Showing posts with label Neuropsychological Review. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Neuropsychological Review. Show all posts

Monday, December 16, 2024

Superior Court Defines Good Cause Requirement or IMEs or DMes


In the case of Verba v. Erie Insurance Exchange, No. 2633 EDA 2023 (Pa. Super. Oct. 31, 2024 Panella, P.J.E., King, J., and Stevens, P.J.E) (Op. by King, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court addressed the standard for determining whether good cause exist to compel the Plaintiff to cooperate with a request for a medical examination, that is, an IME or a DME depending on what you call it, under Pa. R.C.P. 4010.

The court noted that the requirement of good cause set forth in Rule 4010 is designed to protect parties against an unwarranted invasion of their privacy and to preclude the use of such a medical examination for improper purposes.

The court noted that good cause can exist in a pending litigation if there is a controversy that relates to the very existence of a medical condition which goes to the validity of the cause of action and where absent proof of the Plaintiff’s medical condition a case may not proceed.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source: The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert. www.law.com (Nov. 20, 2024).

Source of image:  Photo by Pavil Danilyuk on www.pexels.com.

Monday, October 7, 2024

Trial Court Refuses To Allow Defense Counsel to Attend Neuropsychological IME


In the case of Healey v. Scranton Hospital Company, LLC, No. 2023-CV-1793 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Oct. 2, 2024 Nealon, J.), Judge Nealon ruled, in a medical malpractice case that a defense attorney is not permitted to attend a neuropsychological examination that the defense had scheduled for a Plaintiff.

The court found that Pa. R.C.P. 4010, regarding physical and mental examinations in civil litigation matters, only grants the Plaintiff’s counsel the right to attend such an examination of the Plaintiff.

Judge Nealon noted that, “if the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania deemed it appropriate or necessary for defense counsel to have a corresponding right to attend a Rule 4010 examination, it could have stated so” in the Rule.

Given that Rule 4010 does not reference any right for a defense counsel to attend a medical examination set up for litigation purposes, Judge Nealon denied the defense motion in which the defense sought permission to attend the examination.

In his Opinion, Judge Nealon also cautioned that it would be inappropriate for a plaintiff's attorney interfere with the examination or obstruct the doctor's interview of the plaintiff, sanctions could be warranted.  The Judge also cautioned that, if the plaintiff's attorney acted inappropriately at the examination, the plaintiff's attorney even ran the risk of being disqualified from continuing as counsel for the plaintiff based upon the advocate-witness rule in Rule 3.7 of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney Bruce Zero of the Scranton, PA law firm of Powell, Zero & Mundy for bringing this case to my attention.

Thursday, March 28, 2024

Trial Court Rules That Plaintiff Must Cooperate and Answer IME Doctor's Questions That Are Germane


In the Monroe County case of Nelson v. Wilkins, No. 1381-CV-2022 (C.P. Monroe Co. Jan. 26, 2024 C. Daniel Higgins, Jr., J.), the court granted a Defendant’s Motion to Compel a Plaintiff to provide information to the IME doctor during an independent medical examination of a Plaintiff in a personal injury case arising out of a motor vehicle accident.

According to the decision, the Plaintiff had appeared for an examination but refused to answer the IME doctor’s questions, asserting that the questions were allegedly outside the scope of Pa. R.C.P. 4010 about the occurrence of the accident that led to the Plaintiff’s alleged injuries.

Judge Higgins noted that the rule provides that the examiner is limited to inquiring regarding the facts of liability germane to the issue of damages. The court found that the Plaintiff’s attorney’s position that the IME doctor should not ask questions regarding the history of the accident that could relate to liability and the Plaintiff’s argument that the doctor could avoid the problem by reviewing depositions, police reports, Interrogatories, and other discovery materials “was untenable” because it placed too high of a burden on the IME doctor.

In granting the Defendant’s Motion to Compel in this regard, the Court ordered that the Plaintiff was required to cooperate and answer the questions of the examining doctor.  The court noted that, under Rule 4010, the Plaintiff could have her counsel or other representative present during the examination.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “The Legal Intelligencer Case Alert”, www.LAW.com (March 20, 2024).

Source of image: Photo by Tima Miroshnichenko on www.pexels.com.

Monday, March 15, 2021

Northumberland County Court Addresses Attorney Presence at Neuropsychological IME



In the case of Ackley v. Johns, No. CV-2017-1757 (C.P. North. Co. Dec. 29, 2020 Rosini, J.), entered an Order only in this Northumberland County case ruling that a representative of a Plaintiff may be present during the entirety of a neuropsychological examination, including those parts of the examination that related to objective evaluations as well as the questioning/interviewing parts of the overall examination.

The court based its decision on a literal reading of Pa. R.C.P. 4010(a)(4)(i) which permits the subject of an examination to have a representative present. The court noted that, while it recognized the distinctions raised by the parties with respect to the objective evaluation part of exam and the questioning/interviewing parts of the overall neuropsychological exam, the court felt that it was bound by a clear wording of the discovery Rule of Civil Procedure.

In terms of the defense concern that the presence or involvement of Plaintiff’s counsel or a representative at the evaluation or examination would taint the examination, the court noted in a footnote to the Order that the defense retained the right to address those issues during the course of cross-examination at trial. [In making this statement, the court did not explain how or why a defense attorney would cross-examine its own expert witness at trial.].


Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Cliff Rieders of the Williamsport, Pennsylvania law firm of Rieders, Travis, Humphrey, Waters & Dorhmann, for bringing this case to my attention.

Tuesday, April 21, 2020

Judge Minora of Lackawanna County Addresses Several Notable Discovery Issues Including Permissible Scope of Vocational Assessment


In the case of Barbarevech v. Tomlinson, No. 18-CV-4821 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Nov. 14, 2019 Minora, J.), Senior Judge Carmen D. Minora of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas addressed several notable discovery issues arising out of a motor vehicle accident matter.

On one issue, the Plaintiff sought sanctions against the Defendant due to the Defendant’s failure to provide full and complete discovery responses following a previous Motion to Compel Order issued by the court.

According to the Opinion, the defense counsel noted that he had informally responded to the discovery requests at issue following the entry of that Order and asserted that the Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions filed on the basis that formal supplemental responses were not provided was, in essence, exalting form over substance.

While the court appreciated defense counsel’s position, the court nevertheless determined that the Defendant should have filed formal responses to the written discovery requests at issue after an Order to compel had been entered by the Court. However, Judge Minora chose not to impose sanctions as to the court found the failure to comply formally with the directive of the Court under the circumstances presented in this case which confirmed that the lack of compliance by defense counsel was unintentional in nature and not designed to be an affront to the Court. The defense was directed to provide formal supplemental discovery responses.

In this decision, the court also addressed the proper parameters of a vocational evaluation of the Plaintiff sought by the Defendants.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiffs objected to the proposed length of the evaluation, which was to include an interview followed by standardize testing, all of which would take approximately 4-5 hours in duration.

Plaintiff’s counsel also were seeking an Order compelling the evaluation to take place in either Lackawanna County or Luzerne County.

The Plaintiffs also sought to limit the type of questioning by the vocational expert and to prevent the expert from performing any type of psychological testing.

The Plaintiff also requested the right to have counsel or representative present during the entirety of the examination.

Judge Minora relied upon his own previous decision in the case of Dellavalle v. USAA, 2017-CV-4688 (C.P. Lacka. Co. 2019 Minora, J.), in which the court laid out a framework for a proper neuropsychological independent medical examination. The court found that the evaluation requested by the vocational expert in this matter was sufficiently analogous to the neuropsychological IME requested in the Dellavalle case so as to allow the court to rely upon that prior decision for guidance.

As he has ruled in previous matters,with respect to the location of the IME, Judge Minora noted that traveling any distance, especially where the physical condition of the commuter may be impaired, was an annoyance and possibly a burden. In this matter, the court found that the burden associated with traveling from northeastern Pennsylvania to Valley Forge, Pennsylvania for the vocational evaluation was  “unreasonable” so as to warrant the entry of a Protective Order under Pa. R.C.P. 4012.

The court ruled that the Defendants having chosen the vocational expert from out of the area as an expert should bear the reasonable expenses related thereto. The court also noted that the vocational expert could travel to Luzerne or Lackawanna County and find a place to complete the examination of the Plaintiff. The Court ordered the cooperation of the parties in this regard and ordered the defense to reimburse the Plaintiff for any reasonable costs that may be incurred by the Plaintiff as a result.

With regard to the conduct and duration of the IME, Judge Minora noted that he would “refrain from micromanaging at this stage of the proceedings [the vocational expert’s] customary evaluation processes.” See Op. at 6.

Judge Minora declined to limit in any significant manner the duration of the subject evaluation as he found nothing inherently unreasonable in the anticipated length of the proposed vocational assessment. However, the court was hesitant to allow the length of time to be open ended and, as such, ordered that the evaluation could not exceed 4 ½ hours in duration.

With regard to the presence of the Plaintiff’s attorney or representative during the vocational review, the court rejected the Plaintiff’s request to have a representative present during the entirety of the evaluation. Rather, the court ruled that under Rule 4010(a)(4)(i) allows the representative to be present only during the interview portion of the evaluation, but not during any part of the testing portion.

Lastly, the court denied the Plaintiff’s Motion to Designate the Defense Vocational Expert as a Professional Witness. The Plaintiff pursued this motion under the case of Cooper v. Schoffstall, 905 A.2d 482 (Pa. 2006).

Judge Minora found the Cooper case to be distinguishable and, therefore, dismissed the Plaintiff’s Motion as premature and as an improper attempt to seek from the court a declaratory judgment on the expert’s designation as a professional witness at this stage of the litigation. This decision was entered without prejudice to the Plaintiff’s right to properly present this issue to the trial judge via a Motion in Limine.

The court in this case distinguished Cooper on the grounds that, in the Cooper, case the Plaintiff had first served the written discovery seeking bias information from the expert after which the Defendants objected and the case became before that court by way of a Motion for a Protective Order. In this case, the Plaintiffs had not yet served any discovery requests upon the vocational expert or with respect to the vocational expert and was instead looking for the court to “green light their ability to do so.”

Judge Minora noted that, while such an inquiry by the Plaintiff of the vocational expert may, in the end, be proper, Judge Minora felt that it was not the role of the court to give the Plaintiffs permission to do so at that stage of the litigation.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Commentary:  Judge Minora's decision in this Barbarevich case highlights the difficulty presented by the Cooper v. Schoffstall case in that that case allows for certain additional discovery to be conducted with respect to the potential financial bias of an expert if it is established that the expert is a "professional witness" but the Court in Cooper did not provide any test or standards by which to make that determination.



Wednesday, May 15, 2019

Judge Minora of Lackawanna County Addresses Parameters of Neuropsychological Examinations Requested by Defense


Senior Judge Carmen D. Minora of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas recently weighed in on the issue of the proper parameters for a neuropsychological IME in the case of Dellavalle v. USAA, No. 2017-CV-4668 (C.P. Lacka. Co. May 14, 2019 Minora, J.).

This case involved UIM claim(s) arising out of a motor vehicle accident. 

The issue came before the court by way of a motion to compel filed by the defense.  The defense desired to complete a neuropsychological examination of the Plaintiff with a doctor in Allentown.  The Plaintiff objected to the distance required to travel to the exam and also objected to the requested length of the deposition.

There were also disputes between the parties as to whether the examination could be videotaped, to what extent the Plaintiff's attorney or a representative of the Plaintiff could be present during the exam or testing, and whether the Plaintiff was entitled to secure any raw data generated by the defense expert during the exam.

In addressing the issues before him, Judge Minora noted that Pa.R.C.P. 4010 allows for examination if good cause is shown and that Pa.R.C.P. 4011 grants the court discretion to avoid any discovery that causes unreasonable annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, burden, or expense to a person or a party.

In terms of the location of the expert, the court noted that it hesitated to infringe upon the right of any party to try the case they choose, including with respect to the selection of an expert.  As such, the court rejected the Plaintiff's objection to the location of the expert but ruled that the defense would have to bear any expenses related to the travel required for the Plaintiff to attend the exam.

As for the duration of the neuropsychological IME, the court limited the exam and testing to six hours over two days.  In this regard, the court noted that it was balancing the defense's right to the examination against the Plaintiff's right to be protected from unreasonably burdensome discovery.

With regards to presence of Plaintiff's counsel or a representative of the Plaintiff at the examination, the court noted that there was no binding appellate court precedent on the issue.  Judge Minora reviewed prior trial court opinions on the issue.  In the end, the court ruled that the Plaintiff could have a representative present only for the interview portion of the neuropsychological examination.  The court further ruled that a representative of the Plaintiff would not be allowed in the room during the standardized testing portion of the exam.

Judge Minora additionally ruled that no part of the examination by the doctor and/or the standardized testing could be videotaped.  However, he did allow for videotaping of the interview portion of the exam, i.e., the part at which the Plaintiff's representative was allowed to be present.

The court also ruled that the Plaintiff was to be provided with any raw data generated during the examination.  The court's Order also required that all examination and testing materials were to be returned to the Plaintiff upon the conclusion of the case.

Anyone wishing to review this decision, may click this LINK

I send thanks to Attorney Bruce Zero, Esq. of the Scranton, PA office of Powell Law for bringing this decision to my attention.

For other Tort Talk entries on this issue, check out the Label of "Neuropsychological Review" way down on the right hand column of the Tort Talk blog at www.TortTalk.com.




Friday, May 11, 2018

Parameters of Neuropsychological IME Reviewed in Dauphin County Case

Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas
In an Order only issued by the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas in the case of Eberhard v. Pettis, No. 2014-CV-78180-CV (Jan. 31, 2018 McNally, J.), the court compelled a Plaintiff to attend an independent neuropsychological evaluation. 

In the Order, the court permitted Plaintiff’s counsel, or another representative of the Plaintiff, to attend the interview phase of the evaluation only.   The Order further prohibited the Plaintiff from recording the standardized testing portion of the evaluation.  

In its Order, the court cited to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court case of Shearer v. Hafer, No. 93 MAP 2016 (Pa. 2018) as supporting the trial court’s decision in this regard.  

Anyone wishing to review this Order only, may click this LINK.

For other Tort Talk posts on cases addressing the permissible parameters of neuropsychological examinations, please click HERE

Friday, February 23, 2018

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Reviews Collateral Order Doctrine for Appeals


Tort Talkers may recall prior posts on the Lebanon County case of Shearer v. Hafer pertaining to whether a Plaintiff is entitle to have a representative present during portions of a neuropsychological IME. 

The Tort Talk post on the Superior Court's decision in this case can be viewed HERE.  The post on the trial court's decision can be viewed HERE.  Concisely, the Superior Court affirmed the trial court's order allowing a representative of the Plaintiff to be present during the preliminary interview phase of the neuropsychological evaluation, but not during the standardized testing portion of the evaluation.

Now comes the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision recently handed down in this case on January 18, 2018 ruling that the Pennsylvania Superior Court erred in even considering the issue on appeal as the trial court's order was not an appealable order as of right under Pa.R.A.P. 313 where the trial court order only met one of the three prongs of the collateral order doctrine.  As such, the Superior Court's decision on the issue was vacated.

The Majority Opinion of the Court in Shearer v. Hafer, No. 93 MAP 2016 (Pa. Jan. 18, 2018), written by Justice Todd, can be viewed HERE.

Justice Wecht's Concurring Opinion can be viewed HERE.

Justice Mundy's Dissenting Opinion can be viewed HERE.

This Opinion may be a good one to consult if you have a question on whether a trial court order is appealable under the collateral order doctrine under Pa.R.A.P. 313. 

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reaffirmed the rule of law that the collateral order doctrine is to be narrowly construed and that each of the three prongs to allow for an appeal must be clearly present.

The three prongs of the collateral order doctrine as set forth under Pa.R.A.P. 313(b) are:

(1) the order is separable from and collateral to the main cause of action

(2) the right involved in the order is too important to be denied review by the appellate court, and

(3) the question presented is such that if review is postponed until the final judgment of the case, the claim will be irreparably lost.




Wednesday, December 14, 2016

Year End Review Article Published In Pennsylvania Law Weekly

The below article of mine was published in the December 1, 2016 edition of the Pennsylvania Law Weekly and is republished here with permission:
 
Civil Litigation

A Year in Review: The Top Recurring Issues
By

Daniel E. Cummins

December 1, 2016/Pennsylvania Law Weekly 

Daniel E. Cummins
Foley, Comerford & Cummins
Scranton, PA

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A number of recurring issues rose to the top of attention in the past year, many of which are expected to remain on the forefront of civil litigation trends into 2017. Here's a look back at some of the top topics in 2016 in personal injury matters.

Facebook Discovery Issues

In past years, with the rapid expansion of social media, the primary issue was to what extent a party may seek discovery of another party's social media activity, particularly with respect to Facebook. Now that the courts have generally allowed parties to delve into the private portions of another party's social media accounts provided that a predicate showing has been made that relevant information will be uncovered, a more recent trend of cases has considered when any such discovered information must be produced, i.e., before or after a party's deposition.
Typically, the courts have previously held, at least in the case of video surveillance completed on a party, that such surveillance information need not be produced in state court civil litigation matters until after the completion of a party's deposition.
The trial court judges in Dauphin County, including Judge Andrew H. Dowling and Judge Bruce F. Bratton, appear to be among the first to address the issue of when virtual surveillance information, i.e., social media search results from Facebook, Instagram, Tumblr and the like, must be produced have taken a different approach. These judges have ruled that social media information should be produced to an opposing party before that party's deposition, as in Vogelsong v. Cruz-Ramirez, No. 2015-CV-234 CV (C.P. Dauph. Co. July 29, Dowling, J.); Vinson v. Jackson, No. 2015-CV-05150-CV (C.P. Dauph. Co. Aug. 23, Bratton, J.); and Appleby v. Erie Insurance Exchange, No. 2016-CV-2431 (C.P. Dauph. Co. Sept. 9, Dowling, J.).
Whether other trial court judges from around the commonwealth will rule in a similar fashion or will, instead, apply the same rule of discovery pertaining to video surveillance remains to be seen.

Claims of Privileged Information in Discovery

In its decision in the case Brown v. Greyhound Lines, No. 1167 EDA 2015, 2016 Pa. Super. 108 (Pa. Super. May 24), the Pennsylvania Superior Court addressed issues pertaining to the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine as applied between attorneys and third-party administrators in personal injury civil litigation matters.
The issue raised in this matter involved a request for production of documents sent by the plaintiff to a defendant carrier seeking the contents of claims files, correspondence, and emails discussing the bus accident that were sent to or from any individual employed by Gallagher Bassett, a third-party adjustment company which contractually handled claims and investigations for the carrier. The defendants objected to these discovery requests on the basis that the materials were confidential under the attorney-client privilege and attorney work product privilege.
Applying the law to the case before it, the appellate court found that the defendants had failed to establish that the trial court's rulings allowing for the discovery of certain documents should be overturned. In part, the court faulted the defendants in failing to carry their burden of proof on the privilege by failing to make any specific arguments beyond citing general precepts concerning the attorney-client and work product privileges.
The issue of the admissibility of communications between defense counsel and a third-party claims administrator was also addressed in the Middle District court decision by Judge Matthew W. Brann in the case of Heller's Gas v. International Insurance of Hannover, 4:15-CV-01350 (M.D. Pa. June 1).
In this breach of contract and bad-faith case relative to a policy that provided commercial premises coverage, the plaintiff insured claimed that documents withheld or redacted in discovery did not fall within the attorney-client privilege, the work product doctrine, and did not pertain to reserve information. The plaintiff more specifically asserted that all but one of the documents at issue was either sent to or from employees of the insurer's third-party administrator or its authorized claim representative, and as neither of these entities were subsidiaries of, or owned by, the insurer, the communications were not privileged.
The carrier countered with the argument that the communications between the third party administrator's in-house counsel and the claim representative's in-house counsel with the insurer all fell within the scope of attorney-client privilege.
The court reviewed the unredacted documents during an in camera session. Thereafter the court, referring to F.R.C.P. 26, decided: "After thoroughly examining the documents, this court finds that the information redacted appropriately falls within the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine and is consequently information directly related to or referencing legal strategy regarding the instant litigation. The correspondence further supports [the insurer's] latterly advanced argument that [the third party administrator and authorized claims representative] are essentially agents of [the insurer]." As such, the court found that the redactions were appropriate.
In a more recent decision on issues pertaining to assertions of privilege in response to discovery requests, the Superior Court emphasized that such issues were immediately appealable on an interlocutory basis as collateral orders.
In Farrell v. Regola, 2016 Pa. Super. 241 (Pa. Super Nov. 8), a case that involved claims of the attorney-client privilege and psychologist/patient privilege, the court held that in the event that a trial court orders the production of the privileged information in response to a motion to compel, even for the purpose of an in camera review by the trial court, the aggrieved party is allowed an immediate interlocutory appeal as of right as a collateral order.
The Superior Court ruled that, if matters are indeed privileged, no one, not even a trial judge, may have access to them. The Superior Court also ruled that the application of privileges is subject to a de novo review.

Waiver/Release from Liability Forms

A number of decisions were handed down over the past year upholding waiver or release forms executed by injured parties prior to participating in recreational activities.
In an apparent case of first impression of Feleccia v. Lackawanna College, No. 12-CV-1960 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Feb. 2), Judge James A. Gibbons of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas was faced with the issue whether two junior college students who were injured at a preseason football practice were barred from recovering against the college because both signed waivers of liability prior to their injuries.
In his opinion, Gibbons noted that, while Pennsylvania courts have upheld exculpatory releases for skiing, white water rafting, weight lifting, skating, and motorcycling, among other types of activities, no case was found involving collegiate football.
Gibbons nevertheless ruled that neither the applicable law nor the facts of this case required the court to distinguish between the inherently dangerous nature of football and these other types of sporting activities noted. As such, the court ruled that waivers of liability executed by the students precluded their recovery.
In the Superior Court case of Hinkal v. Gavin Pardo & Gold's Gym, No. 165 MDA 2014, 2016 Pa. Super. 11 (Pa. Super. Jan. 22) (en banc), the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed a trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendant's on the basis of a waiver agreement signed by the injured party plaintiff as part of a membership at Gold's Gym.
The Pennsylvania Superior Court agreed with the trial court's decision that the waiver language set forth in the Gold's Gym membership agreement was valid and enforceable. Accordingly, the entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendant was affirmed.
In another recent decision by the Superior Court in the case of Toro v. Fitness International, 2016 Pa.Super. 243 (Pa. Super. Nov. 10), the Pennsylvania Superior Court again affirmed the entry of summary judgment in favor of a defendant fitness center on the basis of an executed waiver form in a slip and fall case.
As part of its decision, the appellate court ruled that a release or waiver of liability signed by the plaintiff when joining the health club was valid and binding. The court stated that, where someone engages in a voluntary athletic or recreational activity, a release in a contract for the use of the facilities is not contrary to public policy. The court also ruled that a waiver of liability in this regard was not a contract of adhesion because there is no requirement for anyone to engage in recreational activities. The court also referred to the oft cited rule that a failure to read a release or waiver language before signing it does not affect its validity.

Neuropsychological IMEs

In its decision in the case of Shearer v. Hafer, No. 665 MDA 2015 (Pa. Super. March 9), the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed a trial court's granting of a defendant's motion for a protective order prohibiting the presence of third-party observers during the standardized test portion of a neuropsychological evaluation.
Following a motor vehicle accident that gave rise to this case, the plaintiff treated with a neuropsychologist and, during that treatment, the plaintiff's treating neuropsychologist employed standardized testing procedures that were conducted without the presence of the plaintiff's attorney or any other third party. The defense hired a doctor to complete an independent neuropsychological examination. The plaintiff's counsel demanded to be present during all components of the neuropsychological examination. The IME doctor objected to this request, including the plaintiff's counsel's request to audio tape the testing evaluation.
The IME doctor indicated that he would allow the plaintiff's attorney to be present during the interview portion of the examination. However, the IME doctor would not permit either the presence of the plaintiff's counsel and the audio taping during the standardize test phase of the neuropsychological evaluation.
The Superior Court noted that there was no Pennsylvania appellate court decision directly on point that addressed a litigant's right to counsel during a psychological examination.
On appeal the appellate court affirmed the trial court's order, which stated that, although plaintiff's counsel could be present during the preliminary interview phase of the neuropsychological examination, no individual was allowed in the evaluation room with the plaintiff and the IME doctor during the phase of the evaluation that involves standardize testing. The order further provided that no recording device would be permitted in the evaluation room.
The Pennsylvania Superior Court ruled that, pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 4012, the trial court had the discretion to enter the order at issue. The court also found support for the trial court's decision under Pa. R.C.P. 4010, pertaining to physical and mental examination of person.
The Superior Court also noted that, although there was "no case law [that] address of the application of Rule 4012 to Rule 4010," the court noted that an explanatory commenting 1978 amendment to Rule 4012 stressed that the amendment provides a comprehensive rule, which covers all depositions and all discovery. Accordingly, the court ruled that it appeared that the legislature intended that Rule 4012 would empower the trial court with discretion to issue protective orders in various discovery procedures, including, specifically, the power to limit the number of individuals present at an independent medical or psychological examination.

Sever and Stay Post-'Koken' Bad-Faith Claims

Over the past year there was a rising trend of motions to sever and stay bad-faith claims in post-Koken automobile litigation matters.
A split of authority continues in this regard, with some courts allowing the severance and the stay of bad-faith claims, some courts severing the bad-faith claim but not staying bad-faith discovery, and some other courts denying these types of motions altogether. Summaries of at least some of these decisions uncovered, most by order only and without opinion, can be found on the post-Koken scorecard on my "Tort Talk" blog at www.TortTalk.com.
It remains to be seen if this issue, as well as other important post-Koken issues will make it up the appellate ladder in the year ahead. As the lower courts and the bar are craving guidance in this still novel area of the law, it is hoped that the Superior Court would publish any of its decisions on these topics as opposed to offering unpublished decisions marked "nonprecedential."

'Tincher'

In 2016, the courts and the bar continued to grapple with how to apply the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's products liability decision of Tincher v. Omega Flex, 104 A.3d 328 (Pa. 2014), in which the court ruled that the Restatement (Second) of Torts continued to be the accepted guideline for such cases.
In Tincher, the Supreme Court more specifically held that the nondelegable duty in a strict liability case is that the a person or company engaging in the business of selling a product has a duty to make a product that is expected to and does reach its user without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold and free from a defective condition that is unreasonably dangerous to the user of the product.
The court also confirmed under Tincher, that to demonstrate a breach of duty in a strict liability matter, a plaintiff must prove that a manufacturer placed a defective product on the market. Under Tincher, a case of strict products liability requires proof, in the alternative, either of the ordinary consumer's expectations or of the risk-utility of a product.
The court in Tincher more specifically held that the consumer expectations test defines a "defective condition" as a condition, upon normal use, dangerous beyond the reasonable consumer's contemplations. In contrast, the risk-utility test offers a standard which, in typical common law terms, states that: "a product is in a defective condition if a 'reasonable person' would conclude that the probability and seriousness of harm caused by the product outweigh the burden of costs of taking precautions."
In the past year, there have been some motions for summary judgment granted and some denied on the basis of Tincher. The trial courts are also attempting to craft new jury instructions for trials of post-Tincher matters. It is anticipated that the Tincher decision will continue to have a significant impact in products liability litigation matters until the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has a chance to revisit the issue. •

Special to the Law Weekly Daniel E. Cummins is a partner and civil litigator with the Scranton law firm of Foley Comerford & Cummins. His civil litigation blog, Tort Talk, can be viewed at www.TortTalk.com.

Wednesday, March 23, 2016

Proper Parameters for Neuropsychological IME Addressed by Pennsylvania Superior Court

In its recent decision in the case of Shearer v. Hafer, No. 665 MDA 2015 (Pa. Super. March 9, 2016 Panella, J. Ott, J., and Jenkins, J.) (Op. by Panella, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed a trial court’s granting of a Defendant’s Motion for a Protective Order prohibiting the presence of third party observers during the standardized test portion of a neuropsychological evaluation.  

According to the Opinion, this matter arose out of a motor vehicle accident.   Among the injuries claimed by the Plaintiff was cognitive harm allegedly triggered by the accident.   The Plaintiff treated with a neuropsychologist and, during that treatment, the Plaintiff’s treating neuropsychologist employed standardized testing procedures that were conducted without the presence of the Plaintiff’s attorney or any other third party.  

During the course of the litigation, the defense hired a doctor to complete an independent neuropsychological examination.   Plaintiff’s counsel demanded to be present during all components of the neuropsychological examination.   The IME doctor objected to this request, including the Plaintiff’s counsel’s request to audio tape the testing evaluation.   The IME doctor pointed to an official statement of the National Academy of Neuropsychology as indicating that third party presence and/or audio taping during testing may represent a threat to the validity and reliability of the test data.   The IME doctor indicated that he would allow the Plaintiff’s attorney to be present during the interview portion of the examination.  However, the IME doctor would not permit either the presence of the Plaintiff’s counsel and the audio taping during the standardize test phase of the neuropsychological evaluation.

This proposed compromise by the IME doctor was not acceptable to Plaintiff’s counsel.  

The issue then came before the trial court, which entered an Order granting the Defendant’s request for protective order.  That order stated that, although Plaintiff’s counsel could be present during the preliminary interview phase of the neuropsychological examination, no individual was allowed in the evaluation room with the Plaintiff and the IME doctor during the phase of the evaluation that involves standardize testing.   The order further provided that no recording device would be permitted in the evaluation room.  

The Superior Court noted that there was no Pennsylvania appellate court decision directly on point that addressed a litigant’s right to counsel during a psychological examination.   As noted, on appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court ruled that, pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 4012, the trial court had the discretion to enter the order at issue.  The court also found support for the trial court’s decision under Pa. R.C.P. 4010, pertaining to Physical and Mental Examination of Person.  

The Superior Court also noted that, although there was “no case law [that] address of the application of Rule 4012 to Rule 4010,” the court noted that an explanatory commenting 1978 amendment to Rule 4012 stressed that the amendment provides a comprehensive Rule which covers all depositions and all discovery.   Accordingly, the court ruled that it appeared that the legislature intended that Rule 4012 would empower the trial court with discretion to issue protective orders in various discovery procedures, including, specifically, the power to limit the number of individuals present at an independent medical or psychological examination.  

The Superior Court went on to note that Rule 4012 did not empower the trial court to issue protective orders carte blanche.  Rather, the moving party still had the burden of showing “good cause” for the issuance of a protective order.   The court noted that the good cause standard “strikes an appropriate balance between competing interests, including a litigant’s privacy interest (however they be defined)…. and the court’s obligation to administer justice efficiently and prevent abuse of the discovery process.”   See Op. at 11 [citation omitted].  

Here, the Superior Court found that the Defendants had established good cause for the trial court’s issuance of the protective order.  In the end, the Superior Court found that the trial court’s decision represented a fair and thoughtful balance of both the patient’s interests and the presence of counsel during a neuropsychological examination and the court’s obligation to administer justice efficiently and to prevent abuse of the discovery process.   See Op. 12.   As such, the trial court’s order was affirmed as the Superior Court found no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in this regard. 


Anyone desiring a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Additional Commentary: For one of the first decisions on this same issue with the same result (which decision actually predates and is cited by the trial court in its decision in Shearer), see Lackwanna County Judge Carmen D. Minora’s Opinion in the case of Marion v. Lukaitis in this Tort Talk post HERE.

UPDATE:  This decision was later vacated by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court who ruled that the Superior Court erred in considering the appeal in the first place as the trial court's order was not an appealable order as of right under Pa.R.A.P. 313 where the trial court's order only met one of the three prongs of the collateral order doctrine. 

To view this decision by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, click HERE.  The Concurring Opinion by Justice Wecht, and the Dissenting Opinion by Justice Mundy are not Linked here.

Monday, October 26, 2015

Another Trial Court Crafts Another Remedy for Parameters of Neuropsychological IMEs



Another trial court decision regarding the permissible parameters of a neuropsychological examination is the Delaware County 1case (from a year ago) of D'Aurizio v. Rota, No. 2013-008170 (C.P. Del. Co. Dec. 2, 2014 Green, J.).

In this Order without Opinion, the court ordered the plaintiff to attend the neuropsychological IME but also mandated that the plaintiff's attorney would be permitted to be present during the interview portion of the exam and that the testing portion of the neuropsychological exam could be videotaped but without an audio component.

The defense was also ordered to share any neuropsychological testing data with the plaintiff's expert after the completion of the exam.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this Order may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.

Here's a LINK to a Pennsylvania Law Weekly article of mine two years ago on the topic.

To review other more recent Tort Talk posts on the permissible parameters of neuropsychological IMEs as determined by trial courts from around the Commonwealth in the absence of appellate guidance, click HERE and HERE.

I send thanks to Attorney Dale Larrimore of the Philadelphia law firm of Larrimore & Farnish, LLP for bringing this case to my attention.


Friday, September 11, 2015

Trial Court Reaffirms Ruling Allowing Plaintiff's Attorney At Neuropsychological IME; But Court Also Allows for Immediate Appeal of Issue

In the case of Romagnoli v. Westmoreland Reg. Hosp., No. 1514 of 2011 (C.P. Westmoreland, Aug. 26, 2015 Marsili, J.) Judge Anthony G. Marsili denied a Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration of a prior Order entered in the same case allowing Plaintiff to have counsel or representative present at independent neuropsychological examination.  The court also reaffirmed its prior decision to allow the Plaintiff to make an audio or stenographic recording of examination.

However, noting the split of authority on the issue, the Romagnoli court granted the defense an immediate right of appeal to have the appellate court address the question presented.

Anyone wishing to review the court's decision in Romagnoli may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney Patrick J. Loughren of the Pittsburgh law office of Loughren, Loughren & Loughren, P.C. for bringing this decision to my attention.

Tuesday, March 31, 2015

Parameters for Neuropsychological IME Set in Lebanon County Case

In the Lebanon County Court of Common Pleas case of Shearer v. Hafer, No. 2012-01286 (C.P. Leb. Co. March 17, 2015 Charles, J.), Judge Bradford Charles ruled in favor of a defense discovery motion to compel a neuropsychological IME, with the parameters being that the Plaintiff's attorney would be allowed to be present during the preliminary interview phase by the doctor of the Plaintiff but not thereafter.

The court ruled that once the standardized testing portion of the neuropsych IME began, no one other than the doctor and the Plaintiff would be allowed in the room and no recording device would be permitted in the room.

The court also ruled that, once the IME was completed, the Plaintiff's attorney would be entitled to a copy of the standardized testing that was completed.

Anyone desiring a copy of this Order may click this LINK

I send thanks to Attorney Scott Cooper of the Harrisburg, PA law firm of Schmidt Kramer for bringing this case to my attention.

UPDATE:  This decision went up to the Superior Court and then to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that the Superior Court erred in considering the appeal in the first place as the trial court's order was not an appealable order as of right under Pa.R.A.P. 313 where the trial court's order only met one of the three prongs of the collateral order doctrine. 

To view this decision by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, click HERE.  The Concurring Opinion by Justice Wecht, and the Dissenting Opinion by Justice Mundy are not Linked here.


For other neuropsychological IME decisions summarized on Tort Talk, click HERE and HERE.


Wednesday, February 18, 2015

Additional Testing for Psych IME Denied by Judge Minora

In  a recent February 10, 2015 decision in the case of Trojanowicz v. Ford Motor Co., No. 2013 - CV - 223 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Feb. 10, 2015 Minora, J.), Judge Carmen D. Minora addressed issues raised by a Defendant in a motion to compel a Plaintiff to undergo additional testing requested by an Independent Psychiatric Medical Examiner in a personal injury matter arising out of a motor vehicle accident.

In this matter, the defense referred the Plaintiff to a psychiatric IME to address the Plaintiff's complaints of post-traumatic stress disorder.  The Plaintiff completed an examination with the defense expert.  The defense filed a motion to compel the Plaintiff to undergo additional psychiatric tests as part of, and to complete, the IME process.

The Plaintiff countered by arguing that the tests were not medically necessary, that the test were not identified to Plaintiff's counsel prior to the evaluation, and that the tests were not even going to be completed by the evaluating psychiatrist.

Judge Carmen D. Minora
Lackawanna County
Judge Minora essentially denied the Defendant's appeal from the decision of the Lackawanna County Special Trial Master as untimely but went on to note how he would have ruled on the merits.  As such, Judge Minora's findings noted below are arguably dicta.

Citing to Pa.R.C.P. 4010, Judge Minora noted that whether or not to allow additional examinations was a decision left to the broad discretion of the trial court.  Given that the psychiatric IME doctor wrote in his initial report that he was able to come to accurate conclusions and opinions based upon the review he had completed to date, Judge Minora found that additional testing would not be allowed.

With respect to the defense argument that there would be no prejudice to the Plaintiff in allowing for additional testing, Judge Minora pointed out that prejudice to the Plaintiff was not a part of the analysis in the determination of whether to require the Plaintiff to submit to an IME.

The court also accepted as valid the Plaintiff's objections noted above with respect to the lack of notice being provided as to the type of testing, the identity of the person performing the testing, and that the additional testing was not medically necessary.


Anyone desiring a copy of this decision may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.


I send the prevailing Plaintiff's attorney, Christine Lezinski, Esquire of the Scranton, PA law office of Lenahan & Dempsey for forwarding this decision to my attention.



Updates, Trends and Thoughts Regarding Pennsylvania Civil Litigation Law
by Northeastern Pennsylvania Insurance Defense Attorney Daniel E. Cummins
 



Friday, June 6, 2014

Attorney Presence Allowed At Independent Psychological or Neuropsychological Exam (Pa.R.C.P. 4010)

Over the past year, at least two more trial court decisions have come down upholding a Plaintiff's right to have their attorney or other representative present for an independent neuropsychological examination:

Romagnoli v. Westmoreland Reg. Hosp., No. 1514 of 2011 (C.P. Westmoreland, March 27, 2013)(Plain language of Rule 4010 supports Plaintiff's right to have counsel or representative present at independent psychological examination;  Plaintiff has right to make audio or stenographic recording of examination;  Defendant's Motion to Compel Psychological IME of Plaintiff without presence of counsel denied).


Sanderson v. Geiger, et al., No. 2011-CV-8539 (C.P. Dauphin Aug. 22, 2013)(In Order without Opinion, Court held that Plaintiff permitted to have counsel present at all aspects of independent psychological examination and vocational assessment without exception;  Plaintiff also permitted to audio record entire psychological examination, including objective testing portion).



Source: Supplement to 32nd Annual Pennsylvania Auto Insurance Law Book (2014) issued by the Pennsylvania Association for Justice.