Thursday, December 10, 2020

Summary Judgment Granted In Products Liability Case



Summary Judgment was granted to various Defendants in the strict liability case of Zielinski v. Mega Mfg., Inc.,  No. 2:18-CV- 05113-JDW (E.D. Pa. Oct. 9, 2020 Wolfson, J.). 

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff’s decedent died in a workplace accident when a table on which he was loading metal sheets upended the sheets fell upon the Plaintiff and killed him. 

The Plaintiff was working at a manufacturing plant and was using a machine to stamp sheet metal. 

The record indicated that, when the manufacturing plant had purchased the machine, the Defendant machine manufacturer informed the facility that it had to supply tables and material handling devices to be used with the stamping machine. The manufacturer prepared specifications to guide the design of such a table. However, it was emphasized in the Opinion that that manufacturer did not build, certify, or otherwise take responsibility for the creation of the table. 

The manufacturing plant where the decedent worked bought a table from a Co-Defendant. It was indicated that the Co-Defendant’s specifications called for the table to be anchored to the floor. However, the manufacturing plant did not do so and instead installed casters. At the time of the incident, the decedent was transferring sheets to the table when the table tipped and the sheets of metal fell upon the decedent. 

The court noted that there was no evidence presented as to what caused the table to upend. 

The decedent’s wife had filed a wrongful death and survival action against, in part, both the manufacturer of the machine and the manufacturer of the table under claims for strict liability and negligence. 

In entering summary judgment, the court noted that the manufacturer’s product, which was the machine used to stamp sheet metal, did not injure the decedent. It was also noted that that Defendant did not manufacture, supply, sell, or even recommend the particular table that upended. 

The court found that Pennsylvania law did not hold that manufacturer of the stamp machine strictly liable for failing to warn under the circumstances presented. It was additionally noted that that manufacturer did not have the duty to warn just because it had recommended the size of the table needed to make its machine work. Furthermore, that manufacturer Defendant did not require its customers to use any type of material tables and it was noted that workers could also simply stack materials on the floor or onto a forklift. 

The court additionally noted that the Plaintiff did not offer any evidence that the alleged defeat with the stamp machine, or any lack of any warning, was the proximate cause of the decedent’s death. 

The court additionally ruled that the Plaintiff’s claims against the maker of the table failed because that Defendant did not manufacture the table with casters or approve the change to the use of the table by the manufacturing plant. 

The court noted that, even if the table caused the decedent’s death, it was not the same type of table that that Defendant had sold to the facility since it had been modified. The court additionally noted that the manufacturing plant’s modifications to the table fell under the warnings about the use of the table. 

As stated, summary judgment was granted in favor of both Defendants. 

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions.” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (Oct. 27, 2020).

STILL TIME TO SIGN UP FOR NEXT WEEK'S CLE ON MEDIATION/ARBITRATION TIPS

 



A ZOOM CLE

"MEDIATION/ARBITRATION TIPS"

(1 Hour of Substantive CLE Distance Learning Credit)


Tuesday, December 15, 2020 -  12:30 p.m.



Created By:   Daniel E. Cummins, Esq. - Moderator and Presenter


Additional Presenters:

Judge Thomas M. Blewitt (ret.)

Richard G. Fine, Esq.

Thomas B. Helbig, Esq.

Lucille Marsh, Esq.

Judge Joseph Van Jura (ret.)

Judge Thomas I. Vanaskie (ret.)



The cost to attend the program is free for PADC members and $45 for non-members.

To register for this program contact the PADC Executive Director David Cole at dcole@philadefense.org.



Technology Assistance Provided by 

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Tuesday, December 8, 2020

Pennsylvania Tops "Judicial Hellhole" List for the Second Year in a Row


Here is a LINK to the 2020-2021 "Judicial Hellholes" List put out annually by the American Tort Reform Association.

Pennsylvania has topped the list of "Judicial Hellholes" for the second year in a row.

In particular, the report cited to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court relative to plaintiff-friendly decisions it handed down in the past year.  The article also pointed to the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas.


Default Judgment Opened in Monroe County



In the case of Yasdiman v. Watson, No. 3652-CV-2019 (C.P. Monroe Co. Oct. 13, 2020 Williamson, J.), the court granted a Defendant’s Petition to Open a Default Judgment.

The court reviewed the general requirements of the opening of a default judgment which included a timely filed petition, a reasonable explanation or excuse for the delay that resulted in the entry of a default judgment, and the presentation of a responsive pleading setting forth a meritorious defense.

The court emphasized that, under Pa. R.C.P. 237.3(a)(2), there is no need to meet the first two (2) requirements if the Petition to Open was filed within the first ten (10) days after the entry of the judgment.

In this matter, the Plaintiff filed a Praecipe for a Default Judgment on March 9, 2020. However, the Prothonotary did not enter the judgment and mail notice to the parties until March 13, 2020. 

The Defendants filed the Answer and New Matter on March 12, 2020, which would have been the day before the Prothonotary entered the judgment on the docket and mailed out a notice of the same to the parties.

The Defendants filed a Petition to Strike or Open the Judgment on March 23, 2020, which would have been the tenth day after the Prothonotary had entered the judgment on the docket and mailed out the notices to the parties, but would have been more than ten (10) days after the date the Plaintiff actually filed the Praecipe for Default Judgment.

The court noted that the Defendant’s Petition to Open or Strike was filed on the tenth day filing the entry of default judgment. As such, the court applied Pa. R.C.P. 237.3(a)(2) and held that the Defendants only had to provide a responsive pleading with the meritorious defense to open the judgment. The court reviewed the Answer and New Matter that was filed and noted several possible defenses, including assumption of the risk, lack of causation, and the statute of limitations. As the court found that the Defendants’ pleading was sufficient to meet the requirements of the rule, the Motion to Open was granted.

Judge Williamson went on to note that, even if the judgment was deemed to be filed on March 9, 2020, the court found that the Defendant still met all three (3) elements of the requirements to support the opening of a default judgment.

Since the Petition to Open was granted, the court did not address whether the judgment should be stricken as was also requested by the defense.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions.” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (Nov. 24, 2020).

Summary Judgment Granted in Construction Area Trip and Fall Case



In the case of Cappolella v. R & R. Constr., No. 4526-CV-2017 (C.P. Monroe Co., Sept. 22, 2020, Williamson, J.), the court entered summary judgment in favor of a tenant Defendant in a trip and fall case. 

According to the Opinion, the moving Defendant was a tenant in a commercial building that was under construction. The Plaintiff’s Complaint alleged that he sustained injuries when he fell while performing construction work elsewhere on the premises. The moving Defendant was a tenant on the premises and operated a pizzeria. Other Defendants were construction companies performing work on the premises. 

The moving tenant Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment arguing that it had no involvement with the work being performed by the construction Defendants. Under the lease in the records, the moving Defendant was only responsible for any repairs to its portion of the lease premises and that it had no responsibility for the maintenance for the rest of the building. 

The moving Defendant asserted that it had no knowledge of any of the construction being performed elsewhere on the premises at the time of the Plaintiff’s alleged injuries. The moving Defendant also asserted that it did not even know about the accident until notified of the same by the Plaintiff’s attorney. 

In the Plaintiff’s response, it was asserted that the tenant Defendant was generally liable as a possessor of land. 

The court disagreed and granted summary judgment in favor of that particular Defendant after finding that the Plaintiff failed to allege sufficient fact to make out a claim that the tenant Defendant had acted negligently. The court emphasized that there was no evidence that the tenant Defendant had hired, directed, or managed any of the work being performed by the construction Defendants. It was also emphasized that the Plaintiff was not injured on the portion of the premises leased by the moving Defendant. 

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions.” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (Nov. 10, 2020). 






Need assistance in bringing your slip or trip and fall case, or your construction case, to a close.  Please consider CUMMINS MEDIATION SERVICES.  

Contact Dan Cummins today at dancummins@CumminsLaw.net or at 570-319-5899 to schedule your Mediation.


Monday, December 7, 2020

Deposition of Corporate Designee of Insurance Company Allowed; But Scope of Deposition Limited by Court



In the case of Evanina v. The First Liberty Ins. Corp., No. 3:20-CV-00751 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 2020 Saporito, M.J.), the court granted in part and denied in part a Motion for a Protective Order field by the Defendant, The First Liberty Insurance Corporation, relative to the Plaintiff’s desire to complete a deposition of a corporate designee of the insurance company on issues related to the regular use exclusion. 

After reviewing the rules of discovery under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, which also covers the standards for a Motion for a Protective Order, Magistrate Judge Joseph F. Saporito, Jr., narrowed the scope of the requested corporate designee deposition to only cover those issues set forth in the Plaintiff’s Complaint.

The court also noted that the deposition of the corporate designee was allowed in a breach of contract claim that did not include a statutory bad faith claim given that there is also a duty of good faith and fair dealing imposed under an insurance contract which could be a part of a breach of contract action.


Given that the regular use exclusion was being relied upon by the carrier as a potential defense, the court ordered that this area of inquiry under the corporate designee deposition would be allowed.

However, other requested areas to be reviewed, as noted in the deposition notice, such as questions pertaining to the household exclusion, the family car exclusion, and the unlisted driver exclusion were precluded as irrelevant to the issues presented in this particular case.

In its decision, the court also rejected the carrier’s contention that the requested deposition was disproportionate to the needs of discovery in the case. After reviewing the factors pertinent to this inquiry, the court agreed with the Plaintiff’s arguments on this part of the issue.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this Order and Decision by the United States Magistrate Judge Joseph F. Saporito, Jr., may click this LINK.

Sunday, December 6, 2020

Dental Practice Not Permitted to Recover Under All-Risk Policy Relative to COVID-19 Pandemic



In the case of Brian Handel, D.M.D., P.C. v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 20-3198 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 6, 2020 Bartle, J.), the court found that the Plaintiff, which was a Pennsylvania dental practice, had failed to plead plausible facts that the restrictions placed upon the practice due to the COVID-19 pandemic caused damage or loss in any physical way to its property so as to trigger coverage under its “all-risk” insurance policy with the Defendant. 

The court noted that the dental office had been required to close its practice under the governmental orders related to the pandemic. Thereafter, the dental practice made a claim against the insurance company under the “all-risk” insurance policy for claims of business income loss and extra expenses due to the interruption of the dental practice due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The dental practice filed this declaratory judgment action and a breach of contract. Allstate moved to dismiss the Plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to state a claim and this motion was granted.

The court noted that, under the subject insurance policy, Allstate had agreed to pay for “direct physical loss of or damage to covered property…caused by or resulting from any covered cause of loss.”

The policy defined a “covered cause of loss” as a “direct physical loss unless the loss is excluded or limited under Section 1-Property.” 

In response to the Plaintiff’s claims, the District Court noted that the Governor’s order did not require dental offices such as the Plaintiff's office to close completely. Rather, the Plaintiff’s practice was able to remain open for emergency procedures. As such, the court found that the dental practice/property remained inhabitable and usable, albeit in limited ways.

As such, the court found that the Plaintiff failed to plead plausible facts that COVID-19 caused damage or loss in any physical way to the property so as to trigger the coverage.

The court also found that the Plaintiff’s claim of coverage pursuant to the Civil Authority Provision of the policy also failed. Under that provision, Allstate was obligated to cover the loss of business income and necessary expenses when a “covered cause of loss” damage property in the immediate area and a civil authority prohibited access to the covered property.

The court found no facts pled of any direct physical loss of prohibited access to the property. As such, the court found that the Plaintiff could not sustain a claim for coverage under the Civil Authority Provision of the policy based upon the COVID Pandemic.

The court went on to note that, even if the Plaintiff had pled sufficient facts for physical damage or loss as a result of the pandemic, the Plaintiff’s claims were still barred by the virus exclusion provision of the policy. Under that exclusion, it was provided that the carrier would not cover loss or damage if caused, either directly or indirectly by “any virus, bacterium, or other microorganism that induces or is capable of inducing physical stress, illness, or disease.” 

In the end, the District Court granted the carrier’s Motion to Dismiss.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions.” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (Nov. 24, 2020).