Showing posts with label Negligence Per Se. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Negligence Per Se. Show all posts

Tuesday, September 12, 2023

Leash That Puppy: Violation of Dog Law Amounts To Negligence Per Se, But Plaintiff Must Still Prove Causation


In the case of Goodell v. Stroble, No. 22-00906 (C.P. Lyc. Co. July 26, 2023 Carlucci, J.), the court granted in part and denied in part a Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment in a dog bite case.

According to the Opinion, the Defendant dog owner attended an estate sale. The subject incident occurred when the Defendant was putting her purchases in her vehicle and her dog jumped out of the vehicle and allegedly attacked the nearby Plaintiff.

The Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment arguing that the Defendant’s failure to restrain her dog on a leash or within the vehicle violated the Dog Law, making the Defendant negligent as a matter of law on a negligence per se basis.

While the court agreed that Pennsylvania law requires owners to control their dogs and that a deliberate violation of the Dog Law does constitute negligence per se, claims of absolute liability as a result can still be defended if a Defendant provides an appropriate defense.

In this regard, the court noted that there still remained the crucial question as to whether or not the dog owner’s negligence was the proximate cause of the Plaintiff’s injuries. The court explained that proximate cause refers to a direct link between a Defendant’s actions and a Plaintiff’s harm.

The court emphasized that the question of proximate cause generally remains a question to be decided by a jury.

As such, the court granted the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment in part and denied it in part. More specifically, the court ruled that the Defendant’s conduct in this case was negligent per se under the Dog Law violation. However, the motion was denied in part on the question of proximate causation.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions.” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (Aug. 15, 2023).


Source of image:  Photo by Blue Bird on www.pexels.com.

Thursday, November 10, 2022

The Dangers of Store Checkout Lines


In the case of Kovalev v. Wal-Mart, Inc., No. 2:2022-CV-1217 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 11, 2022 Quinones Alejandro, J.), the court granted a F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6)Motion to Dismiss in part and denied it in part in a premises liability case.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff was allegedly injured when he was standing in a checkout line and a customer behind him started hitting the Plaintiff with her shopping cart while shouting "move the line."  The Plaintiff alleged, in part, that, even though security personnel had the ability to observe the incident via real-time surveillance in a security room several feet away, no one came to the aid of the Plaintiff at the time of the incident.    

After suit was initiated, the Defendant store filed a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss on various grounds.

The Plaintiff's claims against Wal-Mart for assault and battery were dismissed given the lack of any facts to support any allegations that the store intentionally harmed the Plaintiff.  Nor were there any facts to support an allegation that Wal-Mart was liable for the intentional acts of another patron in the store.

The court found that the Plaintiff’s claim that the store was negligent in failing to have sufficient security to prevent its customers from assaulting other customers did state a valid cause of action.  Here, the Plaintiff alleged that he was a business invitee of the store and that the store was negligent in protecting him from the intentional or criminal acts of a third person within the store.

However, the court also found that a negligence duty to provide security within a commercial establishment does not create a special relationship that would support a separate claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The court noted that such relationships exist only in extremely limited circumstances.

The court dismissed the Plaintiff's separate claim for "gross negligence" after finding that there is no separate cause of action for gross negligence recognized under Pennsylvania law.  

The court additionally found that negligence per se is not an independent cause of action.

In contrast, the court in this matter additionally ruled that there is civil cause of action recognized in Pennsylvania for recklessn endangerment. 

The court also ruled that, absent a civil cause of action for a particular act, there can be no cause of action for civil conspiracy to commit that act. The court also found that a negligence claim is not an intentional or criminal act that could support a separate civil conspiracy claim.

Lastly, the court also found that physical and emotional injuries do not support a cause of action under the Unfair Trade Practices & Consumer Protection Law, as that cause of action is limited to losses of money or property.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Court's compantion Order can be viewed HERE.


I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Thursday, September 2, 2021

Summary Judgment Granted in Dog Bite Case Due To Lack of Proof of Prior Vicious Propensities


In the case of MR v. Bunting, No. 6856-CV-2019 (C.P. Monroe Co. June 8, 2021 Williamson, J.), the court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants on the Plaintiff’s negligence per se and negligence claims arising out of a dog bite incident. The court also granted summary judgment on the claim for punitive damages.

According to the Opinion that the minor Plaintiff was allegedly bitten by a dog at a birthday party. There was an allegation that, following the incident, the dog owner allegedly told the guardian of the minor that the dog had bitten someone before.

After the case proceeded through discovery, the dog owner filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. 

With regards to the allegations that the dog owner had violated the Pennsylvania Dangerous Dog Law and was, therefore, negligent per se, the court found no evidence in the record that the law had been violated under the facts presented. 

The court noted that the fact that the dog owner allegedly mentioned that the dog had bitten someone in the past was not sufficient in and of itself. Rather, Judge Williamson noted that the evidence had to show that the dog had previously caused severe injury without provocation and that there was no evidence of this in the record.

The court also noted that liability only existed under theory of negligence per se if the owner knew or had reason to know of the animal’s dangerous propensities. Judge Williamson stated that there was no evidence in the record regarding the nature and circumstances of any alleged prior bite.

Although there was evidence that the dog would growl in the past, the record revealed that this behavior was more consistent with play growling, rather than aggressive growling. The court found that the Plaintiff did not provide any evidence that the dog had vicious tendencies.

As such, summary judgment was granted.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions.” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (July 27, 2021).


Source of image (not of the dog in question):  Photo by Karsten Winegeart on unsplash.com.

Monday, February 3, 2020

Dog Bite Complaint Cleaned Up by Judge Williamson of Monroe County



Proving that a judge’s bite is sometimes worse than a dog’s bite, the court granted several Preliminary Objections to a Plaintiff’s dog bite Complaint in the case of MR v. Bunting, No. 6856-Civil-2019 (C.P. Monroe Co. Nov. 22, 2019 Williamson, J.).

Judge David J. Williamson of the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas granted a demurrer to a paragraph in the Plaintiff’s Complaint that mentioned a duty to maintain insurance. The court granted that demurrer and struck that allegation after finding that there is no requirement to provide insurance or any duty to do so under Pennsylvania law. 

The court also rejected a claim by the Plaintiff that the Defendants owed a duty not to own, harbor and/or keep a dog with violent and aggressive past behavior and tendency. The court noted that there was no basis in Pennsylvania law to support such a claim as Defendants cannot be negligent merely for owning a dog with past violent or aggressive behavior. As such, this allegation of the Complaint was dismissed. 

Judge Williamson also struck allegations of negligence per se stated in the Complaint which were based upon certain sections of the Pennsylvania dog law. The court noted that the sections cited by the Plaintiff dealt with registration and responsibility for a dog found to be a dangerous animal within the meaning of the dog law. However, the court found that the Plaintiffs did not allege that the Defendants’ dog was a dangerous animal within the meaning of the particular provisions of the statute. As such, there could be no negligence per se claim under the dog law under the particular Complaint. 

The court also struck the Plaintiff’s allegations for premises liability since the allegations of the Complaint confirmed that the Plaintiff was claiming that the injury arose from a dog bite and not from any claimed defeat in the condition of the land possessed by the Defendants. 

Judge Williamson also struck various references in the Complaint in which the Plaintiff had claimed certain types of liability with “including but not limited” language. The court found that the use of this phrase violated the law set forth in Connor v. Allegheny General Hospital, 461 A.2d 600 (Pa. 1983). 

The court also struck the Plaintiff’s claim for attorney’s fees as there was no statutory authority or contractual language to support the same. 

Judge Williamson struck the Plaintiff’s request for damages for interest. The court noted that, under Pennsylvania law, such a claim is not allowed in tort actions in which damages sought are unliquidated as they were in this particular case. 

The court did overrule an objection to the Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages and allowed that case to proceed into discovery in order to afford the Plaintiff an opportunity to gather facts to support such claims. 

Although the courts struck many allegations from the Plaintiff’s Complaint, the case was allowed to proceed on certain other claims. 

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.
Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions.” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (Jan. 7, 2020).

Tuesday, December 3, 2019

Allegations of Recklessness Allowed to Stand Based Upon Cell Phone Use While Driving



In the case of Henderson v. Palmer, No. 10035 of 2019, C.A. (C.P. Lawrence Co. Oct. 7, 2019 Cox, J.), the court denied a Defendant’s Preliminary Objections to the Plaintiff’s claims of reckless conduct based upon a Defendant driver allegedly using a cell phone and/or texting, and/or using “some other electronic device or for other reasons, in direct violation of applicable law.”

This matter arose out of a motor vehicle accident that occurred when the Plaintiff’s vehicle was rear-ended by the Defendant’s vehicle.

The court in Henderson reviewed decisions from Oklahoma and Delaware involving a Defendant’s use of a cell phone during the course of an accident. After reviewing those cases, the court in Henderson found that allegations asserting that the Defendant was using a cell phone while driving and was otherwise distracted from observing the roadway while operating a vehicle at a high rate of speed were sufficient to permit allegations of recklessness to survive Preliminary Objections.

However, the court granted the Defendant’s Preliminary Objections to the Plaintiff’s negligence per se allegations given that the Plaintiff failed to provide any factual allegations demonstrating any conduct to establish the violation of the statutes alleged.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions.” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (Nov. 5, 2019).


Thursday, August 29, 2019

Judge Brann of Federal Middle District Issues Opinion Addressing Motions to Dismiss and/or Stay in College Hazing Case



In the case of Piazza v. Young, No. 4:19-cv-00128 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 27, 2019 Brann, J.), the court addressed various Motions to Dismiss and Motions to Stay in a civil lawsuit arising out of the fatal injuries sustained by a student at Penn State allegedly as a result of hazing activities in a fraternity.  The court granted the motions in part and denied the motions in part.  

Of note, with respect to those fraternity brothers Defendants who were under the age of 21, the court allowed the claims of the Plaintiff to proceed against those underaged Defendants under the Plaintiff’s theory of recovery to hold the Defendants liable for breaching an alleged protective duty that the Defendants, as fraternity members, allegedly owed to the Plaintiff’s son, a fraternity pledge. 

Judge Matthew W. Brann
M.D. Pa.
In this regard, Judge Brann refused to apply the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in the case of Kapres v. Heller, 640 A.2d 888 (Pa. 1994) in as an expansive manner as requested by those moving Defendants who were under the age of 21.   Under the Kapres case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court generally ruled that individuals under the age of 21 cannot be held liable under the social host doctrine to a guest or third party injured on the premises relative to the service of  alcohol. 

The court in this Piazza case refused to read the Kapres case as immunizing the fraternity Defendants in this case from alleged liability for their otherwise allegedly wrongful conduct that involved the provision of alcohol.   See Op. at 16-18.  The court also noted that an expansive reading of the Kapres decision in the context of this case would not serve to further the social utility of the Pennsylvania statutes against hazing activities.

However, the court did otherwise note that the Plaintiff’s separate claim for negligence per se relative to the service of alcohol asserted against the fraternity Defendants who were under the age of 21 should be dismissed under the rationale of the Kapres case.  

This Opinion is also notable for the court’s review of the law pertaining to allegations of breach and causation, hazing allegations, allegations of civil conspiracy and claims of battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress.  

The court ruled that those defendants who acted to aid plaintiff after his accident can be liable under Restatement §§323, 324A for negligently failing to seek professional medical help.  However, the court found that other defendants who did not act to aid the Plaintiff could not be found to be liable for failing to render any aid as there is no cognizable duty under these facts to rescue in the first place.

Judge Brann also found that a negligence per se claim based upon an alleged violation of Pennsylvania’s anti-hazing statute is a viable claim. 

The Plaintiff’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim was dismissed under the rationale that an alleged attempted cover up of the incident did not amount to an intent to inflict emotional distress on anyone.

The court additionally denied the Motion to Dismiss the claims of punitive damages asserted in this matter.   The court noted that it has routinely declined to dismiss punitive damages demands at the Motion to Dismiss stage of the case and prior to discovery.  

Judge Brann also addressed separate Motions to Stay filed by several Defendants who have been criminally charged arising out of the same incident.  

On this issue, the court reviewed the six (6) factors required under the case of Barker v. Kane, 49 F.Supp. 3rd 521, 525-26 (M.D. Pa. 2016) and granted this in part and denied it in part.   Essentially, the court denied the request to stay the matter but crafted the remedy that entitles certain Defendants to exercise their right against self-incrimination.   The court noted that certain Defendants would not be required to  answer any pleadings or discovery or participate in any depositions that would implicate their Fifth Amendment Right against self-incrimination by engaging in such pleadings and discovery.  

Anyone wishing to review this decision by Judge Brann may click this LINK.

Monday, April 15, 2019

Criminal Convictions Found to Support Negligence per se Finding in Companion Civil Case


In the fraternity hazing case of Liu v. Pi Delta Psi Fraternity, Inc., No. 3028-CV-2015 (C.P. Monroe Co. March 21, 2019 Zulick, J.), Judge Arthur L. Zulick of the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas addressed a Plaintiff’s use of the doctrine of offensive collateral estoppel by way of a Motion for Summary Judgment seeking a finding of liability against certain fraternity Defendants based upon prior criminal convictions and/or pleas of guilty relative to the hazing charges arising out of the same incident.

According to the Opinion, this case arose out of fatal injuries to a pledge to a fraternity at Baruch College in New York City.   The fraternity had rented a house in Monroe County over a weekend for initiation rituals.  

After the Plaintiff’s decedent sustained fatal injuries allegedly as a result of the initiation rituals, a personal injury action was brought against the fraternity and various members of the fraternity.   

In separate proceedings, criminal charges were brought against the fraternity and 37 individuals.  

One of the Defendants at issue with respect to the Motion for Summary Judgment had entered a guilty plea to conspiracy to hinder apprehension/conceal evidence, and conspiracy to commit hazing.  

The fraternity itself went to trial and was convicted of multiple counts, including aggravated assault, conspiracy to commit aggravated assault, and hazing.  

The Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment arguing that the Defendants at issue, who had been previously convicted of charges and/or who pled guilty to charges in the criminal case should be deemed to be negligent per se in this civil lawsuit.

Judge Arthur L. Zulick
After reviewing the law pertaining to negligence cause of actions and negligence per se, the court ruled that summary judgment would be entered in favor of the Plaintiff due to the Defendants’ convictions for conspiracy to haze the Plaintiff, which convictions were found to supply the basis for a determination of a breach of duty in this negligence cause of action.  

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Monday, October 24, 2016

Federal Middle District Court Judge James M. Munley Grants Offensive Motion for Summary Judgment Filed by Plaintiff on Liability in Car Accident Case

In the case of Broe v. Manns, No. 3:15-cv-985 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2016 Munley, J.), Judge James M. Munley of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania granted an offensive Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the Plaintiffs on the issue of liability in a motor vehicle accident case.  

According to the Opinion, this case arose out of a rear-end motor vehicle accident.  

The Plaintiff filed a Complaint alleging negligence and loss of consortium. Thereafter, the Plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability.  

After reviewing the summary judgment standard of review, the court granted the Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on liability.  

The Plaintiff main contention was that the Defendant’s admission that he failed to brake to avoid the Plaintiff’s vehicle constituted negligence per se.  

The Defendant countered with an argument that his admission, given during a deposition, was an insufficient basis upon which to grant summary judgment.   The Defendant also asserted that the sudden emergency doctrine relieved him from liability. 

The court stated that it is well-settled that a violation of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code constitutes negligence per se.   Relying upon Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code provisions, including the assured clear distance ahead statute at 75 Pa. C.S.A. §3361, and noting that the police cited for violating that statute, the court found that the Defendant’s admission in this regard eliminated any genuine issue of material fact.   The court found that the Defendant’s admissions, coupled with the citations for violating the assured clear distance ahead statute, sufficiently established negligence per se.   Since the Defendant had not identified any genuine issues of material fact, the court found that there was no sufficient evidentiary basis upon which a reasonable jury could find in the Defendant’s favor on the liability issue.  

The court also rejected the Defendant’s reliance upon the sudden emergency doctrine noting that, under the applicable law, a person cannot avail himself of the protections of that doctrine if that person was himself driving carelessly.   The court stated that, based upon the Defendant’s citation for violating the motor vehicle code, along with his admissions on the issue of liability, the undisputed evidence before the court was found to establish, at the very least, that the Defendant was driving carelessly.  As such, the court found that the Defendant could not rely upon the sudden emergency doctrine to relieve him from liability.  

As stated, overall, the court granted Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the issue of liability.

 
Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.

 
I send thanks to Attorney Michael J. Foley of The Foley Law Firm of Scranton, Pennsylvania for bringing this case to my attention.  
 
 

Monday, May 11, 2015

Violation of Dangerous Dog Law in Dog Bite Case Equals Negligence Per Se

In the case of Harrison v. Haueisen, PICS Case. No. 15-0607 (C.P. Lycoming Co. April 2, 2015 Gray, J.), Judge Richard Gray of the Lycoming County Court of Common Pleas denied a Defendant’s Preliminary Objections to a Plaintiff’s Complaint in a dog bite case.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiffs were allegedly injured when they were injured attacked by a dog while walking on the sidewalk of a public street. No provocation by the Plaintiffs was indicated.

In their Complaint, the Plaintiffs alleged that the dog had previously bitten a child, that the Defendant owner knew or should have known that the dog had dangerous propensities, and that neighbors had previously complained to the Defendant about their failure to restrain the dog and about the dog’s alleged vicious propensities. Moreover, it was alleged that, shortly before the incident, a complaint was made to the Williamsport Police about a separate dog biting incident.

The Defendant owner filed Preliminary Objections in the form of a demurrer based upon an alleged violation of the dangerous dog law. The second preliminary objection was a demurrer to the punitive damages claim.

The court rejected the Defendant’s arguments that a violation of the Dangerous Dog Law did not amount to negligence per se. To the contrary, the court ruled that the Pennsylvania Superior Court had previously held that an unexcused violation of a statute constitutes negligence per se.

As such, taking the Plaintiff’s factual allegations as true as required by the standard of review, the court concluded that a violation of the Dangerous Dog Law could form the basis for a liability finding. As such, this initial Preliminary Objection was denied.

However, the court emphasized that, liability in this respect was not absolute as the negligence per se doctrine did not impose strict liability. Rather, the Plaintiff still had to prove causation and the extent of damages.

With regards to the demurrer to the claims for punitive damages, the court found that the Plaintiff had pled sufficient facts to support that claim. The Plaintiff asserted that the Defendants had a subjective appreciation of the risk of harm to which the Plaintiffs were exposed and that the Defendants acted or failed to act in a manner that showed a conscious disregard of that risk. Accordingly, this claim was allowed to proceed.

Anyone wishing to review this Harrison decision may click this LINK.


 

Friday, April 3, 2015

Negligence Per Se Pleading Allowed in Federal Dog Bite Case; But Proof of Causation Still Required



In what appears to be a rare Federal Court dog bite case, Judge A. Richard Caputo of the Federal Middle District Court of Pennsylvania addressed allegations of negligence per se in the case of Hughes v. Badaracco-Apolito, 2015 U.S. Dist. Lexis 18834 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 17, 2015 Caputo, J.). 

In addressing motions pertaining to the validity of pleadings, Judge Caputo ruled that a Plaintiff may proceed on a Dog Law negligence per se claim.  However, the court noted that while such a negligence per se claim could be pled, a Dog Law criminal conviction does not establish negligence per se because causation remains to be established as well. 
Judge A. Richard Caputo
M.D. Pa.
Moreover, the court noted that Summary Dog Law convictions are summary offense convictions which are not even admissible in civil litigation to establish causation by way of the collateral estoppel doctrine.
Accordingly, while the Plaintiff was allowed to plead negligence per se based upon a Dog Law conviction, the court stated that the Plaintiff still had the burden of proving causation at trial.
The court otherwise dismissed the punitive damages claims that were pled in this Hughes case.  The Plaintiff had asserted a claim for punitive damages that was based, in part, on an allegation that the Defendant failed to have the dog on a leash.  Judge Caputo noted that merely failing to leash dogs does not establish the necessary outrageous conduct required to pursue punitive damages.

In his Opinion, Judge Caputo alsoreiterated the long-standing rule of law that dog owners are not absolutely or strictly liable in tort for damages caused by their dogs.  Rather, negligence on the part of the dog owner must be established.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of Judge Caputo's decision in the Hughes case may click this LINK 

I send thanks to Attorney James Beck of the Philadelphia office of Reed Smith for bringing this case to my attention.  I highly recommend that you check out Attorney Beck's award-winning and nationally recognized blog, the Drug and Device Law Blog, which can be accessed at this LINK.

Tuesday, March 24, 2015

Negligence Per Se Doctrine Applied Relative to Maintenance of Smoke Alarms in Fatal Fire Case

In a recent Pike County Court of Common Pleas decision in the case of Tooley v. Mill Rift Inn, Inc., No. 2496-2009 Civil (C.P. Pike Co. Feb. 25, 2015 Kameen, P.J.), President Judge Joseph F. Kameen addressed Motion for Summary Judgments filed by each party in a case arising out of a fatal fire at the Mill Rift Inn in Westfall Township, Pike County, Pennsylvania.   At the time of the incident, the Plaintiff’s decedent resided in the Mill Rift Inn in one of its apartments.  

The issue before the court was whether or not the Plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment under the negligence per se doctrine given the Defendant’s alleged failure to annually inspect the smoke detectors at the Mill Rift Inn in violation of Pennsylvania Code Provisions.

After reviewing the record before the court, Judge Kameen found that the Plaintiff had established that the Defendant’s violation of the applicable law was sufficient to trigger the doctrine of negligence per se.  In his opinion, Judge Kameen set forth the law pertaining to his doctrine and the four (4) elements that a party must meet to establish the application of the negligence per se doctrine.  

Judge Joseph F. Kameen
Pike County
More specifically, the court found that the Defendant’s failure to annual inspect the smoke detectors in the decedent’s apartment and/or to notify her in writing of her own duty to inspect her apartment’s smoke detectors as required by the Pennsylvania Code was indeed a substantial factor in bringing about the Plaintiff’s harms for purposes of the negligence per se analysis.  As such, the Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment in this regard was granted.  

With regards to the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment which argued, in part, that the Plaintiff was ever a tenant at the Mill Rift Inn, Judge Kameen found that the record established that an oral agreement existed that was sufficient to create a landlord/tenant relationship under Pennsylvania law.   The court found that the verbal agreement with regards to the Plaintiff living in the apartment was sufficient to establish the existence of a month-to-month rental agreement between the parties under Pennsylvania law.  

The court also denied the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment based upon its status as a landlord out of possession.  

First of all, the court noted that there were no support for this argument by the Defendant with respect to the control of the “hard wired” electrical systems on the premises such that the landlord could be considered a landlord out of possession.  

Judge Kameen also noted that, even if the court found that the Defendant was a landlord out of possession, the reserved control exception of the general rule that landlords out of possession are protected from liability was found to apply where the hardwired items such as the smoke detectors were not serviceable by the tenants who lack lawful excess to the main electrical lines in the building.   The court also noted that the Plaintiff had no right of access to the basement where the fuse boxes were located.  

Accordingly, there were no reasonable expectation that the decedent would have been able to repair the smoke detectors in her apartment.   As such, the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment in this regard was denied.  

Judge Kameen did grant the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the Plaintiff’s allegations of a breach of implied warranty of habitability as there was no evidence to show that the tenant gave notice to the landlord of any alleged defect or condition such that the landlord had a reasonable opportunity to make the necessary repairs prior to the incident.   Here, there was no evidence that the tenant notified the Defendant of any defects at issue in this case, including the allegedly non-functional smoke detectors.   As such, this claim was stricken under the summary judgment standard. 


I send thanks to Attorney Michael Foley of the Foley Law Firm in Scranton, Pennsylvania for providing me with a copy of this Opinion in the case in which he is the Plaintiff’s counsel.  

 Anyone desiring a copy of this may email me at dancummins@comcast.net.

Sunday, January 29, 2012

Plaintiff's Act of Permitting Unauthorized Person to Drive Results in Plaintiff's Vicarious Liability for Own Injuries

In its recent opinion in the case of Price v. Leibfried, No. 332 MDA 2011 (Pa. Super. Dec. 21, 2011 Gantman, Lazarus, and Olson, JJ.) (Opinion by Lazarus, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court addressed 75 Pa. C.S.A. §1574 which pertains to permitting unauthorized person to drive in the context of an auto accident litigation.

In this case, the evidence before the court confirmed that this matter involved a two car motor vehicle accident. The Plaintiff was a passenger in her own motor vehicle, which rear-ended a tractor trailer. The Plaintiff’s vehicle was being operated by her friend at the time of the accident  The Plaintiff named the friend as one of the defendants in the lawsuit.

Prior to the accident, the Plaintiff and her friend had been drinking alcohol throughout the evening.

In her Complaint, the Plaintiff alleged negligence against her friend and also sued a local tavern under the Dram Shop Act.

At the close of discovery, the Defendant driver filed a Motion for Summary Judgment asserting that the Plaintiff was vicariously liable for her own injuries and cited to 75 Pa. C.S.A. §1574 (Permitting Unauthorized Person to Drive).

In its opinion, the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the trial court finding that there was no genuine issue of material fact that the Plaintiff knew, prior to the accident, that the Defendant driver did not have a valid driver’s license on the night of the accident.  There was no issue of fact that the Plaintiff also knew that the Defendant driver had been drinking beer and hard liquor on the night in question.

Based on these facts, the Superior Court agreed with the trial court decision that, as a matter of law, the Plaintiff was therefore vicariously liable for the Defendant driver’s negligence in the operation of the Plaintiff's vehicle pursuant to 75 Pa. C.S.A. §1574, as interpreted under the case of Terwilliger v. Kitchen, 781 A.2d 1201, 1206 (Pa. Super. 2001).

The Superior Court agreed that no reasonable minds could differ on a conclusion that the facts established that the Plaintiff had knowledge that the Defendant driver was not a licensed driver and that, despite this knowledge, the Plaintiff still authorized or permitted the Defendant driver to drive her vehicle. Since the Plaintiff therefore violated §1574 of the Motor Vehicle Code by allowing an unauthorized person to operate her vehicle, the court agreed that the Plaintiff was vicariously liable for the Defendant driver’s negligence.

The court went on to state that, since the Plaintiff was vicariously liable for the Defendant driver’s actions, she could not recover damages from that Defendant.

In so ruling, the court allowed the remaining claim by the Plaintiff against the Defendant tavern to proceed to trial where an apportionment of the percentage of liability between the Defendant driver and the tavern would be left for the jury to decide.  Based upon this ruling, however, the Plaintiff would not be permitted to recover against the Defendant driver on any verdict entered against that particular defendant.

Anyone desiring a copy of this opinion may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.

Thursday, January 14, 2010

Commonwealth Court Rejects Negligence Per Se Argument in Auto Accident Case

In the recent case of Behney v. Bolich, 2009 WL 4877762 (Pa.Cmwlth. Dec. 18, 2009), the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania upheld a defense verdict in a case where the Defendant had lost control of her vehicle due to ice on the roadway and fishtailed into the oncoming lane of travel, colliding with the Plaintiff's vehicle.

This decision addresses an appeal from the trial court's denial of the Plaintiff's motion for post-trial relief in which the Plaintiff asserted, in part, that the trial court should have found the Defendant to be negligent per se, thereby allowing the case to proceed to the jury on the damages issues alone. The Plaintiff asserted that the Defendant was negligent per se in terms of excessive speed above the posted speed limit, driving on the wrong side of the road, and failing to pass a vehicle on the right.

The Defendant disputed at trial the allegations that she was speeding or driving too fast for the conditions. Rather, she asserted that she was traveling along in a reasonable and safe fashion at the speed limit when she suddenly, unexpectedly, and unfortunately encountered ice in a dip in the roadway. Other witnesses, including another driver and the police officer, confirmed the presence of the ice on the road.

The Commonwealth Court noted that, although there was no question that the Defendant's vehicle crossed into the northbound lane, the Defendant claimed that the accident was due to the presence of ice and slush on the road that caused her to lose control of her car. In addition, the issues of whether the Defendant violated the Vehicle Code by speeding, driving too fast for road conditions or passing improperly at the time of the accident were disputed.

Accordingly, the Commonwealth Court agreed that the issue of whether the Defendant's negligence was a cause of the accident was for the jury to decide. As such, it was held that the trial court did not err in refusing to direct a verdict in the Plaintiff's favor.

It is also noted that, in this case, the appellate court upheld the non-suit that was entered against PennDOT on the grounds that there was no evidence that PennDOT had prior notice of the icy conditions such that they should have remedied the situation at some point before the accident occurred.


For those of you who may not have access to Westlaw, this Opinion can also be viewed at http://www.aopc.org/OpPosting/Cwealth/out/1106CD09_12-18-09.pdf.