Thursday, June 30, 2022

Trial Court Opines That Defendant's Appeal From Order Dismissing Defendant's Objections to Jurisdiction Should Be Quashed


In the case Galette v. New Jersey Transit, No. 200800610 (C.P. Phila. Co. May 31, 2022 Crumlish, J.), the trial court filed a Rule 1925 Opinion to the appellate court recommending the dismissal of the Defendant’s appeal from the trial court’s Order dismissing the Defendant’s objections to jurisdiction.

It was the position of the trial court that the Order dismissing the Defendant’s objection to jurisdiction was appealable only under Pa.R.A.P. 311(b) and that the requirements of that Rule had not been met. 

According to the Opinion, this matter arose out of a personal injury action filed by the Plaintiff against the Defendant New Jersey Transit, and another Defendant. According to the lawsuit, the Plaintiff was injured while sitting in a parked vehicle in the City of Philadelphia when that vehicle was allegedly struck by a bus operated by one of NJ Transit’s employees.

The Defendant, NJ Transit, objected to the court’s jurisdiction over it through a Motion to Dismiss. That Motion was denied and NJ Transit filed an appeal, which prompted this Opinion by the court.

The trial court noted that an Order denying a Motion to Dismiss is ordinarily interlocutory and, therefore, not appealable unless expressly made so by statute.

In its Opinion, the court cited to Pa.R.A.P. 311, which lists the interlocutory appeals that may be taken as a right, and Pa.R.A.P. 312, which allows for interlocutory appeals by permission.

Under Pa. R.A.P. 311(b), an appeal is allowed as a right when a trial court’s Order overruled Preliminary Objections to the trial court’s in personam or in rem jurisdiction and either the Plaintiff elected to treat the Order as final or the trial court stated in the Order that a substantial issue of jurisdiction existed.

Given that these requirements were not met, and given that the Defendant, NJ Transit, did not otherwise seek leave of court to file an interlocutory appeal, or request an Order stating that a substantial issue of jurisdiction was presented, the trial court noted that the appeal should be quashed by the Pennsylvania Superior Court.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions.” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (June 7, 2022).




Wednesday, June 29, 2022

Court Finds No Valid Cause of Action Against Insurance Agent for Negligence


In the case of The Original Apostolic Faith Church v. Geico, No. April Term, 2019 No. 04027 (C.P. Phila. Co. March 23, 2022 Djerassi, J.), the trial court, in a Rule 1925 Opinion, ruled that a Plaintiff could not maintain negligence claims against the retail insurance agent and the wholesale insurance broker that the Plaintiff had used to secure commercial insurance policy as those two parties did not owe the Plaintiff any duty to review or provide advice upon notice of a renewal of the policy.

The court also found that those two Defendants did not owe the Plaintiff any duty to assist the Plaintiff in finding any replacement coverage.

As such, the trial court requested the Superior Court to affirm the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of the Defendants.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions.” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (June 7, 2022).



Source of image:  Photo by Andrea Piacquadio on www.pexels.com.

Tuesday, June 28, 2022

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Agrees to Review the Validity of the Regular Use Exclusion


In an Order handed down yesterday, June 27, 2022, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed to hear an appeal from the Pennsylvania Superior Court's decision in the case of Rush v. Erie Insurance Exchange finding that the Regular Use Exclusion in automobile insurance policies violates the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law.

Here is a LINK to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's June 27, 2022 Order granting the appeal.

To view the Pennsylvania Superior Court's decision in the Rush case, please click HERE.

Here is a LINK to my recent March 31, 2022 article from the Pennsylvania Law Weekly entitled "The Regular Use Exclusion May Not Be So Regular Anymore."

To review other Regular Use cases and articles on the topic, please go to the Tort Talk Blog at www.TortTalk.com, scroll down to the Labels section on the right hand column and then scroll down alphabetically to the Label for "Regular Use Exclusion" and click that Label.


I send thanks to Attorney Glen Shikunov of the Philadelpha office of McCormick & Priore for bringing this update to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Andrea Piacquadio on www.pexels.com.

Monday, June 27, 2022

"Innocent Plaintiff" Fair Share Act Argument Gains Steam (Via More Dicta)


In the case of Anderson v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., No. 2:21-CV-00493-CCW (W.D. Pa. June 22, 2022 Wiegand, J.), the court addressed the issue raised by the parties as to the amount of the credit to which the UIM carrier was entitled in this particular claim.  As part of the analysis the Court addressed novel arguments raised under the Fair Share Act.

According to the Opinion, this case arose out of a fatal motor vehicle accident. 

After the accident, the Plaintiffs sued the third party tortfeasor and settled those claims. The Plaintiffs then filed a claim for UIM benefits with Motorists Mutual.

Motorists Mutual denied the claim on the basis that the value of the claim did not exceed the combined $5.1 million liability limits of the various third party tortfeasors.

With regards to the coverages at issue in the third party liability side, the Plaintiff was a passenger in a vehicle in which the operator of that vehicle was covered under a liability policy providing $100,000.00 in liability coverage.

The other vehicle involved in the accident was owned by a trucking Defendant who had liability limits of $1 million dollars as well as an umbrella policy with an additional $4 million dollars in coverage.

The Plaintiff settled the third party claim securing the $100,000.00 policy limit that covered the vehicle in which the Plaintiff was located at the time of the incident. The Plaintiff also settled against the trucking company for $55,000.00. Motorist Mutual consented to those settlements.

The court noted that, under the Motorist Mutual UIM endorsement, it was provided that the carrier would pay UIM benefits if “[t]he limits of liability under any applicable bodily injury liability bonds or policies have been exhausted by payment of judgements or settlements….”

In this matter, Motorists Mutual contended that it should receive a credit of $5.1 million dollars, which was the sum of all of the liability limits at issue (accepting a City of Pittsburgh policy limit, which was handled by the parties and the Court separately).

The Plaintiff was seeking a partial summary judgment under an argument that, unless Motorists Mutual could prove that the trucking Defendants’ percentage of fault equaled or exceeded 60%, Motorists Mutual should only be entitled to a credit equaled only to the amount the Plaintiff was legally entitled to recover from the joint tortfeasors, that is, $650,000.00, which was the sum of the amounts actually paid in settlement on the third party side by the operator of the vehicle in which the Plaintiff is located and the trucking Defendants. 

More specifically, the Plaintiff was contending that the UIM carrier must prove that the trucking Defendants’ liability equaled or exceeded 60% in order for the UIM carrier to claim the full credit of $5 million dollars under that third party Defendants’ policies. The Plaintiff went on to argue that, if the UIM carrier was unable to establish this proof, then the UIM carrier should only be entitled to a credit of the amount paid pursuant to the settlements because the Plaintiff would have been unable to recover the full amount of damages from the trucking Defendants under the Pennsylvania Fair Share Act.

The court applied Pennsylvania law and noted that there was no controlling Pennsylvania Supreme Court precedent on the issue of the enforcement of exhausting clauses concerning UIM benefits. However, it was noted that the Pennsylvania Superior Court had decided a number of cases in this regard, including the case of Boyle v. Erie in which the Superior Court held that a UIM carrier was entitled to the full amount of any liability limits that were available on the third party side.

The Plaintiff attempted to assert that the Boyle decision was inapplicable, in part, due to the underlying policy concerns and Boyle being no longer applicable due to the passage of the Pennsylvania Fair Share Act.

The court in this matter held that it did not need to decide whether the Pennsylvania Fair Share Act altered Boyle’s holding.

The court more specifically stated that, even assuming that the enactment of the Pennsylvania Fair Share Act altered Boyle’s holding, the Plaintiff’s argument was still noted to fail because “it is not clear that the Pennsylvania Fair Share Act applies where the Plaintiff’s negligence is not in question, as is the case here.” See Op. at 13. 

In this regard, the court in this matter pointed to the case of Spencer v. Johnson, 249 A.3d 529 (Pa. Super. 2021). The court in this Anderson case stated that, in the Spencer case, the Pennsylvania Superior Court found, “as an alternative holding,” that for the “Fair Share Act to apply, the Plaintiff’s negligence must be an issue in the case.” See Op. at p. 13, citing Spencer at 559.

The court additionally pointed to another Pennsylvania Superior case on that similar issue and citing to the Spencer case. See Snyder v. Hunt, No. 851 EDA 2020, 2021 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2993, at *14-15 (Pa. Super. Nov. 10, 2021).

The court in this Anderson case predicted that “because the decedent’s negligence is not at issue in this case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would find that the Fair Share Act does not apply in cases such as this one, where the Plaintiff’s negligence is not an issue, and, as a result, that the traditional principles of joint and several liability would control."  See Anderson Op. at 14.

Under this analysis, the court in Anderson held that it did not need to decide whether the Fair Share Act altered Boyle’s holding. 

The court went on to find that the language of the exhaustion clause in this case compelled the court to rule that the UIM carrier was indeed entitled to a credit for the full amount of the liability limits available in the underlying third party case (excepting those liability limits possessed by the City of Pittsburgh).

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Joseph Hudock of the Pittsburgh law firm of Summers McDonald Hudock Guthrie & Rauch, P.C. for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Ekaterina Bolovtsova on www.pexels.com.

Thursday, June 23, 2022

Negligence Claim Asserted Against Carrier Dismissed in Bad Faith Action



In the case of Moravia Motorcycle, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Company, No. 2:21-CV-01274 (W.D. Pa. May 9, 2022 Dodge, M.J.), the court addressed a Motion to Dismiss a bad faith claim relative to an insurance policy issued by Allstate for damage to the Plaintiff’s motorhome during the course of a storm.

At issue in this case was a Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiff’s claims for negligence and bad faith.

Relative to the bad faith claims, the court found that the conflicting information provided by Allstate to the Plaintiffs was sufficient to support the bad faith claim presented.

However, the court dismissed the Plaintiff’s allegations that Allstate was negligent by misrepresenting the status of the policy, failing to fully advise them of the actual terms of the coverage and other similar allegations of negligence.

Allstate otherswise sought the dismissal of the negligence claims under the gist of the action doctrine and for lack of specificity.

The court dismissed the negligence claim but allowed the bad faith claim to proceed.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Joseph Hudock of the Pittsburgh law firm of Summers, McDonnell, Hudock, Guthrie & Rauch, P.C., for bringing this case to my attention.

Wednesday, June 22, 2022

A Continuing Trend of Claims Representative Depositions Being Allowed in Luzerne County


Luzerne County Courthouse

In each of the following three (3) Orders (without Opinion) out of the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas, the court ruled that the claims representatives handling the case for the Defendant’s liability carrier was required to attend a deposition requested by Plaintiff’s counsel. 
However, the court did note that the Plaintiff would be precluded from questioning the claims representative as to the claims representative’s mental impressions, conclusions, or opinions respecting the value or merit of any claim, any defense thereto, or respecting strategy or tactics with respect to any claim or defense:


The court Order in Ehrmanntraut v. People’s Security Bank and Trust Co., No. 4995-CV-2020 (C.P. Luz Co. Nov. 15, 2021 Hughes, J.), may be viewed at this LINK.


The court Order in Harenza v. House, No. 2019-CV-10883 (C.P. Luz Co. Dec. 2, 2021 Pierantoni, J.), may be viewed at this LINK.


The court Order in Stochla v. Fenner, No. 2019-CV-11607 (C.P. Luz. Co. May 26, 2022 Polachek-Gartley, J.), may be viewed at this LINK.

Tuesday, June 21, 2022

ARTICLE: Justice Delayed Is Still Compensable: Courts Rule on Damages During Shutdowns

Justice Delayed Is Still Compensable: Courts Rule on Damages During Shutdowns


By Daniel E. Cummins | June 09, 2022

Pennsylvania Law Weekly


Daniel E. Cummins












Now that more and more cases are reaching verdict on this side of the COVID-19 pandemic, the issue of whether or not the shuttering of the court system in Pennsylvania during the course of the pandemic should be considered in the calculation of delay damages in personal injury matters has come to the forefront.


In the decisions handed down so far by the trial and appellate courts, the ruling has been that defendants are not vaccinated against having to pay additional damages on personal injury awards to cover the interest owed to the plaintiff from the time after the suit has been filed up to the time of the verdict.


Delay Damages Under Rule 238


Under Pa.R.C.P. 238(a)(1) it is provided that, “at the request of the plaintiff in a civil action seeking monetary relief for bodily injury … damages for delay shall be added to the amount of compensatory damages awarded against each defendant or additional defendant found to be liable to the plaintiff in the verdict of a jury … and shall become part of the verdict, decision or award.”


The recognized, but arguably ineffective, purpose behind the delay damages rule found at Pa.R.C.P. 238 is to “alleviate court congestion by promoting earlier settlement of claims.”  See Schrock v. Albert Einstein Medical Center, 589 A.2d 1103, 1106 (Pa. 1991).


Under the rule, a trial court may award delay damages even if the defendant did nothing to delay trial, if trial was delayed because of a crowded docket, or due to other factors which were not the fault of the plaintiff or any party. 


Pick Up the Phone


In the case of Yoder v. McCarthy Construction, May Term 2018, No. 0769 (C.P. Phila. Co. Feb. 10, 2022 Foglietta, J.), Judge Angelo J. Foglietta of the Philadelphia Common Pleas Court issued a prescient Rule 1925 opinion requesting the Pennsylvania Superior Court to affirm the trial court’s rulings during the course of a personal injury trial that resulted in a $5 million verdict of the plaintiff.


In Yoder, the court rejected the defendant’s assertion that the trial court erred in awarding delay damages for the period that the court was closed due to the COVID-19 pandemic. 


The court ruled that the plain language of Rule 238 confirmed that delay damages are appropriate due to cover any delay that was not the fault of any party. The court found that a court closure due to a pandemic fell within this definition. 


Referencing the goal of the delay damages rule in promoting settlement discussions, the court additionally noted that the trial court’s closure during the pandemic “did not prevent defense counsel from picking up the telephone, scheduling a Zoom hearing, or sending a text message to opposing counsel indicating the desire to make an offer to settle this case.” 


Foglietta reasoned that the court’s closure could have served as an encouragement to the parties to settle and that, the fact that it did not, did not entitle the defendant to a reward of being excused from paying delay damages when the underlying purpose of delay damages is to discourage dilatory conduct during the course of a personal injury litigation.


It’s the Plaintiff’s Money


In the case of Getting v. Mark Sales & Leasing, No. 348 MDA 2021 (Pa. Super. April 7, 2022 Olson, J., Kunselman, J., and Stevens, P.J.E.) (Op. by Kunselman, J.), the court addressed issues raised by a defendant following a trial at which a jury awarded the plaintiff over $2 million in damages for personal injuries and in which the defendant claimed that it should not owe the plaintiff delay damages for the length of time that the COVID-19 pandemic shuttered the Pennsylvania courts.


This case arose out of an accident during which the plaintiff was injured while using a rider mower rented from the defendant company. While the plaintiff was using the mower on a hill on his property, the mower rolled over and injured the plaintiff.


In post-trial motions that dealt, in part, with the plaintiff’s claims for delay damages, the defense asserted that delay damages should not be imposed against the defendant during the time period of the judicial emergency that was declared by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on March 16, 2020, and extended by the trial court until the time of trial in this case.


The Pennsylvania Superior Court noted that, two days after it declared a judicial emergency on March 16, 2020, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued a March 18, 2020, order in which the courts in the commonwealth of Pennsylvania were closed, jury trials were suspended, and all events on the calendars of the courts were postponed.


The Superior Court confirmed that there were only two recognized periods of time that may be excluded from the calculation of delay damages: “any periods of time after which the defendant has made a written offer of settlement, the offer is continued in effect for at least ninety days or until the commencement of trial, whichever occurs first, the offer is rejected by the plaintiff, and the plaintiff does not recover more than 125% of the offer; and any periods of time during which the plaintiff caused the delay of the trial.” See Getting at p. 16 citing King v. SEPTA, 557 A.2d 11, 12-13 (Pa. Super. 1989) (en banc). In that previous King case, the Superior Court confirmed that Rule 238 has “not allowed for the exclusion of periods of delay not caused by either party.  


After reviewing the case before it and the applicable law, the Superior Court noted that the defense was not making a request to be excused from paying delay damages based upon either of the two recognized bases noted above. Accordingly, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had not suspended the right of Plaintiff to collect delay damages during the 2020 judicial emergency.


The court in Getting noted that the plaintiffs had the right to be made whole for their injuries by an application of the delay damages rule. The court additionally noted that the COVID-19 pandemic and the ensuing judicial emergency it created did not prevent the defendants from engaging in settlement talks or making reasonable offers in an effort to try to alleviate the courts dockets.  


The court noted that the record before it confirmed that the plaintiff and the defendant had actually engaged in settlement talks during the pandemic. As such, the court in Getting pointed out that “simply because the flow of cases had temporarily stopped, it does not follow that all legal practice also ceased.” The court noted that the Defendant remained free at all times during the judicial emergency to increase its settlement offer to induce the plaintiffs to settle and thereby assist the defendant in avoiding additional delay damages.


The Superior Court otherwise indicated that the defendant was not entitled to an unjust windfall from the five-month delay caused by the judicial shutdown. Rather, the Superior Court in the Getting case noted that the defendant retained the unfettered use of the “plaintiff’s money throughout the judicial emergency.” As such, the Superior Court felt it appropriate that the defendant “must compensate the plaintiffs for using the plaintiff’s money during the judicial emergency” and thereby must pay the plaintiff to the fullest extent allowed under Pa.R.C.P. 238. 


Plan on Paying Delay Damages


Based upon the few cases handed down to date, it appears that the trial and appellate court judges will be rejecting efforts by defendants to point to the COVID-19 pandemic as a reason to suspend the application the interest allowed over time under Pa.R.C.P. 238 in terms of delay damages. Rather, it appears that the courts of Pennsylvania will be enforcing a plaintiff’s right to recover delay damages in personal injury matters.


Such a ruling applicable to the back end of personal injury litigations appears to be consistent with those other rulings by the courts of Pennsylvania applicable to the front end of cases in which the courts have refused to cut plaintiffs a break relative to service of process issues based upon delays caused by the pandemic.


In other words, in terms of the impact of the pandemic on Pennsylvania civil litigation matters, the courts, so far, have followed the principle that what’s good for the goose is good for the gander.


Daniel E. Cummins is the managing partner of the Clarks Summit law firm of Cummins Law, a civil litigation practice. He also conducts mediations of civil litigation matters through Cummins Mediation Services. Cummins is also the sole creator and writer of the Tort Talk Blog (www.TortTalk.com), which is designed to provide continuing updates on important cases and trends in Pennsylvania civil litigation law. He can be reached at dancummins@CumminsLaw.net.