Evidence of Compliance With Industry Safety Standards Not Admissible in Products Cases

Back in December of 2023, in the case of Sullivan v. Werner Co., No. 18 EAP 2022 (Pa. Dec. 22, 2023) (Op. by Mundy, J.) (concurring Op. by Justice Donohue) (dissenting Opinion Todd J., jointed by Brobson, J.), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that evidence of a product’s compliance with industry and governmental safety standards remains inadmissible following the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in the case of Tincher v. Omega Flex, Inc., 104 A.3d 368 (Pa. 2014).

Anyone wishing to review the decision in this case may click this LINK.

Justice Donohue's Concurring Opinion can be viewed .

Chief Justice Todd's Dissenting Opinion can be viewed HERE. 

Trial Court Judge Rules That Hills and Ridges Doctrine Does Not Apply To Falls That Occur under an Awning

In the case of Johnson v. Harris-Dent, No. 23-00,097 (C.P. Lyc. Co. July 8, 2024 Linhardt, J.), the court denied a Motion for Summary Judgment in a slip and fall case that occurred during a winter storm event.  The Plaintiff allegedly slipped on alleged black ice that was allegedly located on the top step of a homeowner's porch that was covered by an awning.

The court denied the motion based upon issues of fact. More specifically, the court noted that the Plaintiff had cited to the case of Heasley v. Carter Lumber, 843 A.2d 1274 (Pa. Super. 2004) for the proposition that the hills and ridges doctrine is not applicable where the incident occurred in an area that was covered by a roof or awning.

Judge Lindhart noted that, in the Heasley case, the Plaintiff’s slip and fall occurred while the Plaintiff was walking in a shed that had three walls, with the fourth side open, and an overhead roof with an awning extending from it. In that case, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the hills and ridges doctrine did not apply to a fall occurring inside an outdoor storage shed. 

In the Heasley case, the court reasoned that the hills and ridges doctrine was intended to protect property owners from an undue burden of ensuring that open spaces such as sidewalks and parking lots are constantly kept clear of snow and ice.  The court in Heasley found that the Defendant did not present anything that demonstrated that, keeping a structure, which is only partially open to the elements, free of snow and ice presented any burden at all, let alone an undue burden on its owners. The Heasley court also indicated that the extension of the hills and ridges doctrine to structures and/or other partially opened areas would raise many difficult questions. As such, the Pennsylvania Superior Court in the Heasley case declined to extend the application of the hills and ridges doctrine to an incident that occurred in a structure covered by a roof and/or an awning.

Judge Linhardt applied the Heasley case to this Johnson case in which the Plaintiff alleged that he fell on the top step of the Defendant’s covered porch which step was allegedly covered by an awning and on which was allegedly some black ice. Judge Linhardt noted that, under the current status of Pennsylvania law, if that allegation is proven, then it appeared that the hills and ridges doctrine would not be applicable to this litigation.

The court found that genuine issues of material fact must be resolved by the jury in this regard and that, therefore, the Motion for Summary Judgment was denied.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source of image:  Photo by Jay Wennington on www.unspash.com.

Issues of Fact On Whether Condition That Caused Slip and Fall Was Open and Obvious Results in Reversal of Entry of Summary Judgment

In its Non-Precedential decision of Robinson v. Seven Springs Mountain Resort, No. 313 WDA 2023 (Pa. Super. June 12, 2024 Bowes, J, Kunselman, J., and Murray, J.) (Op. by Bowes, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in a trip and fall matter.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff was involved in playing a disc golf (golf with a frisbee) at the time of the incident.  She slipped and fell on a steep slope that had gravel on it and sustained a fractured ankle.

The trial court granted summary judgment after noting that the natural condition at issue was known and obvious since the Plaintiff knew she was walking down a steep slope with patches of rocky and loose dirt when she fell.  The trial court had ruled that the defendant landowner did not owe any duty to protect the Plaintiff from the natural conditions of the terrain that led to the Plaintiff's fall.

On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court ruled that there were issus of fact as to whether the conditions at issue were open and obvious.  

The Court also noted that, even if the condition on the Defendant’s playing field that cause the Plaintiff’s fall was an open and obvious condition, the Defendant was not relieved of its duty of care when it had reason to expect that the invitee’s attention might be distracted.  Here, the appellate court noted that the Plaintiff's attention could have been distracted while playing disc golf.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Priscilla Du Preez on www.pexels.com.

Trial Courts Are Not Rubber Stamps When It Comes To Requests to Seal a Settlement

No Rubber Stamps

In the case of Moore v. JB Hunt Transport, Inc., No. 2024-CV-3773 (C.P. Lacka. Co. July 10, 2024 Nealon, J.), the court addressed the novel issue of a request by a Plaintiff’s attorney to seal the amount of a settlement in light to the alleged effect of that settlement on the potential settlement of companion cases.

This case arose out of a fatal motor vehicle collision.  According to the Opinion, several individuals were injured during the course of the accident. 

With regard to this request to seal the judicial record, the counsel for the settling Plaintiff noted that the parties had agreed that the records regarding the settlement should be sealed. The Plaintiff in this case also was requesting a sealing of the record in order to ensure that members of the public, who could potentially be jurors in the cases brought by the other injured parties, could be shielded from information regarding the settlement amount in this particular case. 

At the time of the argument and hearing on the issues presented, the settling Plaintiff’s attorney also argued that the public disclosure of the amount of the settling parties’ settlement could complicate the potential resolution of the claims being asserted by other claimants as a result of the subject accident.

In this Opinion, Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas reviewed the standard of review for a court faced with a Motion to Seal a Settlement in a personal injury matter.

Judge Nealon noted that to warrant the sealing of public judicial records reflecting the terms and the amount of a settlement, a party requesting the same must demonstrate that the interest in secrecy outweighs a well-settled presumption in favor of public access to judicial records. In order to satisfy a burden of proof in this regard, a party must establish that public access must be prohibited by the court in order to prevent “a clearly defined and serious injury.”

Judge Nealon noted that the sealing of court records is not a perfunctory judicial task that is automatically granted by the agreement of the parties or at the request of a party.  Rather, a sealing of court records is instead only permitted after an informed analysis of the issues presented and approval granted the court in compliance with precedent on the issue.

Here, the court found that the Plaintiff’s stated reasons in support of the request to seal the settlement did not establish the requisite “good cause” for sealing the court record to avoid a “clearly defined and serous injury.” The court also found that the Plaintiff’s stated reasons in support of its request for a sealing of the settlement did not warrant the granting of the court-sanctioned secrecy of the parties’ settlement filings and the records of the state funded judicial system.

As such, the Plaintiff’s request to seal the judicial record was denied.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Issues in Motion in Limine Deferred By Court Until Trial Must Be Formally Raised Again At Trial

In the case of Wingate v. McGrath, April Term 2019, No. 04637 (C.P. Phila. Co. March 28, 2024 Powell, S.J.), the trial court issued a Rule 1925 Opinion addressed to the Superior Court and requested the Superior Court to reverse the trial court’s previous decision to grant the Plaintiffs a new trial.  

The trial court made this request in this Opinion after the trial court revisited the issue and found that the Plaintiffs had waived their objections to the Defendant’s medical expert witness by failing to renew the issues raised in the Plaintiff’s Pre-Trial Motion In Limine until after that expert for the defense had testified at trial.

According to the Opinion, this case arose out of a motor vehicle accident matter. During discovery, the Defendant produced reports from medical expert who offered an opinion that the Plaintiff’s back pain complaints were unrelated to the accident.

Prior to trial, the Plaintiff filed a Motion In Limine to preclude the Defendant’s expert from testifying. The trial court issued an Order indicating that the motion would be decided at the time of trial. 

However, at trial, the Plaintiff did not restate the issues raised in their Motion In Limine until after the jury had heard the testimony from the Defendant’s medical expert. 

The jury entered a defense verdict.

Although the trial court had initially granted the Plaintiff a new trial after the entry of the defense verdict, in the post-trial proceedings, the trial court ruled in this Rule 1925 Opinion for the Superior Court's review that, under Pennsylvania law, where a decision on a Motion In Limine is deferred by the trial court until the time of trial, a party who presented such a motion is obligated to restate the issues raised at trial in order to have them formally addressed by the trial court.   According to the law cited by this trial court, the failure to re-raise the Motion in Limine issues in a timely fashion at trial results in a waiver of those issues. 

In this regard, the trial court cited to the Pennsylvania Superior Court decision in the case of Blumer v. Ford Motor Co., 20 A.3d 1222, 1223 (Pa. Super. 2011).

As such, in this Rule 1925 Opinion, the trial court requested the Superior Court to reverse the trial court Order that granted the Plaintiff a new trial.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert,” Law.com (June 26, 2024).

Superior Court Affirms Grant of New Trial Based On Counsel Persistently Asking Questions About Inadmissible Matters

In the Non-Precedential decision by the Pennsylvania Superior Court in the case of Lopez v. Crown Equipment Corp., No. 3146 EDA 2022 (Pa. Super. May 21, 2024 Dubow, J., McLaughlin, J. and King, J.) (Op. by Dubow, J.), the Court affirmed a trial court’s granting of a new trial to a Plaintiff after a verdict was entered for a Defendant in a products liability case.

On appeal, the Superior Court noted that the defense counsel’s persistent questions about matters that were inadmissible in this strict liability matter served to prejudice the Plaintiff, thus requiring a new trial.

The Superior Court noted that the trial court judge was in the best position to observe how a trial is being conducted and to determine whether statements by counsel or a witness could have a prejudicial effect on the jury.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this Non-Precedential decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Judge Hertzberg of Allegheny County Rules That Act 6 Reductions Need Not Be Applied to Expenses for Treatment by Out-of-State Doctor

In the case of Yurek v. Bower, No. GD18012387 (C.P. Allegh. Co. July 3, 2024 Hertzberg, J.), the trial court issued a Rule 1925 Opinion following a motor vehicle accident and, as part of the post-trial issues presented, considered whether medical bills related to treatment provided to the Plaintiff by an out-of-state doctor are subject to reduction under Act 6 of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law, 75 Pa.C.S.A. Section 1797.

According to the Opinion, following the subject accident, the Plaintiff underwent a cervical spine fusion surgery which was performed in Florida.

The case eventually went to trial and, as part of the verdict, the jury awarded $150,000.00 in past medical expenses, most of which was related to the cost of the surgical treatment that took place in Florida.

During the post-trial proceedings, one of the issues raised was the trial court’s refusal to reduce the amount of the past medical expenses award any more than down to the figure of $148,000.00.  This amount was the specific amount that was presented in evidence as to the actual cost of the surgery. 

The defense asserted that the trial court erred in denying the defense motion to mold the jury’s $150,000.00 past medical expenses award down to $9,882.00 under an application of Act 6, 75 Pa. C.S.A. §1797(a), of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law.

Section 1797 of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law allows for a recovery of medical bills at up to 110% of what Medicare would pay a provider for the same service.

According to the Opinion, at trial, Judge Hertzberg allowed the Plaintiff to introduce medical bills into evidence before they were reduced under the MVFRL.  The court noted at trial that it would allow for and consider any post-trial motions to mold any medical expenses award.   The court stated that it took this approach based upon the Superior Court’s decision in the case of Pittsburgh Neurosurgery Associates v. Danner which allowed for awards involving these types of bills to be presented at trial in full, subject to being molded in a post-trial proceeding.

In this Yurek case, the court emphasized that, during trial, the treating doctor from Florida testified that he was not licensed in Pennsylvania and that he did not perform any medical work in Pennsylvania. 

There was testimony that there were allegedly no doctors in Pittsburgh who would do the type of cervical spine fusion surgery that the Florida doctor performed on the Plaintiff in Florida. The doctor also testified that he charged $120,000.00 for performing the surgery.  An additional $28,000 was charged by the surgical center.  As such, the total expenses for the treatment performed in Florida was $148,000.

At trial, the Plaintiff also testified as to her belief that no other doctors in Pennsylvania would perform the type of surgery at issue. 

In his decision, Judge Hertzberg noted that his review of the evidence led him to conclude that, at least $148,000.00 of the $150,000.00 award of past medical expenses was related to the treatment provided by the Florida doctor. 

The judge agreed with the Plaintiff’s argument that because the Florida doctor was not a Pennsylvania licensed provider, the expenses related to the treatment provided by that out-of-state doctor was not subject to reduction under Act 6 of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law.

Judge Hertzberg reasoned that the express language of “cost containment” provision in the MVFRL, which is applicable to medical expenses in a motor vehicle accident case, “twice references medical bill amounts ‘applicable in this Commonwealth under the Medicare program.’" 

Judge Hertzberg noted that this language also signaled to him that the statute’s application was limited to only apply to Pennsylvania licensed providers.  

In so ruling, Judge Hertzberg also reviewed a regulation regarding the act that was issued by the insurance department. Those regulations, found at 31 Pa. Code §69.11 state, in pertinent part, that the cost containment or payment limitation provisions apply to care rendered by Pennsylvania licensed providers.  

As such, Judge Hertzberg used this additional analysis to find that Act 6 reductions did not apply to the care rendered by the doctor at issue in this case where the doctor at issue was not a Pennsylvania licensed provider, where the treatment did not take place in Pennsylvania, and where the treatment rendered was not available in Pennsylvania.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source: Article – “Motor Vehicle Law Doesn’t Require Reduction of Medical Bills For Procedure That Wasn’t Available in PA., Judge Rules,” By Riley Brennan of the Pennsylvania Law Weekly (July 9, 2024).