Court Allows Plaintiff's Expert To Testify in Medical Malpractice Case

In the case of Pratt v. Shahid, No. CV-23-00720 (C.P. Lyc. Co. April 14, 2026 Carlucci, J.), the court denied the Defendants’ Motion In Limine seeking to preclude the Plaintiff from introducing the testimony of a doctor in a medical malpractice case.

In this case, the court denied the Defendants’ request for an exclusion of the Plaintiff’s medical expert’s testimony given that the Plaintiff’s expert’s opinion was found to be supported by medical literature.

The court also noted that the Defendants’ challenge went to the Plaintiff’s expert’s conclusions rather than the methodology utilized by the expert. 

The court found that the Plaintiff’s expert’s methodology was not novel, as it was similar to the methodology used by the Defendants’ expert. The court further noted that, even if the Plaintiff’s methodology was considered to be novel, it was still generally accepted in the scientific community as supported by articles from scientific journals submitted by the Plaintiff.

In the end, the court ruled that, while the Plaintiff’s expert’s conclusions differed from those advanced by the Defendants’ expert, that difference is not a proper basis for excluding the testimony of the Plaintiff’s expert.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (May 28, 2026). 

Judge Brann Review Rules of Evidence Regarding Admissibility of Evidence and Expert Testimony in a Trucking Accident Matter

In the case of Cleveland Brothers Equip. Co. v. Vorobey, No. 4:19-CV-01708 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 10, 2023 Brann, J.), the court addressed numerous pre-trial Motions in Limine in a contribution action arising out of a trucking accident.

In ruling on the various pre-trial Motions in Limine at issue, Judge Brann provided a detailed recitation as to the current law regarding the general the admissibility of certain evidence at trial.

With regards to one of the issues raised in this case, in which Cleveland Brothers was seeking contribution against a Co-Defendant relative to a Cleveland Brothers’ payment of a settlement in an underlying personal injury matter, the court ruled that evidence regarding a Defendant’s lack of participation in a Mediation that led to the settlement of the underlying action would be excluded as irrelevant to the negligence issues presented in this contribution case. 

The court reasoned that whether and why a party did or did not participate in an underlying legal proceeding had no bearing on whether that party owed a duty of law or breached that duty relative to the underlying motor vehicle accident. The court also noted that the reference to any litigation strategy by the parties in the underlying case was inadmissible as it would likely confuse and distract the jury in this subsequent contribution action.

Chief Judge Matthew W. Brann
M.D. Pa.

In this decision, the court also addressed issues regarding the qualifications and competency of a defense accident reconstruction expert to testify with regards to certain issues relevant to the accident. In his Opinion, Judge Brann set out the applicable law as to the admissibility of an expert witness as an expert in detail.  After reviewing that law, Judge Brann limited the Defendant's accident reconstruction expert’s testimony in certain respects.

The court also addressed whether or to the Defendant in this contribution action could attempt to introduce evidence that the settlement of the underlying personal injury case was allegedly influenced upwards by the fact that punitive damages claims were pled.

Judge Brann found that the Defendant in this contribution case had not developed any factual basis to support a claim that the punitive damages pled in the underlying case did serve to influence the settlement for which Cleveland Brothers was seeking a contribution in this matter.

The court also noted that an affirmative defense, such as the one at issue regarding the punitive damages issue, raised by a Defendant can be dismissed prior to trial for lack of proof. The court found that the Defendant’s proof in this regard was woefully insufficient and, as such, the Defendant was precluded from referencing at the trial of the contribution claims the fact that punitive damages may have been at issue in the underlying personal injury matter.

Relative to the actions of the Defendant truck driver, Judge Brann noted that, since the negligence of that driver was conceded, evidence of that driver’s conviction for traffic violations would be precluded as being more prejudicial then probative under an application of the Federal Rules of Evidence.

Judge Brann also addressed whether or not Cleveland Brothers could proceed with affidavits and/or testimony from the Plaintiff’s attorneys for the original Plaintiffs in the underlying litigation in the effort by Cleveland Brothers to establish that the damages paid in the underlying settlement were reasonable and necessary. 

The court analogized this evidence as being similar to office notes or reports by treating physicians. Judge Brann stated that, in the same way that treating physicians need not submit expert reports concerning their treatment in order to testify at trial, the attorneys for the original Plaintiffs in this same litigation would be permitted to testify as to the fairness of settlement without submitting expert reports under F.R.C.P. 26.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm in Philadelphia for summarizing this case in his monthly newsletter.  For full disclosure purposes, I note that I represented an Additional Defendant in this case.

Federal Court Addresses Daubert Motion Relative to Expert Testimony and Motion for Summary Judgment in Products Case

In the case of DiDonato v. Black & Decker (U.S.), Inc., No. 20-CV-4425-JMY (E.D. Pa. Feb. 9, 2022 Younge, J.), the court denied a Motion for Summary Judgment and a Motion regarding the admissibility of expert testimony under Rule 702 in a products liability case.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff was allegedly injured while cleaning a vehicle and using a power buffer/polisher manufactured by the Defendant.  

Relative to the issues raised by the defense with respect to the Plaintiff’s expert testimony, the court found that the Plaintiff’s expert’s testimony about an alternative design was admissible under Rule 702. The court noted that the reliability analysis with respect to an expert testimony looks at the reliability of the methodology as opposed to the conclusions of the expert. To be admissible, the expert’s testimony must also assist the trier of fact in resolving a factual dispute.

The court noted that it is not essential that an expert be able to recreate the facts of the accident. The court reasoned in this case that, while the accident in this case happened quickly while the Plaintiff was allegedly distracted while using the Defendant’s power tool, those facts did not preclude the Plaintiff’s expert from opining on the issue of causation.

In another important ruling, the court noted that experts are allowed to rely upon the testimony of witnesses, even where that testimony is disputed.

The court ultimately found that, since the Plaintiff’s expert’s testimony was admissible, the Plaintiff’s risk/utility theory of a designed defect survived the Motion for Summary Judgment.  However, summary judgment was granted with respect to the Plaintiff's claims of a manufacturing defect, and with regards to the breach of express warranties and failure to warn claims.

The court additionally noted that the extent to which the Plaintiff’s alleged carelessness and alleged failure to follow instructions caused the accident was an issue for the jury to decide.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Court's companion Order can be viewed HERE.


I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck from the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of image (not the device in question):  Photo by Khunkorn Laowisit from www.pexels.com.

Pennsylvania Superior Court Reviews Admissibility of Expert Testimony Based Upon Methodology Behind Opinion

The Pennsylvania Superior Court recently issued a notable decision regarding the admissibility of expert testimony in the case of In the Interest of: M.R., a minor, 2021 Pa. Super. 30 (Pa. Super. March 1, 2021 Bender, P.J.E., Olson, J., and King, J.) (Op. by Bender, J.).

Although this is not a tort case, and involves issues regarding child abuse, the law regarding the admissibility of expert opinions set forth in this decision would likely also apply in civil litigation matters.

At issue in this case was whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion by admitting the testimony of the parents’ expert witness who offered an opinion that metabolic bone disease of infancy (also known as temporary brittle bone disease) was the cause of the twin children’s multiple fractures and not any abuse.

In reviewing the issue of admissibility of the expert’s opinion, the court reviewed Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 702 and the case of Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).

The court noted that, under Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 702, which controls the admissibility of expert testimony, one of the requirements for the admission of an expert’s opinion is that the expert’s methodology is generally accepted in the relevant field. This is commonly referred to as the Frye test.

The court noted that the Frye test is limited to an inquiry into whether the methodologies by which the scientist had reached his or her conclusions have been generally accepted in the scientific community. 

The court noted that this test restricts the admission of scientific evidence to that evidence that has resulted from scientific research which has been deemed to be generally recognized as sound research as opposed to the “fanciful creations of a renegade researcher.” [citation omitted].   However, the test is not so restrictive that it does not allow for a scientist to testify as to new conclusions which have emerged during the course of properly conducted research.

Under this test, the proponent of the admission of expert scientific evidence bears the burden of establishing all of the elements supporting its admission, including the general acceptance of a methodology that has actually been employed in the relevant scientific community.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court emphasized that the law of Pennsylvania is that the question of whether a methodology is generally accepted in the relevant scientific community is a determination that is to be made based upon the testimony of scientists in that community and not upon any alleged scientific expertise of the trial court judge. Rather, the Frye test assures that judges will be guided by scientists when assessing the reliability of a scientific method.

As such, under the analysis to be applied in determining whether to admit an expert's opinion, it is the trial court’s function to ensure that the expert has applied a generally accepted scientific methodology to reach his or her scientific conclusions. To fulfill this function, the trial court must be guided by scientists in the relevant field, including the experts retained the parties in the case and any other evidence of general acceptance presented by the parties.  For example, a reference to the methodology in textbooks, scientific publications, studies, statistics, expert testimony, or in other judicial opinions on the issue, or a combination of these sources, can support the admission of an opinion.

The Superior Court cautioned that the trial court may consider only whether the expert applied methodology generally accepted in the relevant field, and the trial court may not go further and attempt to determine whether or not it agrees with the expert’s application of those methodologies and/or whether the expert’s conclusions have sufficient factual support.  Rather, those questions are for a jury to decide.

In setting forth this law, the Pennsylvania Superior Court in this case quoted extensively from the recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in the case of Walsh Estate of Walsh v. BASF Corp., 234 A.3d 446, 456 (Pa. 2020).

In the end, the Pennsylvania Superior Court found that the trial court had abused its discretion by admitting the testimony of the expert in this child abuse case.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia office of Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.