Showing posts with label MCARE Act. Show all posts
Showing posts with label MCARE Act. Show all posts

Tuesday, April 14, 2026

Superior Court Addresses Discoverability of Internal Post-Incident Investigative Reports in Medical Malpractice Case


In the case of Griffin v. The Bryn Mawr Hospital, No. 3361 EDA 2024, 2026 Pa. Super. 53 (Pa. Super. March 19, 2026 Bowes, J., Murray, J., and Beck, J.) (Op. by Beck, J.) (Concurring and Dissenting Op. by Murray, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court addressed whether four internal documents created by the medical providers after the hospital allegedly mishandled fetal remains were protected from disclosure under Pennsylvania’s Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error Act (MCARE) and the Federal Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act.

According to the Opinion, the case arose out of a lawsuit filed by parents who alleged that the hospital mistakenly cremated the placenta instead of their fetus and later admitted to a “mix up.”

During discovery, the hospital withheld four internal reports tied to its investigation. The hospital asserted that these documents were privileged patient-safety materials generated as part of its compliance and internal review processes.

In its Opinion, the court addressed how far hospitals can shield internal investigation documents from discovery under the above-referenced state and federal patient-safety laws.

The Superior Court majority ruled that the documents were not protected under MCARE. The court found that the MCARE statute applied only to events involving direct patient care and not post-treatment conduct. The court here found that the allegations in this case did not implicate any medical treatment issues.

With regards to the application of the federal law, the federal law under the PSQIA, this court entered a split decision. The court held that three of the documents at issue were shielded under the broader scope of the PSQIA law because they were created as part of the hospital’s internal patient safety evaluation system.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of the Majority's decision may click this LINK.

Judge Murray's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion can be viewed HERE.


Source: Article – “Pa. Superior Court Splits On MCARE Patient-Safety Privilege Case,” By Tristin Hoffman of The Legal Intelligencer (March 25, 2026).


Source of image:  Photo by RDNE Stock Project on www.pexels.com.

Thursday, January 22, 2026

Superior Court Addresses Statutory Privilege Related to Patient Safety Reports In Med Mal Cases


In the case of Boyle v. Mainline Health, Inc., No. 2454 EDA 2023 (Pa. Super. Sept. 10, 2025 Lazarus, P.J., King, J., and Lane, J.) (Op. by King, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court ruled that a failure to provide a Patient Safety Report (PSRS) to the hospital’s Patient Safety Committee or governing board meant that the hospital could not rely upon the statutory privilege under the Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error Act (MCARE). 

The court otherwise ruled that the creation of other records as part of a patient safety evaluation system did trigger the privilege under the Patient Safety and Healthcare Quality Improvement Act (PSQIA). As such, the discovery Order of the trial court was affirmed in part and reversed in part.

This matter arose out of a medical malpractice action in which the Plaintiff’s alleged that there child suffered birth injuries. During the discovery, the Plaintiffs sought documents related to the investigation of the baby’s delivery. 

In response, the Defendants produced a privilege log identifying four (4) responsive documents, the Patient Safety Occurrence Worksheet, the Situation Background Assessment/Recommendations, the Patient Safety Reporting System, and the Potential Compensible Event Report. The Defendants asserted that these documents were privileged under the MCARE Act and the PSQIA. 

The Plaintiff responded with a Motion to Compel.

After the trial court granted the Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel, the case went up on appeal. As noted, the Superior Court affirmed in part and reversed in part.  The Superior Court found that the Defendants did not meet their burden of establishing the PSRS report arose out of a matter reviewed by a patient safety committed or governing board pursuant to their Section 311(b) MCARE Act responsibilities.  As such, the Defendants were required to disclose the PSRS report.

The appellate court also reversed the portion of the trial court's Order finding that the Defendants failed to establish that the PSQIA privilege applied to certain other documents.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

The Concurring/Dissenting Opinion by Judge Lane can be viewed HERE.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert, www.Law.com (Sept. 30, 2025).


Source of image:  Photo by Thirdman on www.pexels.com

Friday, September 26, 2025

Superior Court Addresses Discoverability of Hospital Patient Safety Review Records


In the case of Boyle v. Main Line Health, Inc., No. 2454 EDA 2023 (Pa. Super. Aug. 10, 2025 King, J., Lazarus, J., and Lane, J.) (Op. by King, J.) (Lane, J. concurring and dissenting), the appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part a trial court discovery Order relative to the discoverability of hospital patient safety review records in a medical malpractice action.

The court noted that discovery Orders involving claims of privilege are immediately appealable a collateral Orders.

The Superior Court noted that hospital patient safety review records that are actually used to make MCARE mandatory reports are protected from disclosure in litigation by the Act.

In this case, the Defendant hospital had an MCARE patient safety plan and a patient safety officer. The MCARE safety patient plan established a patient safety committee pursuant to MCARE and also set forth requirements for both internal and external reporting.

The Superior Court noted that MCARE confidentiality extends to all documents, materials, or information solely prepared or created for the purpose of reporting compliance.

However, the court noted that, without evidence that the event at issue was actually submitted to a patient safety committee or governing board, the MCARE privilege cannot be established. 

The court noted that a general assertion of a particular privilege as to all documents is sufficient to preserve the privilege as to any portion of the documents.

The court also noted that, under the federal Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act privilege, “patient safety work product” is not subject to state-law discovery. The court noted that documents produced solely in accordance with the Patient Safety Evaluation System and reported to the patient safety organization are protected under the PSQIA.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by Judge Lane can be reviewed HERE.


I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Wednesday, April 2, 2025

Medical Battery Claim Dismissed From Medical Malpractice Case


In the case of Herr v. Myers, No. 30007 of 2023, C.A. (C.P. Lawr. Co. Dec. 4, 2024 Hodge, J.), the court sustained various Preliminary Objections asserted by medical malpractice Defendants.

In this case, the Plaintiff sued certain medical providers under a claim of medical battery arising from post-surgical home health care. According to the Plaintiff, a registered nurse removed his post-surgical wound vac contrary to the instructions of his physicians. The Plaintiff alleged that this removal of the post-surgical wound vac caused complications that required additional treatment and surgery.

The Plaintiff sued the registered nurse and her employer for negligence in medical battery. The Defendants responded with Preliminary Objections, asserting in part, that the Plaintiff’s claims for medical battery was legally insufficient because the Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error Act (MCARE Act) did not provide a cause of action for medical battery against nurses, who are not responsible for obtaining informed consent. The Defendants also objected to the Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages.

The court agreed that a nurse is excluded from the definition of a “healthcare provider” who must obtain a patient’s informed consent under both the common law and the MCARE Act.

However, the court noted that the removal of a wound vac did not constitute a surgical procedure and that the wound vac was not classified as a surgical device.

The court also noted that the Defendant healthcare provider who removed the wound vac was a registered nurse rather than a physician or a surgeon and that the registered nurse was, therefore, not required to obtain informed consent when providing routine medical treatment.

Accordingly, the court sustained the Defendants’ Preliminary Objections regarding Plaintiff’s claim for medical battery and struck this claim from the Complaint.

The court also found that the Plaintiff’s claims for punitive damages were legal insufficient as the Plaintiff’s Complaint only stated facts sufficient to assert a claim of negligence. The court found that the alleged facts were not sufficient to demonstrate a level of recklessness necessary to support an award of punitive damages. As such, the punitive damages claims was also stricken.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (March 6, 2025).

Wednesday, October 18, 2023

Superior Court Addresses Discoverability of Root Cause Analysis Documents in a Medical Malpractice Case


In the case of Ford-Bey v. Professional Anesthesia Services, No. 162 EDA 2022 (Pa. Super. Sept. 12, 2023 King, J., Sullivan, J., and Stevens, P.J.E.) (Op. by Sullivan, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed a trial court’s discovery Order requiring a hospital to produce documents to the Plaintiff in a medical malpractice action.

According to the Opinion, this medical malpractice matter arose out of complications following a wrist surgery. The Plaintiff’s decedent eventually passed away.

During discovery, the Plaintiff requested from the hospital all data and documents from a root cause analysis that was completed following this treatment. The hospital objected based on privilege and the Plaintiff moved to strike the objections.

The hospital asserted that the materials from the root cause analysis arose out of the hospital’s performance of its MCARE obligations and that §311(a) of MCARE protected such materials from disclosures in a civil lawsuit. In support of its claim of confidentiality, the hospital provided the trial court with a copy of its Sentinel Event Policy for review. The policy established the procedures for the hospital relative to the reporting of a “Sentinel Event” and provides that the hospital will conduct a root cause analysis to determine the basic, causal factors that led to the event.  The purpose of the root cause analysis was to result in an action or improvement plan and may also result in corrective actions managed through the hospital officials.

After a review of the matter, the trial court struck the hospital’s objections and ordered the hospital to produce certain documents related to the root cause analysis that was completed. The hospital then appealed.

On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed.

Initially, the court reviewed whether it had jurisdiction to decide this appeal. The court decided that it could address the merits of the claims presented.

Relative to the discoverability of the documents at issue, the court noted that Pennsylvania law imposes a shifting burden of proof in disputes when deciding whether to compel the disclosures or materials over a claim of any privilege. 

More specifically, a party asserting a privilege must initially produce facts to properly invoke the privilege. Once the privilege is properly invoked, the parties seeking disclosure bears the burden of showing that the disclosures should be compelled either because the privilege has been waived or because an exception to the privilege applies. If the party asserting the privilege produces insufficient facts to invoke the privilege, then the burden will not shift to the party seeking disclosure.

Here, it was the hospital’s claim that the trial court erred in compelling the disclosure because the evidence from its policy and the depositions of the hospital officials established that MCARE protected the documents at issue relative to the root cause analysis investigation of the Plaintiff’s treatment. The hospital argued that §311(a) confidentiality provision only requires that documents, materials, or information created or prepared by a hospital official arise out of a Patient Safety Committee’s or a Governing Board’s duties to review matters under §310(b) of the MCARE Act. The hospital asserted that the documents at issue were a manifestation of information that was solely prepared or created for the purpose of compliance with the MCARE Act.

In affirming the trial court’s rejection of the hospital’s claim of privilege, the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s reliance on the Opinion of Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas in the case of Venosh v. Henzes, 31 Pa. D.&C. 5th 411, 2013 WL 9593953 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Nealon, J.), aff’d, 105 A.3d 788 (Pa. Super. 2014) (Unpublished Memorandum).

In finding that §311(a) did not protect the hospital’s notes from disclosure in this matter, the Superior Court found in this Ford-Bey case that the Sentinel Event Policy relied upon by the hospital was not an implementation of the investigation or reporting requirements of MCARE. The court noted that the hospital’s policy did not even refer to MCARE and did not require the hospital’s Patient Safety Committee to receive reports from an investigation. Moreover, the hospital’s policy only called for the hospital’s Governing Board’s involvement in only limited circumstances.

The trial court in this matter additionally emphasized that the hospital did not establish that its Patient Safety Committee or Governing Board had in fact reviewed the documents from the root cause analysis in this matter.

The appellate court, again citing Venosh, concluded that, absent proof that a Patient Safety Committee or a Governing Board review the notes at issue, the confidentiality provisions of §311(a) did not apply.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court concurred with the trial court’s conclusion that §311(a) did not protect the hospital from having to disclose the notes at issue. The appellate court agreed that the hospital failed to produce evidence to demonstrate that the hospital official solely prepared or created her notes for the purpose of complying with MCARE. The court agreed with the trial court that the hospital did not present any clear evidence that the Sentinel event’s policy implemented the special requirement of an MCARE-required safety plan or that the Department of Health approved the Sentinel event policy as an MCARE-required safety plan.

In the end, the appellate court found no error of law or abuse of discretion in the trial court’s ruling that the hospital’s Sentinel event policy was not an implementation of the investigation or reporting requirements of MCARE or the trial court’s decision that the hospital was required to produce the documents in question in discovery.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Wednesday, January 11, 2023

Superior Court Analyzes Discoverability of Peer Review Documents in Medical Malpractice Case


In the case of Sanders v. Children’s Hosp. of Phila., No. 646 EDA 2021 (Pa. Super. Nov. 22, 2022 Bowes, J., McLaughlin, J., and Stabile, J.) (Op. by Bowes, J.) (McLaughlin, J., concurring/dissenting), the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed in part and reversed in part a trial court’s decision relative to a Defendant hospital’s challenges on alleged privileged documents in a Plaintiff’s medical malpractice wrongful death and survival action. The appellate court found that most of the documents and reports at issue were protected from discovery by the Peer Review Protection Act or the Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error Act (MCARE Act).

According to the Opinion, the court involved twenty three (23) infants at the hospital who had allegedly contracted an adeno-virus in the hospital’s NICU. Testing allegedly revealed the presence of the virus on equipment used for an eye exam and the virus was allegedly transmitted to patients by doctors touching the equipment and then touching the patients.

A doctor who led the investigation into the matter reported to the Patient Safety Committee and held “safety huddles” using powerpoint presentations with members of the Infection Prevention and Control Department and the NICU doctors and nurses. Several conferences were also held by the Defendant medical providers as a result of which a root cause analysis report was created. The investigating doctor also published an abstract and an article about the method of transmission.

The Plaintiff sought documents at issue in discovery.

On appeal, the court ruled that certain documents were admissible and certain documents were privileged. In the opinion, the court provided a nice overview of the application of the Peer Review Protection Act and the Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error Act.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by Judge McLaughlin can be viewed HERE.


Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions.” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (Dec. 13, 2022).  I also send thanks to Attorney Peter Faben of Lancaster, PA for bringing this case to my attention as well.


UPDATE:  In more recent developments in this matter, the Plaintiff filed a Motion for re-argument  en banc, which was granted, causing the above initial decision to be withdrawn.  Thereafter, the case was resolved prior to the on en banc arguments.  As such, the case was concluded without any decision from the full court.  

Tuesday, December 27, 2022

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Addresses Tolling Provision Found in MCARE Act


The Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed MCARE’s tolling provision recently in the case of Reibenstein v. Barrax, No. 32 MAP 2021 (Pa. Dec. 12, 2022) (Op. by Wecht, J.) (Sallie, Mundy, J. and Dougherty, J., concurring/dissenting).

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff in this medical malpractice action had brought her claims against the Defendant after the two (2) year statute of limitations had expired.

The court noted that the Plaintiff’s death certificate indisputably and correctly noted the medical cause of the decedent’s death.

In this decision, the court made a distinction between a reference to a decedent's manner of death and a decedent's cause of death.  In the context of the operation of the statute of limitations as stated under the MCARE Act, the court noted that the issue involved the legal cause of death and the medical cause of death.

The Court noted that MCARE provides a two year statute of limitations in death actions with the statute beginning to run at the time of the decedent's death.  The Act provides that the statute of limitations will be tolled where there is an affirmative misrepresentation or fraudulent concealment of the cause of death.    

Here, the Plaintiff brought their claims against one of the medical defendants after the two year period had run.  The Court noted that the decedent's death certificate undisputedly and correctly noted the medical cause of the decedent's death.

The trial court had ruled that the phrase “cause of death” referred specifically and only to the direct medical cause of death.  Accordingly, the trial court granted summary judgment to the Defendant doctor under §513(d) of the Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error Act (MCARE Act).

The Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed the trial court decision and interpreted the “cause of death” on the death certificate more broadly to cover considerations associated with the manner of death, that is, the legal cause.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the decision by the Superior Court and held that MCARE’s tolling provision could not support the breadth of the reading suggested by the Pennsylvania Superior Court.

The court in this matter essentially ruled that the reference to the “cause of death” refers only to the medical meaning of the phrase and not the legal interpretation.

This decision is otherwise notable in that Pennsylvania Supreme Court majority determined that the tolling provision under the MCARE Act for instances when the decedent’s cause of death has been allegedly concealed refers only to the medical cause of death.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of the Majority Opinion by Justice Wecht in this decision may click this LINK.

The Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by Justice Dougherty may be viewed HERE.

The Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by Justice Sallie Mundy may be viewed HERE.


Source of image:  Photo by Manasvita on Unsplash.com.

Monday, December 19, 2022

Court Rules That Peer Review Documents Sought In Medical Malpractice Action are Discoverable


In the case of Lahr v. Young, No. 2021-C-0010 (C.P. Leh. Co. Oct. 3, 2022 Caffrey, J.), the court ruled that patient safety reports that the Plaintiff sought in discover from the Defendants in this medical malpractice action were solely prepared for compliance with the Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error Act reporting requirements. 

The court noted that the Peer Review Protection Act grants qualified immunity for healthcare providers participating in a peer review process and establishes an evidentiary privilege applicable to peer review proceedings to protect the process which is designed to improve the practice of medicine.

However, the court noted that these documents were not immune from discovery because they did not arise out of matters reviewed by a patient safety committee.  It was emphasized that the documents at issue consisted of information that was otherwise available from original sources.  As such, the court vacated a prior Order and issued a new Order granting discovery.

The court granted this Motion after an in-camera review of the documents at issue.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions.” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (Dec. 6, 2022).


Source of image:  National Cancer Institute on www.unsplash.com.

Friday, September 9, 2022

Patient Safety Reports Ruled Admissible in Medical Malpractice Case

In the case of Lahr v. Young, No. 2021-C-0010 (C.P. Lehigh Co. June 17, 2022 Caffrey, J.), the Court ruled that Defendants failed to demonstrate the certain patient safety reports generated by the medical providers while Plaintiff was in hospital to give birth were immune from discovery in this medical malpractice suit under either the Peer Review Protection Act or the privilege afforded by the Medical Care Availability and Reduction Error Act. The court granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel.

Anyone wishing to review this decision, may click this LINK


Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions.” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (Aug. 30, 2022).

Source of images: www.pexels.com.

Tuesday, June 14, 2022

Trial Court Rules in Favor of Discoverability in Med Mal Case of Notes Made By Patient Safety Director


In the case of Ford-Bey v. Professional Anesthesia Services North America, LLC, No. 2017-Civil-02996 (C.P. Montg. Co. March 23, 2022 Saltz, J.), the court found, in a medical malpractice action, that the notes made by a hospital employee were not protected by the confidentiality provisions of the medical care availability and reduction of error (MCARE) Act because the notes were not made for the sole purpose for complying with the patient safety reporting requirements of the MCARE Act.

According to the Opinion, this was a medical malpractice case arising from the death of the decedent after surgery.

The Defendant hospital objected to the Plaintiff’s discovery requests for notes made by the patient safety director that were prepared during a root cause analysis of the incident.

The court granted the discovery requests and ordered that the documents be produced. The hospital filed an appeal and the court issued this Rule 1925 Opinion.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions.” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (May 3, 2022).


Source of image:  Photo by National Cancer Institute on www.unsplash.com.






Thursday, September 30, 2021

Peer Review Privilege for Hospital's Documents Reviewed


In the case of Gill v. Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia, No. 180900385 (C.P. Phila. Co. July 19, 2021 Foglietta, J.), the court addressed a Defendant hospital’s appeal of its Discovery Order granting the Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike the hospital’s privilege objections related to hospital documents and powerpoint presentations that were created following an outbreak of a virus in the neonatal intensive care unit.

The Defendants argued that the Peer Review Protection Act and the Medical Care and Availability and Reduction of Error (MCARE) Act served to protect from discovery the documents that the Plaintiff had requested in discovery.

In this Rule 1925 Opinion issued by the trial court, the trial court disagreed with the Defendant’s arguments.

The trial court noted that the creation date and the content of the hospital’s documents at issue indicated that they were not protected by the peer review privilege. The court also noted that the hospital had already disclosed some of the information at issue to third parties, which served to waive any claimed privilege.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions.” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (Sept. 7, 2021).


Source of image:  Photo by National Cancer Institute on Unsplash.com.

Friday, May 7, 2021

Motion to Reinstate Punitive Damages in a Med Mal Case on the Eve of Trial Denied



In the case of Keyes v. Abington Manor, No. 16-CV-3024 (C.P. Lacka. Co. March 26, 2021 Nealon, J.), the court issued a detailed Order deciding a Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend a Complaint in order to reinstate a claim for punitive damages in this medical professional liability action which was scheduled to commence trial ten (10) days after the motion was filed.

The case involved claims of professional negligence against a skilled nursing facility.

Earlier in the same case, the same court (but different judge) had sustained Preliminary Objections to the Plaintiff’s claims for punitive damages. However, in that Court Order it was indicated that, if after the completion of discovery there was evidence that warranted punitive damages, the Plaintiff could file a motion to amend the Complaint to include such claims.

After reviewing the law of Pennsylvania as well as the MCARE Act regarding punitive damages, the court noted that the Defendants would have to be chargeable with willful, wanton, or reckless conduct in order for punitive damages to apply. After reviewing the record before the court, the court did not find such evidence to support these types of claims.

As the court found that the record did not contain sufficient evidence to demonstrate a triable issue in order to submit the punitive damages claim to a jury, the Plaintiff’s Motion seeking to amend the Complaint to reinstate claims for punitive damages was denied.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Monday, April 26, 2021

Judge Terrence R. Nealon Addresses Claims of Recklessness Under MCARE Act


In the case of Doughitt v. Saber Health Care Group, LLC, No. 20-CV-3136 (C.P. Lacka. Co. April 22, 2021 Nealon, J.), the court addressed issues regarding claims of punitive damages in a medical malpractice action involving Wrongful Death and Survival claims.

This case was brought by an estate and daughter of a former nursing home resident under a medical professional liability claim alleging corporate and individual negligence and recklessness by the Defendants which allegedly resulted in the nursing home resident’s death.

In the Complaint, the Plaintiff confirmed that she was seeking damages under the Wrongful Death Act and the Survival Act, including demands for compensatory and punitive damages.

The Defendants filed Preliminary Objections in the nature of a demurrer seeking to strike the claims for punitive damages on the grounds that those claims were insufficient as a matter of law under §505(a) of the medical care availability and reduction of error (MCARE) Act, 40 P.S. §1303.505(a).

Judge Nealon noted that §505(a) of the MCARE Act is consistent with other Pennsylvania case law governing punitive damages in that the Act provides that punitive damages are recoverable for a healthcare provider’s “willful or wanton conduct or reckless indifference to the rights of others.”

Reiterating his previous rationale as stated in other decisions regarding claims of recklessness, Judge Nealon noted that, although wanton and willful misconduct and recklessness are considered under the law to be conditions of the mind such that they may be averred generally pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 1019(b), the court found that the Plaintiff in this matter still alleged sufficient facts in any event that would factually support a finding of wanton or reckless indifference by the Defendant’s in any event.

More specifically, the court noted that the Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant’s intentionally increased a number of infirm residents with complex health conditions in order to increase their governmental reimbursements, knowingly establish staffing levels that were insufficient, repeatedly ignored staff reports regarding alleged alarming increases in infections and illnesses within the facility, and other allegations.

Judge Nealon went on to note that, generally speaking, in a Survival action, the decedent’s estate is permitted to pursue claims that the decedent could have asserted if he or she had lived. In contrast, the Wrongful Death action is brought by specified relatives of the decedent to compensate those surviving family members for the losses that they have sustained as a result of the decedent’s death.

The court noted that, consequently, the decedent’s estate may recover punitive damages in a Survival action if the decedent could have recovered those types of damages had he or she survived. However, under Pennsylvania, punitive damages are not recoverable in a Wrongful Death action.

As such, the court sustained the Defendant’s demurrer to the punitive damages claims only with respect to the Plaintiff’s punitive damages claims asserted in the Wrongful Death action. The Defendant’s demurrer was overruled in all other respects.


Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Friday, January 15, 2021

Admissibility of Similar Expert Opinions in a Medical Malpractice Case



In the case of Snyder v. Scranton Hospital Company, LLC, No. 19-CV-83 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Dec. 14, 2020 Nealon, J.), Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas addressed the admissibility of the expert testimony in a medical malpractice case. 

This matter arises out of a malpractice action during which the Plaintiff alleges that he suffered permanent left ulnar damage secondary to stretching or compression trauma caused by his improper positioning and inadequate monitoring during the course of a surgery.

In support of his claims, the Plaintiff has produced expert reports from an anesthesiologist, a rheumatologist, and a nurse with regards to the relevant standards of care and medical causation, along with additional expert reports from orthopedic surgeons concerning causation and the allegedly resulting damages.

The Defendants filed a Motion In Limine seeking to limit the expert testimony that the Plaintiff intended to present. More specifically, the Defendant sought to preclude any testimony by the rheumatology expert with regards to the standard of care and causation issues. The Defendants asserted that this expert should not be permitted to testify as he is not qualified to offer opinions on the standard of care and causation under the mandates of the MCARE Act, that the expert’s opinions would be cumulative in light of the opinions being offered by the Plaintiff’s other experts, and given that the rheumatologist expert's testimony was impermissibly speculative.

After his review of the record and the expert reports, Judge Nealon found that the rheumatologist expert offered by the Plaintiff did not satisfy the standard of care familiarity, same subspeciality, and similar approved board-certification requirements set forth in §512(c) of the MCARE Act, or the “related field of medicine” criteria in §512(e) of that Act, in order to be determined to be competent to address the standard of care under the facts of this case.

However, the court also found that the rheumatologist expert offered by the Plaintiff was sufficiently qualified under §512(a)(b) of the Act in order to testify as to the medical causation.

The court additionally noted that, since the causation opinions offered by the various different types of experts presented by the Plaintiff contained discrete reasoning offered by different types of medical specialists addressing the issue of causation from distinct clinical perspectives, the causation testimony of these different experts was found to be corroborative, rather than needlessly cumulative.

The court additionally found that the defense challenges to the rheumatologist's testimony based upon Pa. R.E. 703 and Pa. R.C.P. 207.1 under an argument that the testimony was impermissibly speculative was devoid of merit. The court noted that the rheumatologist’s opinions were based upon medical reports, depositions, and other evidence in the record. It was also noted that the expert did not rely upon novel scientific evidence or methodology that has not been accepted in the field of rheumatology.

As such, the court ruled that the rheumatologist would not be allowed to testify as to the applicable standard of care, but would be allowed to testify on the causation issues.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Monday, August 10, 2020

Pennsylvania Superior Court Addresses Tolling Provision of MCARE Act



In the case of Reibenstein v. Barax, No. 1624 (M.D.A. 2019 (Pa. Super. July 30, 2020 Olson, J., Dubow, J. and McLaughlin, J.) (Op. by McLaughlin, J.), the court referred the matter back to the trial court relative to a summary judgment motion on the statute of limitations in a medical malpractice case. 

The court noted that the Medical Care Availability and Reduction Error Act (“MCARE”) provides a statute of limitations that requires a Plaintiff to commence a wrongful death or survival action asserting a medical professional liability claim within two (2) years after the death of the Claimant. See 40 Pa. C.S.A. 1303.513(d). 

However, the Pennsylvania Superior Court also noted that the statute of limitations under this provision is subject to an equitable tolling for “affirmative misrepresentation or fraudulent concealment of the cause of death.” See 40 Pa. C.S.A. 1303.513(d).

The Pennsylvania Superior Court held that “affirmative misrepresentation or fraudulent concealment of the cause of death” means affirmative misrepresentations about or fraudulent concealment of conduct the Plaintiff alleges led to the decedent’s death. 

The court referred this matter back to the trial court for further proceedings on whether there was a fraudulent concealment or affirmative misrepresentation of an act by the medical Defendant at issue related to the Claimant’s death. 

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Friday, April 17, 2020

Court Addresses Evidentiary Privileges Under MCARE Act In Med Mal Case



In the case of DelGuercio v. Tio, No. 19-CV-3604 (C.P. Lacka. Co. March 26, 2020 Nealon, J.), the court issued a Rule 1925(a) Order in support of its decision directing a Defendant hospital in this medical malpractice action to submit two (2) event reports and a patient safety report for an in camera review in order to facilitate a determination as to whether those materials are protected from discovery by the Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005 and the Peer Review Protection Act of the Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error Act (MCARE). 

The court noted that the hospital, as the party asserting evidentiary privileges under these Acts, had the burden of establishing that the discovery of the reports at issue was prohibited by those statutes. The court noted that the limited submissions by the Defendant hospital raised a series of unanswered questions regarding the applicability of the claimed privileges. 

As such, rather than grant the Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel, the court directed the hospital to submit the disputed reports for an in camera review in an effort to resolve the unsettled issues. 

Rather than complying with this directive, the Defendant hospital filed an appeal and the court issued this Rule 1925 Opinion in support of its finding that it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to have ordered the in camera review under the circumstances.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this case may click this LINK.

Monday, February 10, 2020

Justice Wecht Rips Pennsylvania Supreme Majority in His Dissent on Majority's Ruling Not To Reconsider Its Flawed MCARE Decision


In its recent decision in the case of Yanakos v. UPMC, No. 10 WAP 2018 (Pa. Jan. 31, 2020), a majority of Justices on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declined to reconsider its original decision in this case from late last year in which the Court struck down the statute of repose under MCARE thereby allowing a wider avenue of recovery for Plaintiffs. The decision struck down a seven year statute of limitations for a certain class of medical malpractice cases.

In his Dissent, Justice Wecht expressed his ardent disagreement with the majority's refusal to reconsider its decision and wrote that “[t]he filing before us illustrates that the decision in Yanakos was not just incorrect, but was confused as well. Confused about the law. Confused about procedure. Confused about insurance. Confused about the questions presented.”

Justice Wecht noted that not only did the appeal take on a life of its own after it reached the Pennsylvania Supreme Court but "this [Pennsylvania Supreme] breathed new life into it" by expanding the issue before the Court. 

This expansion of the issue by the Justices in the majority enabled those Justices to address more expansive issues and issue a decision of a wider scope on matters that, in the words of Justice Wecht's Dissent, the Plaintiff "had never argued and that the lower courts had never considered."

Justice Wecht also indicated that he wanted a reconsideration because the decision by the majority “ignored precedent, misinterpreted the remedies clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution, and incorrectly adopted (and then misapplied) the intermediate scrutiny test.” 

Justice Wecht noted that that the American Medical Association, the National Federation of Independent Business, the Pennsylvania Medical Society and even the majority caucuses in both the Pennsylvania House and Senate had joined the petition for reconsideration to no avail.

Justice Wecht went on to write, “Reargument is a fail-safe. It gives an appellate court the opportunity to admit that it made a mistake. This court should have taken advantage of that opportunity today.” For these reasons, Justice Wecht dissented from the decision by the majority to preserve their previous decision by denying any reconsideration of the issue.

The majority's refusal to allow for a reconsideration to be heard means that MCARE's statute of repose is no longer valid.

You can read Justice Wecht's compelling Dissenting Opinion on the majority's decision in Yanakos to refuse to allow for a reconsideration of its previous decision HERE. 

The Tort Talk post on the original Opinion previously issued by the Supreme Court in Yanakos, along with Justice Wecht's Dissenting Opinion to that original decision can be viewed HERE.

Source: "Pa. Justices Refuse to Reconsider Statute of Repose Ruling, Sparking Stinging Dissent From Wecht" by Max Mitchell of the Pennsylvania Law Weekly (Feb. 6, 2020).

Tuesday, January 7, 2020

Punitive Damages Claim Allowed to Proceed Against Medical Corporation in Med Mal Case



In the case of Garvey v. Adamo, No. 19-CV-1893 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Dec. 17, 2019 Nealon, J.), the court addressed the issue of vicarious liability of a healthcare provider for punitive damages. 

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff in this matter instituted a medical malpractice action against his former treating physician, that doctor’s medical partners, and their professional corporation, under allegations that the doctor prescribed opioids to the Plaintiff in excessive amounts, causing the Plaintiff to become drug-dependent and require treatment for an opioid addiction. 

The Plaintiff alleged in the Complaint that the doctor’s professional corporation and his partners knew, or had reason to know, of the doctor’s improper administration of opioids, which actually cumulated in the doctor’s guilty plea in a criminal case. 

Before the court were Preliminary Objections filed by the professional corporation seeking to dismiss the punitive damages claim pursuant to §505(b) of the Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error (MCARE) Act. 

Judge Nealon ruled that, under §505(c) of the MCARE Act, a healthcare provider may be vicarious liability for punitive damages only if it was aware of the agent’s reckless conduct and allowed it to occur. 

Judge Nealon wrote, as he has done in the cases involving motor vehicle accidents that, although recklessness is a condition on the mind that may be averred generally under Pa. R.C.P. 1019(b), in this case the Plaintiff had alleged that the professional corporation “had actual notice” of its doctor’s unconscionable administration of opioids and still “allowed the conduct” by the doctor to continue. Based on these allegations, the court overruled the corporation’s demurrer to the punitive damages claim. 

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney Jonathan Comitz of the Wilkes-Barre, PA law firm of Comitz Law Firm, LLC for bringing this case to my attention. 

Monday, December 30, 2019

THE 2019 TORT TALK TOP TEN



Here is the Tenth Annual 2019 Tort Talk Top Ten--an annual listing of notable cases and important trends in Pennsylvania civil litigation law over the past year or so as highlighted in Tort Talk blog posts.

If you wish to view the actual Tort Talk post on any of the following cases or topics, or the actual Opinion, please go to TortTalk.com and type the name of the Plaintiff in the case in the Search Box in the upper right hand corner of the blog.  There should be a Link to the actual Opinion within the blog post itself.


10. Palmiter v. Commonwealth Health Systems, Inc., No. 19-CV-1315 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Nov. 22, 2019 Nealon, J.)


In a case of first impression, Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas addressed the issue of whether the Medical Marijuana Act creates an implied private cause of action or a medical assistant who was terminated by her health care employers for prescribed use of medical marijuana while not working in her place of employment. The court recognized such a cause of action and allowed the claim to proceed.


9. Lack of Appellate Guidance on Post-Koken Issues Continues




Despite the passage of well over a decade of time since the Koken decision was handed down in 2005, there is still a continuing trend of a lack of any concrete appellate guidance on any of the many novel issues created by this form of litigation from the pleadings stage to trial. The lack of appellate guidance is due to the fact that most of the cases in this area of law continue to be resolved by one form of ADR or another. The hope remains that those cases that do go up the appellate ladder will result in published decisions by the Superior Court and grantings of allocatur by the Supreme Court.

Here is a quick LINK to the Post-Koken Scorecard on Tort Talk.


8. Yanakos v. UPMC, No. 10 WAP 2018 (Pa. Oct. 31, 2019)


The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in a 4-3 decision, ruled in favor of the Plaintiff’s argument that MCARE's statute of repose was unconstitutional. The rationale of the majority Opinion in Yanakos striking down the statute of repose under the MCARE Act was that the statute of repose was not substantially related to a governmental interest as was necessary to uphold the statute. The Court also found that the statute of repose in the MCARE Act violated the Pennsylvania Constitution's guarantee of open access to the Courts.


7. Livingston v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., No. 318 EDA 2017 (Pa. Super. April 29, 2019 Colins, J., Lazarus, J., Kunselman, J.) (Op. by Colins, J.)




In April of 2019, the Pennsylvania Superior Court provided its latest pronouncement on the law on the admissibility of intoxication evidence in civil litigation matters. The Court reiterated the rule of law that evidence of alcohol or drug consumption by a person involved in an accident is admissible only where there is sufficient evidence that reasonably shows intoxication and unfitness to engage in the activity at issue at the time of the accident.


6. Moran v. USAA, No. 3:18-cv-2085 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 14, 2019 Caputo, J.)

The court dismissed a Plaintiff’s bad faith claim without prejudice and leave to amend to correct certain issues with the Complaint. This is one of many Federal Court decisions evidencing a continuing trend towards forcing Plaintiffs’ to avoid conclusory allegations in bad faith matters and instead requiring the pleading of specific acts of alleged bad faith.  There were also a number of decisions handed down over the past year that confirmed that the extension of an alleged low ball offer followed by a settlement or an award of a much higher number does not necessarily equate to bad faith -- click HERE to view those Bad Faith - Low Ball Offer cases.


5. Sawyers v. Davis, 2019 Pa. Super. 219 (Pa. Super. Oct. 22, 2019 Bowes, J., Olson, J., Stabile, J.) (Op. by Bowes, J.) (Olson, J, dissenting)




The Pennsylvania Superior Court ruled that a trial court erred in dismissing the Plaintiff’s personal injury action against a defendant motorist for improper service.  Over the past year, a number of decisions have been handed down at both the trial court and appellate level analyzing the application of the Lamp v. Heyman line of cases and their progeny.  Click HERE to view a compilation of those cases.


4. Davis v. Volkswagen, No. 1405 EDA 2018 (Pa. Super. July 19, 2019 Bowes, J., McLaughlin, J., Stabile, J.) (Op. by McLaughlin, J.)(Stabile, J., Concurring)

The Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the Lehigh County Court of Common Pleas did not commit any error in a products liability case when it instructed the jury on both the consumer expectation test and the risk-utility test that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court established in the case of Tincher v. Omega-Flex.  The Superior Court ruled in this fashion even though the Plaintiff only litigated the case under the consumer expectation test. The Court found that, where the defense presented evidence that also implicated the risk-utility test, a jury instruction was warranted in that regard as well.


3. Farese v. Robinson, 2019 Pa. Super. 336 (Pa. Super. Nov. 8, 2019 Lazarus, J., Kunselman, J., Colins, J.)   (Dissenting Op. by Lazarus, J.).




In Farese, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held, in what appears to be the first appellate decision of its kind, that future medical expenses need not be reduced in accordance with Act 6 before being presented to the jury at trial in an auto accident case. This decision did not impact the rule that past medical expenses incurred in motor vehicle accident cases have to be reduced before being presented to a jury.


2. BouSamra v. Excela Health, No. 5 WAP 2015 (Pa. June 18, 2019)

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court offered its latest pronouncement on attorney work product issues in June of 2019. The Court addressed the issue of whether a law firm’s sending of pre-litigation emails to a public relations firm served to waive the attorney work-product doctrine, and whether a third party must provide legal advice, or be acting under the control of an attorney or the client, in order to qualify as a privileged person under the doctrine. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded the work product doctrine was not waived by disclosure unless the alleged work product was disclosed to an adversary or disclosed in a manner which significantly increased the likelihood that an adversary or anticipated adversary would obtain it.

1. Gallagher v. GEICO, 201 A.3d 131 (Pa. Jan. 23, 2019)



The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the Household Exclusion contained in a Geico policy violated the MVFRL was invalid because it served as a “de facto waiver” of stacked coverage. The Court suggested that its decision in Gallagher not only applied to that case, but should also be read to eradicate the Household Exclusion across the board.  While a number of subsequent Federal Court decisions served to expand the scope of the Gallagher decision, at least one more recent trial court decision (Nationwide v. Ryman) has suggested that the Gallagher decision should be limited to its facts.



Wednesday, November 6, 2019

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Rules that Medical Malpractice Statute of Repose is Unconstitutional



In the case of Yanakos v. UPMC, No. 10 WAP 2018 (Pa. Oct. 31, 2019) (Op. by Mundy, J.), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in a 4-3 decision, ruled that MCARE's statute of repose was unconstitutional.

Typically, a medical malpractice action is governed by a two (2) year statute of limitation.  However, there may be some cases where a Plaintiff does not discover an injury that is allegedly the result of medical negligence within that two year period.  Under MCARE's statute of repose, medical malpractice actions must be brought within seven (7) years of alleged medical malpractice.

The rationale of the majority Opinion in Yanakos striking down the statute of repose under the MCARE Act was that the statute of repose was not substantially related to a governmental interest as was necessary to uphold the statute.  The Court also found that the statute of repose in the MCARE Act violated the Pennsylvania Constitution's guarantee of open access to the Courts.

The majority Opinion in Yanakos can be viewed HERE.

The Opinion of Justice Donohue, concurring in and dissenting from the result, can be viewed at this LINK.

The dissenting Opinion written by Justice Wecht can be viewed HERE.

Source:  Article - "MCARE Statute of Repose is Unconstitutional, Pa. Supreme Court Rules."  Pennsylvania Law Weekly.  By Max Mitchell (October, 31, 2019).