Thursday, October 31, 2013

HAPPY HALLOWEEN




HAPPY HALLOWEEN GREETINGS
FROM
TORT TALK
 
 
I invite Defense attorneys to "dress up" as Plaintiff's attorneys in their mindset just for a moment on this Halloween day and picture the difficulties and pressures faced by attorneys on that side of the bar. 

I also invite Plaintiff's attorneys to don the costume of a defense attorney's mindset, if only for a brief moment, and think of the burdens and stress faced by defense attorneys. 
 
I then also invite all attorneys on both sides of the civil litigation bar "to be" claims professionals for Halloween for a moment in their minds today and realize the pressures and stresses faced by those individuals in their livelihood.

Similarly, all claims professionals are invited "to be" attorneys for a few moments as a Halloween costume and think of the responsibilities and strains that each profession imposes upon its participants day in and day out.
 
By being considerate of the position of others and by viewing the world from the perspective of the opposite side, we may all be reminded our way is not the only way and that we are all willing participants in the noble pursuit of the fair administration of justice and compensation in the civil litigation world. 
 
By working together in a reasonable and professional fashion, we can all strive to further this noble and honorable pursuit, uplift the reputation of the respective professions, and continue to ward off the scary thought of the alternative--the resolution of compensatory disputes in the absence of law and order.

 
******************************

Whew!.......enough of that heady stuff.  Now go raid your kid's Halloween bag for the good stuff.



 
 
Source of image: www.dtntech.com
 

 

Wednesday, October 30, 2013

Summary Judgment Denied in Rejection of UIM Coverage Case

In an Opinion and Order, the Court of Common Pleas in Franklin County in the case of Blake v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 31 Franklin Co. L. J. 60 (C.P. Franklin Co. 2013 Herman, J.), denied a Plaintiff-insureds' Motion for Summary Judgment in a Declaratory Judgment action because genuine issues of material fact were found to exist with respect to whether underinsured motorist coverage (UIM) coverage was offered and discussed, and whether the insured-husband signed the UIM rejection form. 

The Blake case involved a motor vehicle accident matter in which the vehicle injured party Plaintiff was rear-ended by the tortfeasor's vehicle.  The tortfeasor's carrier tendered its $25,000 limits and the Plaintiff then turned to his own automobile insurance policy with Progressive Insurance for Underinsured (UIM) coverage.

Progressive basically said, "Not so fast" and produced an executed rejection of UIM coverage form applicable to the policy signed by the injured party's wife.

The injured part Plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment action asserting that the rejection of UIM coverage was not properly secured from the insureds.

In Blake, the insured-husband contended that during the phone conversation he had with the agent that UIM coverage was never specifically discussed and that he requested "full coverage."  Also, the insured-husband asserted that he did not know what UIM coverage was and that he had not authorized his wife to sign his name to a UIM rejection form.

According to the Opinion, the rejection form that the insurer produced contained the husband's signature but the wife who picked up the insurance forms testified that she signed her husband's name per instructions from the agent.   

The agent, however, testified that she did not recall the transaction of the purchase of the policy or the interaction with the insureds but stated that her business practice was to explain UIM coverage to clients, offer different default coverages and levels than what the insureds eventually purchased, and that she would not let one spouse sign for the other. 

The Franklin County trial court found that material issues of fact and testimony were in dispute and, as such, the carrier's motion for summary judgment was denied in order to allow the case to proceed to a jury to decide the matter.

Anyone wishing to review this Opinion in the Blake case may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney Scott Cooper of the Harrisburg law firm of Schmidt Kramer for bringing this case to my attention.  In turn, Attorney Cooper acknowledged the efforts of Bill Mabius of the Pennsylvania Association for Justice in publicizing this Opinion.

Tuesday, October 29, 2013

Eastern District Federal Court Reaffirms Commencement Date for UIM Statute of Limitations

On October 28, 2013, Judge Jan E. DuBois of the Eastern District Federal Court of Pennsylvania issued an opinion in the case of Wilson v. Great American Insurance Company, NO. 2:12-CV-5700 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 28, 2013 DuBois, J.), on the issue of the commencement date for the statute of limitations in an underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits claim.

The insurance company argued that the statute of limitations in a UIM case can be deemed to start to run when the underlying liability carrier tenders its limits. The insured Claimant countered that the commencement date should be when the third party release is signed.

The Eastern District Federal Court held in Wilson that the date the release is signed is the commencement date for the statute of limitations to start to run.

It has been repeatedly held in Pennsylvania that the statute of limitations in a UIM case is four (4) years.

Anyone desiring to review a copy of the Wilson case may click HERE

Commentary:  This decision in the case of Wilson v. Great American Ins. Co. is consistent with prior cases holding that the statute of limitations in a UIM case begins to run when the third party matter is settled or when a verdict is entered in the third party lawsuit.

In Hopkins v. Erie Insurance Company, 65 A.3d 452 (Pa.Super. 2013 Gantman, Allen, and Ott, JJ.)(Opinion by Allen, J.)(Concurrence by Gantman, J.), the Superior Court held that a UIM cause of action accrues when the third party case settled and not when the contract was allegedly breached when Erie denied the claim. In so ruling ,the Superior Court followed the reasoning of the united States Court of Appeals of the Third Circuit in State Farm v. Rosenthal, 484 F.3d 251 (3d Cir. 2007).

The Superior Court in Hopkins more specifically held that "the four-year statute of limitations on underinsured motorist claims begins to run when the insured settles with, or secures a judgment against, the underinsured owner or operator.”

Click this LINK to view the Hopkins decision. 


I send thanks to Attorney Paul Oven of the Moosic, PA law firm of Dougherty, Leventhal & Price and Scott Cooper of the Harrisburg, PA law firm of Schmidt Kramer for bringing this case to my attention.
Source of image:  www.sandz.net

Monday, October 28, 2013

Are You Aware of the Benefits and Risks Associated With Relevant Technology?


According to an October 29, 2013 article entitled "Justices Add Tech Savviness to Professional Responsibility" in The Legal Intelligencer by Max Mitchell, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recently amended the Rules of Professional Responsibility to note a requirement that all Pennsylvania attorneys keep abreast of not only changes in the law but also, with the advancement of computer technology, the "benefits and risks associated with relevant technology" in the practice of law. 

Also emphasized was a greater need to take precautions against inadvertent exposure or disclosure of documents.

The article can be viewed online HERE.  If you have trouble accessing the article online, please let me know.

Source of image:  www.news.yahoo.com.

Motion to Bifurcate Post-Koken Trial Denied in Schuylkill County

In an October 22, 2013 Order without Opinion in the Post-Koken case of Post v. Schnerring and Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. S-1887-12 (C.P. Schuylkill Co. Oct. 22, 2013 Dolbin, J.), Judge Cyrus Palmer Dolbin of the Schuylkill County Court of Common Please denied Motions to Bifurcate the trial filed by both the underinsured motorists benefits (UIM) carrier, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company and the third party tortfeasor Defendant.

Anyone desiring a copy of this Order in Post v. Liberty Mutual may click this LINK.

The Tort Talk Post-Koken Scorecard has been updated with this case and other recent cases.  The Scorecard is always freely accessible by going to Tort Talk at www.TortTalk.com and scrolling down the right hand column and clicking on the date noted under "Post-Koken Scorecard."  Here's a shortcut LINK if you want to check it out now.

I send thanks to the prevailing Plaintiff's Attorney Michael Pisanchyn of the Pisanchyn Law Firm in Scranton, PA for bringing the Post case out of Schuylkill County to my attention.

I respectfully request the readers of Tort Talk to advise of any Post-Koken decisions you may hear of so that they can be publicized in an effort to inform all attorneys of the novel common law developing in this new era of Pennsylvania automobile litigation.

Judge Wettick Precludes Discovery of Documents Under Peer Review Protection Act

In his recent decision in the case of Scrima v. UPMC Mercy, PICS Case No. 13-2704 (C.P. Allegheny Co. Sept. 9, 2013 Wettick, J.), Judge R. Stanton Wettick ruled that the documents Plaintiff sought to discover which documents were prepared for purposes of reviewing the quality of medical services that were provided by a Defendant hospital were protected by the Pennsylvania Peer Review Protection Act (Pa. P.R.P.A.), 63 P.S. §425.1-425.4 and, therefore, not discoverable. 

Judge R. Stanton Wettick
Judge Wettick noted that, under the Pa.P.R.P.A., records and proceedings of a review committee established for the purpose of reviewing information related to the evaluation and improvement of patient care are considered confidential.  

However, documents or records that are otherwise available from other original sources are not to be construed as protected from discovery or for use in any civil action merely because they were presented during proceedings held by such a committee (known as the "original sources" exception).

After reviewing the record before him, Judge Wettick found that the original sources exception of the Rule did not apply.   Accordingly, the court ultimately ruled that the Plaintiffs remained free to examine the hospital staff concerning their knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the Plaintiff’s injuries, but that the Plaintiffs were precluded from inquiring about conclusions or recommendations resulting from the investigation into the matter. 

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may contact the Pennsylvania Instant Case Service of the Pennsylvania Law Weekly at 1-800-276-7427 and pay a small fee for a copy.  

Source:  Pennsylvania Law Weekly “Digest of Recent Opinions (October 1, 2013).   

Friday, October 25, 2013

Judge Williamson of Monroe County Construes Parameters of a Release in MVA Case

In the Monroe County case of Hertzog v. Stafford, LLC, PICS Case No. 13-2524 (C.P. Monroe Co. July 10, 2013 Williamson, J.), Judge David J. Williamson of the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas ruled that a Plaintiff’s execution of a Release of “any and all claims” in favor of Enterprise Rental Company did not apply to claims that the Plaintiff raised against a Co-Defendant tortfeasor who was driving one of the Enterprise’s company cars when that Co-Defendant rear-ended the Plaintiff. 

According to a summary of the Opinion, the Co-Defendant driver tortfeasor filed Motion for Summary Judgment arguing that the claims against her were barred as the Plaintiff had signed a Release of “any and all claims” against Enterprise and “other persons” arising from the accident.  

Judge David J. Williamson
Monroe County
Judge Williamson rejected the Defendant’s argument and, citing Charles v. Giant Eagle Markets, 522 A.2d 1 (Pa. Super. 1987), reasoned that, generally speaking, unless a Release states otherwise, a Release of one tortfeasor does not serve to discharge other tortfeasors.  

The Court in this matter read the phrase “other persons” as referring to other persons within the employment of the Enterprise Rental Car Company, which the Co-Defendant driver was not.   The trial court also further pointed out that the phrase “other persons” was modified by the language “of and from” as contained in the Release and referring to Enterprise.  

As such, the court denied that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment based upon the Release signed by the Plaintiff.

Anyone desiring a copy of this Opinion may contact the Instant Case Service of the Pennsylvania Law Weekly at 1-800-276-7427, providing the above PICS Case No. and pay a small fee.  

Source:  “Digest of Recent Opinions.”  The Pennsylvania Law Weekly (October 8, 2013).