Showing posts with label Umbrella Policy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Umbrella Policy. Show all posts

Tuesday, September 15, 2026

Superior Court Finds That UIM Claim Fails Under Terms of an Umbrella Policy


In the case of Mathews v. Ace Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 638 EDA 2025 (Pa. Super. Sept. 4, 2026 Stevens, P.J.E., Stabile, J., Lane, J.) (Op. by Stevens, P.J.E.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court addressed the issue of whether an umbrella policy applied to provide underinsured (UIM) motorist benefits to a Plaintiff.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff suffered severe injuries as a result of being hit by a car while crossing the street.  The Opinion noted that the driver involved was underinsured.

According to the Opinion, there was an insurance policy issued to the Plaintiff’s employer that entitled the Plaintiff to UM/UIM benefits.However, the Plaintiff was denied any excess benefits under his employer’s umbrella policy. 

The Plaintiff brought suit for breach of contract and for a declaratory judgment on the issue of UIM coverage under the umbrella policy.

The trial court had entered judgment on the pleadings in favor of the umbrella carrier.  On appeal, the Superior Court affirmed.

The Superior Court noted that the plain and express terms of the umbrella policy, including exclusions, limited the umbrella coverage to third-party claims only.

The Superior Court rejected the Plaintiff’s efforts to argue that the policy language was ambiguous. The Plaintiff had attempted to argue that the umbrella policy contained an endorsement indicating that coverage for bodily injury would follow the terms of any underlying insurance.

However, as noted, other language in the umbrella policy specifically limited the umbrella insurance coverage to third party claims.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: Pa. Super. Blog (pasuperblog.substack.com) by Attorney Jon Bruno of Bruno Litigation, LLC in Pittsburgh, PA.

Source of image:  Jean-Phillipe Delberghe on www.unsplash.com.
 

Monday, April 8, 2019

Nonsuit in Declaratory Judgment Action on Coverage Affirmed Based On Definition of "Occurrence"


In the case of Kiely v. Phila. Contrib. Ins. Co., 2019 Pa. Super. 90 (Pa. Super. March 26, 2019 Ott, J., Dubow, J. Stevens, P.J.E.)(Op. by Dubow, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed a trial court’s entry of compulsory non-suit in favor of the carrier on a coverage question arising out of a homeowner’s policy and/or an umbrella policy. 

According to the Opinion, an insured who was covered a homeowner’s policy and an umbrella policy issued by the same carrier was sued in an underlying litigation by a former domestic employee, who asserted claims of assault and intentional infliction of emotional distress.   The insured had tendered the lawsuit to the carrier for a defense. The carrier denied coverage, asserting that the intentional torts alleged in the underlying Complaint were not “occurrences.” 

The insured then commenced this coverage litigation against the carrier seeking a declaration that the carrier was obligated to defend and indemnify the insured on the claims presented.  The insured also sought damages for bad faith.  

The coverage litigation proceeded to a trial.  At trial, the trial court permitted the insured to introduce evidence that evidence that he (the insured) lacked the mental capacity sufficient to intentionally assault the Plaintiff in the underlying matter.

The trial court entered a nonsuit in favor of the carrier after finding that the insured failed to introduce evidence of an “accident” which was required in order to trigger coverage under the policy for an “occurrence.”  

On appeal, the Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s entry of a compulsory nonsuit.   The court held that the insured’s alleged assault upon the underlying Plaintiff was not an “accident; rather, it was an intentional tort.”   Accordingly, given that the policy defined an “occurrence” as an “accident,” and given that the no accident or occurrence was alleged in the underlying personal injury Complaint, the Superior Court agreed that the carrier did not owe any duty to defend or indemnify under the policy.  

In addition to upholding the trial court’s entry of a compulsory nonsuit, the Superior Court additionally held that it was improper for the trial court to have permitted the insured to introduce evidence that the insured lacked the mental capacity to commit intentional torts.

The Superior Court noted that in a declaratory judgment action concerning insurance coverage issues, the allegations in the underlying personal injury Complaint control the analysis and that extrinsic evidence could not be admitted while the underlying lawsuit was still pending.  Simply put, in a coverage action, the essential analysis required involved comparing the allegations of the underlying Complaint to the insurance policy to determine if the coverage provisions were triggered.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney Benjamin P. Novak, Esquire of the Lancaster, Pennsylvania office of Fowler, Hirtzel, McNulty & Spaulding, LLP, for bringing this case to my attention.

Thursday, February 8, 2018

Judge Gelb Addresses Issue of Apparent First Impression Relative to Umbrella Policy

In the case of Charles v. USAA, No. 7106 - CV - 2016 (C.P. Luz. Co. March 3, 2017 Gelb, J.), Judge Lesa Gelb of the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas ruled in favor of the carrier in a declaratory judgment action filed by a Plaintiff seeking a decision regarding the applicability of a personal umbrella policy to wrongful death claims arising out of a motor vehicle accident as asserted by the children of decedent, Janice Lewis, against her husband (deceased), the owner of the policy.

According to the Opinion, the decedent, Janice Lewis, was a passenger in a vehicle driven by her husband, Kenneth Lewis, when that vehicle was involved in an accident with another vehicle.  Both Janice and Kenneth Lewis were fatally injured in the accident.

At the time of his death, Kenneth Lewis was insured by USAA  through automobile, homeowners, and personal umbrella insurance policies.  The Plaintiffs submitted various claims to USAA for consideration.

USAA agreed to tender the limits under the automobile insurance policy.

However, USAA advised that it would not extend benefits for the death of Janice Lewis under the personal umbrella policy of Kenneth Lewis.  The carrier pointed to an Exclusion in the umbrella policy for the bodily or personal injury of any insured under the policy.  The Plaintiffs argued that none of the wrongful death beneficiaries were "insureds" under the umbrella policy and that they were, therefore, not subject to the Exclusion and should be entitled to recover under that policy.

The issue came before the court on cross motions for summary judgment.

After reviewing applicable Pennsylvania law concerning the construction of insurance policy contracts as applied to the provisions at issue in this case, Judge Gelb ruled that the language of the umbrella policy, including the definition of "bodily injury" and the relevant Exclusion against recovery by insureds, when reviewed in conjunction with the nature of the Pennsylvania Wrongful Death Statute, compelled her decision to uphold the carrier's denial of coverage.

More specifically, the court noted that the covered bodily injury in this case, as per the policy provisions, is that of the decedent, Janice Lewis, who was an insured under the umbrella policy.  Therefore, under the clear and unambiguous language of the umbrella policy, the Exclusion against coverage for bodily injury incurred by an insured was applicable to preclude coverage under the facts presented.

Judge Lesa Gelb
Luzerne County
Judge Gelb also noted that, under Pennsylvania law, while a wrongful death action is not derivative of the decedent's rights, it is derivative of the decedent's injuries.  Accordingly, the court reiterated that it followed that, as the wrongful death action in this matter arose out of a bodily injury occurring to an insured, coverage for the same under the umbrella policy was precluded by the Exclusion noted.

The court also dealt with an apparent issue of first impression raised by the Plaintiffs.  The Plaintiffs alleged that the Lewis's children suffered emotional harm resulting from their mother's death, which is a recoverable element of damages pursuant to the Wrongful Death Statute, which claim allegedly should serve to trigger coverage under the umbrella policy.

However, Judge Gelb noted that the Plaintiffs did not allege any physical injury to the children from which the emotional harm allegedly manifested.  It was emphasized that the protections of the umbrella policy required a physical injury in order to trigger coverage and the only physical injury or injuries at issue in this case were those of the deceased mother, who as an insured, was excluded from coverage under the personal umbrella policy.

As such, the court granted the carrier's motion for summary judgment and denied the Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.

Anyone wishing to review this decision by Judge Gelb may click this LINK.

Tuesday, December 29, 2015

Judge Gibbons of Lackawanna County Reaffirms That MVFRL Does Not Apply to Excess or Umbrella Policies

In his recent Opinion in the case of Ranocchia v. Erie Insurance Exchange, No. 2014-CV-4555 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Nov. 25, 2015 Gibbons, J.), Judge James A. Gibbons of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas granted summary judgment in favor of Erie Insurance in a declaratory judgment matter on the issue of whether the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law applies to and provides underinsured motorists benefits under and excess insurance policy containing both and expressed exclusion of such UIM benefits and legally deficient waivers of UIM benefits.  

In this matter, the Defendant carrier asserted that the MVFRL simply does not apply to excess insurance policies.   The Defendant carrier also asserted that, even if the Pennsylvania law does allow for UIM benefits under an excess liability policy, a provision in the excess policy expressly excluding UIM benefits prevents the Plaintiff from recovering any UIM benefits under that policy.  

The Plaintiffs countered with an argument that the waivers of UIM coverage provided by the Defendant relative to the excess liability policy created and ambiguity thereby requiring a reformation of the policy.  Stated otherwise, the Plaintiffs asserted that UIM benefits should be considered to be a part of the excess liability policy until waivers of UIM coverage were secured.  The Plaintiffs asserted that, because the waivers in this matter were invalid, the Plaintiffs were entitled to recover UIM benefits under the excess liability policy.  

In his decision, Judge Gibbons ruled that, while this precise issue “[w]hile this precise issue has never been addressed by our appellate courts, we are persuaded by existing case law regarding the MVFRL’s inapplicability to excess insurance policies that Defendants are entitled to summary as a matter of law.”  

In his Opinion, Judge Gibbons primarily rested his decision on the settled law that the MVFRL does not apply to excess or umbrella policies.  As such, there are no UIM requirements applicable to excess or umbrella policies.  

Where the excess policy, as here, clearly provided that it did not apply to UIM coverage, the inclusion of UIM rejection forms, although inconsistent with the expressed language of the policy indicating that there was no UIM coverage, did not create an ambiguity.   Accordingly, the court granted the Defendant carrier’s Motion for Summary Judgment.  

Anyone desiring a copy of Judge Gibbons' decision may click this LINK.

The Plaintiff has filed a Notice of Appeal from this decision.