Thursday, February 28, 2013
TORT TALK EXPO CLE SEMINAR - APRIL 18, 2013
VIDEO CLIP: Discovery of Facebook Content
I was recently invited by The Legal Intelligencer/Pennsylvania Law Weekly, for whom I write a regular civil litigation column, to participate in a series of video presentations for their website.
In the first video clip generated, Pennsylvania Law Weekly staff reporter Ben Present and I discuss the emerging issue of social media law. In this installment, we discuss whether Facebook pages are discoverable.
This video is part of the paper's Social Media Law collection, which features news, analysis, videos and an interactive timeline on this growing area of law. Other clips are expected to follow.
To view the first installment video clip on the discoverability of Facebook pages, click HERE.
I thank reporter Ben Present for inviting me to participate in this discussion.
Wednesday, February 27, 2013
Offensive Use of Collateral Estoppel By Workers' Comp Claimant Upheld
In his recent February 13, 2013 Memorandum and Order in the
case of Alpensjo v. Sandvik Materials
Technology, Inc., No. 2010-Civil-1277 (C.P. Feb. 13, 2013, Minora, J.),
Judge Carmen D. Minora of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas addressed
a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed by the Plaintiff asserting the
theory of collateral estoppel based upon a final judgment rendered by a
worker’s compensation judge.
This case arises out of a Complaint filed by the Plaintiff alleging that Sandvik wrongfully terminated the Plaintiff's employment as a violation of public policy in the context of a worker’s compensation claim. The Complaint also alleged defamation.
According to the Opinion, the record before the Court contained evidence of positive work reviews and advancement by the Plaintiff in his employment up through the date of a December 11, 2008 motor vehicle accident that left the Plaintiff impaired and unable to work. The Court noted that, up to the time of the accident, there is no documents or testimony suggesting that Sandvik was unhappy with the Plaintiff as their employee.
After the accident, the Plaintiff was limited in his ability to work and attempted, despite his condition, to at least work part-time hours. By March of 2009, the Plaintiff arrived at work and was advised that his employment was terminated. The Plaintiff, who was a Swedish citizen was advised that he had 30 days to leave the country as his work Visa was set to expire.
The Court noted that the Plaintiff had a companion worker’s compensation benefits claim proceeding after his motor vehicle accident as well. In the worker’s compensation claim, the worker’s compensation judge rendered a decision on the Plaintiff’s claim. The Plaintiff asserted that the worker’s compensation judge’s decision should act as collateral estoppel on specific findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in that Opinion related to issues pending in his Court of Common Pleas action.
The defense argued that the worker’s compensation decision should not be deemed to be conclusive or be given preclusive effect as the Defendant had no full and fair opportunity to litigate before the worker’s compensation court. The Defendant also argued that there was no identity of issues as required by the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
With respect to this Court of Common Pleas decision, there was an issue as to whether or to the worker’s compensation decision squarely faced and resolved the central factual issue raised in the Court of Common Pleas case, i.e., whether the Plaintiff was subjected to a retaliatory discharge from his employment.
In his Opinion, Judge Minora provides a thorough review of
the doctrine of collateral estoppel as well as the relationship of issues
raised in a worker’s compensation claim as related to a companion Court of
Common Pleas claim.
After reviewing the record before the Court, Judge Minora found that the elements necessary to implement the doctrine of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion were met in the case before him. Judge Minora also found that the worker’s compensation hearings were conducted with sufficient protections and opportunity to be heard by Sandvik. Ultimately, the Court found that the parties of the worker’s compensation case were identical to the parties in this Court of Common Pleas case and that Sandvik had a full and fair opportunity to litigate at the worker’s compensation hearing. Accordingly, Judge Minora found that certain factual determinations made by the worker’s compensation judge were deemed to be conclusively established between the parties for purposes of the Court of Common Pleas case and that the Defendant was collaterally estopped from disputing these particular issues.
Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s request for partial summary judgment based upon a doctrine of collateral estoppel was granted.
Anyone desiring a copy of this decision reviewing the doctrine of collateral estoppel may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.
This case arises out of a Complaint filed by the Plaintiff alleging that Sandvik wrongfully terminated the Plaintiff's employment as a violation of public policy in the context of a worker’s compensation claim. The Complaint also alleged defamation.
According to the Opinion, the record before the Court contained evidence of positive work reviews and advancement by the Plaintiff in his employment up through the date of a December 11, 2008 motor vehicle accident that left the Plaintiff impaired and unable to work. The Court noted that, up to the time of the accident, there is no documents or testimony suggesting that Sandvik was unhappy with the Plaintiff as their employee.
After the accident, the Plaintiff was limited in his ability to work and attempted, despite his condition, to at least work part-time hours. By March of 2009, the Plaintiff arrived at work and was advised that his employment was terminated. The Plaintiff, who was a Swedish citizen was advised that he had 30 days to leave the country as his work Visa was set to expire.
The Court noted that the Plaintiff had a companion worker’s compensation benefits claim proceeding after his motor vehicle accident as well. In the worker’s compensation claim, the worker’s compensation judge rendered a decision on the Plaintiff’s claim. The Plaintiff asserted that the worker’s compensation judge’s decision should act as collateral estoppel on specific findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in that Opinion related to issues pending in his Court of Common Pleas action.
The defense argued that the worker’s compensation decision should not be deemed to be conclusive or be given preclusive effect as the Defendant had no full and fair opportunity to litigate before the worker’s compensation court. The Defendant also argued that there was no identity of issues as required by the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
With respect to this Court of Common Pleas decision, there was an issue as to whether or to the worker’s compensation decision squarely faced and resolved the central factual issue raised in the Court of Common Pleas case, i.e., whether the Plaintiff was subjected to a retaliatory discharge from his employment.
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| Judge Carmen D. Minora Lackawanna County |
After reviewing the record before the Court, Judge Minora found that the elements necessary to implement the doctrine of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion were met in the case before him. Judge Minora also found that the worker’s compensation hearings were conducted with sufficient protections and opportunity to be heard by Sandvik. Ultimately, the Court found that the parties of the worker’s compensation case were identical to the parties in this Court of Common Pleas case and that Sandvik had a full and fair opportunity to litigate at the worker’s compensation hearing. Accordingly, Judge Minora found that certain factual determinations made by the worker’s compensation judge were deemed to be conclusively established between the parties for purposes of the Court of Common Pleas case and that the Defendant was collaterally estopped from disputing these particular issues.
Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s request for partial summary judgment based upon a doctrine of collateral estoppel was granted.
Anyone desiring a copy of this decision reviewing the doctrine of collateral estoppel may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.
I send thanks to the Foley Law Firm in Scranton, PA for bringing this
decision to my attention.
Labels:
Collateral Estoppel,
Workers' Compensation
Judge Nealon Reviews Frye Expert Standard in FELA Case
In another FELA decision in the case of Dennis v. Delaware and Hudson Railway Co. Inc., No. 2005-CV-1826
(C.P. Feb. 12, 2013 Nealon, J.), Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna
County Court of Common Pleas addressed a Frye
motion filed by the railroad Defendants to bar the opinion of the Plaintiff’s
expert.
As you may recall from prior posts, these consolidated cases involve former railroad workers seeking to recover damages under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. §51-60, for black lung disease allegedly caused by occupational exposure to coal dust.
In this particular matter, the Defendants filed a Frye motion asserting that the Plaintiffs’ pulmonary expert admitted under oath during his trial deposition that he did not observe the generally accepted methodology for diagnosing pneumoconiosis (black lung disease), such that the expert’s opinion should be deemed to be inadmissible under the standard set forth in the Frye decision.
Judge Nealon granted the Defendant’s Motion after noting
that, during his trial testimony, the Plaintiffs’ expert identified the
generally accepted methodology for diagnosing black lung disease but acknowledged
that he did not follow that methodology in formulating his opinions.
The Court also noted that the expert’s opinions were not supported by any generally accepted diagnostic criteria. Accordingly, the testimony was ruled inadmissible under Frye and Pa. R.C.P. 207.1. The Court therefore granted the Defendant’s Frye motion and ruled that the expert’s testimony was inadmissible.
Judge Nealon’s opinion provides a thorough review of the standard set forth under Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) for the evaluation of novel scientific evidence being offered by an expert.
Anyone desiring a copy of this Opinion may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net. Given the number of decisions issued in this matter, please reference Dennis v. Delaware and Hudson Railway (Frye standard) when requesting this Opinion.
As you may recall from prior posts, these consolidated cases involve former railroad workers seeking to recover damages under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. §51-60, for black lung disease allegedly caused by occupational exposure to coal dust.
In this particular matter, the Defendants filed a Frye motion asserting that the Plaintiffs’ pulmonary expert admitted under oath during his trial deposition that he did not observe the generally accepted methodology for diagnosing pneumoconiosis (black lung disease), such that the expert’s opinion should be deemed to be inadmissible under the standard set forth in the Frye decision.
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| Judge Terrence R. Nealon Lackawanna County |
The Court also noted that the expert’s opinions were not supported by any generally accepted diagnostic criteria. Accordingly, the testimony was ruled inadmissible under Frye and Pa. R.C.P. 207.1. The Court therefore granted the Defendant’s Frye motion and ruled that the expert’s testimony was inadmissible.
Judge Nealon’s opinion provides a thorough review of the standard set forth under Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) for the evaluation of novel scientific evidence being offered by an expert.
Anyone desiring a copy of this Opinion may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net. Given the number of decisions issued in this matter, please reference Dennis v. Delaware and Hudson Railway (Frye standard) when requesting this Opinion.
Thursday, February 21, 2013
Facebook Decision Out of Schuylkill County Follows Trend
In a January 31, 2013 decision in the case of Hoy v. Holmes, No. S-57-12, 107 Sch.L.R. 19 (C.P. Schuylkill Co. 2013 Domalakes, J.), Judge John E. Domalakes addressed a Defendant's Motion to Compel access to a Plaintiff's social media sites, including Facebook, in a motor vehicle accident case.
Finding no factual predicate presented to allow for access to the Plaintiff's private pages on social media sites, the court denied the motion to compel without prejudice to the Defendant's right to present the motion again if a factual predicate was established.
In so ruling, the court in Hoy followed the trend of other decisions across the Commonwealth by coming to the following conclusions:
(1) There is no constitutional right to privacy or any privilege that prohibits discovery of a party's social media activity;
(2) Material found on the public portions of one's social media sites is discoverable; and
(3) Material located on one's private pages of a social media profile are discoverable upon a showing of a factual predicate suggesting that allowing discovery of the private profile will lead to relevant information. If no such factual predicate is established, discovery of the private pages will not be allowed.
Judge Domalakes' opinion in Hoy provides a thorough update on the current status of the law and confirms the lack of any appellate authority up through the issuance of this decision on January 31, 2013.
Anyone desiring a copy of Hoy v. Holmes may click this LINK.
I send thanks to Attorney J.T. Herber III of the Pottsville law firm of Williamson, Friedberg & Jones LLC for providing me with a copy of this decision.
I will update the Tort Talk Facebook Discovery Scorecard which can always be accessed by going to Tort Talk at www.TortTalk.com and scrolling down the right hand column and clicking on the date noted under "Facebook Discovery Scorecard." For now, here's a shortcut LINK to that Scorecard.
Please let me know if you hear of any other Facebook Discovery decisions.
Finding no factual predicate presented to allow for access to the Plaintiff's private pages on social media sites, the court denied the motion to compel without prejudice to the Defendant's right to present the motion again if a factual predicate was established.
In so ruling, the court in Hoy followed the trend of other decisions across the Commonwealth by coming to the following conclusions:
(1) There is no constitutional right to privacy or any privilege that prohibits discovery of a party's social media activity;
(2) Material found on the public portions of one's social media sites is discoverable; and
(3) Material located on one's private pages of a social media profile are discoverable upon a showing of a factual predicate suggesting that allowing discovery of the private profile will lead to relevant information. If no such factual predicate is established, discovery of the private pages will not be allowed.
Judge Domalakes' opinion in Hoy provides a thorough update on the current status of the law and confirms the lack of any appellate authority up through the issuance of this decision on January 31, 2013.
Anyone desiring a copy of Hoy v. Holmes may click this LINK.
I send thanks to Attorney J.T. Herber III of the Pottsville law firm of Williamson, Friedberg & Jones LLC for providing me with a copy of this decision.
I will update the Tort Talk Facebook Discovery Scorecard which can always be accessed by going to Tort Talk at www.TortTalk.com and scrolling down the right hand column and clicking on the date noted under "Facebook Discovery Scorecard." For now, here's a shortcut LINK to that Scorecard.
Please let me know if you hear of any other Facebook Discovery decisions.
Pennsylvania Supreme Court Addresses Viability of Attorney's Fee Claim in Peer Review Dispute
In its recent February 20, 2013 decision in the case of Herd Chiropractic v. State Farm, No. 35 MAP 2012 (Pa. 2013)(Majority: Castille, C.J., Eakin, J., Todd, J.)(Maj.Opinion by Saylor, J.)(Dissent by Baer, J. with McCaffery, J. joining)(Orie Melvin, J., did not participate), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that attorney fees are not
recoverable when the peer review process is followed under Section 1797 of the
Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law.
As noted in this previous Tort Talk post, the Pennsylvania Superior Court had gone the other way and allowed for the recovery of attorney's fees in this scenario. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed.
This case provides a nice overview of the peer review process and challenges to the same. In this matter, an individual obtained treatment from a chiropractic office after a motor vehicle accident. State Farm submitted the chiropractor's medical bills to the peer review process and the result was a finding that certain treatments by the chiropractor were not reasonable and necessary. As such, the carrier refused further payments. In response, the chiropractic office filed suit and one of the main issues that went up to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court involved the remedies permitted under the statute.
While the carrier appeared to agree that the medical provider may have been authorized to seek the recovery of the payments due plus interest under the statute, the carrier asserted that attorneys fees were not permitted under the plain language of the statute where a peer review was utilized prior to the denial of the payments.
The Supreme Court relied upon several reasons in coming to its decision that attorney's fees were not permitted. One such rationale was the Court's adherence to the American Rule that each party is responsible for its own attorneys fees absent statutory authorization to the contrary allowing the recovery of attorney's fees in a particular matter, an agreement for the payment of attorney's fees, or some other exception (none of which was found to exist in this matter).
While the Court agreed that Section 1797 is "neither comprehensive or a model of clarity," any change of the law in this regard in terms of attorney's fee-shifting should come from the General Assembly and not the Court. The Court went on to state that the "Legislature's failure to adjust Section 1797 over time as imperfections have been revealed by experience, while unfortunate, does not alter the functions ascribed to our branches of government."
Applying the statute as worded, the Court concluded that attorney's fees were not warranted where a peer review was utilized in the process.
The Majority's Opinion in Herd Chiropractic v. State Farm can be viewed HERE.
The Dissenting Opinion in Herd Chiropractic v. State Farm can be viewed HERE.
I send thanks to Attorney Mark Martini of the Pittsburgh law firm of Robb Leonard Mulvihill for bringing this case to my attention. Attorney Martini and Attorney Robert Loch, of the same office, filed the amicus curiae brief for the Pennsylvania Defense Institute. Attorney Gary Drakas of Forry Ullman represented State Farm.
As noted in this previous Tort Talk post, the Pennsylvania Superior Court had gone the other way and allowed for the recovery of attorney's fees in this scenario. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed.
This case provides a nice overview of the peer review process and challenges to the same. In this matter, an individual obtained treatment from a chiropractic office after a motor vehicle accident. State Farm submitted the chiropractor's medical bills to the peer review process and the result was a finding that certain treatments by the chiropractor were not reasonable and necessary. As such, the carrier refused further payments. In response, the chiropractic office filed suit and one of the main issues that went up to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court involved the remedies permitted under the statute.
While the carrier appeared to agree that the medical provider may have been authorized to seek the recovery of the payments due plus interest under the statute, the carrier asserted that attorneys fees were not permitted under the plain language of the statute where a peer review was utilized prior to the denial of the payments.
The Supreme Court relied upon several reasons in coming to its decision that attorney's fees were not permitted. One such rationale was the Court's adherence to the American Rule that each party is responsible for its own attorneys fees absent statutory authorization to the contrary allowing the recovery of attorney's fees in a particular matter, an agreement for the payment of attorney's fees, or some other exception (none of which was found to exist in this matter).
While the Court agreed that Section 1797 is "neither comprehensive or a model of clarity," any change of the law in this regard in terms of attorney's fee-shifting should come from the General Assembly and not the Court. The Court went on to state that the "Legislature's failure to adjust Section 1797 over time as imperfections have been revealed by experience, while unfortunate, does not alter the functions ascribed to our branches of government."
Applying the statute as worded, the Court concluded that attorney's fees were not warranted where a peer review was utilized in the process.
The Majority's Opinion in Herd Chiropractic v. State Farm can be viewed HERE.
The Dissenting Opinion in Herd Chiropractic v. State Farm can be viewed HERE.
I send thanks to Attorney Mark Martini of the Pittsburgh law firm of Robb Leonard Mulvihill for bringing this case to my attention. Attorney Martini and Attorney Robert Loch, of the same office, filed the amicus curiae brief for the Pennsylvania Defense Institute. Attorney Gary Drakas of Forry Ullman represented State Farm.
Centre County Trial Court Rules in Favor of Consolidation in Post-Koken Case
The Centre County Court of Common Pleas has handed down a February 14, 2013 opinion in a Post-Koken case in favor of the consolidation of third party and UIM claims.
In the case of Murphy v. Hampton et al, No. 2012-3855 (Centre Co. Feb. 14, 2013 Grine, J.), the court reviewed a matter involving a lawsuit filed after a person was allegedly injured in an accident with a bus. The victim filed a lawsuit against the driver of the bus, the bus driver's employer, Centre Area Transportation Authority, and Nationwide, the Plaintiff's underinsured motorist (UIM) carrier.
The third party Defendants filed preliminary objections to the jointly filed Complaint. The third party Defendants made assertions of (1) improper joinder under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 2229(b) and (2) a need for severance under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 213(b) because they would be prejudiced by the introduction of insurance evidence at trial.
The trial court ruled in Murphy that the cases were not improperly joined as the causes of action arose out of the same occurrence and the same operative facts. The court also noted that joinder avoided inefficiency and the delay attendant with what would be nearly two identical trials. The court also noted that the joinder of the claims promoted judicial economy.
The trial court also found that severance was not required and the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence 411 under the circumstances presented.
The preliminary objections of the third party Defendants were therefore overruled.
This decision out of Centre County is consistent with a prior 2012 Centre County decision in the case of Fennessey v. Sweeney and State Farm.
Anyone desiring a copy of Murphy v. Hampton may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.
I send thanks to Attorney Scott Cooper of the Harrisburg law firm of Schmidt Kramer, as well as Attorney Paul Oven of the Moosic law firm of Dougherty, Leventhal & Price for bringing this case to my attention. I thank Attorney Bill Mabius of the Pennsylvania Association For Justice for providing me with a copy of the opinion.
In the case of Murphy v. Hampton et al, No. 2012-3855 (Centre Co. Feb. 14, 2013 Grine, J.), the court reviewed a matter involving a lawsuit filed after a person was allegedly injured in an accident with a bus. The victim filed a lawsuit against the driver of the bus, the bus driver's employer, Centre Area Transportation Authority, and Nationwide, the Plaintiff's underinsured motorist (UIM) carrier.
The third party Defendants filed preliminary objections to the jointly filed Complaint. The third party Defendants made assertions of (1) improper joinder under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 2229(b) and (2) a need for severance under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 213(b) because they would be prejudiced by the introduction of insurance evidence at trial.
The trial court ruled in Murphy that the cases were not improperly joined as the causes of action arose out of the same occurrence and the same operative facts. The court also noted that joinder avoided inefficiency and the delay attendant with what would be nearly two identical trials. The court also noted that the joinder of the claims promoted judicial economy.
The trial court also found that severance was not required and the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence 411 under the circumstances presented.
The preliminary objections of the third party Defendants were therefore overruled.
This decision out of Centre County is consistent with a prior 2012 Centre County decision in the case of Fennessey v. Sweeney and State Farm.
Anyone desiring a copy of Murphy v. Hampton may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.
I send thanks to Attorney Scott Cooper of the Harrisburg law firm of Schmidt Kramer, as well as Attorney Paul Oven of the Moosic law firm of Dougherty, Leventhal & Price for bringing this case to my attention. I thank Attorney Bill Mabius of the Pennsylvania Association For Justice for providing me with a copy of the opinion.
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