In a recent Pike County Court of
Common Pleas decision in the case of
Tooley
v. Mill Rift Inn, Inc., No. 2496-2009 Civil (C.P. Pike Co. Feb. 25, 2015
Kameen, P.J.), President Judge Joseph F. Kameen addressed Motion for Summary
Judgments filed by each party in a case arising out of a fatal fire at the Mill
Rift Inn in Westfall Township, Pike County, Pennsylvania.
At the time of the incident, the Plaintiff’s
decedent resided in the Mill Rift Inn in one of its apartments.
The issue before the court was whether or not the Plaintiff
was entitled to summary judgment under the negligence per se doctrine given the
Defendant’s alleged failure to annually inspect the smoke detectors at the Mill
Rift Inn in violation of Pennsylvania Code Provisions.
After reviewing the record before the court, Judge Kameen
found that the Plaintiff had established that the Defendant’s violation of the
applicable law was sufficient to trigger the doctrine of negligence per
se.
In his opinion, Judge Kameen set
forth the law pertaining to his doctrine and the four (4) elements that a party
must meet to establish the application of the negligence per se doctrine.
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Judge Joseph F. Kameen
Pike County |
More specifically, the court found that the
Defendant’s failure to annual inspect the smoke detectors in the decedent’s
apartment and/or to notify her in writing of her own duty to inspect her
apartment’s smoke detectors as required by the Pennsylvania Code was indeed a
substantial factor in bringing about the Plaintiff’s harms for purposes of the
negligence per se analysis.
As such, the
Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment in this regard was
granted.
With regards to the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
which argued, in part, that the Plaintiff was ever a tenant at the Mill Rift
Inn, Judge Kameen found that the record established that an oral agreement
existed that was sufficient to create a landlord/tenant relationship under
Pennsylvania law.
The court found that
the verbal agreement with regards to the Plaintiff living in the apartment was
sufficient to establish the existence of a month-to-month rental agreement
between the parties under Pennsylvania law.
The court also denied
the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment based upon its status as a landlord
out of possession.
First of all, the
court noted that there were no support for this argument by the Defendant with
respect to the control of the “hard wired” electrical systems on the premises
such that the landlord could be considered a landlord out of possession.
Judge Kameen also noted that, even if the court found that the Defendant
was a landlord out of possession, the reserved control
exception of the general rule that landlords out of possession are protected
from liability was found to apply where the hardwired items such as the smoke detectors
were not serviceable by the tenants who lack lawful excess to the main
electrical lines in the building.
The
court also noted that the Plaintiff had no right of access to the basement
where the fuse boxes were located.
Accordingly, there were no reasonable expectation that the decedent
would have been able to repair the smoke detectors in her apartment.
As such, the Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment in this regard was denied.
Judge Kameen did grant the Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment on the Plaintiff’s allegations of a breach of implied warranty of
habitability as there was no evidence to show that the tenant gave notice to
the landlord of any alleged defect or condition such that the landlord had a
reasonable opportunity to make the necessary repairs prior to the
incident.
Here, there was no evidence
that the tenant notified the Defendant of any defects at issue in this case,
including the allegedly non-functional smoke detectors.
As such, this claim was stricken under the
summary judgment standard.
I send thanks to Attorney Michael Foley of the Foley Law
Firm in Scranton, Pennsylvania for providing me with a copy of this Opinion in
the case in which he is the Plaintiff’s counsel.