the Old, In With the New: A Civil Litigation Year-End Review

The below article of mine appeared in the December 11, 2025 edition of the Pennsylvania Law Weekly and is republished here with permission.


Expert Opinion // Civil Procedure

Out With the Old, In With the New: 
A Civil Litigation Year-End Review

By

Daniel E. Cummins

December 11, 2025

Over the past year, there was a steady flow of notable decisions handed down by the various state and federal courts across the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania as another year of civil litigation jurisprudence goes down in the books. Those decisions are reviewed below.

Overall, some old rules have been ousted as no longer viable, and some new rules have been enunciated to guide civil litigation practice going forward.

Readers may secure more details on the decisions summarized below, as well as a copy of the actual court decisions referenced, by going to the Tort Talk Blog and typing the name of the plaintiff into the search box in the upper right-hand corner of the blog.

Good Cause for IME

In a decision that was handed down near the end of the previous year in the case of Verba v. Erie Insurance Exchange, 326 A.3d 973 (Pa. Super. 2024 ), the Pennsylvania Superior Court addressed the standard for determining whether good cause exists to compel the Plaintiff to cooperate with a request for a medical examination under Pa.R.C.P. 4010.

The court noted that the requirement of good cause set forth in Rule 4010 is designed to protect parties against an unwarranted invasion of their privacy and to preclude the use of such a medical examination for improper purposes. Simply put, the court in Verba held that good cause can exist in a pending litigation if there is a controversy, or a dispute between the parties, regarding the validity of the plaintiff’s injury claims.

Allegations of Recklessness

The year 2025 began as 2024 ended—with state trial court judges looking past the fact that Pennsylvania is a fact-pleading state and allowing plaintiffs to plead recklessness and punitive damages claims in complaints with reckless abandon in all personal injury matters regardless of the facts involved. This trend continued throughout this year with trial court judges relying upon the errant Pennsylvania Superior Court decision in the case of Monroe v. CB H20, 286 A.3d 785 (Pa. Super. 2022) (en banc).

While the state trial court judges from all around the commonwealth continued to routinely allow claims of recklessness in every case, at least one federal district court judge said not so fast. In McKinney v. GM, No. 1:24-CV-00140-SPB (W.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2025), Judge Susan Paradise Baxter of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania granted a partial motion to dismiss claims of punitive damages after finding that the plaintiff failed to plead sufficient facts to support a punitive damages claim.

The court noted that allegations of recklessness that could support a punitive damages claim must involve more than claims of ordinary negligence. In McKinney, the court found that the products liability complaint contained no factual allegations identifying the nature of the alleged defect, how the defendant allegedly became aware of it, or what actions the defendant failed to take in conscious disregard of that risk.

Baxter, applying Pennsylvania law, emphasized that punitive damages are to be considered an extreme remedy that are not available for conduct arising from mere inadvertence, mistake or errors in judgment. The court found that the complaint in the McKinney case failed to contain any factual allegations that even suggested that the defendant acted with an evil motive or in conscious disregard of a known risk.

Attorney Discipline

The first notable decision handed down by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court over this past year was handed down in February. In the case of Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Anonymous Attorney, [docket no. withheld by court] (Pa. Feb. 12, 2025), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court clarified the standard of proof for a disciplinary hearing involving allegations of attorney misconduct. The court opted for a higher burden.

According to the opinion, prior to this ruling, the previously accepted standard of proof for disciplinary cases against attorneys was “a preponderance of the evidence through clear and satisfactory evidence.” In this case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the burden of proof of disciplinary cases going forward should be “clear and convincing evidence.”

In ruling in this fashion, the court noted that “attorney disciplinary proceedings are not civil disputes for money damages, and the public’s and the attorney’s interests are not clearly minimal.” The court otherwise noted that “disciplinary proceedings are not strictly civil nor criminal in nature, but rather have been styled as ‘quasi criminal.’” For these reasons, the court chose to go with a higher burden of proof.

New Jury Selection Rule Goes Into Effect

In April, the new Pa.R.C.P 220.3 went into effect on April 1 requiring trial court judges to be present in the courtroom for jury selections in civil cases unless the litigants opt out of the requirement. This rule was set to take effect on April 1, 2025, and can be found under Pa. R.C.P. 220.3.

Avenues of Recovery in Worker’s Compensation Cases Expanded

In May of this year, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court overturned decades of precedent with its decision in the case of Steets v. Celebration Fireworks, (Workers' Compensation Appeals Board), 335 A.3d 1076 (Pa. May 30, 2025), in order to allow a new line of worker’s compensation claims to go forward.

In this decision, the Supreme Court created new law and cleared the way for the estates of those individuals who died as a result of work-related injuries to collect benefits related to claims for disfigurement and injury. The court overturned long-standing case law regarding whether specific loss benefits are payable after an employee’s death from causes related to the work injury.

Archaic Local Rule Overruled

In another decision of note from May of this year, the Superior Court struck down a trial court’s local rule.

In the case of Scheibe v. Woodloch Resort, No. 1478 EDA 2024 (Pa. Super. May 20, 2025), the archaic local rule at issue from the Pike County Common Pleas Court required original signatures on all filings with the court, which did not allow for electronic signatures.

In Scheibe, the Pennsylvania Superior Court noted that the trial court had improperly refused to docket paperwork relative to the initial filing of the lawsuit. The prothonotary had rejected the filing because the documents contained only an electronic signature in violation of the local rules that required original signatures.

The appellate court first confirmed that there was no requirement in the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure for any filing to be hand-signed by a party or their attorney. Rather, the statewide Rules of Civil Procedure contemplated that a “signature” could include a computer-generated signature.

The Superior Court additionally held that, under the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, documents mailed to the prothonotary’s office were deemed to be filed when received by that office as a litigant would have no control over when that office would stamp and process the filing. The Superior Court also confirmed that the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure expressly prohibited the rejection of a filing that complied with the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure where that filing did not meet the requirements of a local rule.

For all of these reasons, the Superior Court agreed that the complaint was timely filed. In the process, the appellate court struck down the archaic local rule of court.

New Cellphone Law

While texting while driving has been banned in Pennsylvania since 2012, in June of this year, a new law went into effect that banned any and all cellphone use while driving on the roads of Pennsylvania. Under certain exceptions noted in the law, a driver may use a cellphone for emergency purposes. A driver may also use a mobile device if they pull off to the side of the road and stop where a vehicle may safely remain in a stopped position.

The law, known as “Paul Miller’s Law,” went into effect on June 5, 2025, and made it illegal to use a cellphone in your hands in any way while driving. The law even prohibits these activities even when one is stopped at a red light or in a traffic jam. Under the language of the law, it appears that an overhead bluetooth system can be used to make calls as long as one uses the buttons on the steering wheel and the dash and not by way of pushing buttons on the cellphone.

For the next year through June 2026, the penalty for a violation will be a written warning. Starting June 5, 2026, the penalty will be a summary offense with a $50 fine, plus court costs and other fees. Moreover, if a driver is convicted of both vehicular homicide and driving while distracted, they may be sentenced up to an additional five years in prison.

Gist of the Action Doctrine

In July, the Pennsylvania Superior Court addressed the viability of the gist of the action doctrine. Under this doctrine, a negligence claim cannot be recast in a complaint as a breach of contract claim and vice versa.

In the case of Swatt v. Nottingham Village, 2025 Pa. Super. 138 (Pa. Super. July 2, 2025) (en banc) (Op. by Kunselman, J.), an en banc panel of the Pennsylvania Superior Court addressed the issue of whether the gist of the action doctrine should continue to be applied to contract actions as it has been for the past 26 years.

This case arose out of a nursing home malpractice claim. The plaintiff filed claims for both malpractice and breach of contract.

Despite a number of prior cases confirming that the gist of the action doctrine does apply as a defense where a breach of contract claim is added to a negligence claim, this en banc panel of the Superior Court concluded, after completing an exhaustive review of the case law allowing for alternative pleadings, that the gist of the action doctrine should no longer apply to prevent the pleading of an alternative breach of contact claim in a negligence action. Rather, the court noted that, under any set of facts, plaintiff could make claims for both negligence and breach of contact in the alternative wherever warranted.

This ruling eradicating this defense could prove important in those cases where a plaintiff’s negligence claim is potentially barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations, but where the plaintiff attempts to keep the lawsuit alive by pleading, in the alternative, a breach of contract claim which has a four-year statute of limitations claim.

Another Archaic Local Rule Overruled

In August, the Superior Court struck down another archaic local rule in its decision in the case of Biros v. U Lock, No. 113 WDA 2024 (Pa. Super. Aug. 1, 2025).

In Biros, the Superior Court vacated a trial court order out of the Westmoreland County Common Pleas Court of in which the trial court had denied, with prejudice, an appellant’s motion to file her Pa. R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal, nunc pro tunc.

The Superior Court noted that, Pa. R.C.P. 205.4(e)(2) bars any refusal by a trial court of an otherwise compliant pleading for filing based upon a requirement of a local rule pertaining to the electronic filing of legal papers. The appellate court found that Westmoreland County’s archaic requirement that notices of appeal could only be filed in person or by mail was such a local rule. Accordingly, the appellate court ruled that the appellant’s initial filing was properly and timely filed and was sufficient to initiate the appeal.

Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens Clarified

In September of this year, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court provided clarity on the test to be applied in reviewing a petition to transfer venue under the doctrine of forum non conveniens in the case of Tranter v. Z & D Tour, No. 32 EAP 2024 (Pa. Sept. 25, 2025) (Op. by Wecht, J.).

This matter arose out of a multi-vehicle collision that occurred in Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania involving a passenger bus and commercial vehicles. The crash resulted in five deaths and numerous injuries. The plaintiffs who resided in various locations across the country and abroad, filed personal injury lawsuits in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas against several corporate defendants, all of which conducted business nationwide. The defendants sought to transfer the cases to Westmoreland County under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.

The Supreme Court held that the Superior Court’s imposition of a “key witness” requirement in the analysis was inconsistent with Pennsylvania precedent on the issue of the type of evidence required to secure a transfer of a matter under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.

The Supreme Court otherwise clarified that a party seeking a transfer of a matter under the doctrine of forum non conveniens must identify the burdened witnesses and provide a general statement of their respective testimony. The Supreme Court confirmed that the petitioner need not show that the testimony of the witnesses is “critical” or “necessary” to the defense. As such, the Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s decision to transfer the cases out of Philadelphia County and to Westmoreland County as a proper exercise of the trial court’s discretion.

Arbitration Clauses and Children

On the same day in September that it issued its decision in the Tranter case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a parent who signs an arbitration agreement cannot bind a nonsigning spouse or a minor child to the terms of that agreement.

The case of Shultz v. Skyzone, No. 25 EAP 2023 (Pa. Sept. 25, 2025) (Op. by Donohue, J.), involved the claims brought on behalf of several minors who were injured at trampoline parks operated by Skyzone in Philadelphia. In each instance, only one parent had signed a “participation agreement, release, and assumption of the risk” on behalf of their child. That agreement contained an arbitration provision waiving the right to sue in court.

After the lawsuits for personal injuries were filed, the defendant filed petitions to compel arbitration, relying upon the signed agreements. The issue was litigated all the way up to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court held that parents lacked the authority to bind a minor to an agreement to arbitrate, as this would deprive the minor of judicial protections and oversight designed to safeguard their interests. As noted above, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court also held that a parent who signs an arbitration agreement cannot bind a nonsigning parent, or minor child, to its terms.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court handed down the same decision on the same date in the consolidated case of Santiago v. Philly Trampoline Park, No. 24 EAP 2023 (Pa. Sept. 25, 2025) (Op. by Donohue, J.).

Statutory Employer Doctrine Upheld

In October, in the case of Yoder v. McCarty Construction, 43 MAP (Pa. Oct. 23, 2025), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reaffirmed the validity of the statutory employer doctrine under the Worker’s Compensation Act and rejected arguments from the plaintiff seeking to abolish this doctrine.

According to the opinion, the plaintiff suffered a workplace injury. The plaintiff was an employee of a subcontractor. The general contractor asserted the defense of statutory employer immunity in the personal injury action arising out of the accident.

The Supreme Court began its decision by reaffirming the law behind the statutory employer doctrine that has been in effect in Pennsylvania since 1930 as enunciated in the case of McDonald v. Levinson Steel, 153 A. 424, 426 (Pa. 1930).

That long-standing law provides that, under Section 203 of the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act), 77 P.S. Section 462, a general contractor that hires a subcontractor to perform work on a jobsite is deemed to be an “employer” of employees of the subcontractor in certain circumstances. In those instances where the subcontractor does not make payment, the general contractor will be considered liable for the worker’s compensation payments. In exchange for this imposition of secondary liability on the general contractor, the act’s statutory employer provision in Section 203 of the act, 77 P.S. Section 52, extends to a general contractor the same tort immunity afforded to the subcontractor of the injured worker in any third-party lawsuit arising out of the same accident.

As noted, at the Supreme Court level in this Yoder case, the court rejected arguments by the plaintiff that the statutory employer doctrine should be rejected or that such immunity should be deemed to be waivable in certain circumstances.

Artificial Intelligence

In the year 2025, courts and litigators found a steady rise in the use of artificial intelligence (AI) in many aspects of the law. AI platforms have begun to be used to assist in the evaluation of cases and also with respect to legal research and brief writing.

Near the end of this year, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued an interim policy to guide judges and court personnel who desired to use AI in their day-to-day work.

This policy allows for judges and court personnel to utilize AI for summarizing documents, conducting preliminary legal research, and drafting initial versions of documents. These rules, which are compiled under a document entitled the “Interim Policy On The Use Of Generative Artificial Intelligence By Judicial Officers And Court Personnel" was set to go into effect on Dec. 8, 2025.

It is anticipated that, in the near future, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court may also come out with rules to guide attorneys on the proper use of AI in the practice of law relative to any filings with the courts.

In the Pennsylvania federal courts, Judge Karoline Mehalchick of the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania has been leading the way by crafting a civil practice order that is issued in all of her matters that requires attorneys to identify any AI-created portions of their court filings and to certify to the court that any citations contained therein have been checked for accuracy.

As noted in the Aug. 14, 2025, the Pennsylvania Law Weekly article titled “AI and Its Proper Use in the Practice of Law,” by Daniel E. Cummins and Michael Cummins, a number of lawyers in Pennsylvania and across the country have been sanctioned for submitting fake legal citations, known as hallucinations, as a result of utilizing AI platforms for legal research and the writing of briefs and not checking the accuracy of such citations. Such issues have caused a need for the above rules as well as a rise in continuing legal education courses designed to educate attorneys to be careful in utilizing these emerging technologies.

New Book

Last but not least, it is noted that, over the past year, the Pennsylvania Bar Institute (PBI) published an e-book titled Raising the Bar: A Practical Guide to the Practice of Law, written by Daniel E. Cummins. The book compiles articles written by me over the past 25 years providing practice and professionalism tips for lawyers and judges, many of which articles were originally published right here in the Pennsylvania Law Weekly. The book is designed to provide lawyers, whether they be new or experienced, with tips and reminders on how to improve their day-to-day practice of law and efforts at a work-life balance.

Daniel E. Cummins is the managing partner at Cummins Law in Clarks Summit, Pennsylvania. Contact him at dancummins@cumminslaw.net.

Reprinted with permission from the December 11, 2025 edition of the "The Pennsylvania Law Weekly © 2025 ALM Global Properties, LLC. All rights reserved. Further duplication without permission is prohibited, contact 877-256-2472 or asset-and-logo-licensing@alm.com.

Friday, December 5, 2025

HOLIDAY GIFT FROM TORT TALK: Complimentary Copy of the 2025 Tort Talk Civil Litigation Update

Here is the LINK to a complimentary copy of the 199 paged 2025 Tort Talk Civil Litigation Update booklet that was created Daniel E. Cummins, Esq.   

Tort Talk has been putting out this annual Civil Litigation Update Booklet over the past 14 years since at least 2011, whether it be at the Tort Talk Expos or here on the Blog.

The 2025 Tort Talk Civil Litigation Update is a compilation of the most notable Tort Talk posts over the past year or so and is offered here FREE OF CHARGE as a Holiday gift to all Tort Talkers.

If you wish to review the actual Opinion of any of the cases summarized in the Tort Talk 2025 Civil Litigation Update, please go to www.TortTalk.com and type the case name, or the name of the Plaintiff, into the SEARCH BOX near the upper right hand corner of the blog (not the top box, the second from the top box).  That will take you to the Tort Talk post on that case, in which post there should be a LINK to the actual Opinion.

I note that the PBI sells its annual Civil Litigation Update Booklet for approximately $79.00!  The Tort Talk Civil Litigation Update Booklet is FREE.

As such, to the extent you may have a desire to pay it forward in another way with kindness this Holiday season, I would politely propose that you please consider making a donation to a charity or a non-profit organization of your choice, or to Lackawanna Pro Bono or The Children's Advocacy Center.

Thanks for reading Tort Talk and and thank you for providing me with notable cases to highlight here on Tort Talk.  All is greatly appreciated.

HAPPY HOLIDAYS!

Daniel E. Cummins, Esq.
Cummins Law
Clarks Summit, PA
579-319-5899
dancummins@cumminslaw.net


Source of  top image:  Photo by Thais Araujo on www.pexels.com

Monday, November 17, 2025

BOOK PUBLISHED: RAISING THE BAR - A Practical Guide to the Practice of Law by Daniel E. Cummins

The Pennsylvania Bar Institute recently published my book entitled Raising the Bar: A Practical Guide to the Practice of Law.  This book has been published as an e-book.

To the extent you may be interested in the same, here is a LINK to the Book cover, the Table of Contents so that you can get a sense of the content, and an excerpt from the article entitled "Lessons from The Godfather."

The book compiles my articles from over the past two decades providing a wide variety of tips and encouragement to help young lawyers and experienced lawyers alike improve their practice of law.

Here is the LINK to the webpage on the PBI's website where the book can be purchased if you are interested.

Thank you for your consideration.


Friday, November 7, 2025

TORT TALK PASSES 4,500 MARK

 

4,500 Posts

Tort Talk, which has been in existence 

over the past 16 years since 2009, 

recently published its 4,500th post.

Sending thanks to all the Tort Talkers 

who read and contribute to the blog.


THANK YOU VERY MUCH

Daniel E. Cummins

Cummins Law

Clarks Summit, PA

Thursday, November 6, 2025

BOOK PUBLISHED!! -- RAISING THE BAR: A Practical Guide to the Practice of Law -- by Daniel E. Cummins, Esq.

Proud to note that the Pennsylvania Bar Institute (PBI) has published my book entitled Raising the Bar:  A Practical Guide to the Practice of Law.  

The book, which is in e-book format, compiles my articles from over the past two decades on tips to improve your practice of law.

Remember those articles taking themes from The Godfather or Ferris Bueller's Day Off?  How about those articles applying holiday traditions to offer tips to improve your practice?  Or those other articles that simply provided tips to improve your depositions? And don't forget those articles that encourage you to take vacations and to take the time to develop your interests outside the practice of law.

These articles have all been compiled in a single book and can be purchased from the PBI at this LINK.





Monday, October 13, 2025

CLE SET FOR THIS WEDNESDAY -- PROCEED WITH CAUTION: INCORPORATING AI INTO YOUR PRACTICE

NEED CLE CREDITS?   

Please consider registering for the below ZOOM CLE set for this Wednesday, October 15, 2025 at noon being presented by myself and my son, Michael.  

Michael, who has been described by a professor of his as a "generational talent" in the field of AI, is a Computer Science and Philosophy major who is focusing on AI studies at Ursinus College in Collegeville, PA just outside of Philadelphia.  Back in high school, he was also his class's Salutatorian, and a two-time State Champion in high school mock trial with the Abington Heights High School Mock Trial Team.

During this ZOOM CLE seminar, at which you can sit back and you enjoy your lunch at your desk or in the comfort of your home, Michael and I will review the increasing use of AI in the practice of law and will offer advice on pitfalls to avoid.

This CLE will contribute towards your meeting the ethical requirement under RPC 1.1 to keep up with the technological changes in society that can impact your ability to represent your individual clients.

The ZOOM CLE is free for members of the Wilkes-Barre Law and Library Association.  Non-members may also register to attend for a small fee.

Details on how to register for THIS WEDNESDAY'S October 15th CLE are set out below.

THANK YOU for considering!! 



Tuesday, September 30, 2025

ARTICLE: Appellate Courts Disagree on Whether the Discovery Rule Applies in Breach of Contract Actions

 The below article written by myself and my son, Daniel E. Cummins, Jr., who is a second year student at Virginia Law School and a member of the Virginia Law Review, was recently published in the September 25, 2025 edition of the Pennsylvania Law Weekly.


    Daniel E. Cummins, Jr.                                        Daniel E. Cummins, Esq.


Expert Opinion // Discovery


Appellate Courts Disagree on Whether the Discovery Rule Applies in Breach of Contract Actions

September 25, 2025

By

Daniel E. Cummins, Esq.

and

Daniel E. Cummins Jr.


It seems that, with respect to breach of contract actions, there is no meeting of the minds as to whether the discovery rule applies to toll the running of the statute of limitations.

In recent years, Pennsylvania law has remained unsettled over whether the discovery rule is applicable to actions based on an express written contract. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not issued any decisions extending the discovery rule to such cases. However, the Commonwealth Court and the Superior Court have taken opposite positions on this issue. The Commonwealth Court has refused to apply the discovery rule to breach of written contract cases, while the Pennsylvania Superior Court has held that the discovery rule applies in all cases.

The Importance of Statutes of Limitations

Pennsylvania courts have repeatedly emphasized the important purposes that statutes of limitations serve. The courts have noted that “statutes of limitations ‘are designed to effectuate three purposes: preservation of evidence; the right of potential defendants to repose; and administrative efficiency and convenience.’” See Lesoon v. Metropolitan Life Insurance, 898 A.2d 620, 626–27 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) (quoting Kingston Coal v. Felton Mining, 690 A.2d 284, 288 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997)). Statutes of limitations also serve to give defendants prompt notice that claims are being made against them, prevent stale claims that may prejudice defendants, and promote finality and stability with respect to civil disputes. See Estate of Gasbarini v. Medical Center of Beaver County, 409 A.2d 343, 346 (Pa. 1979).

As such, a statute of limitations defense is not a mere technicality, but rather a "substantial and meritorious” defense that is “vital to the welfare of society and ... favored in the law." See Schmucker v. Naugle, 231 A.2d 121, 123 (Pa. 1967).

Statute of Limitations in Contract Actions

Under Pennsylvania law, a four-year statute of limitations applies to contract actions. See 42 Pa.C.S. Section 5525.

In Erie Insurance Exchange v. Bristol, 174 A.3d 578, 585–86 (Pa. 2017), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that this statute of limitations begins to run when the defendant is alleged to have breached the contract. The court noted that its holding was “in accord with the law across the country.” This decision is consistent with 42 Pa.C.S. Section 5502(a), which provides that “[t]he time within which a matter must be commenced ... shall be computed ... from the time the cause of action accrued.”

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has also generally held that “the lack of knowledge, mistake or misunderstanding do not toll the running of the statute of limitations.” See Rice v. Diocese of Altoona-Johnstown, 255 A.3d 237, 246 (Pa. 2021). However, this article discusses the discovery rule, an equitable exception to this general rule.

The Discovery Rule

The discovery rule is a doctrine that suspends or tolls the running of a statute of limitations until an injured party knows or reasonably should know of their injury, and its cause. See Fine v. Checcio, 870 A.2d 850, 858 (Pa. 2005). This doctrine ensures that, in certain limited circumstances, a plaintiff is not barred from bringing suit simply because they could not discover their injury and its cause in time.

For the discovery rule to apply, a plaintiff must have been unaware of their injury and unable to discover its cause despite the "exercise of reasonable diligence.” See Fine, 870 A.2d at 858. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has defined “reasonable diligence” in this context as “what is expected from a party who has been given reason to inform himself of the facts upon which his right to recovery is premised.”

Under this standard, “there must be some reason to awaken inquiry and direct diligence in the channel in which it would be successful.” Stated otherwise, “a party fails to exercise reasonable diligence when they fail to make an inquiry when ... information regarding their injury becomes available.” See Mariner Chestnut Partners v. Lenfest, 152 A.3d 265, 279 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016).

The party seeking to invoke the discovery rule bears the burden of establishing their inability to discover their injury despite the exercise of reasonable diligence. See Dalrymple v. Brown, 701 A.2d 164, 167 (Pa. 1997). In this regard, the courts have noted that “the polestar of the Pennsylvania discovery rule is not a plaintiff's actual acquisition of knowledge but whether the information, through the exercise of due diligence, was knowable to the plaintiff. The failure to make inquiry when information is available is failure to exercise reasonable diligence as a matter of law.” See DiDomizio v. Jefferson Pulmonary Associates, 280 A.3d 1039, 1046 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2022).

Whether an injured party exercised reasonable diligence is typically a question for the jury. See Wilson v. El-Daief, 964 A.2d 354, 362 (Pa. 2009). Nonetheless, because of the objective nature of the test, a court may determine the applicability of the discovery rule as a matter of law where "the facts are so clear that reasonable minds cannot differ." See Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 251 (3d Cir. 2014).

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has applied the discovery rule to a wide variety of tort actions. However, to date the Supreme Court has not yet applied the rule by name to a case involving allegations of a breach of a written contract.

Does the Discovery Rule Apply in Breach of Contract Actions?

In 2019, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court noted that, based on its research as of that time, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had never applied the discovery rule to a breach of contract claim. See Carulli v. North Versailles Township Sanitary Authority, 216 A.3d 564, 580 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2019) (en banc).

The Commonwealth Court is correct that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has never applied the discovery rule by name to a breach of contract case. However, in the case of Romeo & Sons v. P.C. Yezback & Son, 652 A.2d 830, 832 (Pa. 1995), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the statute of limitations on a construction contract “will not start to run until the injured party becomes aware, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should become aware, of the defect.” In this case, the Supreme Court did not adopt a broad rule for breach of contract actions. Given that this decision was limited to “the case of a latent defect in construction,” whether the discovery rule applies to breach of contract actions in general remains an open question.

In one other case, a justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court touched upon the issue in a dissenting and concurring opinion. See Crouse v. Cyclops Industries, 745 A.2d 606, 613 n.1 (Pa. 2000) (Saylor, J., dissenting and concurring). In Crouse, then-Justice Thomas Saylor wrote that "although the discovery rule, which evolved in the tort context, has been applied by Pennsylvania courts in some discrete categories of cases involving contractual or quasi-contractual claims ... , its use has not been adopted on a wholesale basis in this area” with regard to breach of contract claims.

In the absence of a concrete ruling from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the Commonwealth Court and the Superior Court have taken opposite positions on whether the discovery rule applies to breach of contract actions generally.

The Commonwealth Court’s View

In Carulli, 216 A.3d 564, the en banc Commonwealth Court held that the discovery rule does not apply to breach of contract actions.

The Commonwealth Court in Carulli employed three different rationales to come to this conclusion. First, the Commonwealth Court noted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court “has neither expressed a blanket prohibition nor has it applied the discovery rule ... to a breach of contract action where a party is seeking to enforce an express written contract that the party negotiated.” See Carulli, 216 A.3d at 583.

Second, the Commonwealth Court asserted that equitable considerations do not require applying the discovery rule to breach of contract claims. In support of this rationale, the Commonwealth Court noted that “parties to a contract are not without recourse.” Rather, parties to a contract have the chance to draft provisions to protect their interests, including provisions requiring inspections along with terms outlining the rights of parties in the event of a breach. Under the Commonwealth Court’s rationale in Carulli, there should be no situation in which contract parties are unable to discover a breach in time to bring suit.

Third, the Commonwealth Court reviewed the substantive differences between tort claims and contract claims. The Commonwealth Court reiterated that parties to a contract can protect themselves from undiscovered injuries or damages in ways that tort plaintiffs cannot. The court also noted that “in a breach of contract action, the injury is ... the breach,” whereas “a tort action cannot be brought until the plaintiff suffers appreciable injury.” The court thus implied that because contract parties presumably have the ability to discover breaches and may bring suit immediately upon a breach, it makes little sense to apply the discovery rule in this context.

The court in Carulli also cited the general rationale behind statutes of limitations, noting that it is unjust to compel a party to defend a lawsuit long after the alleged injury has occurred, when memories have faded, witnesses have died and/or evidence has been lost.

The Superior Court’s View

In sharp contrast, in Morgan v. Petroleum Products Equipment, 92 A.3d 823, 828 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014), the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that “the discovery rule in Pennsylvania applies to all causes of action, including breach of contract.” In support of this contention, the Superior Court cited its previous decision in Sadtler v. Jackson-Cross, 587 A.2d 727, 731 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) in which the court also applied the discovery rule to a breach of contract claim. However, neither case contained any detailed discussion of the rationale for applying the discovery rule to contract actions; rather, the courts simply held that the discovery rule did apply.

In two recent cases over the past year and a half, the Superior Court has again held that the discovery rule applies to breach of contract actions. See Spiritrust Lutheran v. Wagman Construction, 314 A.3d 894, 907 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2024); Wasielewski v. Goebel Insurance Agency, 334 A.3d 372, 372 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2025) (unpublished table decision). No Superior Court decision has strayed from that court’s repeated application of the discovery rule to contract cases.

A number of Pennsylvania federal court judges from each of the districts have also followed the Superior Court’s decision in Morgan, holding that the discovery rule applies to all actions, including breach of contract actions. See Handy v. Delaware River Surgical Suites, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174030, at *12 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 2024); Walden v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65250, at *49 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 10, 2024); see also Canfield v. Statoil USA Onshore Properties, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40870, at *40 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 22, 2017) [other citations omitted].

Grounds for Varying Arguments

The review of the above jurisprudence confirms that there remains a split of authority on whether the discovery rule applies to toll the statute of limitations in breach of written contract actions. Given the unsettled nature of the law, there remains grounds for the defense to oppose the application of the rule as well as grounds for plaintiffs to press for the application of the doctrine.

Until this matter proceeds back up the appellate ladder to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, it appears that, for the time being, both the bench and the bar will have to continue to grapple with the issue of whether the discovery rule applies to breach of written contract actions.



Daniel E. Cummins is the managing partner at Cummins Law in Clarks Summit, Pennsylvania. Contact him at dancummins@cumminslaw.net. Daniel E. Cummins Jr. is a second-year law student at the University of Virginia School of Law, where he is a member of the Virginia Law Review. He is also the director of operations for the Virginia Law Moot Court Team and a member of the Virginia Law Mock Trial Team.


Reprinted with permission from the September 25, 2025 edition of the Pennsylvania Law Weekly © 2025 ALM Global Properties, LLC. All rights reserved. Further duplication without permission is prohibited, contact 877-256-2472 or asset-and-logo-licensing@alm.com.