Showing posts with label Pike County. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Pike County. Show all posts
Friday, July 5, 2019
Appointment of Attorney Kelly Gaughan to Judgeship on Pike County Court of Common Pleas Confirmed
Here's a LINK to a local news article from northeastern Pennsylvania reporting on the Pennsylvania Senate confirming the appointment of Attorney Kelly Gaughan to take over a vacancy on the bench of the Pike County Court of Common Pleas. The vacancy was created when Judge Joseph Kameen retired from the bench.
Attorney Gaughan, who won both sides of the May, 2019 primary election for the position, expects to be sworn in for the appointment in September of 2019 and serve out the remainder of the year. She will be the only candidate for the position on the November, 2019 ballot.
Friday, February 11, 2011
A Pike County Tip from a Former Pike County Law Clerk (Me)
This is a “heads-up” for your Pike County cases from Tort Talk. As a former law clerk in the Pike County Court of Common Pleas for now Senior Judge Harold A. Thomson, Jr., I like to follow the court's decisions that come out of that county in the very Northeastern corner of Pennsylvania where my career began.
The Pike County Court of Common Pleas has recently issued a number of decisions, including Oliver v. Mazarul, No. 1374-2010-Civil (Pike Co. 2011, Chelak), in which both current Judges, President Judge Joseph Kameen and Judge Gregory Chelak, have indicated that the Pike County Court of Common Pleas has an “established policy of, in general, granting Preliminary Objections to untimely Preliminary Objections.”
The court has noted that Pa. R.C.P. 1026(a) requires Preliminary Objections to be filed within twenty (20) days of the service of a Complaint. When a party files a Preliminary Objections after the deadline, that party bears the burden of demonstrating just cause for the delay in filing the objections. The Court has cited Gale v. Mercy Medical Center, 698 A.2d 647 (Pa. Super. 1997) to support its strict stance on this issue.
Accordingly, if you intend to file Preliminary Objections in Pike County, you better get them filed within twenty (20) days of the Complaint or it will likely be summarily dismissed as untimely unless you can show a just cause for the delay.
The Pike County Court of Common Pleas has recently issued a number of decisions, including Oliver v. Mazarul, No. 1374-2010-Civil (Pike Co. 2011, Chelak), in which both current Judges, President Judge Joseph Kameen and Judge Gregory Chelak, have indicated that the Pike County Court of Common Pleas has an “established policy of, in general, granting Preliminary Objections to untimely Preliminary Objections.”
The court has noted that Pa. R.C.P. 1026(a) requires Preliminary Objections to be filed within twenty (20) days of the service of a Complaint. When a party files a Preliminary Objections after the deadline, that party bears the burden of demonstrating just cause for the delay in filing the objections. The Court has cited Gale v. Mercy Medical Center, 698 A.2d 647 (Pa. Super. 1997) to support its strict stance on this issue.
Accordingly, if you intend to file Preliminary Objections in Pike County, you better get them filed within twenty (20) days of the Complaint or it will likely be summarily dismissed as untimely unless you can show a just cause for the delay.
Monday, October 4, 2010
Bill Rice Memorial Service This Friday
This Friday, October 8, 2010, at 2 p.m., in the Pike County Court of Common Pleas in Milford, Pennsylvania, there will be a memorial service for my friend and former co-law clerk, Attorney Bill Rice. Bill recently passed away at the too young age of 48 after a battle with cancer.
All are invited to attend the service. The service will be presided over by Senior Judge Harold A. Thomson, Jr. (for whom Bill and I worked as law clerks), President Judge Joseph Kameen, and Judge Gregory Chelak. Friends and colleagues of Bill Rice will be invited to say a few words in his honor.
The proceedings will be transcribed by the Pike County Court Reporter and the transcript will be filed for all time in the Prothonotary's Office and a copy of the transcript will be given to the Rice family which includes his wife and four young daughters.
All are invited to attend the service. The service will be presided over by Senior Judge Harold A. Thomson, Jr. (for whom Bill and I worked as law clerks), President Judge Joseph Kameen, and Judge Gregory Chelak. Friends and colleagues of Bill Rice will be invited to say a few words in his honor.
The proceedings will be transcribed by the Pike County Court Reporter and the transcript will be filed for all time in the Prothonotary's Office and a copy of the transcript will be given to the Rice family which includes his wife and four young daughters.
Thursday, September 16, 2010
Superior Court Reverses Trial Court's Grant of Summary Judgment Based Upon Trivial Defect Doctrine in Trip and Fall Case
You may recall that I previously reported on the Pike County Court of Common Pleas Decision on granting summary judgment to the Defendant under the trivial defect doctrine in the case of Melchiorre v. Lord's Valley Xtra Mart back in June of 2009.
That decision was appealed by the Plaintiff and, on September 8, 2010, the Pennsylvania Superior Court handed down its “non-precedential decision” reversing the trial court granting of summary judgment in a 2 to 1 decision. See Melchiorre v. Lourdes Valley Xtra Mart, No. 2038 E.D.A. 2009 (Pa. Super. Sept. 8, 2010, Gantman, Shogan, and Mundy, J.J.) (Gantman, J., dissenting).
In its non-precedential opinion, the Superior Court quoted extensively from the case Mull v. Ickes, 994 A.2d 1137 (Pa. Super. 2010) for the law surrounding trivial defects.
The Superior Court's Opinion reminds us that Melchiorre involved a plaintiff who tripped on the lip of a concrete pad that was surrounded by asphalt at a gas station. The trial court in Pike County had ruled that, based upon its review of the record and the photographs, “the one inch deviation is clearly trivial, and that, as a matter of law, [the defendants] were not negligent for permitting its existence.”
The Superior Court disagreed and noted that, its review of the records, in a light most favorable to the non-moving Plaintiff, compelled the conclusion “that the defect in this matter was not so trivial as to authorize summary judgment as a matter of law.”
The Superior Court noted that the deviation between the concrete pad and the surrounding asphalt, as depicted in the photographs, reflected that the 1-inch variation was not consistent around the concrete pad, but rather, the difference between the asphalt and concrete in other areas of the concrete pad may have been more or less than one inch at different places. Accordingly, the Superior Court found that the evidence established “that the defect was not obviously trivial as there is no definite or mathematical rule that determines when a defect is trivial.”
Finding that the evidence was sufficient to establish genuine issues of material fact that must be resolved by a jury, the Superior Court reversed the entry of summary judgment and remanded the case back to the Pike County Court of Common Pleas for further proceedings. As noted, Superior Court Judge Gantman dissented from this decision without any opinion.
I thank the prevailing plaintiff’s attorney, Gene Goldenziel of the Scranton law firm of Needle, Goldenziel, & Pascale, for forwarding this unpublished decision to my attention.
Anyone desiring a copy of this opinion, may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.
That decision was appealed by the Plaintiff and, on September 8, 2010, the Pennsylvania Superior Court handed down its “non-precedential decision” reversing the trial court granting of summary judgment in a 2 to 1 decision. See Melchiorre v. Lourdes Valley Xtra Mart, No. 2038 E.D.A. 2009 (Pa. Super. Sept. 8, 2010, Gantman, Shogan, and Mundy, J.J.) (Gantman, J., dissenting).
In its non-precedential opinion, the Superior Court quoted extensively from the case Mull v. Ickes, 994 A.2d 1137 (Pa. Super. 2010) for the law surrounding trivial defects.
The Superior Court's Opinion reminds us that Melchiorre involved a plaintiff who tripped on the lip of a concrete pad that was surrounded by asphalt at a gas station. The trial court in Pike County had ruled that, based upon its review of the record and the photographs, “the one inch deviation is clearly trivial, and that, as a matter of law, [the defendants] were not negligent for permitting its existence.”
The Superior Court disagreed and noted that, its review of the records, in a light most favorable to the non-moving Plaintiff, compelled the conclusion “that the defect in this matter was not so trivial as to authorize summary judgment as a matter of law.”
The Superior Court noted that the deviation between the concrete pad and the surrounding asphalt, as depicted in the photographs, reflected that the 1-inch variation was not consistent around the concrete pad, but rather, the difference between the asphalt and concrete in other areas of the concrete pad may have been more or less than one inch at different places. Accordingly, the Superior Court found that the evidence established “that the defect was not obviously trivial as there is no definite or mathematical rule that determines when a defect is trivial.”
Finding that the evidence was sufficient to establish genuine issues of material fact that must be resolved by a jury, the Superior Court reversed the entry of summary judgment and remanded the case back to the Pike County Court of Common Pleas for further proceedings. As noted, Superior Court Judge Gantman dissented from this decision without any opinion.
I thank the prevailing plaintiff’s attorney, Gene Goldenziel of the Scranton law firm of Needle, Goldenziel, & Pascale, for forwarding this unpublished decision to my attention.
Anyone desiring a copy of this opinion, may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.
Tuesday, September 7, 2010
Grant of New Trial Affirmed in Pike County Trip and Fall Case
A recent non-precedential decision by the Pennsylvania Superior Court in the trip and fall case of Stefanelli v. Birchwood Lakes Community Association, 1444 EDA 2009 (Pa.Super. Aug. 10, 2010) is significant for the fact that prior automobile accident decisions were utilized by the court to support the granting of a new trial for a plaintiff in a case where a defense verdict was entered after the jury found negligence but no factual cause even though all of the medical experts agreed that the Plaintiff sustained an injury as a result of the incident.
The case went up on appeal from the granting of a new trial by Pike County Court of Common Pleas Judge Gregory Chelak found that the jury's verdict "was so contrary to the evidence as to shock one's sense of justice."
More specifically, the Judge noted that the agreement of the medical experts for each side that the Plaintiff sustained some form of injury as a result of the incident combined with the jury's finding of negligence resulted in the trial court ruling that the jury's additional finding of no factual cause as being against the weight of the evidence.
As such, Judge Chelak granted the Plaintiff a new trial. On appeal, the Superior Court affirmed in this non-precedential Opinion.
Anyone desiring a copy of the Superior Court's Opinion in Stefanelli v. Birchwood Lakes may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.
I thank the prevailing Plaintiff's attorney, James Conaboy Esquire of the Scranton law firm of Abrahamsen, Conaboy and Abrahamsen for forwarding this decision to my attention.
The case went up on appeal from the granting of a new trial by Pike County Court of Common Pleas Judge Gregory Chelak found that the jury's verdict "was so contrary to the evidence as to shock one's sense of justice."
More specifically, the Judge noted that the agreement of the medical experts for each side that the Plaintiff sustained some form of injury as a result of the incident combined with the jury's finding of negligence resulted in the trial court ruling that the jury's additional finding of no factual cause as being against the weight of the evidence.
As such, Judge Chelak granted the Plaintiff a new trial. On appeal, the Superior Court affirmed in this non-precedential Opinion.
Anyone desiring a copy of the Superior Court's Opinion in Stefanelli v. Birchwood Lakes may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.
I thank the prevailing Plaintiff's attorney, James Conaboy Esquire of the Scranton law firm of Abrahamsen, Conaboy and Abrahamsen for forwarding this decision to my attention.
Tuesday, May 25, 2010
Link to Legal Intelligencer Article on Pike County Decision Finding No UM Claim for Accident Caused by Debris in Road
Here's a link to a May 25, 2010 article by Leo Strupczewski in The Legal Intelligencer and Pennsylvania Law Weekly on the recent Pike County decision in Adragna v. State Farm, in which my firm secured a holding that there can be no uninsured motorist claim from a single car accident caused by debris in the road under the policy language at issue in that matter:
http://www.law.com/jsp/pa/PubArticlePA.jsp?id=1202458577382&src=EMC-Email&et=editorial&bu=The%20Legal%20Intelligencer&pt=TLI%20AM%20Legal%20Alert&cn=PLW_052510&kw=Court%20Holds%20UM%20Benefits%20Unavailable%20in%20Single-Car%20Accident%20Premium%20Access%20Required&hbxlogin=1
The facts of each case are different. No specific results are implied for future cases. Descriptions of awards in previous cases are no guarantee of future results and should not create any expectations that my firm or I can achieve similar results in another case.
http://www.law.com/jsp/pa/PubArticlePA.jsp?id=1202458577382&src=EMC-Email&et=editorial&bu=The%20Legal%20Intelligencer&pt=TLI%20AM%20Legal%20Alert&cn=PLW_052510&kw=Court%20Holds%20UM%20Benefits%20Unavailable%20in%20Single-Car%20Accident%20Premium%20Access%20Required&hbxlogin=1
The facts of each case are different. No specific results are implied for future cases. Descriptions of awards in previous cases are no guarantee of future results and should not create any expectations that my firm or I can achieve similar results in another case.
Wednesday, January 20, 2010
Punitive Damages for Cell Phone Use During Car Accident?
In an Opinion and Order dated January 14, 2010, in the case of Linehan v. Jaludi, No. 1865-2008-Civil (Pike Co. Jan. 14, 2010), Judge Gregory H. Chelak of the Pike County Court of Common Pleas addressed the issue of whether a plaintiff may pursue a claim for punitive damages on the basis that the defendant was jabbering away on cell phone to the point of distraction at the time of the accident.
In this case, the plaintiff was a police officer whose vehicle was stopped on the side of the road with the cruiser's flashing lights activated. Another vehicle was stopped in front of the plaintiff's police car. The defendant, while driving and allegedly talking on her cell phone, allegedly drifted off the roadway and collided with the police car while the plaintiff police officer was inside of the car, resulting in alleged injuries to the plaintiff.
The plaintiff police officer later filed a negligence Complaint in which a punitive damages claim was asserted, in part, on the basis of the defendant using a cell phone at the time of the accident. The defendant filed preliminary objections.
Judge Chelak of the Pike County Court of Common Pleas sustained the defendant's preliminary objections and granted the motion to strike the claim for punitive damages. It was held that the allegations of the Complaint that the defendant was so distracted by her cell phone conversation that she crashed into the plaintiff's police car with its flashing lights were insufficient, in and of themselves, to support the punitive damages claim.
However, citing the case of Pennington v. King, slip copy, 2009 WL 415718, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12779 at 21 (E.D.Pa. 2009, Pratter, J.) as offering support for a punitive damages claim base upon a driver being distracted by cell phone use, the Pike County Court noted that, if discovery turned out to confirm the cell phone use and distraction, by way of cell phone records or otherwise, the plaintiff would have the right to seek to amend the Complaint in an effort to support the possibility of restating the punitive damages claim pursuant to Rule 1033.
I thank Attorney Paul Oven from the Moosic, PA law firm of Dougherty, Leventhal & Price for bringing this case to my attention.
Anyone desiring a copy of this Opinion may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.
In this case, the plaintiff was a police officer whose vehicle was stopped on the side of the road with the cruiser's flashing lights activated. Another vehicle was stopped in front of the plaintiff's police car. The defendant, while driving and allegedly talking on her cell phone, allegedly drifted off the roadway and collided with the police car while the plaintiff police officer was inside of the car, resulting in alleged injuries to the plaintiff.
The plaintiff police officer later filed a negligence Complaint in which a punitive damages claim was asserted, in part, on the basis of the defendant using a cell phone at the time of the accident. The defendant filed preliminary objections.
Judge Chelak of the Pike County Court of Common Pleas sustained the defendant's preliminary objections and granted the motion to strike the claim for punitive damages. It was held that the allegations of the Complaint that the defendant was so distracted by her cell phone conversation that she crashed into the plaintiff's police car with its flashing lights were insufficient, in and of themselves, to support the punitive damages claim.
However, citing the case of Pennington v. King, slip copy, 2009 WL 415718, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12779 at 21 (E.D.Pa. 2009, Pratter, J.) as offering support for a punitive damages claim base upon a driver being distracted by cell phone use, the Pike County Court noted that, if discovery turned out to confirm the cell phone use and distraction, by way of cell phone records or otherwise, the plaintiff would have the right to seek to amend the Complaint in an effort to support the possibility of restating the punitive damages claim pursuant to Rule 1033.
I thank Attorney Paul Oven from the Moosic, PA law firm of Dougherty, Leventhal & Price for bringing this case to my attention.
Anyone desiring a copy of this Opinion may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.
Tuesday, August 25, 2009
Update on Seatbelt Defense Case
In an August 6, 2009 per curiam Order issued in the case of Gaudio v. Ford Motor Company, the Pennsylvania Superior Court denied a request to hear additional arguments regarding a defendant's right to introduce evidence concerning seat belt usage, or the lack thereof, in products liability cases involving questions about an automobile's crashworthiness.
This Order effectively upholds the Superior Court's 2-1 decision, found at ruling that the trial court should not have allowed any reference to the plaintiff's decedent's failure to wear a seatbelt in a crashworthiness case. Judge James Fitzgerald III dissented on this issue in the prior Superior Court opinion and suggested that the Courts could use guidance from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on whether any and all evidence pertaining to the lack of seatbelt use should be precluded under all circumstances.
The original 2-1 Superior Court decision can be found on Westlaw at 2009 WL 1530669, and the Pike County trial court opinion by Judge Harold A. Thomson, Jr. can be found at 2007 WL 5077415.
It remains to be seen now whether the defense will appeal this case up to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
This Order effectively upholds the Superior Court's 2-1 decision, found at ruling that the trial court should not have allowed any reference to the plaintiff's decedent's failure to wear a seatbelt in a crashworthiness case. Judge James Fitzgerald III dissented on this issue in the prior Superior Court opinion and suggested that the Courts could use guidance from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on whether any and all evidence pertaining to the lack of seatbelt use should be precluded under all circumstances.
The original 2-1 Superior Court decision can be found on Westlaw at 2009 WL 1530669, and the Pike County trial court opinion by Judge Harold A. Thomson, Jr. can be found at 2007 WL 5077415.
It remains to be seen now whether the defense will appeal this case up to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
Wednesday, July 22, 2009
Summary Judgment for Defense in Pike County Trip and Fall Case
On June 19, 2009, Judge Gregory H. Chelak of the Pike County Court of Common Pleas issued an opinion granting summary judgment in favor of the defense in a case involving a plaintiff who tripped and fell allegedly due to the raised edge of a concrete pad at a gas station being a mere one inch above the surrounding asphalt. Melchiorre v. Lords Valley Xtra Mart, No. 1358-2006-Civil (June 19, 2009).
Relying upon, Rocklin v. Hartmann, No. 248-2003-Civil (June 22, 2006) aff'd No. 1673 EDA 2006 (Pa.Super. Feb. 13, 2007), a prior Pike County decision in favor of the defense in a case involving a 1.5 inch elevation, Judge Chelak held that, under the "trivial defect" doctrine, the one inch discrepancy involved in the case at hand was "so trivial that, as a matter of law, Defendants were not negligent in permitting it to exist." The court based its decision, in part, on photographs of the defect supplied in the motion for summary judgment materials.
In so ruling, Judge Chelak rejected the Plaintiff's argument that the trivial nature of the defect should be disregarded on account of the fact that the Defendants had notice of the defect prior to the incident. Judge Chelak held that "[p]ursuant to the trivial defect doctrine, the existence of such defects does not give rise to a negligence claim, with or without notice."
The Plaintiffs filed an appeal on July 1, 2009 and the case is currently pending before the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
Relying upon, Rocklin v. Hartmann, No. 248-2003-Civil (June 22, 2006) aff'd No. 1673 EDA 2006 (Pa.Super. Feb. 13, 2007), a prior Pike County decision in favor of the defense in a case involving a 1.5 inch elevation, Judge Chelak held that, under the "trivial defect" doctrine, the one inch discrepancy involved in the case at hand was "so trivial that, as a matter of law, Defendants were not negligent in permitting it to exist." The court based its decision, in part, on photographs of the defect supplied in the motion for summary judgment materials.
In so ruling, Judge Chelak rejected the Plaintiff's argument that the trivial nature of the defect should be disregarded on account of the fact that the Defendants had notice of the defect prior to the incident. Judge Chelak held that "[p]ursuant to the trivial defect doctrine, the existence of such defects does not give rise to a negligence claim, with or without notice."
The Plaintiffs filed an appeal on July 1, 2009 and the case is currently pending before the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
Monday, July 20, 2009
Pike County Legal Journal Issues Tribute to Colonel Henry Thomas, former Court Crier for Pike County Court of Common Pleas
In this week's Pike County Legal Journal there is an excellent tribute to the late Colonel Henry Thomas, former Court Crier for the Pike County Court of Common Pleas. What a great guy he was--just a solid human being all around.
My first legal job was as a law clerk in the Pike County Court of Common Pleas and I was lucky enough to get to work with Colonel Thomas whenever court was in session and I can say I am a better lawyer and person for it. He helped me to learn some of the basic expectations and courtesies expected in the courtroom and even how local practice was supposed to work in Pike County.
He also was known for taking his job seriously. Being a former military policeman, he was always quick to tell anyone who appeared before the court to take their hands out of their pockets. He would always try to be the first one in the courtroom in the morning so that he could do a "bomb sweep" of the courtroom and the gallery (and he was serious about it). Yet, he would also show he was human in that he would sometimes nod off to sleep during the "eloquent" arguments of various attorneys near the end of a long argument day.
As I am sure there are many lawyers out there who have fond memories of having encountered Colonel Thomas over the years in Pike County, I invite you to submit a comment below of any memories of Colonel Thomas you may have to offer.
I also wanted to share parts of the moving tribute to him that appeared the Pike County Legal Journal:
Col. Henry G. Thomas
October 21, 1912 to October 29, 2003
Court Crier for
The Pike County Court
of Common Pleas
1979-1998
Many bar members can probably fondly recall all the times Col. Henry G. Thomas stood up to call court to order by reciting these words: “OYEZ, OYEZ, OYEZ, all you have ought to do before the Honorable Court, draw near and give your attention and you shall be heard. God Save this Commonwealth and this Honorable Court. [The Honorable President Judge, Harold A. Thomson presiding.]”
For almost two decades, Col. Thomas began every morning of court with the above greeting. He served his role as court crier with no less dedication than he served his country in the military.
Col. Thomas prided himself on checking the courtroom every morning to be certain that all the chairs and tables were cleared of any contraband. A talkative fellow, he could recall endless facts, dates, and other information seemingly effortlessly. He was famous for taking the list of jurors’ names home with him after jury selection and memorizing them. For the remainder of the trial, he knew each juror by name. When taking a verdict from a jury, many of us recall laughing at the way he would ask the jurors if they were content with the verdict ...followed up by the next question ...were they content with each other.
He also liked to help ease young lawyers’ nervousness by sharing with them secrets he learned from the military tribunal of rubbing their hands together to release nervous energy before engaging in a trial. Any time he saw a new lawyer’s face in the courtroom, he always went over to get their card so that he could properly introduce them to the court. When Tuesday morning Motions Court still existed, Col. Thomas made sure that he directed the order of attorneys appearing to present their motions so that no one went out of order of seniority. He was an integral part of court and missed by all who had the pleasure of knowing him.
Col. Henry Thomas had an interesting life. Born in Luzerne County, Pennsylvania, he went on to study at Penn State. He graduated in the late 1930s and through ROTC received a Lieutenant’s Commission in the Infantry. He was made a commander of a CCC camp just before World War II. When the war started he became a MP Officer and went to North Africa to observe the German and Italian prisoners. Later in the war he went to India and Burma as a MP Officer. At the end of the war, he was in Vienna and was involved with the four power policing of the city. He later served in Korea. In his later years, Col. Thomas faithfully served Judge Thomson by calling court to order each morning in his capacity as court crier. Col. Thomas passed away at age 91. He and his wife Naomi are buried in Arlington National Cemetery, Arlington, Virginia. The Pike County Bar Association salutes the many years of faithful service to the court by Col. Thomas. The picture of Col. Thomas with his plaque from the court is on the wall outside the Judge’s Chambers in the Pike County Courthouse.
My first legal job was as a law clerk in the Pike County Court of Common Pleas and I was lucky enough to get to work with Colonel Thomas whenever court was in session and I can say I am a better lawyer and person for it. He helped me to learn some of the basic expectations and courtesies expected in the courtroom and even how local practice was supposed to work in Pike County.
He also was known for taking his job seriously. Being a former military policeman, he was always quick to tell anyone who appeared before the court to take their hands out of their pockets. He would always try to be the first one in the courtroom in the morning so that he could do a "bomb sweep" of the courtroom and the gallery (and he was serious about it). Yet, he would also show he was human in that he would sometimes nod off to sleep during the "eloquent" arguments of various attorneys near the end of a long argument day.
As I am sure there are many lawyers out there who have fond memories of having encountered Colonel Thomas over the years in Pike County, I invite you to submit a comment below of any memories of Colonel Thomas you may have to offer.
I also wanted to share parts of the moving tribute to him that appeared the Pike County Legal Journal:
Col. Henry G. Thomas
October 21, 1912 to October 29, 2003
Court Crier for
The Pike County Court
of Common Pleas
1979-1998
Many bar members can probably fondly recall all the times Col. Henry G. Thomas stood up to call court to order by reciting these words: “OYEZ, OYEZ, OYEZ, all you have ought to do before the Honorable Court, draw near and give your attention and you shall be heard. God Save this Commonwealth and this Honorable Court. [The Honorable President Judge, Harold A. Thomson presiding.]”
For almost two decades, Col. Thomas began every morning of court with the above greeting. He served his role as court crier with no less dedication than he served his country in the military.
Col. Thomas prided himself on checking the courtroom every morning to be certain that all the chairs and tables were cleared of any contraband. A talkative fellow, he could recall endless facts, dates, and other information seemingly effortlessly. He was famous for taking the list of jurors’ names home with him after jury selection and memorizing them. For the remainder of the trial, he knew each juror by name. When taking a verdict from a jury, many of us recall laughing at the way he would ask the jurors if they were content with the verdict ...followed up by the next question ...were they content with each other.
He also liked to help ease young lawyers’ nervousness by sharing with them secrets he learned from the military tribunal of rubbing their hands together to release nervous energy before engaging in a trial. Any time he saw a new lawyer’s face in the courtroom, he always went over to get their card so that he could properly introduce them to the court. When Tuesday morning Motions Court still existed, Col. Thomas made sure that he directed the order of attorneys appearing to present their motions so that no one went out of order of seniority. He was an integral part of court and missed by all who had the pleasure of knowing him.
Col. Henry Thomas had an interesting life. Born in Luzerne County, Pennsylvania, he went on to study at Penn State. He graduated in the late 1930s and through ROTC received a Lieutenant’s Commission in the Infantry. He was made a commander of a CCC camp just before World War II. When the war started he became a MP Officer and went to North Africa to observe the German and Italian prisoners. Later in the war he went to India and Burma as a MP Officer. At the end of the war, he was in Vienna and was involved with the four power policing of the city. He later served in Korea. In his later years, Col. Thomas faithfully served Judge Thomson by calling court to order each morning in his capacity as court crier. Col. Thomas passed away at age 91. He and his wife Naomi are buried in Arlington National Cemetery, Arlington, Virginia. The Pike County Bar Association salutes the many years of faithful service to the court by Col. Thomas. The picture of Col. Thomas with his plaque from the court is on the wall outside the Judge’s Chambers in the Pike County Courthouse.
Friday, July 10, 2009
Status of the Prohibition of the Seat Belt Defense in Pennsylvania
Seat Belt Defense Ban Wearing Thin
A Superior Court panel upholds the ban but illustrates its weaknesses
By Daniel E. Cummins
Special to the Law Weekly
DanCummins@comcast.net
Although a Superior Court panel in Gaudio v. Ford Motor Co., PICS Case No. 09-0927 (June 1, 2009), voted 2-1 to uphold the legislative prohibition against the seat belt defense found under 75 Pa.C.S.A. Section 4581(e), the constrained tone of the majority opinion -- and the strong dissent by Senior Judge James J. Fitzgerald -- can be viewed as another assault on what had been previously viewed as an ironclad ban on use of the defense in civil litigation matters.
Gaudio involved a strict products liability action in which the plaintiff attempted to prove that the vehicle's airbag system was defective and caused the plaintiff's decedent's injuries in a single-car crash. During the accident, the decedent's vehicle slid off a road and landed in a ditch. The unbelted decedent was later found in the vehicle by emergency personnel along with an exposed and deflated airbag.
Ford Motor Co. defended the case by asserting that the airbag system was not defective and that the decedent's injuries were caused by other pre-accident factors including the fact that the decedent was not wearing his seat belt, was unnecessarily closer to the steering wheel, and was also reaching down to the floor area at the time the airbag was deployed.
The trial court, in an opinion issued by Pike County Common Pleas Judge Harold A. Thomson Jr., acknowledged the general legislative prohibition against mentioning a plaintiff's non-use of a seat belt during a civil trial. However, the trial court judge, striking a blow against the rarely questioned prohibition against the seat belt defense, held that defendants should be allowed to use the defense in very limited circumstances, such as the Gaudio case, where the plaintiff was seeking a monetary recovery in a matter where the issue of the lack of seat belt use by the injured party was a key factor in the resolution of the central question of whether the airbag system was defective. More specifically, the trial court felt that, as long as the defense was not being used to assert contributory negligence on the part of a plaintiff, it could perhaps be used for other limited purposes relevant to the case.
Thomson's decision was originally analyzed in my Oct. 1, 2007, Pennsylvania Law Weekly column titled "Time to Unbuckle the Seat Belt Defense?" That article noted Thomson's finding that the seat belt defense should be allowed in a limited fashion in certain cases "raises a question as to the continuing validity of the legislative bar against the use of the 'seat belt defense' in all civil matters."
In that previous article, it was also proposed that, in this day and age, now over 20 years after the seat belt law went into effect in 1987, the time had come to allow for the seat belt defense as an additional incentive to those last remaining non-compliant drivers to use seat belts, particularly given all of the scientific evidence existing today confirming that seat belts serve to prevent or minimize injuries in motor vehicle accidents.
However, the previous article concluded with the notion that, in light of the clear statutory mandate prohibiting the seat belt defense in civil litigation matters, it appeared that the change in the law would have to come from the Legislature as opposed to the courts of Pennsylvania.
A Constrained Superior Court
As anticipated, the judges in the majority of the Superior Court's decision in Gaudio opted to follow the letter of the law of the statutory prohibition against the seat belt defense and "construe[d] the legislative intent of the provision to be a blanket exclusion of evidence of seat belt usage in civil actions for any purpose, including to prove not only contributory negligence but also defect, causation and/or damages."
The majority in Gaudio also noted that it was not a proper function of the court to insert its judgment as to the propriety of the prohibition against the seat belt defense where the Legislature had already resolved the issue by a clearly worded statute. Thus, the majority opinion, including the emphasis that any change in the law would have to come from a Legislative amendment, appears to indicate that the court felt constrained to follow the law in this regard. This apparent dissatisfaction of the Superior Court with the scope of the prohibition against the seat belt defense can be viewed as another chipping away of the strength of that prohibition.
Fitzgerald's Dissent
The ironclad prohibition against the seat belt defense was also dented by Fitzgerald's clear dissent on the seat belt issue and his confirmation that the state's appellate courts have struggled with some of the issues involved and would benefit from guidance from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on the question of the continuing validity and breadth of the prohibition.
In his dissenting opinion, Fitzgerald cited Daddona v. Thind, 891 A.2d 786 (Pa. Commw. 2006), and Foley v. Clark Equipment Co., 523 A.2d 379 (Pa. Super. 1987), in support of his decision that the trial court judge had properly allowed Ford Motor Co. to introduce evidence of the decedent's seat belt use, or lack thereof. Since contributory negligence was not a valid defense in this products liability case, the use of the seat belt defense in that regard was not squarely addressed by the Gaudio court. However, Fitzgerald noted that those prior appellate decisions supported allowing the seat belt defense to be utilized at least for the purposes of showing the lack of a defect (with respect to the airbags) and attempting to defeat any causation argument put forth by the plaintiff.
Time for Change
The time has come for a change in the law. As noted in my previous article on this topic, in more than 20 years since the passage of the law prohibiting the seat belt defense, scientific evidence has clearly established that using seat belts minimizes the chances of death and can minimize the extent of injuries in motor vehicle accidents. This evidence is so well-established that the wearing of seat belts for safety purposes is now deemed as common sense by the general public.
Compared to the few people who routinely used seat belts more than 20 years ago when the seat belt law was first passed, a large majority of motorists now use seat belts on such a routine basis that a seat belt defense at trial would likely only be applicable to that small number of non-law-abiding motorists lacking common sense and still foolish enough to break the law by riding in motor vehicles without belting up.
Fears by the plaintiff's bar that unbelted parties injured or killed through no fault of their own in a motor vehicle accident may be completely and unfairly barred from recovery by virtue of the injured party's failure to wear a seat belt can be tempered by Legislative limitations on the breadth of the seat belt defense. For example, the Legislature may mandate that an injured party's recovery may be limited up to a certain percentage but not entirely barred by the seat belt defense. Plaintiff's fears in this regard may also be addressed by their ability to secure expert witnesses to defeat the seat belt defense by showing that, even if the Plaintiff had been wearing a seat belt, the forces of the impact would have resulted in the same or similar injuries.
Realistically speaking, the allowance of the seat belt defense in automobile cases would really be no different than the currently allowed defense in premises liability cases that people have a duty to exercise due care in protecting themselves from injury by watching where they are walking. Also, in almost every situation, a plaintiff has a duty to mitigate his damages. What better way is there for a motor vehicle occupant to mitigate his potential damages and injuries than by simply clicking on a seat belt? Click. Done.
Last but certainly not least, it would also appear that the abolishment of the prohibition against the seat belt defense would further the now currently recognized policy of cost containment with respect to spiraling automobile insurance costs by limiting the damages recoverable by those few injured parties who continue to break the law by still refusing to wear seat belts after all of these years.
Only the Legislature Can Act
Treatises have noted that a substantial minority of jurisdictions allow for the seat belt defense given the obvious effectiveness of seat belts in reducing fatalities and injuries. See ""onuse of seatbelt as reducing amount of damages recoverable," 62 A.L.R.5th 537 (1998) by Christopher Hall. In those jurisdictions, defendants are permitted to point to the injured party's failure to use the seat belt to support contributory negligence or mitigation of damages defenses in automobile accident cases.
Pennsylvania should join those jurisdictions. However, it appears that any such change in the law will have to come from the Legislature. Public support may be secured for this change by asserting that an amendment doing away with the prohibition against the seat belt defense could, as noted, ultimately serve to contain the spiraling costs of automobile insurance rates for the law abiding citizens of Pennsylvania who do wear their seat belts as required.
Daniel E. Cummins is a partner and civil litigator with the Scranton law firm of Foley Cognetti Comerford Cimini & Cummins.
This article is reprinted here with permission from the June 29, 2009 issue of the Pennsylvania Law Weekly.(c) 2009 Incisive Media US Properties, LLC. Further duplication without permission is prohibited. All rights reserved. Please contact the author for permission to reprint or duplicate.
A Superior Court panel upholds the ban but illustrates its weaknesses
By Daniel E. Cummins
Special to the Law Weekly
DanCummins@comcast.net
Although a Superior Court panel in Gaudio v. Ford Motor Co., PICS Case No. 09-0927 (June 1, 2009), voted 2-1 to uphold the legislative prohibition against the seat belt defense found under 75 Pa.C.S.A. Section 4581(e), the constrained tone of the majority opinion -- and the strong dissent by Senior Judge James J. Fitzgerald -- can be viewed as another assault on what had been previously viewed as an ironclad ban on use of the defense in civil litigation matters.
Gaudio involved a strict products liability action in which the plaintiff attempted to prove that the vehicle's airbag system was defective and caused the plaintiff's decedent's injuries in a single-car crash. During the accident, the decedent's vehicle slid off a road and landed in a ditch. The unbelted decedent was later found in the vehicle by emergency personnel along with an exposed and deflated airbag.
Ford Motor Co. defended the case by asserting that the airbag system was not defective and that the decedent's injuries were caused by other pre-accident factors including the fact that the decedent was not wearing his seat belt, was unnecessarily closer to the steering wheel, and was also reaching down to the floor area at the time the airbag was deployed.
The trial court, in an opinion issued by Pike County Common Pleas Judge Harold A. Thomson Jr., acknowledged the general legislative prohibition against mentioning a plaintiff's non-use of a seat belt during a civil trial. However, the trial court judge, striking a blow against the rarely questioned prohibition against the seat belt defense, held that defendants should be allowed to use the defense in very limited circumstances, such as the Gaudio case, where the plaintiff was seeking a monetary recovery in a matter where the issue of the lack of seat belt use by the injured party was a key factor in the resolution of the central question of whether the airbag system was defective. More specifically, the trial court felt that, as long as the defense was not being used to assert contributory negligence on the part of a plaintiff, it could perhaps be used for other limited purposes relevant to the case.
Thomson's decision was originally analyzed in my Oct. 1, 2007, Pennsylvania Law Weekly column titled "Time to Unbuckle the Seat Belt Defense?" That article noted Thomson's finding that the seat belt defense should be allowed in a limited fashion in certain cases "raises a question as to the continuing validity of the legislative bar against the use of the 'seat belt defense' in all civil matters."
In that previous article, it was also proposed that, in this day and age, now over 20 years after the seat belt law went into effect in 1987, the time had come to allow for the seat belt defense as an additional incentive to those last remaining non-compliant drivers to use seat belts, particularly given all of the scientific evidence existing today confirming that seat belts serve to prevent or minimize injuries in motor vehicle accidents.
However, the previous article concluded with the notion that, in light of the clear statutory mandate prohibiting the seat belt defense in civil litigation matters, it appeared that the change in the law would have to come from the Legislature as opposed to the courts of Pennsylvania.
A Constrained Superior Court
As anticipated, the judges in the majority of the Superior Court's decision in Gaudio opted to follow the letter of the law of the statutory prohibition against the seat belt defense and "construe[d] the legislative intent of the provision to be a blanket exclusion of evidence of seat belt usage in civil actions for any purpose, including to prove not only contributory negligence but also defect, causation and/or damages."
The majority in Gaudio also noted that it was not a proper function of the court to insert its judgment as to the propriety of the prohibition against the seat belt defense where the Legislature had already resolved the issue by a clearly worded statute. Thus, the majority opinion, including the emphasis that any change in the law would have to come from a Legislative amendment, appears to indicate that the court felt constrained to follow the law in this regard. This apparent dissatisfaction of the Superior Court with the scope of the prohibition against the seat belt defense can be viewed as another chipping away of the strength of that prohibition.
Fitzgerald's Dissent
The ironclad prohibition against the seat belt defense was also dented by Fitzgerald's clear dissent on the seat belt issue and his confirmation that the state's appellate courts have struggled with some of the issues involved and would benefit from guidance from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on the question of the continuing validity and breadth of the prohibition.
In his dissenting opinion, Fitzgerald cited Daddona v. Thind, 891 A.2d 786 (Pa. Commw. 2006), and Foley v. Clark Equipment Co., 523 A.2d 379 (Pa. Super. 1987), in support of his decision that the trial court judge had properly allowed Ford Motor Co. to introduce evidence of the decedent's seat belt use, or lack thereof. Since contributory negligence was not a valid defense in this products liability case, the use of the seat belt defense in that regard was not squarely addressed by the Gaudio court. However, Fitzgerald noted that those prior appellate decisions supported allowing the seat belt defense to be utilized at least for the purposes of showing the lack of a defect (with respect to the airbags) and attempting to defeat any causation argument put forth by the plaintiff.
Time for Change
The time has come for a change in the law. As noted in my previous article on this topic, in more than 20 years since the passage of the law prohibiting the seat belt defense, scientific evidence has clearly established that using seat belts minimizes the chances of death and can minimize the extent of injuries in motor vehicle accidents. This evidence is so well-established that the wearing of seat belts for safety purposes is now deemed as common sense by the general public.
Compared to the few people who routinely used seat belts more than 20 years ago when the seat belt law was first passed, a large majority of motorists now use seat belts on such a routine basis that a seat belt defense at trial would likely only be applicable to that small number of non-law-abiding motorists lacking common sense and still foolish enough to break the law by riding in motor vehicles without belting up.
Fears by the plaintiff's bar that unbelted parties injured or killed through no fault of their own in a motor vehicle accident may be completely and unfairly barred from recovery by virtue of the injured party's failure to wear a seat belt can be tempered by Legislative limitations on the breadth of the seat belt defense. For example, the Legislature may mandate that an injured party's recovery may be limited up to a certain percentage but not entirely barred by the seat belt defense. Plaintiff's fears in this regard may also be addressed by their ability to secure expert witnesses to defeat the seat belt defense by showing that, even if the Plaintiff had been wearing a seat belt, the forces of the impact would have resulted in the same or similar injuries.
Realistically speaking, the allowance of the seat belt defense in automobile cases would really be no different than the currently allowed defense in premises liability cases that people have a duty to exercise due care in protecting themselves from injury by watching where they are walking. Also, in almost every situation, a plaintiff has a duty to mitigate his damages. What better way is there for a motor vehicle occupant to mitigate his potential damages and injuries than by simply clicking on a seat belt? Click. Done.
Last but certainly not least, it would also appear that the abolishment of the prohibition against the seat belt defense would further the now currently recognized policy of cost containment with respect to spiraling automobile insurance costs by limiting the damages recoverable by those few injured parties who continue to break the law by still refusing to wear seat belts after all of these years.
Only the Legislature Can Act
Treatises have noted that a substantial minority of jurisdictions allow for the seat belt defense given the obvious effectiveness of seat belts in reducing fatalities and injuries. See ""onuse of seatbelt as reducing amount of damages recoverable," 62 A.L.R.5th 537 (1998) by Christopher Hall. In those jurisdictions, defendants are permitted to point to the injured party's failure to use the seat belt to support contributory negligence or mitigation of damages defenses in automobile accident cases.
Pennsylvania should join those jurisdictions. However, it appears that any such change in the law will have to come from the Legislature. Public support may be secured for this change by asserting that an amendment doing away with the prohibition against the seat belt defense could, as noted, ultimately serve to contain the spiraling costs of automobile insurance rates for the law abiding citizens of Pennsylvania who do wear their seat belts as required.
Daniel E. Cummins is a partner and civil litigator with the Scranton law firm of Foley Cognetti Comerford Cimini & Cummins.
This article is reprinted here with permission from the June 29, 2009 issue of the Pennsylvania Law Weekly.(c) 2009 Incisive Media US Properties, LLC. Further duplication without permission is prohibited. All rights reserved. Please contact the author for permission to reprint or duplicate.
Monday, June 22, 2009
Recent Jury Verdict Entered in Pike County in Automobile Accident Case
According to the June 19, 2009 edition of the Pike County Legal Journal a recent jury verdict was handed down on June 12, 2009 in the Pike County automobile accident case of AURORA AND DONALD BEACH, Plaintiffs v. CHRISTINE SCHAEFERS, JESUS DIAZ, and DELBY DIAZ, Defendents, Docket No. 76-2005-Civil.
The case arose out of a car accident that occurred at around 7 p.m. on February 14, 2003 on U.S. Route 6 in Westfall Township at the light for the on-ramp to Interstate 84 around 7 p.m. The Plaintiff was a passenger in a vehicle being operated by Defendant Diaz.
Defendant Schaefers, prior attempting to make a left turn onto the I-84 on ramp, came to a stop in straight travel lane, as opposed to the left-hand turning lane. While stopped in the traffic lane, Defendant Schaefer's vehicle was rear-ended by Defendant Diaz's vehicle in which the Plaintiff, Aurora Beach, was located as a passenger. The Plaintiff alleged injuries to her to both her right knee and lower back.
It was undisputed that Defendant Schaefers was not in the left hand turning lane and was stopped in the wrong long lane of travel for such a turn. It was also undisputed that the left hand turning lane had a red light while the remaining straight lanes of travel, in which Schaefers’ vehicle was stopped, had a green light.
Both sides submitted the testimony of medical experts concerning the injuries Plaintiff sustained as a result of the accident and her need for future medical treatment. Testimony revealed Plaintiff had a herniated disc in her lower back and that she had undergone two knee surgeries and would probably need a knee replacement in the future. At the time of trial, Plaintiff was 23 years of age and had a life expectancy of 64.9 years.
Following a two-day jury trial, the jury entered a verdict in favor of the Plaintiff in the amount of $310,000. The jury found Defendant Schaeffers 80% negligent for stopping in the wrong lane of travel and found Defendant Delby Diaz 20% negligent for rear-ending the Schaefer vehicle.
The jury awarded the Plaintiff $300,000 for future medical expenses, but only $5,000 for pain and suffering, and only $5,000 for loss of enjoyment of life, for a total award of $310,000. The jury made no award for disfigurement or embarrassment and humiliation.
It appears that the Pike County jury bought into an argument that the Plaintiff may need future medical treatment, including surgery. Showing that the county is still relatively conservative when it comes to pain and suffering awards, the jury may have felt that, as long as the Plaintiff is able to treat with the medical expenses damages awarded, then the Plaintiff should have less pain and suffering. Of course, this is speculation and only a suggestion as to how the jury may have come to their decision.
The Presiding Judge at trial was the Honorable Gregory H. Chelak. Plaintiff's counsel was Danielle Mulcahey, Esquire from the Scranton law firm of Wright & Reihner. Defendant Schaefer was represented by Kevin Hayes, Esquire of the Scranton law firm of Scanlon, Howley & Doherty. Defendant Diaz was represented by the Scranton law firm of Byrne, Neyhart & Higgins.
The case arose out of a car accident that occurred at around 7 p.m. on February 14, 2003 on U.S. Route 6 in Westfall Township at the light for the on-ramp to Interstate 84 around 7 p.m. The Plaintiff was a passenger in a vehicle being operated by Defendant Diaz.
Defendant Schaefers, prior attempting to make a left turn onto the I-84 on ramp, came to a stop in straight travel lane, as opposed to the left-hand turning lane. While stopped in the traffic lane, Defendant Schaefer's vehicle was rear-ended by Defendant Diaz's vehicle in which the Plaintiff, Aurora Beach, was located as a passenger. The Plaintiff alleged injuries to her to both her right knee and lower back.
It was undisputed that Defendant Schaefers was not in the left hand turning lane and was stopped in the wrong long lane of travel for such a turn. It was also undisputed that the left hand turning lane had a red light while the remaining straight lanes of travel, in which Schaefers’ vehicle was stopped, had a green light.
Both sides submitted the testimony of medical experts concerning the injuries Plaintiff sustained as a result of the accident and her need for future medical treatment. Testimony revealed Plaintiff had a herniated disc in her lower back and that she had undergone two knee surgeries and would probably need a knee replacement in the future. At the time of trial, Plaintiff was 23 years of age and had a life expectancy of 64.9 years.
Following a two-day jury trial, the jury entered a verdict in favor of the Plaintiff in the amount of $310,000. The jury found Defendant Schaeffers 80% negligent for stopping in the wrong lane of travel and found Defendant Delby Diaz 20% negligent for rear-ending the Schaefer vehicle.
The jury awarded the Plaintiff $300,000 for future medical expenses, but only $5,000 for pain and suffering, and only $5,000 for loss of enjoyment of life, for a total award of $310,000. The jury made no award for disfigurement or embarrassment and humiliation.
It appears that the Pike County jury bought into an argument that the Plaintiff may need future medical treatment, including surgery. Showing that the county is still relatively conservative when it comes to pain and suffering awards, the jury may have felt that, as long as the Plaintiff is able to treat with the medical expenses damages awarded, then the Plaintiff should have less pain and suffering. Of course, this is speculation and only a suggestion as to how the jury may have come to their decision.
The Presiding Judge at trial was the Honorable Gregory H. Chelak. Plaintiff's counsel was Danielle Mulcahey, Esquire from the Scranton law firm of Wright & Reihner. Defendant Schaefer was represented by Kevin Hayes, Esquire of the Scranton law firm of Scanlon, Howley & Doherty. Defendant Diaz was represented by the Scranton law firm of Byrne, Neyhart & Higgins.
Monday, May 4, 2009
An Update on Pike County Jury Verdicts
I recently began recieving copies of the Pike County (Pennsylvania) Legal Journal, a weekly publication pertaining to matters in that county located in the Northeastern corner of the state where Pennsylvania meets up with New York and New Jersey. Among the items reported on are jury verdicts. I have summarized the information on those recent verdicts for you below.
Please note that it is my intention periodically update you on the reportings of these Pike County verdicts as part our ongoing efforts to keep you apprised on how juries are evaluating claims in this rural county that has a continuing influx of former New York and New Jersey residents. Perhaps a knowledge of Pike County jury verdicts in civil litigation matters may assist you in coming to a proper evaluation of claims arising in that county and the other surrounding rural counties in that area.
To my knowledge, none of the other surrounding counties provide this information in their legal journals. Should that change, I will include that additional information in later updates.
In the meantime, I will reach out to the writers of the legal journals of Lackawanna and Luzerne Counties to see if there is any interest in providing such information on a regular basis. I will also suggest to the writers of the Pike County Journal that it may be helpful to provide the attorney information so that attorneys can contact them for more detailed information or even to send a note of congratulations (or sympathy!).
The information secured on the recent Pike County verdicts is, as follows:
PIKE COUNTY VERDICTS
(Updated 5/4/09)
MCGINNIS V. CHERASARO
No. 202-08-Civil
Verdict Recorded 4/17/09
The Plaintiff sought damages for injuries sustained in a motor vehicle collision which occurred in Milford, Pennsylvania. The Defendant stipulated that his own negligence caused the collision, but disputed the allegation that the collision was a factual cause of the Plaintiff ’s injuries. Specifically, the Defendant argued that the Plaintiff suffered from a pre-existing condition. Following a two-day jury trial, the jury found in favor of the Defendant.
Presiding Judge: Hon. Gregory H. Chelak, J.
BARAK v. RESORTS USA
No. 1304-06-Civil
Verdict Recorded 4/7/09
Plaintiffs filed a negligence action against Resorts USA d/b/a Fernwood Hotel for a slip and fall that occurred in December of 2005 on the walkway leading to one of the resort buildings. After checking in at the hotel, the Plaintiff drove to the building his family was assigned. While walking around the building, the Plaintiff slipped and fell on ice on the sidewalk. As a result of this slip and fall, the Plaintiff sustained a broke ankle and underwent two surgeries to repair it.
Following a two day jury trial, the jury found for the Plaintiff. More specifically, the jury concluded that the Plaintiff was 40% negligent and that the hotel was 60% negligent in causing the Plaintiff’s injuries. Without consideration of, or a reduction for the attributed percentage of causal negligence, the jury awarded the Plaintiff, $12,378.28 in medical expenses and only $2,500.00 for pain and suffering for a total award of $14,878.28.
Presiding Judge: Hon. Gregory H. Chelak, J.
Please note that it is my intention periodically update you on the reportings of these Pike County verdicts as part our ongoing efforts to keep you apprised on how juries are evaluating claims in this rural county that has a continuing influx of former New York and New Jersey residents. Perhaps a knowledge of Pike County jury verdicts in civil litigation matters may assist you in coming to a proper evaluation of claims arising in that county and the other surrounding rural counties in that area.
To my knowledge, none of the other surrounding counties provide this information in their legal journals. Should that change, I will include that additional information in later updates.
In the meantime, I will reach out to the writers of the legal journals of Lackawanna and Luzerne Counties to see if there is any interest in providing such information on a regular basis. I will also suggest to the writers of the Pike County Journal that it may be helpful to provide the attorney information so that attorneys can contact them for more detailed information or even to send a note of congratulations (or sympathy!).
The information secured on the recent Pike County verdicts is, as follows:
PIKE COUNTY VERDICTS
(Updated 5/4/09)
MCGINNIS V. CHERASARO
No. 202-08-Civil
Verdict Recorded 4/17/09
The Plaintiff sought damages for injuries sustained in a motor vehicle collision which occurred in Milford, Pennsylvania. The Defendant stipulated that his own negligence caused the collision, but disputed the allegation that the collision was a factual cause of the Plaintiff ’s injuries. Specifically, the Defendant argued that the Plaintiff suffered from a pre-existing condition. Following a two-day jury trial, the jury found in favor of the Defendant.
Presiding Judge: Hon. Gregory H. Chelak, J.
BARAK v. RESORTS USA
No. 1304-06-Civil
Verdict Recorded 4/7/09
Plaintiffs filed a negligence action against Resorts USA d/b/a Fernwood Hotel for a slip and fall that occurred in December of 2005 on the walkway leading to one of the resort buildings. After checking in at the hotel, the Plaintiff drove to the building his family was assigned. While walking around the building, the Plaintiff slipped and fell on ice on the sidewalk. As a result of this slip and fall, the Plaintiff sustained a broke ankle and underwent two surgeries to repair it.
Following a two day jury trial, the jury found for the Plaintiff. More specifically, the jury concluded that the Plaintiff was 40% negligent and that the hotel was 60% negligent in causing the Plaintiff’s injuries. Without consideration of, or a reduction for the attributed percentage of causal negligence, the jury awarded the Plaintiff, $12,378.28 in medical expenses and only $2,500.00 for pain and suffering for a total award of $14,878.28.
Presiding Judge: Hon. Gregory H. Chelak, J.
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