Court Rules that Defendant's Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's Claims Also Eradicates Cross-claims by Co-Defendant

In the case Robinson v. Phila. Intern. Airport, 263 C.D. 2002 (Pa. Cmwlth. June 9, 2025 Fizzano Cannon, J., McCullough, J., and Hannah Levitt, J.) (Op. by Fizzano Cannon, J.), the court granted the interlocutory appeal and addressed Motions In Limine in a municipal liability personal injury case.

This matter arose out of a slip and fall incident at the Philadelphia International Airport.  The Plaintiff apparently took a trip prior to her flight.

In this appeal, the court noted that, where summary judgment had been granted against the Plaintiffs’ claims against the municipal Defendant, that Defendant could not be held liable for purposes of contribution or indemnity relative to the Co-Defendants.

The court more specifically noted that, where the municipal Defendant had secured summary judgment on the common law ground that it did not have actual or constructive notice of the condition on the land that the Plaintiff claimed was responsible for her injury, that Defendant likewise could not be held liable for indemnity on the cross-claims asserted by the Co-Defendants.

The Commonwealth Court additionally noted that, because the non-municipal Defendant did not oppose the municipal Defendant’s summary judgment motion against the Plaintiff’s claims, which claims were also the basis of the non-municipal Defendant’s crossclaims, that non-municipal Defendant was found to have waived any right to contest the granting of summary judgment.

That waiver and the entry of summary judgment precluded the non-municipal Defendant from later moving to have the municipal Defendant added to the verdict sheet under the Fair Share Act. This was so because the municipal Defendant, by virtue of summary judgment decision, had already been adjudicated as not being a joint tortfeasor with the Co-Defendant relative to the claims of the Plaintiff.

The Court ruled that a subsequent trial judge’s Order granting the non-municipal Defendant’s Motion In Limine to allow evidence against the municipal Defendant and to place it on the verdict sheet therefore violated the coordinate jurisdiction doctrine. As such, the court on appeal ruled that the non-municipal Defendant could certainly assert that it was not liable on the Plaintiff’s claims at trial, but that Defendant could not argue that the municipal Defendant was liable.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Alex P on www.pexels.com.

Liability of Landowner to Passing Motorist for Falling Trees

In the case of Harris v. Felouzis, No. 85 WDA 2023 (Pa. Super. Feb. 10, 2025 Kunselman, J., Lazarus, J., and Bender, J.) (Op. by Kunselman, J.) (Bender, J., dissenting), the court affirmed the entry of a judgment in favor of a Plaintiff in a case involving a Plaintiff motorist who was injured when a 110 year old oak tree fell from a Defendant’s property onto an adjacent road.

The issue was, as Judge Bender aptly put it in his Dissenting Opinion, "[i]f a tree falls on a busy road and injures someone, does it automatically sound in negligence?"

In this case, the court reaffirmed Pennsylvania law that holds that a landowner that allows trees to grow on the property unchecked can be held liable in negligence to motorists injured when a tree falls onto an adjacent road. The court noted that no visible defect in the tree or expert testimony is required. Rather, the standard is reasonable care under the circumstances.

The court noted that, if the condition of the tree could have been known by the exercise of ordinary care, then the Defendant landowner must exercise reasonable care to prevent the tree from falling and injuring anyone who may be using the adjacent road. The law puts the burden on the landowners given that the landowners have access to their own property and the passing motorists do not.

The court noted that the public right of passage on roadways carries with it once the highways have been established, and obligation on occupiers of abutting land to use reasonable care to ensure that the passage way is safe.

Landowners are not allowed to simply let nature take its course.

The Court otherwise rejected the notion that all motorists who use the roadways assume the risk of trees falling upon them.  

This decision is also notable for the Superior Court’s noting that a Motion for Summary Judgment that was denied based upon the sufficiency of the evidence is superseded by the trial record and cannot be separately appealed once a verdict has been entered.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Judge Bender's Dissenting Opinion can be viewed HERE.


I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Mick Haupt on www.unsplash.com.

What Constitutes The "Record" To Be Reviewed On Summary Judgment?

In the case of L.T. v. Kubota Manufacturing, No. 1310 MDA 2023 (Pa. Super. Feb. 14, 2025 Bowes, J., Olson, J., and Stabile, J.) (Op. by Bowes, J.), the Pennsylvania Supeiror court overruled a trial court’s entry of summary judgment in a products liability case.

According to the Opinion, the case arose out of a rider mower accident in which a grandmother accidentally ran over her 7 year old grandson who had come into the yard and slipped on the grass behind her. The Plaintiff alleged that the mower lacked appropriate rear guarding and was negligently designed such that the blades remained engaged even when the tractor was in reverse. The minor’s lower leg eventually had to be amputated.

On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court noted that the trial court erred by not reviewing certain expert reports offered by the Plaintiff which were attached to the Plaintiff’s Brief which were filed of record.

The Superior Court, citing Pa. R.C.P. 1035.1, confirmed in its Opinion that the Rules of Civil Procedure define “record” for purposes of summary judgment as including pleadings, depositions, Answers to Interrogatories, admissions and affidavits, and reports signed by an expert witness that would, “if filed,” comply with Rule 4003.5(a)(1), whether or not the reports have been produced in response to Interrogatories

The court noted that the language of the rule suggest that expert reports need only be submitted to the court, not filed, in order to be considered in Motion for Summary Judgment proceedings.

As such, the appellate court noted that the trial court should have considered the Plaintiff’s expert report, which would have created issues of fact for the jury’s resolution.

In this decision, the Pennsylvania Superior Court also provided a thorough recitation of the current status of products liability law in Pennsylvania, including the law as altered by the case of Tincher v. Omega Flex, 104 A.3d 328 (Pa. 2014). In reviewing that law, the court reiterated that there were indeed issues of fact that needed to be decided by a jury.

As such, the trial court’s entry of summary judgment was overruled.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Superior Court Confirms that Parties Entitled to 30 Days to Respond to Motion for Summary Judgment

In the case of Jordan v. Lynde, No. 234 EDA 2024 (Pa. Super. Dec. 31, 2024 Kunselman, J., Nichols, J., and Beck, J.) (Op. by Kunselman, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court addressed certain procedural issues regarding summary judgment proceedings.

In this case, the court granted in part and reversed in part the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in a matter.

The case arose out of a medical malpractice action.

According to the Opinion, a Defendant in this medical malpractice action belatedly joined in a Co-Defendant’s summary judgment motion only a few days before the motion was actually granted.

The Superior Court noted that it was an error for the trial court to grant summary judgment in favor of that Defendant that had joined the motion late given that Pa. R.C.P. 1035.3(a) requires that a non-moving party opposing a Motion for Summary Judgment proceedings be provided with thirty (30) days to respond to any such motion. The Superior Court noted that there was no exception to this rule with respect to any joinder by any party in any previously filed Motion for Summary Judgment.

The court affirmed the summary judgment granted to all defendants in this medical malpractice case other than late joining Defendant because Plaintiffs sought an extension of their time to respond to the motion by way of an email to the judge's administrative assistant rather than by motion as required by the rules of court.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Schmidt law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Superior Court Reviews Vicarious Liability of Domino's In MVA Case, And Whether Trial Court Decision on MSJ Remains Reviewable on Appeal After Entry of Verdict

In the case of Coryell v. Morris, No. 1977 EDA 2021 (Pa. Super. Jan. 31, 2025) (en banc) (Op. by Bowes, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court ruled that a Domino’s franchise relationship with the delivery driver’s employer created grounds for the pizza chain to be bound vicariously liable for the driver’s negligence during the course of a motor vehicle accident.

Some litigators viewed the court’s analysis in this case as setting up a framework for establishing a franchisor’s vicarious liability in cases involving alleged negligence on the part of a franchisee.

In this decision, the Superior Court found that there was sufficient evidence in the records to show that the franchiser exercised sufficient control over the franchisee to support the finding of vicarious liability.

Also of note was the fact that the Superior Court ruled that a jury’s resolution of the factual issues presented in the case, which involve, in part, factual disputes regarding Domino’s control over the franchisee, such findings by the jury rendered the propriety of the trial court’s summary judgment ruling moot. More specifically, the Superior Court in this case ruled that “[a] trial court’s denial of a fact-dependent pre-trial [motion for summary judgment] is not reviewable when the issue was subsequently resolved at trial.”

It is noted that, in the Dissenting Opinion, Judge King noted that the Superior Court should have decided that it remained capable of reviewing the trial court's denial of the pre-trial Motion for Summary Judgment given the confusion in the caselaw surrounding the issue at the time the trial court ruled on the motion.   

In the end, the Superior Court’s ruling in this case rendered Domino’s Pizza again responsible, at least in part, for the $2.3 million dollar judgment awarded to the Plaintiff motorcyclist who was struck by a Domino’s Pizza delivery driver’s vehicle.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Dissenting Opinion by Judge King can be viewed HERE.

Source: “Pa. Superior Court Rules Pizza Chain Liable For Franchisee Driver’s Crash” by Aleza Furman of the Legal Intelligencer (Feb. 4, 2025).

Federal Court Addresses Potential Liability of a Broker in a Trucking Accident Case

In the case of Allen v. Foxway Transportation, Inc., No. 4:21-CV-00156-MWB (M.D. Pa. Dec. 7, 2023 Brann, C.J.), the court issued a decision in a fatal trucking accident case holding that, under the facts presented in this case, a broker was not liable for the actions of the motor carrier or its driver both of which had been retained to deliver a shipment. However, the court that a material dispute existed on whether the broker had negligently entrusted the motor carrier with a shipment at issue.

As such, the cross-Motions for Summary Judgement by the injured party and the broker were granted in part and denied in part.

Chief Judge Matthew W. Brann’s Opinion is notable, in part, due to his review of Federal Middle District Court Local Rule 56.1 which governs the filing of a short and concise Statement of Material Facts in support of a Motion for Summary Judgment relative to facts that the moving party contends there are no genuine issues to be tried. 

In his Opinion, Chief Judge Brann provided guidance on how such Statements of Material Fact in support of a Motion for Summary Judgment should be written and how the non-moving party should properly respond to the same.

Relative to the substantive issues as to whether, under the facts of this case, the broker could be vicarious liable for the actions of the motor carrier and its driver, Chief Judge Brann reviewed Pennsylvania law regarding vicarious liability and the factors necessary to show a master-servant relationship in support of the same.

After applying those factors to the case presented, the court found that the broker in this case was not liable for the actions of the motor carrier.

The court otherwise found that the Plaintiff had failed to establish support for the allegations that Gateway had been involved in a “joint venture” with the motor carrier. As such, the broker’s Motion for Summary Judgment on this issue was granted.

However, as noted above, the court noted that the issues of negligent entrustment remained in dispute.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source of image:  Photo by Josiah Farrow on www.unsplash.com.