Here is a LINK to the amended Pa.R.E. 611(c)(2) which governs the court's discretion to control the direct and cross-examinations of witnesses at trial. The amendment is effective immediately.
The amendments pertain to the scope of the court's discretion to allow leading questions to be posed to a hostile witness.
It would appear that this amendment may have more impact in criminal trials, but would also be applicable in a civil trial whenever a witness may properly be deemed to be hostile to the questioning attorney's client.
Friday, September 19, 2014
Thursday, September 18, 2014
Defense Verdict in Post-Koken UM Case Upheld
In Senese v.
Liberty Mutual, Inc., No. 13-5139 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 19, 2014 Schiller, J.),the
Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denied a
Plaintiff's post-trial motions after a defense verdict in a UM jury trial.
The Plaintiff alleged that he sustained personal injuries when an unidentified other driver caused the Plaintiff to crash into a parked car.
After trial at which the liability issues were bifurcated from the damages issues, the jury found that an unidentified motorist did indeed exist and was negligent. However, the jury also found that the unidentified driver's negligence was not the factual cause of the accident.
In post-trial motions the court found that there was no error in precluding the insured’s expert accident reconstructionist's testimony since it was not deemed reliable nor would it aid the jury under the Daubert analysis. The trial court also held that it was not error to hold a Daubert hearing on the admissibility of expert evidence where, as here, the court could make an admissibility determination on the basis of the content of the expert's report and the bases for the opinion listed in the expert's report.
The court also found no error in its allowing the Plaintiff to testify that the unidentified driver was traveling at a high rate of speed and accelerating but precluding the Plaintiff from testifying how fast the other drive was going in terms of miles per hour. The court noted that there was no foundation to support allowing the Plaintiff to give more specific testimony on speed.
The Court also found that, under the case presented, there was a reasonable basis for the jury to find that the unidentified vehicle did not cause the accident and that the accident would have occurred anyway. As stated, post-trial motions were denied.
Anyone wishing to review this Opinion, may click this LINK.
I send thanks to Attorney Scott Cooper of the Harrisburg law firm of Schmidt Kramer for bringing this case to my attention. Please note that Attorney Cooper will be a featured presenter at the upcoming Tort Talk Expo September 26, 2014. Please click HERE to Register online or shoot an email to dancummins@comcast.net.
The Plaintiff alleged that he sustained personal injuries when an unidentified other driver caused the Plaintiff to crash into a parked car.
After trial at which the liability issues were bifurcated from the damages issues, the jury found that an unidentified motorist did indeed exist and was negligent. However, the jury also found that the unidentified driver's negligence was not the factual cause of the accident.
In post-trial motions the court found that there was no error in precluding the insured’s expert accident reconstructionist's testimony since it was not deemed reliable nor would it aid the jury under the Daubert analysis. The trial court also held that it was not error to hold a Daubert hearing on the admissibility of expert evidence where, as here, the court could make an admissibility determination on the basis of the content of the expert's report and the bases for the opinion listed in the expert's report.
The court also found no error in its allowing the Plaintiff to testify that the unidentified driver was traveling at a high rate of speed and accelerating but precluding the Plaintiff from testifying how fast the other drive was going in terms of miles per hour. The court noted that there was no foundation to support allowing the Plaintiff to give more specific testimony on speed.
The Court also found that, under the case presented, there was a reasonable basis for the jury to find that the unidentified vehicle did not cause the accident and that the accident would have occurred anyway. As stated, post-trial motions were denied.
Anyone wishing to review this Opinion, may click this LINK.
I send thanks to Attorney Scott Cooper of the Harrisburg law firm of Schmidt Kramer for bringing this case to my attention. Please note that Attorney Cooper will be a featured presenter at the upcoming Tort Talk Expo September 26, 2014. Please click HERE to Register online or shoot an email to dancummins@comcast.net.
No Strict Liability in Dog Bite Cases
In the recent Lycoming County decision in the case of Warner v. Campbell, PICS Case No. 14-1352 (C.P. Lycoming Co. Aug. 4, 2014 Anderson, J.), the court granted a defendant's motion to dismiss a plaintiff's strict liability medical expenses claim in a dog bite case.
According to a summary of the decision, the plaintiffs were, in essence, asserting in their Complaint that the defendant dog owner was strictly liable under Section 459-502 of Pennsylvania's "Dog Law" for medical expenses incurred as a result of a dog bite.
The defense filed preliminary objections and asserted that Pennsylvania law did not recognize strict liability in this regard. The court agreed relying, in part, on the case of Rosenberry v. Evans which required proof of a dog owner's negligence before liability could be found.
To view an unsigned copy of this Opinion and Order online, click HERE.
A copy of this decision can also be secured by contacting the Instant Case Service of the Pennsylvania Law Weekly at 1-800-276-7427 and providing the above PICS Case No. and paying a small fee.
According to a summary of the decision, the plaintiffs were, in essence, asserting in their Complaint that the defendant dog owner was strictly liable under Section 459-502 of Pennsylvania's "Dog Law" for medical expenses incurred as a result of a dog bite.
The defense filed preliminary objections and asserted that Pennsylvania law did not recognize strict liability in this regard. The court agreed relying, in part, on the case of Rosenberry v. Evans which required proof of a dog owner's negligence before liability could be found.
To view an unsigned copy of this Opinion and Order online, click HERE.
A copy of this decision can also be secured by contacting the Instant Case Service of the Pennsylvania Law Weekly at 1-800-276-7427 and providing the above PICS Case No. and paying a small fee.
Wednesday, September 17, 2014
REMINDER: NEW LOCATON FOR TORT TALK EXPO - AT THE MOHEGAN SUN CASINO HOTEL
For those of you attending next Friday's (September 26th) Tort Talk Expo 2014 CLE Seminar, please note that the seminar will NOT be in the same downstairs area ballroom as in past years.
Rather, the Seminar will take place in a ballroom known as "THE CONVENTION CENTER" in the NEW MOHEGAN SUN HOTEL AREA located adjacent to the casino.
Self-parking is available by turning right at the third Stop sign once you enter the casino complex. You may also reach Valet parking by continuing down that same road further on after you have made that right hand turn at the third Stop Sign.
Also, weather permitting, the Cocktail Reception following the Seminar will be held on an outdoor terrace complete with a fire pit. If the weather does not permit an outside Cocktail Reception, the Reception will take place in Breakers, as usual.
Mall Employee Can Be Business Invitee in Premises Liability Case
In a recent Lackawanna
County Court of Common
Pleas decision by a visiting Senior Judge in the case of Young v. Prizm Asset Management Company, No. 2010-CV-8445 (C.P.
Lacka. Co. Nov. 4, 2013, Saxton, J), the
trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendant landowner in a
case in which the Plaintiff, a mall employee, allegedly sustained personal injuries as a result of a criminal
assault in the parking garage of the Steamtown Mall in Scranton,
Pennsylvania.
After reviewing the records before it, the trial court had ultimately ruled that there was no evidence to establish a genuine question of material fact as to any alleged duty owed or breached by the Steamtown Mall. As such, the summary judgment motion was granted at the trial court level.
UPDATE: This Young decision was appealed and, under an Opinion and Order written by Judge David N. Wecht of the Pennsylvania Superior Court, the decision of the trial court judge granting summary judgment was reversed.
After a thorough analysis of the premises liability
law pertaining to the duty owed by landowners to protect business invitees on
the premises from the criminal acts of third parties, the Pennsylvania Superior
Court in Young v. Prizm Asset Management
Company, 2014 Pa. Super. 195, No. 2078 MDA 2013 (Pa. Super. Sept. 9, 2014 Lazarus, J., Wecht, J.,
Musmanno, J.)(Op. by Wecht, J.), held that the trial court correctly ruled that
the Plaintiff, who was a mall employee, could be deemed to be a business
invitee under the applicable law set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts
Section 344.
However, the Superior Court went on to find that genuine issues of material fact existed to be decided by the jury on whether or not the landowner defendant owed and breached a duty of care to the Plaintiff. As such, the entry of summary judgment by the trial court in favor of the defendants was reversed and the case remanded.
Should you have a case involving a business invitee plaintiff allegedly injured as a result of criminal acts of a third party, the Young Opinion presents as the latest pronouncement by the Pennsylvania Superior Court of the applicable law and analysis of potential liability on the part of a defendant landowner.
After reviewing the records before it, the trial court had ultimately ruled that there was no evidence to establish a genuine question of material fact as to any alleged duty owed or breached by the Steamtown Mall. As such, the summary judgment motion was granted at the trial court level.
UPDATE: This Young decision was appealed and, under an Opinion and Order written by Judge David N. Wecht of the Pennsylvania Superior Court, the decision of the trial court judge granting summary judgment was reversed.
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| Judge David N. Wecht Pennsylvania Superior Court |
However, the Superior Court went on to find that genuine issues of material fact existed to be decided by the jury on whether or not the landowner defendant owed and breached a duty of care to the Plaintiff. As such, the entry of summary judgment by the trial court in favor of the defendants was reversed and the case remanded.
Should you have a case involving a business invitee plaintiff allegedly injured as a result of criminal acts of a third party, the Young Opinion presents as the latest pronouncement by the Pennsylvania Superior Court of the applicable law and analysis of potential liability on the part of a defendant landowner.
Anyone wishing to review this Opinion may click HERE.
Tuesday, September 16, 2014
Hills and Ridges Doctrine Applies to Naturally Accumulating Snow and Ice
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| Natural accumulation of snow |
In the unpublished, "Non-precedential" decision of the Pennsylvania Superior Court in the case of Stobodzian v. PNC Fin. Serv. Grp., No. 33 MDA 2014 (Pa. Super. Aug. 5, 2014) (Memorandum Op.) (Lazarus, J., Wecht, J., Musmanno, J.) Opinion by Lazarus, J.), the court ruled that the trial court property applied the hills and ridges jury instruction where the Plaintiff asserted that he was injured as a result of a slip and fall in a bank parking lot due to a natural accumulation of snow.
At trial, evidence was produced that snow fall on February 10, 2010 was approximately 22 inches and that it stopped snowing on the morning of February 11, 2010 at approximately 9:00 a.m. The Plaintiff fell the following day, February 12, 2010.
After a trial on the issues presented, the jury entered a defense verdict. The trial court denied the Plaintiff’s Motions Not Withstanding the Verdict and for a new trial.
One of the issues on appeal involved the Plaintiff’s argument that the trial court should not applied the hills and ridges doctrine jury instruction under the circumstances presented. The court rejected the Plaintiff’s argument that the slush in the parking lot area was an artificial condition created by human intervention in the form of vehicles pulling into the parking lot and dragging snow and slush with them. The court noted that the evidence established that generally slippery conditions existed in the community due to a natural accumulation of recent snow fall. Under such circumstances, the hills and ridges jury instruction was deemed appropriate.
Anyone wishing to review this non-precedential decision may click this LINK.
Source of snowfall image: www.ktsm.com
Sheet of Ice is Not a Hill or Ridge of Ice or Snow
In their recent unpublished, "non-precedential" decision in the case
of McLamb v. Supervalu, Inc., No. 2139 MDA 2013
(Pa. Super. Aug. 15, 2014 Shogan, J., Lazarus, J., Musmanno, J.)(Op. by Shogan, J.), the Pennsylvania
Superior Court affirmed the entry of summary judgment in favor of a Defendant
landowner in a case involving an independent contractor who was allegedly
injured after allegedly falling on ice and snow while returning the Defendant’s
tractor to its lot after delivering goods.
According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff picked up a trailer from the Defendant’s distribution center and delivered goods to Philadelphia before returning to the Harrisburg area, all under snowstorm conditions. When the Plaintiff arrived back in Harrisburg, it was still snowing as he went to the Defendant’s lot to return the trailer. After the Plaintiff parked the trailer in the designated spot, he got out and slipped and fell when he went to uncouple the lines from the trailer.
The Defendant moved for summary judgment based upon the hills and ridges doctrine.
The court reviewed the law of the hills and ridges doctrine and emphasized that, under the test provided, the landowner was protected from liability for generally slippery conditions from ice and snow where the owner did not permit the ice and snow to unreasonably accumulate in ridges or elevations.
The Plaintiff attempted to argue that genuine issues of material facts existed as to whether the conditions were caused naturally or were man-made. The Plaintiff stated that the conditions that caused his fall may have been the result of heavy foot traffic from other loading and unloading trailers in the area.
However, the court rejected that argument and indicated that the records establish that snow had been falling since the evening before the accident and it was clear that generally slippery conditions prevailed in the community such that the hills and ridges doctrine applied.
The court also noted that Plaintiff’s testimony that the lot had not been plowed or salted and was covered due to the continuing snow fall showed nothing that would suggest any human intervention in the condition of the lot.
Moreover, the court noted that the Plaintiff admitted that the area where he fell looked “like a sheet of ice.”
Accordingly, the Superior Court ruled that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment and dismissing the Complaint.
According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff picked up a trailer from the Defendant’s distribution center and delivered goods to Philadelphia before returning to the Harrisburg area, all under snowstorm conditions. When the Plaintiff arrived back in Harrisburg, it was still snowing as he went to the Defendant’s lot to return the trailer. After the Plaintiff parked the trailer in the designated spot, he got out and slipped and fell when he went to uncouple the lines from the trailer.
The Defendant moved for summary judgment based upon the hills and ridges doctrine.
The court reviewed the law of the hills and ridges doctrine and emphasized that, under the test provided, the landowner was protected from liability for generally slippery conditions from ice and snow where the owner did not permit the ice and snow to unreasonably accumulate in ridges or elevations.
The Plaintiff attempted to argue that genuine issues of material facts existed as to whether the conditions were caused naturally or were man-made. The Plaintiff stated that the conditions that caused his fall may have been the result of heavy foot traffic from other loading and unloading trailers in the area.
However, the court rejected that argument and indicated that the records establish that snow had been falling since the evening before the accident and it was clear that generally slippery conditions prevailed in the community such that the hills and ridges doctrine applied.
The court also noted that Plaintiff’s testimony that the lot had not been plowed or salted and was covered due to the continuing snow fall showed nothing that would suggest any human intervention in the condition of the lot.
Moreover, the court noted that the Plaintiff admitted that the area where he fell looked “like a sheet of ice.”
Accordingly, the Superior Court ruled that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment and dismissing the Complaint.
Anyone wishing to review this unpublished, non-precedential decision may click this LINK.
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