Tuesday, June 11, 2019

Gallagher v. GEICO Webinar To Be Rescheduled

Yesterday's planned webinar on Gallagher v. GEICO:  A Seismic Shift in UIM Litigation" was cancelled at the last minute due to technical issues.  While it was beyond our control, I do apologize for any inconvenience caused to anyone by the cancellation.



The Pennsylvania Bar Institute has noted that the webinar, created by Attorneys Scott B. Cooper of the Harrisburg, PA law firm of Schmidt Kramer and Daniel E. Cummins of the Scranton, PA law firm of Foley, Comerford & Cummins, will be rescheduled.

I will provide the details on the rescheduling here on Tort Talk as soon as I am made aware.



UIM Carrier Only Entitled to Credit of Tortfeasor's Liability Limits and Not Amount of Excess Verdict Paid


The Pennsylvania Superior Court issued a notable but "Non-precedential" decision on May 28, 2019 in the case of IDS Prop. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Piotrowski, No. 2546 EDA 2018 (Pa. Super. Ct. May 28, 2019 Lazarus, J., Colins, J., Kunselman, J.) (Non-Precedential Mem. Op. by Kunselman, J.), involving the amount of the credit due to a UIM carrier.

In this underinsured motorist claim there was a dispute over how much of a credit the underinsured motorist carrier was entitled to on a policy which had $100,000 of liability coverage but where there was a jury verdict of over $1 million against the third party tortfeasor.

Before trial the third party insurance carrier offered $36,001.00 which was rejected.  The third party insurance carrier agreed to pay any amount of a verdict even if it exceeded the liability limits.  

The jury returned a verdict of over $1 million and then the case was settled for $485,000 before the trial court’s decision on the defendant’s post-trial motions.  

A UIM claim was pursued and the insured argued the UIM carrier was entitled to a credit on the third party policy limit of $100,000.  

The UIM carrier argued that it was entitled to a $485,000 credit.  The trial court allowed a credit of $100,000 and the carrier appealed.  

On appeal, the Superior Court held that the carrier was entitled to a credit of only the $100,000 limits set forth in the tortfeasor’s liability policy. The Superior Court adopted the trial court’s rationale that the additional $385,000 “was not made because of Piotrowski’s bodily injury, but rather to avoid a potential bad faith claim, including punitive damages.’” 

As such, the trial court’s decision that the UIM carrier was entitled to a credit in the amount of the tortfeasor’s policy limits was affirmed.

Anyone wishing to review this decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney Scott Cooper of the Harrisburg, PA law office of Schmidt Kramer for bringing this case to my attention.

Monday, June 10, 2019

Need CLE Credits? Consider Signing Up For Tomorrow's CLE Webinar on Gallagher v. GEICO Decision


The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's January 2019 decision in the case of Gallagher v. GEICO has reversed many years of precedent and created a seismic shift in the law.

Attorneys Scott B. Cooper of the Harrisburg, PA law firm of Schmidt Kramer and Daniel E. Cummins of the Scranton, PA law firm of Foley, Comerford & Cummins, have developed this engaging 1-hour live webinar, reviewing the history of the law on the validity of the Household Exclusion in automobile insurance policies in Pennsylvania.

The fallout from the Gallagher v. GEICO decision will be reviewed, including whether the decision will have any retroactive effect.

The Live Webinar will take place tomorrow, Tuesday, June 11, 2019 from noon to 1 p.m.  Attendees will earn 1 substantive CLE credit.

Here is LINK to the Pennsylvania Bar Institute's Ad for this seminar.  There is a Link within the Ad to the Registration page.

If that Link to the Registration page does not work, please try this LINK.

Please consider registering for this CLE Webinar that you could listen into and view a powerpoint presentation from your own desk.

Sunday, June 9, 2019

Dramatic Shift in Law of Jurisdiction in Pennsylvania Over Foreign Corporations


The case of In re Asbestos Products Liability Litigation (No. IV), No. 18-3622 (E.D. Pa. June 6, 2019 Robreno, J.), which was handed down on Friday, alters the course of personal jurisdiction law in Pennsylvania relative to corporations.

In reviewing the history of the law on this issue, the court noted that, in 2014, the United States Supreme Court decided the case of Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014) which brought about “a sea change” in the jurisprudence of exercising general personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation.

In Daimler, the United States Supreme Court held that under the Due Process Clause, subjecting a foreign corporation to general jurisdiction in every state in which it “engages in a substantial, continuous, and systematic course of business” was “unacceptably grasping.”

In this Asbestos Products Liabilty Litigation case, Judge Robreno noted that, under Daimler, the exercise of general jurisdiction over a foreign defendant (except in extraordinary circumstances) was limited to where the corporation was “at home,” namely, to those jurisdictions in which the foreign corporation was incorporated and where it maintained its principal place of business.  

Judge Robreno noted that, in contrast, Pennsylvania has long had a statute which requires a foreign corporation wishing to do business in Pennsylvania to register in Pennsylvania. Correspondingly, Pennsylvania law provides that such registration constitutes a sufficient basis for the exercise of general personal jurisdiction over the foreign corporation. 

As such, the courts in Pennsylvania had previously struggled with how to apply the law of Daimler in Pennsylvania.  Judge Robreno boldly laid that struggle to rest with his decision in the Asbestos Litigation case.

Judge Robreno concluded that: “(1) the Pennsylvania statutory scheme that requires foreign corporations to register to do business and, therefore, to consent to general personal jurisdiction in Pennsylvania, offends the Due Process Clause and is unconstitutional; and (2) the Third Circuit’s pre-Daimler decision in Bane v. Netlink, Inc., 925 F.2d 637 (3d Cir. 1991),  finding that, by registering to do business in Pennsylvania, a foreign corporation consents to general personal jurisdiction, is irretrievably irreconcilable with the teachings of Daimler, and can no longer stand.  

As such, it appears that the only way jurisdiction over foreign corporations can now exist in Pennsylvania is when the corporate defendant is “at home” here in Pennsylvania.  Stated otherwise, the Asbestos Products Liability Litigation case appears to lay down a bright line test that limits jurisdiction in Pennsylvania to those corporations who have a principal place of business in Pennsylvania or which are incorporated in the state of Pennsylvania.

Anyone wishing to review this In re Asbestos Products Liability Litigation (No. IV) decision may click this LINK.

UPDATE:  In an Order dated June 25, 2019, Judge Robreno certified the issue to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals for a decision as an interlocutory appeal. 

I send thanks to Attorneys James M. Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this notable decision to my attention.


Friday, June 7, 2019

Motion to Dismiss Federal Court Breach of Contract and Bad Faith Claims Regarding Fire Loss Granted


In the case of Bloxham v. Allstate Insurance Company, No. 3:19-CV-0481 (M.D. Pa. May 2, 2019 Caputo, J.), the court granted a Motion to Dismiss in a property damage fire loss breach of contract bad faith claim against the carrier, but allowed the Plaintiff the right to file an Amended Complaint.  

According to the Opinion, this case involved a central issue of whether the insureds resided at a property when a fire loss occurred.  

Given this dispute, the carrier denied coverage after concluding that the insured did not reside at the property.    The carrier also pointed to certain alleged misrepresentations that were allegedly made by the insureds in connection with the claim.  

The insureds responded with a lawsuit for breach of contract and bad faith.  

In the Complaint, the Plaintiffs asserted that the property was in fact “occupied” at the time of the fire as the Plaintiffs were completing ongoing repairs and renovations to the dwelling when the loss occurred.

Judge Caputo agreed with the defense argument that, because “Plaintiffs allege not that they resided at the property, but only that they ‘occupied’ the property at the time of the loss as a result of ‘ongoing and continuous repairs and renovations to the dwelling’… that the Plaintiffs had failed to state a breach of contract claim.”  

With regards to the bad faith claims, the court found that the Plaintiff’s allegations in this regard were conclusory in that these allegations offered no facts supporting the sweeping legal allegations of bad faith.  

As noted, the Plaintiff was granted the right to amend their Complaint by the court.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney Lee Applebaum of the Philadelphia law firm of Fineman, Krekstein & Harris.  Attorney Applebaum is also the writer of the excellent Pennsylvania and New Jersey Insurance Bad Faith Case Law blog.  




Wednesday, June 5, 2019

Federal Court Dismisses UIM Bad Faith Claim After Plaintiff Fails at Second Bite at the Apple


In the case of Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Das, No. 18-CV-1613 (E.D. Pa. May 8, 2019 Jones, II, J.), the court granted a Motion to Dismiss a UIM bad faith claim and punitive damages claim with prejudice after a Plaintiff failed at a second attempt to properly pled such a claim after having been given the right to amend.

The court emphasized that “a bad faith claim is ‘fact specific’ and depends upon the insure[r]’s conduct in connection with handling and evaluating a specific claim.”   The court noted that a party bringing the bad faith claim under 42 Pa. C.S.A. §8371, has the burden to “describe who, what, where, when, and how the alleged bad faith conduct occurred.”  

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff added additional allegations in the second attempt to pursue a bad faith claim, including averments that the testimony and information provided by the Plaintiff “clearly demonstrates…that her damages are far in excess of the UIM coverage amount.”   

The Plaintiff also added additional allegations that, despite knowledge that the insured was covered under the policy and that her damages were far in excess of the UIM coverage amount, the carrier refused to honor its obligations under the insurance agreement for the bad faith purpose of seeking to evade their obligations to the Plaintiff under the insurance contract.  

The court observed that these allegations lacked the dates of any of the alleged actions and also noted that the Plaintiffs failed to explain, in detail, what was unfair about the carrier’s interpretations of the policy provisions.  

In its Opinion, the court affirmed the principle that, absent specific details that establish a dishonest purpose, it is not bad faith for a carrier to investigate and protect its own interests during litigation.  

The court additionally noted that the failure of an insurance company to immediately concede to a demand for the policy limits is not, without specific facts, enough to establish a claim for bad faith.  

Finding that the Plaintiff’s additional allegations in the second amended pleading were conclusory, the court granted the Motion to Dismiss.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney Lee Appelbaum of the Philadelphia law firm of Fineman, Krekstein & Harris for bringing this case to my attention.  Check out his excellent Pennsylvania and New Jersey Insurance Bad Faith Case Law Blog.

Summary Judgment Granted in Restaurant Slip and Fall Case


In the case of Watson v. Boston Market, No. 17-5648 (E.D. Pa. March 22, 2019 DuBois, J.), the court granted summary judgment in a slip and fall case after the Plaintiff failed to provide evidence that the Defendant created a harmful condition or had actual or constructive notice of such a condition.  

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff slipped and fell on water on the floor of a restaurant bathroom. Thereafter, the Plaintiff saw water dripping from the ceiling light and onto the floor.  

The record before the court indicated that the restaurant manager testified that the restrooms were inspected on at least an hourly basis and that the subject bathroom had been checked approximately 45 minutes before the Plaintiff fell and that no liquid on the floor was found.  The manager also did not recall water ever dripping from the ceiling.  

In granting summary judgment for the defense, the court noted that the Plaintiff merely asserted, without explanation, that the ceiling was dripping.   The court also found that no evidence was prevented to show that the Defendant knew that there was water on the floor or that the ceiling had leaked on any prior occasion.  

The court also noted that the Plaintiff failed to provide any evidence that the Defendant had constructive notice of any alleged water on the floor where the Plaintiff admitted that there were no footprints, track marks, or slip marks on the floor.  

The court additionally noted that the Plaintiff’s argument that stains on the ceiling proved that the leak in the ceiling was a recurring condition failed because the stains on the ceiling did not, in and of themselves, establish that the Defendant should have been aware of a leaking ceiling or water on the floor on this particular occasion.   It was noted that the Plaintiff did not present any evidence to show that the stains were not old stains from a ceiling air conditioning unit that had been replaced six (6) months before the incident.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions.”  Pennsylvania Law Weekly (April 16, 2019).