Below is a reprint of an article of mine from the July 26, 2011 Pennsylvania Law Weekly in which I update the current status of Pennsylvania law and civil litigation on legislative bans against cell phone use while driving.
Call Me From the Road
Lehigh County decision halts trends on banning cell phone use behind the wheel
By
Daniel E. Cummins
2011-07-26 Pennsylvania Law Weekly
In a 2010 column headlined "Hang Up and Drive: Lawmakers and Courts Tackle the Dangers of Cellular Phone Use by Drivers," I analyzed the current legislative and common law trends related to cell phone use while driving.
At that time, the trend involved various municipalities across the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania passing local ordinances banning or limiting the use of mobile communications devices while driving along with Pennsylvania trial courts considering the allowance of punitive damages claims based upon allegations that a defendant driver was using a cell phone at the time of the accident.
Both the legislative and common law trends appear to have come to a screeching halt with the issuance of a May 4 Lehigh County trial court decision by Judge James T. Anthony in the case of Commonwealth v. Steiner in which the court found that Allentown's local ordinance against cell phone use while driving was invalid.
Legislative Trends
The Pennsylvania General Assembly continues to volley legislation on bans against texting and cell phone while driving back and forth between the House and the Senate.
The state Senate did recently approve legislation in the form of SB 314 that would ban texting and use of handheld cell phones while driving. A June 7 amendment changed that Senate bill calling for primary enforcement for texting and driving, but only secondary enforcement for handheld cell phone use. SB 314 has since moved back to the state House of Representatives for further consideration.
The House had previously signed off on a plan under HB 896 to add a $50 fine for drivers whose traffic violations could be tracked back to a distracted driving behavior, including cell phone use. Police would have to write a ticket for the traffic offense — such as speeding or weaving — before adding on the distracted driving fine. HB 896 has moved on to the Senate for consideration.
While the above bills, as well as other similar legislation, continue to be bandied about by the General Assembly, there is currently no statewide prohibition against texting or cell phone use while driving in Pennsylvania.
In the absence of statewide legislation in this regard, many municipalities across Pennsylvania have moved ahead to enact local ordinances on their own.
Of the larger Pennsylvania cities, driving while texting or talking on a cell phone in hand has been banned in Philadelphia and Harrisburg. In both Philadelphia and Harrisburg, talking on a cell phone in a hands-free fashion is still permissible.
Other places across Pennsylvania like Wilkes-Barre, Carbondale, Erie, Bensalem, Lower Chichester in Delaware County, Plymouth Township in Montgomery County, Conshohocken, Lebanon, Bethlehem and Allentown have likewise banned or limited texting and other cell phone use by drivers in one form or another. There may also be other jurisdictions out there that have also enacted bans or are contemplating passing such legislation.
Common Law Trends
The topic of punishing drivers for cell phone use has also come up in the context of recent trial court opinions in motor vehicle accident cases on the issue of whether or not an injured party plaintiff could pursue punitive damages against a defendant driver who was texting or using a cell phone at the time of an accident.
In his Jan. 14, 2010 decision in Linehan v. Jaludi , Pike County Common Pleas Court Judge Gregory H. Chelak of the Pike County Court of Common Pleas addressed the novel issue of whether a plaintiff may pursue a claim for punitive damages on the basis that the defendant was talking on cell phone allegedly to the point of distraction at the time of a car accident.
The plaintiff in Linehan was a police officer whose police vehicle was stopped on the side of the road with the flashing lights activated. Another vehicle was stopped in front of the plaintiff's police car.
The defendant, while driving and purportedly talking away on her cell phone, allegedly drifted off the roadway and crashed into the police car while the plaintiff police officer was inside of the car, resulting in personal injuries to the plaintiff, according to the opinion.
The plaintiff police officer later filed a negligence complaint in which a punitive damages claim was asserted, in part, on the basis of allegations that the defendant was using a cell phone at the time of the accident. The defendant driver filed preliminary objections to the punitive damages claim.
Chelak sustained the defendant's preliminary objections and granted the motion to strike the claim for punitive damages. It was held that the allegations of the complaint — that the defendant was so distracted by her cell phone conversation that she crashed into the plaintiff's police car with its flashing lights — were insufficient, in and of themselves, to support the punitive damages claim at this initial posture of the case.
However, citing the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania case of Pennington v. King , as offering support for a punitive damages claim based upon a driver being distracted by cell phone use, the Pike County court noted that, if discovery turned out to confirm the alleged cell phone use and distraction, by way of cell phone records or otherwise, the plaintiff would have the right to seek to amend the complaint in an effort to support the possibility of restating the punitive damages claim. As one of the defense counsel in that case, I can report that it still remains to be seen if this issue will develop any further in that case.
More recently, Judge Michael E. McCarthy of the Allegheny County Common Pleas Court did allow such a punitive damages claim to go forward beyond the preliminary objections stage in an order he issued without an opinion in the 2010 case Deringer v. Li .
In Deringer , the plaintiff alleged, on information and belief, that the defendant engaged in reckless conduct by using a mobile device at the time he rear-ended the plaintiff's motorcycle which was allegedly stopped to make a left turn.
The defendants filed preliminary objections to the plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages. The defense argued that such conduct only amounted to negligence and did not support any claim for punitive damages. The defendant also argued that, to date, the Pennsylvania legislature has not made cell phone use while operating a car illegal.
In overruling the preliminary objections filed by the defendant, McCarthy did note in his order that "[t]he arguments may be more appropriately raised and addressed by motion for summary judgment."
Such a claim for punitive damages has also been allowed to proceed beyond the preliminary objections stage in the Fayette County Court of Common Pleas case of Hall v. Chritchfield .
A Screeching Halt to the Trends
The validity of the various local law bans, as well as the court decisions allowing for punitive damages, may have all been called into question by a Lehigh County criminal court decision finding the ban enacted by Allentown to be invalid.
In the May 2011 Lehigh County Common Pleas Court case of Steiner , Judge James T. Anthony ruled that an Allentown City ordinance prohibiting the use of a cell phone while operating a motor vehicle was invalid because the state legislature intended that all motor vehicle regulations be uniform throughout the state. Anthony held that the Allentown local ordinance would subject motorists to unreasonable inconsistencies contrary to the purpose of the Vehicle Code.
In the criminal case of Steiner , the defendant was charged with violating the ordinance for using a mobile phone while operating his vehicle. The defendant was found guilty and filed a summary appeal. Following the summary appeal hearing, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the ordinance was pre-empted by the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code.
After reviewing the law of pre-emption, Anthony ruled that the Pennsylvania Legislature intended that motor vehicle regulations be uniform throughout the Commonwealth and that local municipalities needed express authorization to enact any ordinances on any matter covered by the Vehicle Code. Thus, for the ordinance at issue to be valid, there must be specific authorization in the Vehicle Code permitting the city of Allentown to enact such an ordinance. The court found that no such authorization existed.
The Lehigh County trial court noted that Section 6109 of the Vehicle Code does provide that its provisions shall not be deemed to prevent local authorities from the reasonable exercise of their police powers. That section provides 23 specific examples of regulations that are presumed to be reasonable in this regard. However, none of the 23 examples authorized the action taken by the city in enacting the ordinance pertaining to the prohibition of cell phone use while driving.
The court also noted that the local ordinance did not provide notice to motorists entering into Allentown that cell phone use was forbidden in that jurisdiction. Anthony stated that "[a] motorist could be utilizing a cell phone while driving in a municipality without a ban and, moments later, be unaware that he was violating the ordinance" while entering Allentown.
Anthony found that exposing drivers to such an inconsistency could not be considered reasonable and was contrary to the intended purpose of the Motor Vehicle Code. As such, the court found Allentown Ordinance 14782 invalid and the defendant's motion to dismiss was granted.
There have been reports of a similar decision by a district magistrate judge out of Harrisburg. A local district magistrate judge in Harrisburg likewise reportedly ruled the local ban against using electronic mobile devices while driving in that city unconstitutional based upon lack of notice to motorists entering that city.
Impact on Future Cases
Perhaps the Steiner decision out of Lehigh County will serve as an impetus to compel the Pennsylvania legislature to finalize and pass a statewide law regarding the use of cell phone or texting devices while driving.
In the meantime, in civil matters where there is an allegation of negligence or claims for punitive damages on the part of any driver involved based upon that driver's alleged use of a cell phone at the time of an accident in violation of a local ordinance, Steiner may serve to ultimately defeat such allegations.
Daniel E. Cummins is a partner and civil litigator with the Scranton law firm of Foley Cognetti Comerford Cimini & Cummins. His civil litigation blog, "Tort Talk," may be viewed at www.torttalk.com.
Thursday, July 28, 2011
ARTICLE: Call Me From the Road
Labels:
Automobile Law,
Cell Phone Use,
Cummins,
Damages,
Evidence,
Punitive Damages
Latest Luzerne County Post-Koken Decision in Favor of Consolidation of Claims
Senior Judge Chester Muroski has issued the latest Luzerne County post-Koken decision in favor of the consolidation of claims in Korona v. Kemler and Mercury Insurance, No. 328 of 2011(Luz. Co. 2011 Muroski, S.J.). The court denied the tortfeasor's Preliminary Objections claiming a misjoinder of actions. The decision was by Order only.
Anyone desiring a copy of the Order may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.
Anyone desiring a copy of the Order may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.
Wednesday, July 27, 2011
Access to Plaintiff's Facebook Page Allowed in Federal Middle District Court Personal Injury Matter
Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson of U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania recently reviewed the issue of whether information contained within a party's Facebook account is properly subject to discovery in the case of Offenback v. L.M. Bowman, Inc., 2011 WL 2491371 (M.D.Pa. June 22, 2011 Carlson, M.J.)
This matter involved a November of 2008 motor vehicle accident that allegedly resulted in severe injuries for the plaintiff limiting his ability to sit, walk, stand, bend, stoop, push, pull and lift. The plaintiff also specifically claimed that he could not drive for any period of time and was physically limited with regard to riding his bicycle or motorcycle.
In discovery, the defendant requested access to the plaintiff's Facebook page under Fed.R.C.P. 26(b)(1). The court granted the request of both parties that the court conduct an in camera review of the Facebook page as part of the court's analysis.
After this in camera review of the plaintiff's Facebook account, the court found that much of the information on the page was irrelevant, but that the postings on the page suggesting that plaintiff engaged in certain activities after the car accident were discoverable.
More specifically, the court found that postings showing the plaintiff had taken post-accident motorcycle rides, mule rides and hunting trips were relevant and discoverable in light of plaintiff's claims of functional limitations in this matter.
Anyone desiring a copy of the decision by the U.S. Magistrate Judge (an Order only with explanatory commentary) in Offenback v. L.M. Bowman, Inc. may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.
This matter involved a November of 2008 motor vehicle accident that allegedly resulted in severe injuries for the plaintiff limiting his ability to sit, walk, stand, bend, stoop, push, pull and lift. The plaintiff also specifically claimed that he could not drive for any period of time and was physically limited with regard to riding his bicycle or motorcycle.
In discovery, the defendant requested access to the plaintiff's Facebook page under Fed.R.C.P. 26(b)(1). The court granted the request of both parties that the court conduct an in camera review of the Facebook page as part of the court's analysis.
After this in camera review of the plaintiff's Facebook account, the court found that much of the information on the page was irrelevant, but that the postings on the page suggesting that plaintiff engaged in certain activities after the car accident were discoverable.
More specifically, the court found that postings showing the plaintiff had taken post-accident motorcycle rides, mule rides and hunting trips were relevant and discoverable in light of plaintiff's claims of functional limitations in this matter.
Anyone desiring a copy of the decision by the U.S. Magistrate Judge (an Order only with explanatory commentary) in Offenback v. L.M. Bowman, Inc. may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.
Labels:
Discovery Issues,
Social Networking Sites
Tuesday, July 26, 2011
PLEASE SAVE THE DATE - AUGUST 24, 2011 - PDI/NEPATLA CLE SEMINAR AT MOHEGAN SUN CASINO - WILKES-BARRE, PA
The August 24, 2011 Pennsylvania Defense Institute/Northeastern Pennsylvania Trial Lawyers Association CLE seminar at the Mohegan Sun Casino in Wilkes-Barre, PA is now less than 30 days away.
The program is shaping up to be a nice event at the Mohegan Sun Casino in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania where there will be raffle prizes, giveaways by the table vendor companies, and a networking cocktail reception at which Attorney John Aponick and Attorney Tom Foley, Jr. will be honored for their 50 years in the practice of law.
I hope you will consider joining us. Here's the Ad for the seminar:
The program is shaping up to be a nice event at the Mohegan Sun Casino in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania where there will be raffle prizes, giveaways by the table vendor companies, and a networking cocktail reception at which Attorney John Aponick and Attorney Tom Foley, Jr. will be honored for their 50 years in the practice of law.
I hope you will consider joining us. Here's the Ad for the seminar:
CIVIL LITIGATION DEVELOPMENTS 2011
CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION SEMINAR
Honoring John J. Aponick, Jr. & Thomas J. Foley, Jr.
for their 50 Years in Practice of Law
Sponsored by
THE PENNSYLVANIA DEFENSE INSTITUTE
and
THE NORTHEAST PENNSYLVANIA TRIAL LAWYERS ASSOCIATION
MOHEGAN SUN CASINO at POCONO DOWNS
Wednesday August 24, 2010
12:30 p.m. to 4:30 p.m.
2 Substantive & 1 Ethics CLE Credits
Immediately followed by Cocktail Reception at the Mohegan Sun Breakers Lounge
12:30 – 1:00 PM Registration
1:00 – 2:00 PM “TRIAL TIPS FROM THE LEGENDS”
John J. Aponick, Jr., Esq. – Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin
Thomas J. Foley, Jr., Esq. – Foley, McLane, Foley, McDonald & MacGregor, P.C.
Moderator: Paul T. Oven, Esq. – Dougherty, Leventhal & Price
BREAK
2:15 – 2:45 PM “SOCIAL MEDIA DISCOVERY”
Melissa A. Scartelli, Esq. – Scartelli, Distasio & Kowalski, P.C.
Alicia C. Caridi, Esq. – Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin
2:45 – 3:15 PM “CLAIMS REP PET PEEVES”
Daniel E. Cummins, Esq. – Foley, Cognetti, Comerford, Cimini & Cummins
Erin Rowan Meyers, Esq. – Claims Manager, Catholic Health Partners
BREAK
3:30 – 4:30 PM "ETHICAL PRACTICE POINTERS FROM THE BENCH"
Judge Correale F. Stevens – President Judge of Pennsylvania Superior Court
Judge Thomas Blewitt – Middle District Federal Magistrate Judge
Judge Thomas F. Burke, Jr. – President Judge of Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas
Judge Robert A. Mazzoni – Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas Judge
Moderator: Michael A. Genello, Esq. – Murphy, Piazza & Genello, P.C.
Course Planners:
Matthew P. Keris, Esq. – Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin
Daniel E. Cummins, Esq. – Foley, Cognetti, Comerford, Cimini & Cummins
Cost for the CLE/Happy Hour:
• Program for claim representatives/risk managers $25.00
• Program for paralegals $50.00
• CLE program for lawyers $175.00
For reservations, please print and complete the form below and return to PDI
or e-mail it to coled01@padefense.org.
Name(s)_____________________________________________
Firm/Company_________________________________________
Make checks payable to:
PENNSYLVANIA DEFENSE INSTITUTE
P.O. Box 697, Camp Hill, PA 17001-0697
For more information, contact PDI at 800-734-0737
Monday, July 25, 2011
Pennsylvania Superior Court Enters Decision in Post-Koken Venue Case
On July 25, 2011, the Pennsylvania Superior Court issued its opinion in the Post-Koken case of Sehl v. Neff, No. 3438 EDA 2009 (Pa.Super. July 25, 2011 Olson, Freedburg, Colville, JJ.)(opinion by Freedburg) affirming the trial court decision that venue was improper in Philadelphia.
This is the post-Koken venue case in which the UIM policy did not have a venue selection clause and the Plaintiff filed suit in Philadelphia County even though the tortfeasor Defendant did not reside in Philadelphia County and even though the accident did not occur in Philadelphia County.
The Superior Court rejected the Plaintiff's contention that since the defendant UIM carrier could be sued in any county in Pennsylvania under the venue rule of Pa.R.C.P. 1006 on the basis that the carrier conducted business in every county, venue for the claims against the defendant tortfeasor could also be joined and filed in any county along with that UIM claim.
In so ruling, the Superior Court also rejected the Plaintiff's contention that the defendant driver and the UIM carrier could be considered to be jointly and severally liable under the venue rules so as to support the Plaintiff's effort to sue both parties in a single county of the Plaintiff's choice. To the contrary, the Superior Court agreed with the trial court's ruling that the tort claims against the defendant driver were separate and distinct from the contract claims against the UIM carrier.
As such, the court found that the exception under Rule 1006(c)(1) could not be relied upon to support the Plaintiff's venue selection in this matter. That exception allows an action to be brought against all defendants in a county where venue is appropriate for one of the defendants "in an action to enforce a joint or joint and several liability against two or more defendants."
I wrote the amicus curiae brief on behalf of the Pennsylvania Defense Institute in favor of the position that venue is not proper in Philadelphia under the circumstances presented. If you wish to review that Brief, it may be accessed by clicking on the link in the JDSupra.com box down on the right-hand column of this blog.
Congrats to the underlying defense attorney, John McGrath, Esquire of the Philadelphia law office of Palmer & Barr, P.C. for this win.
Click here to view the Pennsylvania Superior Court's decision in Sehl v. Neff online: http://www.pacourts.us/OpPosting/Superior/out/a13026_11.pdf
This is the post-Koken venue case in which the UIM policy did not have a venue selection clause and the Plaintiff filed suit in Philadelphia County even though the tortfeasor Defendant did not reside in Philadelphia County and even though the accident did not occur in Philadelphia County.
The Superior Court rejected the Plaintiff's contention that since the defendant UIM carrier could be sued in any county in Pennsylvania under the venue rule of Pa.R.C.P. 1006 on the basis that the carrier conducted business in every county, venue for the claims against the defendant tortfeasor could also be joined and filed in any county along with that UIM claim.
In so ruling, the Superior Court also rejected the Plaintiff's contention that the defendant driver and the UIM carrier could be considered to be jointly and severally liable under the venue rules so as to support the Plaintiff's effort to sue both parties in a single county of the Plaintiff's choice. To the contrary, the Superior Court agreed with the trial court's ruling that the tort claims against the defendant driver were separate and distinct from the contract claims against the UIM carrier.
As such, the court found that the exception under Rule 1006(c)(1) could not be relied upon to support the Plaintiff's venue selection in this matter. That exception allows an action to be brought against all defendants in a county where venue is appropriate for one of the defendants "in an action to enforce a joint or joint and several liability against two or more defendants."
I wrote the amicus curiae brief on behalf of the Pennsylvania Defense Institute in favor of the position that venue is not proper in Philadelphia under the circumstances presented. If you wish to review that Brief, it may be accessed by clicking on the link in the JDSupra.com box down on the right-hand column of this blog.
Congrats to the underlying defense attorney, John McGrath, Esquire of the Philadelphia law office of Palmer & Barr, P.C. for this win.
Click here to view the Pennsylvania Superior Court's decision in Sehl v. Neff online: http://www.pacourts.us/OpPosting/Superior/out/a13026_11.pdf
Labels:
Automobile Insurance,
Koken,
UIM,
Underinsured Motorists Claims,
Venue
Saturday, July 23, 2011
U.S. Federal Middle District Judge Malcolm S. Muir (1914-2011)
Federal Middle District Judge Malcolm S. Muir (96) passed away on Friday, July 22, 2011. Judge Muir had served on the bench since 1970.
Here's a link to a nice article memorializing Judge Muir that was posted on the Lycoming County County Bar Association site by Attorney Gary Weber of the Williamsport law firm of Mitchell, Mitchell, Gallagher, Weber & Southard, P.C.: http://www.lycolaw.org/news.asp?id=406
Here's a link to a nice article memorializing Judge Muir that was posted on the Lycoming County County Bar Association site by Attorney Gary Weber of the Williamsport law firm of Mitchell, Mitchell, Gallagher, Weber & Southard, P.C.: http://www.lycolaw.org/news.asp?id=406
Thursday, July 21, 2011
Judge Amesbury of Luzerne County Addresses Municipal Tort Claims Act
In his July 5, 2011 Order and Opinion in the case of Vannucchi v. Marquis, No. 1136 of 2008 and No. 5136 of 2008 (Luz. Co. July 5, 2011, Amesbury, J.), Judge Amesbury ruled upon a Municipal Tort Claims Act case and allowed the case to proceed beyond the summary judgment stage against a towing company, a local police department, and local police officers.
By way of background, this matter arose out of an incident during which a police officer pulled over a motorist on a motorcycle and ultimately made a decision that the motorcycle should be impounded. When the flatbed tow truck operator arrived at the scene, the police officers turned over the keys to the motorcycle to the tow truck operator. The police officers then left the scene.
Thereafter, as the flat bed tow truck operator had loaded the motorcycle onto the flatbed and was talking to the motorcycle operator in the street, a drunk driver came by and struck and killed the motorcycle operator.
In his decision, Judge Amesbury denied the private towing company Defendant’s request to amend the pleadings to assert the defense of governmental immunity based upon an allegation that this was a police tow as a opposed to a private tow. The Court found that such an amendment would be futile as against a positive rule of law in that the tow company could not be considered a governmental entity under the facts presented.
The Court also denied the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the police department and the local police officers. The Court found that the Plaintiff’s allegations that the failure of the police to use their patrol vehicle as a safety barrier at the scene of the accident as well as the failure of the police to control the scene by the use of flares and/or traffic control devices were negligent allegations that should proceed to a jury for consideration.
Anyone desiring a copy of this Opinion may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.
By way of background, this matter arose out of an incident during which a police officer pulled over a motorist on a motorcycle and ultimately made a decision that the motorcycle should be impounded. When the flatbed tow truck operator arrived at the scene, the police officers turned over the keys to the motorcycle to the tow truck operator. The police officers then left the scene.
Thereafter, as the flat bed tow truck operator had loaded the motorcycle onto the flatbed and was talking to the motorcycle operator in the street, a drunk driver came by and struck and killed the motorcycle operator.
In his decision, Judge Amesbury denied the private towing company Defendant’s request to amend the pleadings to assert the defense of governmental immunity based upon an allegation that this was a police tow as a opposed to a private tow. The Court found that such an amendment would be futile as against a positive rule of law in that the tow company could not be considered a governmental entity under the facts presented.
The Court also denied the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the police department and the local police officers. The Court found that the Plaintiff’s allegations that the failure of the police to use their patrol vehicle as a safety barrier at the scene of the accident as well as the failure of the police to control the scene by the use of flares and/or traffic control devices were negligent allegations that should proceed to a jury for consideration.
Anyone desiring a copy of this Opinion may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.
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