First Named Insured Must Sign Rejection of Stacking Form For It to Be Valid

In the case of Rodriquez v. Penn National Mut. Ins. Co., No. S-203-16 (C.P. Schuylkill Co. Jan. 14, 2020 Goodman, J.), the trial court addressed the issue of the statutory requirement that a first named insured sign a rejection of stacking form in an underinsured motorist context in order for the rejection to be upheld.

According to the Opinion, in this matter, the wife of the first named insured signed the rejection of stacking form.

Thereafter, the wife was involved in a car accident and made claim for stacked UIM coverage, which Penn National denied.

The wife claimed that the rejection of stacking form was invalid under §1738 of the Motor Vehicle Code.

Penn National attempted to argue that the rejection form was still valid because the first named insured’s wife was acting as an agent of first named insured when she signed the rejection of stacking form.

Judge Goodman of the Schuylkill County Court of Common Pleas adopted the plain statute language requiring that a rejection of stacking form be signed by the “first named insured” rendered the rejection form invalid even though it was signed by the wife of the first named insured.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney Scott B. Cooper of the Harrisburg, Pennsylvania law firm of Schmidt Kramer, P.C. for bringing this case to my attention.

Case Dismissed for Failing to Substitute Estate for Deceased Defendant and For Service of Process Issues

In a recent detailed Order issued in the case of Byrne v. Quinn, No. S-1140-2015 (C.P. Schuyl. Co. Oct. 10, 2018 Goodman, J), Judge James P. Goodman of the Schuylkill County Court of Common Pleas, granted a Defendant’s Preliminary Objections to the Plaintiff’s Complaint.  

The court primarily based its decision to dismiss the Complaint on the fact that both parties acknowledged that one of the Defendants had passed away previously and that the Plaintiff was aware of this fact at the time she filed the Complaint but did not seek to substitute a personal representative/estate in the place of the deceased Defendant.  As such, the court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over that particular Defendant.  

The court went on to address the other Defendant’s Preliminary Objections which were filed on the basis that the Complaint was not served prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations.   The court reviewed the law of Lamp v. Hayman, 366 A.2d 882 (Pa. 1976) and its progeny to conclude that the Plaintiff failed to comply with the requirements of Pennsylvania law to undertake a good faith effort to complete service of original process.  

As such, the case was dismissed with prejudice.  

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  

I thank the prevailing defense counsel, Stephen T. Kopko of my office for bringing this decision to my attention.  

Court Addresses Ability of One Plaintiff's Estate to Intervene in a Petition for Court Approval of Another Plaintiff's Estate's Settlement in a Consolidated Matter

In a recent Opinion issued in the case of Coleman v. Bachert, No. S-890-2011 (C.P. Schuylkill Co. April 11, 2017 Goodman, J.), Judge James P. Goodman addressed an emergency motion filed by one estate of a deceased Plaintiff to challenge the settlement secured by the estate of another deceased Plaintiff in a consolidated personal injury civil litigation matter. 

This matter arose out of a motorcycle accident during which one Plaintiff’s decedent was operating the motorcycle and the other, separate Plaintiff’s decedent was a passenger on the motorcycle.   

Judge James P. Goodman
Schuylkill County

After the estate for the decedent passenger secured a settlement from the liability carrier under a single limit liability policy, the estate for the decedent driver requested permission of court to participate in the court approval proceedings relative to the wrongful death settlement in favor of the passenger decedent, asserting that the settlement of that claim could negatively affect the minor Plaintiffs associated with the estate for the decedent driver. 

The estate for the decedent passenger challenged the standing of the estate for the decedent driver to participate in the court’s proceedings for the approval of the settlement in favor of the decedent passenger.  

In part, the estate for the decedent driver asserted that the substantial proposed settlement in favor of the decedent passenger was unfair to the minors represented by the estate for the decedent driver in that it depleted the single liability limits available under the carrier’s policy.   The estate for the decedent driver requested the court to conduct an adjudication on the merits based upon an evidentiary record to review the appropriateness of the proposed settlement in favor of the decedent passenger and to consider the interests of the estate of decedent driver.  The estate of the decedent driver also requested permission for it to fully participate in the court approval of settlement proceedings relative to the settlement in favor of the plaintiff passenger.

In the alternative, the estate of the decedent driver contended that it had standing as a third party beneficiary to the liability carrier’s policy allegedly entitling that estate to participate in the hearing to approve the proposed settlement in favor of the other decedent’s estate.  

In his Opinion, Judge Goodman of the Schuylkill County Court of Common Pleas denied the emergency petition filed by the estate of the decedent driver.   In so ruling, the court found that the estate of the decedent driver was unable to provide the court with any legal interest or authority that the estate of the decedent driver had in the settlement between the settling Defendants (and that Defendant’s carrier), and the estate of the Plaintiff-passenger.  

The court noted that no case law or any other authority had been produced “that would prevent an insurance company from settling a case with one Plaintiff to the detriment of another Plaintiff or that would require the settlement to protect insurance funds for the non-settling Plaintiff.”  

Judge Goodman went on to state that “the case law supports that the insurance company is entitled to determine how to settle cases for policy limits, albeit, it must exercise good faith to its insured.” 

The court noted that the purpose of Rule 2206 is to ensure a fair settlement to a settling party.  Here, the estate of the decedent driver was not the settling party and was also noted to have interests that were adverse to the estate of the decedent passenger.   Accordingly, the court found that the estate of the decedent driver lacked standing under the rule to participate in the settlement approval proceedings between the settling Defendants and the estate of the Plaintiff passenger. 

The court also rejected the third party beneficiary argument presented by the estate of the decedent driver.   The court noted that there was no language in the insurance policy covering the Defendant that identified any injured party at a third party beneficiary to that contract.   As such, the court found that there was no support for the assertion that the estate of the decedent driver was a third party beneficiary of the liability policy.  

Judge Goodman otherwise also noted that “it is well-settled that under Pennsylvania law, an injured party has no right to directly sue the insurer of an alleged tortfeasor unless a provision of the policy or a statute creates such a right.”   [citations omitted].  

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this Opinion may click this LINK.