Showing posts with label Real Estate Exception to Immunity. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Real Estate Exception to Immunity. Show all posts

Tuesday, November 26, 2024

Is There Liability Against PennDOT if a Tree Falls on a Passing Motorist?


In the case of Schmidt v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Transp., No. 33 C.D. 2023 (Pa. Cmwlth. Oct. 11, 2024 Jubelirer, P.J., Dumas, J., and Wolf, J.) (Op. by Dumas, J.), the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court reversed a trial court Order and remanded the case with instructions that summary judgment be entered in favor of PennDOT based upon sovereign immunity. 

According to the Opinion, the subject accident involved a Plaintiff who sustained fatal injuries after the branch of a large tree, which was overhanging the roadway, fell and crushed his vehicle as the Plaintiff drove by.

According to the Opinion, the tree was planted on property owned by the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority. The court noted that, although the branches of the tree extended over the road and PennDOT’s right-of-way, the base of the tree was located outside of PennDOT’s right-of-way.

Accordingly, the appellate court found that PennDOT was entitled to sovereign immunity under claims against it where the tree did not derive, originate from, or have as its source any PennDOT real estate.

The court held that the case therefore did not fall under the real estate exception to the sovereign immunity allowed for under the Sovereign Immunity Act, 42 Pa. C.S.A. §8501-8564.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert,” www.Law.com (Nov. 5, 2024).

Source of image:  Photo by Efrem Efre on www.pexels.com.

Thursday, June 13, 2024

Kickball Injury Claims Against School Kicked Out of Court

In the case of Turner v. Lower Merion School District, No. 657 C.D. 2023 (Pa.Cmwlth. May 10, 2024 Wojcik, J., Wallace, J., Leavitt, S.J.)(Op. by Wallace, J.), the court affirmed the trial court’s decision in a personal injury case arising out of a kickball game at a school.   

The Commonwealth Court held that the Plaintiff’s lawsuit did not fall within the real property exception to governmental immunity where the Plaintiff’s claims stemmed from an injury caused by personalty rather than realty. More specifically, the case involved a temporary kickball base that was not affixed to the ground and which slid out from under the high school student during a physical education class.   


As such, the Commonwealth Court affirmed the trial court's entry of a judgment on the pleadings in favor of the Defendant based upon governmental immunity and kicked the case out of court.


Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source:  Law.com, “The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert” (May 29, 2024)

Tuesday, February 27, 2024

Commonwealth Court Allows Pro Se Prisoner's Slip and Fall Claim To Go Forward



In the case of Pritchard v. Meintell, No. 49 C.D. 2022 (Pa. Cmwlth. Jan. 10, 2024 Jubelirer, P.J., Cannon, J., and Ceisler, J.) (Op. by Jubelirer, P.J.), the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court reversed in part and affirmed in part a lower court’s decision sustaining a Defendant’s demurrer to a prisoner pro se Plaintiff’s slip and fall action on the basis of sovereign immunity.

According to the Opinion, the appellate court found that the trial court erred in finding that the real estate exception did not apply. The trial court was also found to have erred in ruling that sovereign immunity barred the pro se prisoner’s action for his slip and fall injuries.

The court noted that, in alleging that the Defendants failed to maintain the slip/resistant surface on which he slipped, the inmate had adequately alleged an injury that was caused by a dangerous condition of Commonwealth real estate.

The court otherwise found that the inmate’s other negligence claim that were not connected to the negligent maintenance claim were barred under Pennsylvania law.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions.” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (Jan. 30, 2024).

Wednesday, November 1, 2023

Plaintiff Gets Railed Off From Recovery


In the case of Jakmian v. City of Philadelphia, Case ID: 201001469 (C.P. Phila. Co. Aug. 4, 2023 Schulman, J.), the court issued a Rule 1925 Opinion on a Plaintiff’s appeal from an Order of Nonsuit entered in favor of the Defendants, SEPTA and the City of Philadelphia in a case involving an incident that allegedly occurred when the front tire of the Plaintiff’s bicycle became stuck in a SEPTA trolley track located in Philadelphia, causing the Plaintiff to be thrown from her bicycle and suffer, among other injuries, a broken arm.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff testified that she was riding her bicycle on a route that she often traveled between her home and a local gym. The Plaintiff testified that there were trolley tracks that ran down the middle of the street. The Plaintiff was riding in the middle of tracks, such that there was one track to her right and one to her left.

The Plaintiff moved to her right to clear the roadway for a car that was allegedly tailgating her. As she did so, one of the tires of her bike allegedly got struck in the trolley track and caused the Plaintiff to be thrown from her bike and smashed into a parked vehicle.

The court noted that the Plaintiff took pictures of an opening between the rails where the tire of her bicycle allegedly got stuck. The court noted that the Plaintiff did not identify any defect in the rails themselves.

According to the Opinion, at the time of the accident, trolley service had not been in use in the area for at least thirty (30) years and that SEPTA had no plans to change back to utilizing trolley service in that area.

The court reviewed various cases involving the real estate exception to the Sovereign Immunity Act that related to trolley rail.

The court found that the Plaintiff did not produce any evidence to support a claim that the inactivity in and of itself rendered the trolley track to become a dangerous condition.

The trial court held that no relief was due to the Plaintiff where the Plaintiff had failed to offer any evidence to support a claim that inactive trolley tracks were a dangerous condition of real estate for bicyclists.

The court rejected the Plaintiff’s argument that the fact that SEPTA had paved over some tracks in other parts of the city supported her claims of negligence against SEPTA for failing to pave over the trolley tracks where the Plaintiff’s accident occurred. The court found that the Plaintiff failed offer any evidence, by expert witness or otherwise, to show why the existence of trolley tracks presented as a dangerous condition.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions.” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (Oct. 23, 2023).

Source of Image: Photo by Louis Droege on www.unsplashed.com  

Thursday, May 11, 2023

Alleged Negligence Regarding Pedestrian Crossing Sign Found to Fall Within Real Estate Exception to Sovereign Immunity


In the case of Estate of Patterson v. Rockefeller Group Int. Inc., No. 2022-CV-0060 (C.P. Leh. Co. Aug. 22, 2022 Johnson, P.J.), the court found that a Plaintiff’s wrongful death claim against PennDOT was not barred by the sovereign immunity doctrine where the Plaintiff alleged that an artificial condition in the form of an allegedly non-functioning pedestrian crossing sign along a highway that was allegedly under the control of PennDOT was the cause of the Plaintiff’s injuries.

The Preliminary Objections filed by PennDOT in his case were denied in part and sustained in part.

The Plaintiff alleged that the decedent was struck and killed by a motor vehicle while crossing an intersection on a street undergoing a road-widening project. The Plaintiff alleged that the decedent was crossing the road in an area that PennDOT was responsible for and in which the pedestrian crossing sign had inoperable flashing yellow lights that were covered.

In response to PennDOT’s efforts to have the case dismissed under the Sovereign Immunity Act, the court found that the Plaintiff’s allegations of a breach of the Defendant’s duty to properly maintain a pedestrian crossing sign was an action in negligence that satisfied the first prong for defeating the Defendant’s assertion of sovereign immunity, i.e., the statement of a valid cause of action for negligence.

The court found that the second prong under the Sovereign Immunity Act required the Plaintiff to establish that the negligent act complained of fell within any of ten (10) exceptions to sovereign immunity.

Among its claims, the Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant PennDOT installed an item as part of its real estate, namely a pedestrian crossing sign adjacent to a public highway, in a manner that created a hazardous condition.

The court found that this allegation was sufficient to invoke the real estate exception to sovereign immunity. As such, the court found that the Plaintiff had stated a valid cause of action which was not subject to dismissal.

PennDOT also asserted that the Plaintiff’s claims of recklessness and willful indifference should be stricken because the Sovereign Immunity Act only allowed claims for negligence in certain circumstances.

The court found that the Defendant was correct in arguing that the Plaintiff’s claims are recklessness and willful indifference were legally invalid. Under the express terms the Sovereign Immunity Act, sovereign immunity is only waived in actions against the Commonwealth for damages arising out of negligent acts.

The court also reviewed the remainder of the Plaintiff’s allegations which allege various failures to act on the part of PennDOT. The court found that those claims were barred as it was well-established that claims against the Commonwealth based upon a failure to act are barred by the sovereign immunity doctrine.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions.” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (April 11, 2023).


Source of image:  Photo by Lukas Hartman on www.pexels.com.

Monday, May 8, 2023

Real Estate Exception to Immunity to PennDOT Applied in Case Where Tree Fell on Passing Motorist



In the case of Schmidt v. Penn. Dep’t. of Transp., No. 2019-CV-12057 (C.P. Montg. Co. Feb. 27, 2023 Saltz, J.), the court denied a Motion to Dismiss filed by PennDOT in a case involving a tree that fell upon a passing vehicle on a Commonwealth owned road.

PennDOT filed a Motion to Dismiss asserting sovereign immunity.

The court reviewed the real estate exception to sovereign immunity cases involving fallen trees.

The court noted that, while the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is generally immune from suit, the Pennsylvania legislature had waived that immunity in certain limited instances as outlined in 42 Pa. C.S.A. §8522(b).  The exception applicable in this case applied to alleged dangerous conditions on the Commonwealth’s real estate, highways, and sidewalks.

In this matter, the court found that the applicability of the real estate exception depending not on the characteristics of the portion of the tree that constituted the dangerous condition, but on the location of that portion of the tree with respect to the Commonwealth’s property.

The court determined that the Plaintiff had properly asserted that the tree fell within the Defendant’s right-of-way.  As such, the court rejected PennDOT’s argument that the exception did not apply because only a portion of the tree fell within that right-of-way.

The court additionally noted that the Plaintiff’s evidence presented to date, which included expert testimony, implicated the real estate exception to the sovereign immunity afforded to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in this case.

As such, the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment was denied.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions.” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (March 21, 2023).

Thursday, December 1, 2022

Sovereign Immunity Supports Summary Judgment In Favor Of PennDOT Relative to Claims Regarding Placement of a Bus Stop

In the case of Essington v. Monroe County Transit Auth., No. 5117-CV-2020 (C.P. Monroe Co. Aug. 15, 2022 Williamson, J.), the court granted the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the Defendant, PennDOT, in a case involving a pedestrian Plaintiff who had exited a bus and was struck while crossing the roadway under nighttime conditions.

The Plaintiff alleged that PennDOT was negligent by allowing a dangerous condition to occur on its property, i.e., the roadway. More specifically, the Plaintiff alleged that PennDOT was negligent in the planning, designing, controlling, locating, and designation of a bus stop on a state road in a manner that created dangerous conditions.

The Plaintiff also faulted PennDOT for failing to erect signs, lights, guardrails, bus shelters, crosswalks, or other features to protect disembarking bus passengers.

In granting the Motion for Summary Judgment, the court relied upon the Sovereign Immunity Act under 42 Pa. C.S.A. §8522(b). 

The court found that none of the exceptions under that Act were applicable to the case presented. The court emphasized that, in order for liability to attach to PennDOT, a dangerous condition must derive, originate, or have its source that the Commonwealth realty. This is also known as the real estate exception to Sovereign Immunity.

Judge David J. Williamson noted that the Plaintiff’s allegations did not implicate any alleged defects on the land itself. The court noted that, had PennDOT installed the items noted by the Plaintiff, and those items were defective in some manner, then PennDOT could be held liable. However, under Pennsylvania law, the failure to install the items noted by the Plaintiff did not implicate an exception to the immunity afforded the governmental agency under Pennsylvania law.

The court additionally noted that where the Co-Defendant, Monroe County Transit Authority, chose to have a bus stop was not a material defect of the real estate itself and was not a condition created by PennDOT. 

Rather, the Co-Defendant, Monroe County Transit Authority, was the entity that chose where to have their bus stops. The court noted that the Plaintiff did not produce any evidence that PennDOT played any part in the decision to allow the bus stop in the area or any evidence that the business was a dangerous condition of the real estate itself.

The court also rejected the Plaintiff’s argument that PennDOT was negligent for allowing the bus stop to exist and in failing to take steps to inspect, discover, or correct any defects, or to ensure that the real estate was safe for its regular and intended use as a bus stop. The court ruled that the real property exception to the Sovereign Immunity Act only applies to a dangerous condition of Commonwealth real estate and not to negligent policies or activities regarding real estate. The court noted that a failure to inspect has been previously ruled in Pennsylvania to be a policy or an activity which is not within the real estate exception to the immunity statute.

The court also noted that the intended use of the road was as a roadway for vehicular traffic and not for the placement of bus stops. As such, any allegations by the Plaintiff regarding a lack of lighting, narrow shoulders, or safe pedestrian accommodations such as crosswalks, sidewalks, or pedestrian crossing signs, were found not to relate to the design of the roadway itself or to its use as a roadway. As such, those allegations did not serve to defeat PennDOT’s Motion for Summary Judgment. In sum, the court found that the Plaintiff’s expert had not offered any opinion that the roadway itself as designed, caused the accident.

For all of these reasons, and others, the court granted summary judgment in favor of PennDOT.

Anyone wishing to review this decision may click this LINK    


Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions.” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (Oct. 3, 2022).

Wednesday, May 5, 2021

Insufficient Lighting Found To Fall Under Real Estate Exception to Sovereign Immunity Where Tree Blocks Light from Light Pole


In the case of Wise v. Huntingdon County Housing Dev. Corp., No. 97 MAP 2019 (Pa. April 28, 2021 (Majority Op. by Baer, J.), the court ruled that insufficient lighting on a Commonwealth property relative to a slip and fall event could constitute a “dangerous condition” of the property for purposes of the real estate exception of sovereign immunity under 42 Pa. C.S.A. §8522(b)(4).   

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff alleged that there was insufficient lighting on the property that occurred because of the location of a light pole near a tree, which was blocking the light from the light pole.  


Anyone wishing to review a copy of the Majority Opinion of this decision may click this LINK.


The Concurring Opinion by Justice Donohue can be viewed HERE.


The Concurring Opinion by Justice Wecht can be viewed HERE.



Friday, April 2, 2021

Snow/Ice is Not On/Of Real Estate for Real Estate Exception to Sovereign Immunity to Apply



Judgment was entered in favor of the Defendant in the case of Temple v. Housing Auth. of City of Meadville, No. AD 2020-243 (C.P. Crawford, Co. March 18, 2021 St. John, S.J.), which involved a slip and fall incident due to wintry conditions on the property of the Housing Authority of the City of Meadville. 

The Plaintiff allegedly fell on a driveway in her aunt’s housing complex due to snow that had allegedly come upon the driveway after being blown there by a snowblower operated by an employee of the Defendant.

The Housing Authority moved for summary judgment on the grounds that, as a Commonwealth of Pennsylvania agency, it had immunity from any tort claims under the Sovereign Immunity Act.

The Court emphasized within the opinion that the Plaintiff had conceded that the Housing Authority qualified as a Commonwealth entity and that the Sovereign Immunity Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. Section 8521, et seq., applied.

The Plaintiff attempted to have this case read as falling under the real estate exception to immunity for the Defendant.

The Court analyzed the “on/of” distinction  under the real estate exception under the Sovereign Immunity Act as it related to snow and ice that had accumulated on the Housing Authority’s property. 

The Court noted that the case law of Pennsylvania has not interpreted the language of the Act regarding a “dangerous condition of Commonwealth agency real estate” to include substances, like ice or snow, that were merely lying on the real estate. The Court noted that the inapplicability of the real estate exception was the same even if the snow came upon the surface by being thrown there by a snowblower operated by an employee.

Ultimately, the Court determined the Plaintiff offered no facts that could prove that the snow and ice derived, originated from, or had the Commonwealth realty as its source.  Accordingly, the real estate exception to the immunity provided by the Act was found not to be implicated by the facts of the accident.

As a result, the Court ruled the Plaintiff’s claims and evidence were insufficient to abrogate the Housing Authority’s immunity under the Sovereign Immunity act.

Anyone wishing to review this decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney Brian J. Murren and Attorney Jon McAnney of the Lemoyne, PA law firm of Tucker Arensberg, P.C. for bringing this case to my attention.

Thursday, January 3, 2019

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Rules That Lack of Padding On Public School Gym Walls Falls Within Real Estate Exception to PSTCA


In the case of Brewington v. City of Philadelphia, 23 EAP 2017 (Pa. Dec. 28, 2018)(Maj. Op. by Todd, J.)(Concurring Op. by Wecht, J.), the court considered the current status of the real property exception to the governmental immunity provided by the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. Section 8541 et seq.

In this case, the Court found that the lack of padding on a gym wall in a public school may constitute negligence in the care, custody, and control of real property, and thereby fall within the Act's real estate exception to immunity.  In this matter, a student was injured when he ran into the gym wall during a relay race.

As such, the defendant's motion for summary judgment was denied.

The Majority Opinion by Justice Todd can be viewed at this LINK.  The Concurring Opinion by Justice Wecht can be viewed HERE.

I send thanks to Attorney Scott Cooper of the Harrisburg, PA law firm of Schmidt Kramer for bringing this case to my attention.