Tuesday, December 4, 2012

Another Facebook Discovery Decision


In the Indiana County case of Simms v. Lewis, No. 11961 CD 2011 (C.P. Ind. Co. Oct. 10, 2012 Bianco, J.), Judge Thomas M. Bianco took a middle road and granted in part and denied in part a defendant's motion to compel access to a plaintiff's social networking information in a motor vehicle accident case.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff alleged injuries to her head, neck, and back as a result of the motor vehicle accident all of which injuries were alleged to be, or possibly be, serious and permanent in nature.

During discovery, it was determined that the Plaintiff had Facebook, myYearbook, and MySpace accounts, and that each account was active following the accident.  When Plaintiff refused the defense's requested access to the private portions of the Plaintiff's social networking accounts by way of the production of the Plaintiff's user names and passwords, a motion to compel was filed.

The court noted that, in his motion, the Defendant asserted that the front page of the Plaintiff's myYearbook account contained a reference to the Plaintiff's plan to participate in a Zumba exercise class.

In his October 10, 2012 Opinion, Judge Bianco noted that, as of that date [and as of today's date, I note], there has been no appellate decision on this particular issue.  As such, Judge Bianco noted that a number of trial court decisions from around the state have addressed this issue.  In his Opinion, Judge Bianco specifically referenced the Zimmerman v. Weis Markets, Inc. trial court decision out of Northumberland County.

Judge Bianco noted that, by virtue of her allegations in her Complaint in this personal injury matter, the Plaintiff had placed her physical condition at issue.  Accordingly, the court held that the Defendant was entitled to conduct discovery in an effort to obtain information relevant and related to the cause of action stated, which according to Judge Bianco, in today's society may include access to a party's social networking sites.

Where, as here, the defense had made a threshold showing (i.e. the reference to attending Zumba class in the public portions of the Plaintiff's social media sites), the court found that it was "reasonable to infer that the non-public portion of the Plaintiff's account may contain additional relevant evidence."

The court in this case of Simms rejected the Plaintiff's expectation of privacy argument by noting that "the purpose of social networking sites is to share information."  The court ruled that a "Plaintiff cannot maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy  when she created the account and voluntarily posted this information, knowing that the information could become publicly available."

Accordingly, the court held that the Defendant had made a proper threshold showing that access to the Plaintiff's myYearbook account could lead to the discovery of additional relevant information.  As such, access was allowed to this particular account.  The court ordered the parties to meet within 60 days at which meeting the Plaintiff would access her myYearbook account in the presence of defense counsel for a review of the content of the account.

Judge Bianco denied the Defendant's motion to compel access to the Plaintiff's Facebook and MySpace pages on account of the fact that the Defendant had not met the threshold showing for those accounts.  The court noted that, if such a threshold showing was made by the Defendant to support a request for access to the non-public portions of those other accounts, the motion to compel would then be granted.

Anyone wishing to review this Opinion in the Indiana County case of Simms v. Lewis may click HERE.

REMEMBER:  The FACEBOOK DISCOVERY SCORECARD can always be accessed down on the right hand column of Tort Talk at www.TortTalk.com.  Also, when you get to that Scorecard, you can click on the case names to access the actual opinions/orders online.

I send thanks to Attorney Mathew G. Simon of the Indiana, Pennsylvania law firm of Simpson, Kablack & Bell, LLC.


Source of image:  www.mindjumpers.com

Judge Nealon Addresses Lack of Expert in FELA Claim

In the case of Mullin v. Delaware and Hudson Railway Company, Inc., No. 2005-Civil-3088 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Nov. 15, 2012 Nealon, J.), Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas dismissed a Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) claim alleging occupational exposure pulmonary damage on the grounds that the proof of medical causation was insufficient as a matter of law.

In this matter, the Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer, Defendant, Delaware and Hudson Railway Company, Inc., d/b/a Canadian Pacific Railway a/k/a CP Rail System alleging permanent pulmonary damage as a result of prolonged exposure to dust during the course of his employment as a conductor. 

Judge Terrence R. Nealon
Lackawanna County
 This case came before the Court by way of a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the Defendant in which the Defendant asserted that the Plaintiff had not produced an expert report from a medical witness opining that the Plaintiff had developed any pulmonary condition due to heavy dust exposure, and, as such, the Plaintiff was unable to satisfy his burden of proof under the FELA.

Judge Nealon noted that, in order to prevail on a claim under the FELA, Plaintiff must prove: (1) that the Defendant was a common carrier by railroad engaged in interstate commerce; (2) that the Plaintiff was employed by Defendant and assigned to perform duties that further such commerce; (3) that Plaintiff’s injuries were sustained while the Plaintiff was employed by the common carrier; and (4) that the Plaintiff’s injuries resulted from the Defendant’s negligence. [citations omitted].

The Court also noted that FELA claims are subject to a relaxed standard of causation which standard provides for a recovery if the employee’s negligence played any part, no matter how small, in bringing about the employee’s injury. [citations omitted]. Judge Nealon noted that, in light of this liberal burden of proof, a Court was justified in granting summary judgment “only in those extremely rare instances where there is 0 probability either of employer negligence or that any such negligence contributed to the injury of the employee.” [citation omitted].

After applying the record before him to the applicable law, Judge Nealon ruled that, where the Plaintiff neglected to produce an expert medical report substantiating, or even addressing, his occupational exposure claim, the Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted. The Court also noted that this particular Plaintiff had never been deposed in this matter which was consolidated with a number of other matters, and there was no record indicating that this particular Plaintiff had ever been diagnosed with a pulmonary alignment or that any such alleged condition was in any way attributable to his occupation.

Judge Nealon further noted this particular Plaintiff had “not identified a scintilla of medical proof” or “an iota of medical evidence” in support of the causation element and, as such, based upon the record before the Court there was indeed a “zero probability” that any negligence by the Defendant employer contributed to any alleged pulmonary injury allegedly suffered by the Plaintiff.

Accordingly, summary judgment was granted.

Anyone desiring a copy of this Opinion by Judge Nealon in the case of Mullin may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.

Monday, December 3, 2012

Social Media Discovery Allowed in Monroe County Personal Injury Case



In what appears to be the latest decision on the issue of social media discovery, under a November 7, 2012 Order issued in the case of Mazzarella v. Mount Airy Casino Resort, No. 1798 Civil 2009, 2012 WL 6000678 (C.P. Monroe Co. Nov. 7, 2012 Williamson, J.), Judge David J. Williamson of the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas granted a defendant's motion to compel the plaintiff to allow for social media discovery.

I have been advised that Mazzarella involves a premises liability slip and fall case.

In his detailed two-paged Order, Judge Williamson reasoned that the plaintiff's expectation of privacy in her social media activity was "misplaced" as "[t]hose who elect to use social media, and place things on the internet for viewing, sharing and use with others, waives an expectation of privacy."  Accordingly, the court ruled that "[a]t this point, the information requested is not a privacy violation." 

Thus, the plaintiff was ordered to respond to the defendant's discovery request in this regard.  While the Order itself does not say so, I have been advised that the discovery request called for the production of the plaintiff's user name and password and there was no time limit placed on the access granted to the plaintiff's social media sites.

This Order from Mazzarella can be viewed HERE.

I send thanks to Attorney John Bednarz, Jr., a solo practitioner in Wilkes-Barre, PA, for bringing this decision to my attention.

Please also remember that you can check out and access other Social Media Discovery decisions on the Tort Talk Facebook Discovery page at this LINK. 

The Facebook Discovery Scorecard is also always freely accessible by going to www.TortTalk.com and scrolling down the right hand side of the blog and clicking on the date under "Facebook Discovery Scorecard."  Once you get to that Scorecard, you can click on the case names of the decisions noted to access the Opinions or Orders online.

Thursday, November 29, 2012

Assumption of Risk Defense Still Viable in Pennsylvania

In its recent decision in the case of Longwell v. Giordano, 2012 Pa.Super 245 (Pa.Super. Nov. 8, 2012)(Bender, Donohue, and Strassburger, J.J.)(Opinion by Strassburger, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court refused a plaintiff's request to abolish the assumption of risk doctrine.  The court noted that the abolition of a recognized doctrine was not within the purview of the Superior Court's authority.

However, the Longwell court did go on to reverse a Lawrence County trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of a defendant in a trip and fall case.  The defense asserted that the Plaintiff had assumed the risk of danger in walking along a driveway under pitch black night time conditions when the Plaintiff knew that the driveway had a slight drop off. 

The Superior Court reviewed the record and found that, while the Plaintiff was aware of the dangers presented, the Plaintiff proceeded cautiously and took measures to protect himself but still unfortunately fell.  Thus, the Court believed that there were issues of fact to be decided by a jury.  As such, the entry of summary judgment in favor of the defense was reversed.

In so ruling the court also noted that, under the different test of liability found under the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 360, applicable in a case of a lessee versus a landlord for personal injuries in a slip and fall matter, a landlord remains liable to injuries sustained by a tenant in a common area of the premises controlled by the landlord even if the tenant was aware of an allegedly defective condition.  As such, the assumption of risk defense is limited by Section 360 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts in this landlord-tenant context.

Anyone desiring a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Luzerne County Local Rule Streamlines Motion to Compel Discovery Process



The following reminder of a recent new Luzerne County Local Rule pertaining to, and streamlining, Motions to Compel Discovery was highlighted in the Luzerne Register:



NOTICE TO ALL LAWYERS


208.3(b) Alternative Procedures

Cite Rule as: Luz. Co. R.Civ.P.208.3(b)

A Motion to Compel Answers to Interrogatories and/or Responses to Request For Production of Documents, where no objections have been filed, shall be submitted to the Motions Judge along with a proposed Order requiring the opposing party to provide full and complete answers within thirty (30) days or suffer such sanctions as the Court deems necessary.

Notice of Intention to Present the Motion to Compel must be provided to all parties of record not less than three (3) business days prior to the date of presentation and must be attached to the Motion. A brief in support of the Motion shall not be required.

Adopted: 05/15/2012

Effective: 08/15/2012

Wednesday, November 28, 2012

Superior Court Addresses Parameters of Warranty of Habitability



In what some are calling a case of first impression, the Pennsylvania Superior Court ruled in its November 5, 2012 Opinion in the matter of Conway v. Cutler Group, Inc., 2012 Pa. Super 242 (Pa. Super 2012 Musmanno, Mundy, J.J., and McEwan, P.J.E.)(Opinion by Mundy, J.), that home buyers who are not the original owners, purchasers, or users of a home may still bring an implied warranty of habitability claim against the builder of the premises if defects are discovered.

The Superior Court panel unanimously rejected the trial court’s decision which had dismissed the Plaintiff’s claim in this regard against the builder on the basis that there was no privity of contract.

The Superior Court ruled that, because the doctrine of implied warranty of habitability applies to “defects which would not be apparent to the ordinary purchaser as a result of a reasonable inspection,” the issue of whether or not the current home owner was the original purchaser or not was “immaterial.”

The court also noted that a “second or subsequent purchaser is entitled to the same assurances as the original purchaser that the home the builder has constructed is habitable for human living.” This is particularly so because, as noted by the court, “the builder is the party with the ‘necessary expertise’ that the initial purchaser does not possess” in terms of finding latent defects.

The Conway court otherwise indicated that, under the implied warranty of habitability cause of action, the homeowner must still show that the “…alleged defect is latent, attributable to the builder’s design or construction, and affects habitability.” The court also noted that “all homeowners must still bring their claims within the 12-year period set out by the statute of repose.”

Anyone desiring a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source of image:  www.nvtc.ee

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Allows for Direct Corporate Liability in Nursing Home Case

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently handed down a decision on November 21, 2012 in the the nursing home case of Scampone v. Highland Park Care Center, No. 16 WAP 2011 (Pa. 2012)(Opinion by Castille, C.J.) in which the court held that both nursing home facilities and their parent corporations were subject to potential direct liability in negligence claims.

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the corporate negligence theory applied to a skilled nursing facility and the healthcare company responsible for its operations.

By way of background, at trial, the lower court refused to allow the corporate parent to be held liable, but allowed the case against the facility itself to go forward.

The Superior Court reversed the finding as to no liability for the parent corporation, sent the case back to trial, and noted that the trial court may consider not only compensatory but also punitive damages. The appeal then went up to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

Upon review of the case, the Supreme Court held in Scampone that a nursing home and affiliated entities are indeed subject to potential direct liability for negligence where the requisite resident-entity relationship exists to establish that the entity owes the resident a duty of care. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Superior Court in part, but for reasons that differed from the Superior Court, and remanded the case back to that court for further proceedings.

Therefore, under this decision, not only the nursing home facilities, but also their parent corporations, may be held directly liable for inadequate care and for deliberate misdeeds at the facilities.

This Opinion contains a detailed analysis of the difference between direct corporate liability and vicarious liability which obviously could serve to apply in other negligence cases involving corporations, such as medical malpractice, premises liability, or trucking cases, for example.

The Scampone decision can be viewed online HERE.

I send thanks to Attorney Paul Oven of the Moosic, PA law office of Dougherty, Leventhal & Price for bringing this case to my attention.