Wednesday, March 31, 2021

A Primer on Attorney Conduct At Depositions




A hotly debated issue in medical malpractice litigation over the past decade has been whether a defendant-physician can (1) refuse to answer standard of care questions or medical opinion questions or respond to requests to conduct a retrospective review of his/her own care so long as [s]he agrees not to testify as to those matters at trial (Allegheny County Judge R. Stanton Wettick (ret.) approach) or (2) can be compelled to answer deposition inquiries regarding standard of care, medical opinion, and/or retrospective review of care (Lackawanna County Judge Terrence R. Nealon approach).

In an Opinion issued earlier this week in the medical malpractice case of Lau v. Allegheny Health Network, G.D. 18 - 011924 (C.P. Allegh. Co. March 30, 2021 Ignelzi, J.), the Motions Court Judge in Allegheny County, Judge Phillip Ignelzi, abrogated the Judge Wettick approach for Allegheny County moving forward and adopted Judge Nealon’s approach as enunciated in Karim v. Reedy, 53 Pa. D. & C.5th 335 (Lacka. Co. 2016)(click this LINK to view that case) and Howarth-Gadomski v. Henzes, 2019 WL 6354235 (Lacka. Co. 2019)(click this LINK to view that case).

Judge Ignelzi held in Lau that defendant-physicians must now answer questions regarding standard of care, medical opinion, and/or retrospective review of care during their discovery depositions.

The decision is also notable for its instruction on the proper conduct of counsel during discovery, including at depositions. Judge Ignelzi frowned upon speaking objections and instructions by counsel to a witness not to answer a question.

The Court in Lau noted that an attorney should not instruct a witness not to answer a deposition question “unless counsel has objected on the ground that the answer is protected by privilege or a limitation on evidence directed by the Court.” See Op. at p. 33.

Judge Ignelzi adopted Lackawanna County Local Rule of Civil Procedure 4007.1(a), that states that counsel making an objection at a deposition shall state the word “objection,” and briefly state the legal basis for the objection without argument. See Op. at p. 30.

The Court also provides guidance on what types of deposition questions can be properly the subject of “objections to the form of the question,” and confirms that if such objections are not made during the course of a deposition, such objections to the form are considered to be waived under Pa.R.C.P. 4016(c).

More specifically, the Court found that deposition questions that are properly the subject to objections to the form of the question include “compound questions, questions that are ambiguous, unintelligible, misstatements of evidence or testimony, argumentative, assuming facts not in evidence, calling for speculation and deponent answers that are non-responsive.” See Op. at p. 29-30.

Anyone wishing to review this decision may click this LINK.

Motion to Stay Civil Case Pending Resolution of Criminal Case Granted



A Motion to Stay a civil matter pending the resolution of a criminal investigation and charges was granted in the Federal Middle District court case of Doe v. City of Scranton, No. 3:20-490 (M.D. Pa. March 18, 2021 Mannion, J.).

According to the Opinion, the Defendant allegedly used his position as a police officer to coerce sex from woman he used as confidential informants in drug cases he was investigating.

This civil case is proceeding while the companion criminal charges are being investigated.  The court noted that there is an alleged expectation that criminal charges will be filed against the Defendant.

Based upon the court’s review of the Motion to Stay and related materials, Judge Mannion granted the motion and the case was stayed.

The court noted that, in federal court, the decision to stay a case is within the sound discretion of the trial court judge.  Judge Mannion went on to review the six factors to be considered and, in the end, allowed for the stay of the civil matter as requested by the Defendant.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK

Tuesday, March 30, 2021

ABINGTON HEIGHTS HIGH SCHOOL MOCK TRIAL TEAM WINS STATE CHAMPIONSHIP

THE ABINGTON HEIGHTS HIGH SCHOOL MOCK TRIAL TEAM (from Clarks Summit, PA) WON STATE CHAMPIONSHIP LAST NIGHT!!




(See video below of the announcement of the State Champion)

So proud of all the bright, respectful, determined students that made up this team.  So impressed with the dedication of their Teacher Coach Len Romanski.  I helped out as the team's Attorney Advisor.  The team was undefeated throughout the competition, going 9-0.

Thank you to Principal Andrew Snyder and Abington Heights High School for promoting the Mock Trial Program.

Sending great thanks also to the Young Lawyers Division of the Pennsylvania Bar Association for running a great virtual 2021 Mock Trial Season and to all of the volunteers who served as Judges and Jurors throughout the competition. Also send thanks to the Lackawanna Bar Association for running a great District Competition and the Monroe Bar Association for running a great Regional Competition.



Here is a list of team members of the 2021 State Champion Abington Heights High School Mock Trial Team:

Seniors: Noelle Prisco,  Eric Schuster,  Julia LaCoe, Maddie Lucas, Evan Pallis

Juniors: Adam Tinkelman, Aiden Snyder

Sophomores: Faith Bennett, Michael Cummins, Reenad Khan, Chloe Levasseur

Freshmen: Maddie Herold, Dane Huggler, Aidan Lam, William Newton, Thomas Russini, Noor Rutty

Here's a LINK the March 30, 2021 article from the Scranton Times on the Win.  That's my son, Michael Cummins, in the center of the photo with the grey mask on.  Proud to note that he excelled during the Competition, winning a Best Witness Award six (6) times in six Trials.

Pennsylvania Superior Court Reviews Admissibility of Expert Testimony Based Upon Methodology Behind Opinion




The Pennsylvania Superior Court recently issued a notable decision regarding the admissibility of expert testimony in the case of In the Interest of: M.R., a minor, 2021 Pa. Super. 30 (Pa. Super. March 1, 2021 Bender, P.J.E., Olson, J., and King, J.) (Op. by Bender, J.).

Although this is not a tort case, and involves issues regarding child abuse, the law regarding the admissibility of expert opinions set forth in this decision would likely also apply in civil litigation matters.

At issue in this case was whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion by admitting the testimony of the parents’ expert witness who offered an opinion that metabolic bone disease of infancy (also known as temporary brittle bone disease) was the cause of the twin children’s multiple fractures and not any abuse.

In reviewing the issue of admissibility of the expert’s opinion, the court reviewed Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 702 and the case of Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).

The court noted that, under Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 702, which controls the admissibility of expert testimony, one of the requirements for the admission of an expert’s opinion is that the expert’s methodology is generally accepted in the relevant field. This is commonly referred to as the Frye test.

The court noted that the Frye test is limited to an inquiry into whether the methodologies by which the scientist had reached his or her conclusions have been generally accepted in the scientific community. 

The court noted that this test restricts the admission of scientific evidence to that evidence that has resulted from scientific research which has been deemed to be generally recognized as sound research as opposed to the “fanciful creations of a renegade researcher.” [citation omitted].   However, the test is not so restrictive that it does not allow for a scientist to testify as to new conclusions which have emerged during the course of properly conducted research.

Under this test, the proponent of the admission of expert scientific evidence bears the burden of establishing all of the elements supporting its admission, including the general acceptance of a methodology that has actually been employed in the relevant scientific community.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court emphasized that the law of Pennsylvania is that the question of whether a methodology is generally accepted in the relevant scientific community is a determination that is to be made based upon the testimony of scientists in that community and not upon any alleged scientific expertise of the trial court judge. Rather, the Frye test assures that judges will be guided by scientists when assessing the reliability of a scientific method.

As such, under the analysis to be applied in determining whether to admit an expert's opinion, it is the trial court’s function to ensure that the expert has applied a generally accepted scientific methodology to reach his or her scientific conclusions. To fulfill this function, the trial court must be guided by scientists in the relevant field, including the experts retained the parties in the case and any other evidence of general acceptance presented by the parties.  For example, a reference to the methodology in textbooks, scientific publications, studies, statistics, expert testimony, or in other judicial opinions on the issue, or a combination of these sources, can support the admission of an opinion.

The Superior Court cautioned that the trial court may consider only whether the expert applied methodology generally accepted in the relevant field, and the trial court may not go further and attempt to determine whether or not it agrees with the expert’s application of those methodologies and/or whether the expert’s conclusions have sufficient factual support.  Rather, those questions are for a jury to decide.

In setting forth this law, the Pennsylvania Superior Court in this case quoted extensively from the recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in the case of Walsh Estate of Walsh v. BASF Corp., 234 A.3d 446, 456 (Pa. 2020).

In the end, the Pennsylvania Superior Court found that the trial court had abused its discretion by admitting the testimony of the expert in this child abuse case.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia office of Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Monday, March 29, 2021

Post-Trial Motions Denied in Lackawanna County Fatal Boating Accident Case


 
In the case of Loomis v. Bomba, No. 18-CV-930 (C.P. Lacka. Co. March 12, 2021 Nealon, J.), the court addressed a number of post-trial motions filed by a Plaintiff after a defense verdict was entered in a boating fatality litigation.

In the end, after review of the record before it, the court noted that, as the ultimate triers of fact and the judges of credibility, the jury was free to accept or reject the witnesses presented.  The jury’s verdict was found to be not so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice.

With regards to the Plaintiff’s objection that the investigating State Trooper allegedly violated the hearsay rule by referring to a statement that he obtained from a non-testifying witness, the court found that the Trooper’s reference to this statement was permitted to explain his course of conduct in the investigation, rather than any admission of hearsay statement for the truth of the matter asserted. The judge additionally emphasized that he had provided the jury with a cautionary instruction advising the jury that the statement could only be considered for the limited purpose for which it was admitted.

Judge Nealon also rejected any contention by the Plaintiff that his jury instructions were deficient in the court’s failure to charge the jury based upon certain information from a handbook published by the Pennsylvania Fish and Boat Commission. The court noted that the jury was provided by appropriate instructions regarding a boat operator’s duties of care under the Fish and Boat Code as well as under the regulations promulgated by the Fish and Boat Commission. Judge Nealon otherwise noted that the jury instruction charged, as a whole, was not inadequate, unclear, misleading, or confusion. He also noted that the instructions did not omit any basic or fundamental principals of law.

Anyone wishing to review this Opinion may click this LINK.

Friday, March 26, 2021

Employer Running Golf Tournament Found to Be Social Host Under Dram Shop Claim (Not Liable)



In the case of Klar v. Dairy Farmers of America, Inc., No. 10863 of 2015 (C.P. Lawr. Co. Jan. 15, 2021 Cox, J.), the court issued a Rule 1925 Opinion for appellate purposes with regards to the trial court’s granting of a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings against the Plaintiff and in favor of an employer in a case in which the court ruled that an employer who collects contributions for a social event was still considered to a social host with respect to any liability claims under the Dram Shop Act. Based upon this ruling, the trial court dismissed the Plaintiff’s negligence claims against the employer.

According to the Opinion, the Pennsylvania was injured in a motor vehicle accident when the vehicle operated by the Defendant driver struck the Plaintiff’s motorcycle.

The Defendant driver was an employee of Dairy Farmers of America. That employer had sponsored a golf outing and encouraged its employees to attend. The employees made a monetary contribution to offset the cost of the greens fees, food, and alcohol. After collecting the contributions from the employees, the employer paid for the event in its entirety.

The Plaintiff alleged that, at the event, the Defendant driver consumed an amount of alcohol that raised his blood alcohol level beyond the legal limit. The Defendant driver then proceeded to drive and was involved in the accident with the Plaintiff.

The Plaintiff sued the Defendant driver as well as his employer under negligence claims. The employer filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings arguing that it was not liable under the Dram Shop Act because it was a social host.

In this matter, the court followed Pennsylvania law in which other courts had declined to impose liability on non-licensed person who furnished alcohol to individuals for no renumeration. The court ruled that, in order for the Plaintiff to hold the employer liable in this situation, the Plaintiff was required to show that the employer was a person “selling” liquor.

Here, the court noted that the alcohol expense was only a portion of the expenses that the employer paid for the gold event.

While the court recognized that, under case law pertaining to the collective purchase of alcohol, social hosts could be employers or other entities as well as individuals. The court noted that, under Pennsylvania law, social host status did not disappear because the furnishing of alcohol was collective rather than gratuitous.

However, in this matter, the court held that the payment of a fee to defer the costs of the gold outing, with alcohol being only an incidental part of the fee and without any other evidence of the commercial sale of liquor, did not support a claim for either common law negligence or negligence per se against the employer.

As such, in this Rule 1925 Opinion, the trial court requested that the appellate court uphold the trial court’s decision dismissing the Plaintiff's negligence claim against the employer.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions.” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (March 3, 2021).

Thursday, March 25, 2021

Pennsylvania Supreme Court's Latest Pronouncement on Service of Process Issues




In the case of Gussom v. Teagle, No. 12 EAP 2020 (Pa. March 25, 2021)(Maj. Op. by Baer, J.)(Wecht, J., Dissenting), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed the Lamp v. Heyman line of cases regarding the completion of service of original process. This issue was last addressed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in the McCreesh case back 16 years ago back in 2005. Notably, Justice Max Baer had also issued the McCreesh decision.

In this new decision in Gussom, the Court reviewed the long line of precedent on the issue of whether a lawsuit should be dismissed due to a plaintiff’s failure to engage in a good faith effort to complete service and thereby demonstrating an intent to stall the judicial machinery he or she had initiated.

In Gussom, the Superior Court affirmed a trial court order that dismissed a plaintiff’s Complaint based upon a plaintiff’s failure to timely serve her Complaint and the case was dismissed despite the fact that the plaintiff’s actions did not amount to intentional conduct. See Op. at p. 2.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the rulings of the Superior Court and the trial court thereby dismissing the plaintiff's complaint with prejudice. In so ruling, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court confirmed that the standard of review in this context did not require a finding of intent on the part of the plaintiff or prejudice to the defendant under the analysis develop through Lamp v. Heyman and its progeny.

The standard set out by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Gussom is that a plaintiff must make a good faith effort to diligently and timely serve original process upon a defendant. If plaintiff puts forth credible evidence that they made this attempt, then the requirement is fulfilled. “If a plaintiff does not present such evidence, then she has failed to satisfy her evidentiary burden, regardless of whether her actions (or inaction) were intentional, unintentional or otherwise.” See Op. at p. 17.

The Gussom Court held that “a trial court has the discretion to dismiss a complaint when a plaintiff fails to offer proof that she diligently attempted to serve process on a defendant in a timely manner and there is no evidence to indicate that the defendant had actual notice of the commencement of the action in the relevant time frame, regardless of whether the plaintiff acted or failed to act intentionally.” See Op. at p. 3.

The dissent, written by Justice David N. Wecht, would have overturned the Superior Court’s ruling. The dissent felt that the standard should be intent based and should also require the defendant to show prejudice.

The Majority Opinion in Gussom can be viewed HERE.  The Dissenting Opinion can be viewed HERE.


I send thanks to Attorney Joseph B Mayers of the Mayers Firm, LLC in Plymouth Meeting, PA for bringing this case to my attention.