Friday, October 30, 2015

Superior Court Addresses Liability of Premises Owner Where Vehicle Strikes Plaintiff On Sidewalk In Front of Premises

In its recent decision in the case of Truax v. Roulhac, No. 1797 EDA 2013, 2015 Pa. Super. 217 (Pa. Super. Oct. 7, 2015) (en banc) (Op. by Mundy, J.) (Jenkins, J., dissenting), the Pennsylvania Superior Court addressed the liability of premises owners relative to a pedestrian who was injured when a vehicle drove onto the sidewalk area in front of the Defendants' buildings and pinned the Plaintiff to the buildings resulting in personal injuries.

According to the Opinion, in the area of the accident, the parking lot surface was level with the sidewalk area. The only barrier to vehicles between the parking lot area and the sidewalk area was a five (5) inch tall concrete wheel stop.

The pedestrian Plaintiff was injured by a DUI driver who drove over the wheel stop and struck the Plaintiff.

During the course of the litigation, the premises owners Defendants filed separate Motions for Summary Judgment asserting, in part, that the harm was not foreseeable because the premises owners were unaware any similar incidents of motor vehicles jumping the wheel stops.

The premises owners Defendants also argued that they were under no duty to install any other types of barriers to separate the parking lot from the sidewalk area.

One the premises owners Defendants also asserted that he had maintained his duty as a possessor of land because the wheel stops comply with applicable zoning ordinances governing commercial off street parking.

An initial panel of the Pennsylvania Superior Court had previously issued a Memorandum Opinion affirming the granting of summary judgment. With this re-argument en banc, the Superior Court reversed the remanded the case for further proceedings.

After reviewing the law of premises liability, and in particular, the highest duty of care owed to business invitees, the en banc Superior Court found that it was reasonably foreseeable that a vehicle operated by a third party could encroach upon the sidewalk such that the premises owners had a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect its business invitees from that harm. The Superior Court noted that there was sufficient evidence, including expert opinion evidence, supporting the Plaintiff’s claims. The Court found that, reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the injured party, required that the issues be allowed to proceed to a jury for a determination.

The Superior Court noted its disagreement with the trial court’s Opinion that the risk of a vehicle encroaching upon a sidewalk is per se unforeseeable as a matter of law. Rather, the issue of foreseeability in this regard should be submitted to a jury unless the Plaintiff altogether fails to present evidence on that issue.

On the second issue, the Superior Court agreed with the Plaintiff’s contention that the trial court erred by concluding the premises owners discharged their duty as a matter of law by complying with applicable building codes and ordinances. The Superior Court found that, while compliance with law or administrative regulation can, at times, relieve the tortfeasor from a finding of negligence per se, such compliance does not establish, as a matter of law, that due care was exercised.

Accordingly, the court stated that, although a defendant can introduce evidence of its compliance with the law or regulation as evidence of the exercise of due care, compliance with that law regulation does not prevent a finding of negligence where a jury could find that a reasonable person would have taken additional precautions.

Turning the facts of the case before, the Superior Court found that, while the premises owners’ maintenance of concrete wheel stops in accord with applicable building codes and ordinances could be evidence of the premises owners’ exercise of due care, such evidence was not conclusive on the issue of whether or not the premises owners exercises due care as a matter of law so as to relieve them of liability. Rather, these issues should have been allowed by the trial court to proceed to the jury.

Consequently, the Superior Court reversed the trial court’s entry of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. Judge Jenkins filed a dissenting Opinion.

Anyone wishing to review the Majority Opinion in Truax online may click this LINK.

Judge Jenkins Dissenting Opinion in Truax can be viewed Here.


I send thanks to Attorney Thomas J. Foley, III of the Foley Law Firm in Scranton for providing me with a copy of this decision. Attorney Foley served as the Amicus Brief writer for the Pennsylvania Association for Justice in this matter.  

Judge Mannion of Federal Middle District Court Tackles Sackett Rejection of Stacking Analysis

In his recent memorandum decision in the case of Mitchell v. Progressive Pref. Ins. Co., No. 3:14-0384 (M.D.Pa. Sept. 29, 2015 Mannion, J.), Judge Malachy E. Mannion  granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendant carrier on a stacking issue after a review of the Sackett line of cases.

As the Sackett analysis can be convoluted, a link to the decision is provided below for review.

Judge Malachy E. Mannion
Federal Middle District Court
Ultimately, the court ruled that the carrier was not required to obtain a new rejection of stacking issue when the Plaintiff added a vehicle (motorcycle) to the policy.  Judge Mannion based his decision upon the application of the continuous "after-acquired" clause contained in the policy.

Anyone wishing to review this decision in detail may click this LINK

I send thanks to Attorney David Friedman of the King of Prussia law office of Forry Ullman for bringing this case to my attention.



Western District Federal Court Applies Sackett Analysis to Find That New Waiver Forms Not Required

In the Western District Federal Court case of Allstate v. Gierlach, No. 2:13-cv-699 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 2015 Cercone, J.), the court granted the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Allstate in a declaratory judgment matter on a waiver of UIM coverage issue.  
By way of background, the policyholder rejected UIM coverage when the policy was initiated and coverage was provided on one (1) personal automobile vehicle. Thereafter, another vehicle was added and no new form was secured.

In the underlying matter, the insured’s resident son sustained fatal injuries in a motor vehicle accident.

The insured’s attorney attempted to raise a Sackett argument and asserted that a new form should have been secured when another vehicle was added to the policy. Allstate disagreed and filed the declaratory judgment action.

After reviewing the current status of the Sackett analysis under Pennsylvania law, Judge Cercone entered summary judgment in favor of Allstate. The court, relying upon the Pennsylvania Superior Court decision in the case of Smith v. The Hartford Ins. Co., 849 A.2d 277, 280-81 (Pa. Super. 2004) noted that the plain language of §1731 and 1791 under the Motor Vehicle Code evidenced the intent of the Pennsylvania legislature that, once properly waived, UIM coverage need not be reinstated absent affirmative action on the part of the insureds.

Judge Cercone noted that the holding in Smith was reinforced by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in the Sackett case. Judge Cercone stated that the law can be summarized as establishing that "a decision to reject UIM benefits carries forward until affirmatively changed. [There is nothing in [Section] 1731 counseling otherwise.]" [citation omitted].

Judge Cercone found that due to the uinsured’s wholesale waiver of UIM benefits available under the policy, the addition of cars to the policy at a later date was not considered to be a "subsequent purchase of UIM coverage," and was, therefore, not sufficient to constitute affirmative action by the insured’s reinstate UIM coverage.

Based on this analysis, the court granted the Motion for Summary Judgment on Allstate and found that the insured’s prior valid waiver of UIM coverage carried forward when new cause was added to the policy. 


Anyone wishing to review the Allstate v. Gierlach decision may click this LINK.

Wednesday, October 28, 2015

Judge Nealon Allows NIED Claim To Proceed in Med Mal Case


In his recent October 19, 2015 decision, in the case of Euceda v. Green, No. 13-Civil-3373 (Lacka. Co. Oct. 19, 2015 Nealon, J.), Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas addressed a Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment filed against a Plaintiff’s negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) claim in the context of a medical malpractice case.  

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff-mother made a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress after witnessing the traumatic birth of her son who was born with a severely misshaped and bruised head allegedly as a result of the Defendants’ negligence.  The Plaintiff-mother also allegedly witnessed the postpartum seizures that her son suffered, the neonatal resuscitation and intubation that her son required, other treatment administered to her son, and her son’s eventual death in her arms eight (8) days after his birth.

Judge Terrence R. Nealon
Lackawanna County
Judge Nealon also noted that there is evidence in the record allegedly showing that, as a result of the Plaintiff-mother’s contemporaneous observance of the above incidents, the Plaintiff-mother continued to experience severe depression, bouts of hysterical sobbing, inability to breath, nausea, insomnia, and nightmares about her son’s delivery, physical appearance at birth, and death.

The Defendants in this medical malpractice action filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment seeking to dismiss the Plaintiff-mother’s claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress on the basis that the Plaintiff-mother could not demonstrate her physical manifestation of her emotional distress and given that the Plaintiff-mother had not received any psychiatric or psychological care for her depression.

Judge Nealon denied the motion and allowed the claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress to proceed.

The court ruled, in part, that, although it was undisputed that the Plaintiff-mother had not received any professional medical treatment for her depression for emotional state, or emotional state, the court found that medical evidence is not required to sustain a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. In this regard, Judge Nealon cited to Krysmalski by Krysmalski v. Tarasovich, 622 A.2d 298, 305 (Pa. Super. 1993), appeal denied, 636 A.2d 634 (Pa. 1993) [other citations omitted].

Moreover, Judge Nealon found that the bodily symptoms evidence in the record before the court as reportedly sustained by the Plaintiff-mother on a recurrent basis served to satisfy the "physical manifestation" requirement for a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress under Pennsylvania law.

Accordingly, the court ruled that the Defendants had not established that the mother’s claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress was fatally deficient. The Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was denied and the claim was allowed to proceed.


Anyone wishing to review Judge Nealon's decision in Euceda may click this LINK.


 
 

Monday, October 26, 2015

Pa.R.C.P. 211 Amended To Reaffirm Right To Oral Argument On any Motion


The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has amended Pa.R.C.P. 211, pertaining to "Oral Argument," to address a discrepancy between the former Rule 211 and recent appellate decisions on the right of a party to conduct oral argument on any motion filed.

The Amended Rule clarifies that any party, or any interested party, may have oral argument on any motion filed.  The Amended Rule also confirms that the court can require oral argument if none is requested by the parties.  Under the Rule, the court still retains the right to decide the matter without oral argument if all parties agree to the same.

Here is a LINK to Rule 211 as amended, and here is a LINK to the Explanatory Note.


Source of image:  www.virginiaappellatelaw.com

Another Trial Court Crafts Another Remedy for Parameters of Neuropsychological IMEs



Another trial court decision regarding the permissible parameters of a neuropsychological examination is the Delaware County 1case (from a year ago) of D'Aurizio v. Rota, No. 2013-008170 (C.P. Del. Co. Dec. 2, 2014 Green, J.).

In this Order without Opinion, the court ordered the plaintiff to attend the neuropsychological IME but also mandated that the plaintiff's attorney would be permitted to be present during the interview portion of the exam and that the testing portion of the neuropsychological exam could be videotaped but without an audio component.

The defense was also ordered to share any neuropsychological testing data with the plaintiff's expert after the completion of the exam.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this Order may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.

Here's a LINK to a Pennsylvania Law Weekly article of mine two years ago on the topic.

To review other more recent Tort Talk posts on the permissible parameters of neuropsychological IMEs as determined by trial courts from around the Commonwealth in the absence of appellate guidance, click HERE and HERE.

I send thanks to Attorney Dale Larrimore of the Philadelphia law firm of Larrimore & Farnish, LLP for bringing this case to my attention.


Wednesday, October 21, 2015

Superior Court Affirms Analysis for Motion For Remittitur

Some Tort Talkers may recall that the Montgomery Court of Common Pleas decision in the case of Carassai v. Echelmeier, No. 2007-CV-04081 (C.P. Mont. Co. Dec. 8, 2014, Rogers, J.), outlining the standard of review for a motion for remittitur, was summarized in a Tort Talk post at this LINK.  In that case, the jury had awarded a personal injury plaintiff $1 million dollars.

UPDATE:  The Pennsylvania Superior Court has affirmed the trial court's decision in a non-precedential opinion at Carassai v. Echelmeier, 2993 EDA 2014 (Pa.Super. Oct. 16, 2015 Bowes, Mundy, and Fitzgerald, J.)(Mem. Op. by Bowes, J.).  That decision, which outlines the current status of the law on such motions, can be reviewed HERE.

I send thanks to Attorney Charles W. Campbell, a solo practitioner in Norristown, PA for bringing this update to my attention.