Court Refuses To Enforce Settlement Where Plaintiff Asserts She Did Not Agree to the Settlement

In the case of Vangjelli v. Banks, No. 19-CV-1635 (E.D. Pa. April 6, 2023 Bratter, J.), the court denied a Defendant’s Motion to Enforce a Settlement after finding that the Plaintiff asserted that she never agreed to the settlement and that the Plaintiff’s attorney had no express authority from the client to accept the proposed settlement.

The case arose out of issues related to the Plaintiff’s attempts to enter a Social Security Card Center and allegedly encountering trouble with a security guard. This led to the Plaintiff, at one point, being tackled by the security guard. The Plaintiff asserted various claims for personal injury as a result.

After the state court case was removed to federal court, the parties were referred to a magistrate judge for a Settlement Conference.

The magistrate judge was informed that the parties had settled the case. As such, the court dismissed the case with prejudice.

The Plaintiff then sent a letter to the court two (2) days later stating that she did not agree to settle and that her attorneys knew that. The Defendants filed the Motion to Enforce the Settlement at issue.

The court found a conflict of interests between the Plaintiff and her attorneys and granted the attorneys’ Motion to Withdraw. The Plaintiff did not secure new counsel.

The court construed the Plaintiff’s attorney’s letter to the court as a pro se Motion to Set Aside the Order of Dismissal.

Applying Pennsylvania law, the federal courts noted that counsel needed the express authority of the client to settle the case. The court stated that, express authority would not be found where, as here, the client had repudiated the attorney’s authority in a timely manner after the settlement.

Given that the evidence in this case showed a lack of clarity regarding the attorney’s express authority to settle the claims, the court denied the Defendant's Motion to Enforce the Settlement.

More specifically, the court saw and heard notable material gaps and inconsistencies in the testimony of the Plaintiff and her attorneys on the issues presented. The court also noted that none of the witnesses presented any documentary evidence.

It was indicated that there were two Settlement Conferences that were conducted via telephone. The record indicated that the Plaintiff was in the attorney’s office listening to the first conference but was not present for the second conference. While she was not present at the second conference, she had agreed to be available by telephone to discuss any settlement offers and to possibly authorize her attorneys to accept any offers.

The Plaintiff’s attorney testified that he conveyed the settlement offer to the Plaintiff, asked her if she wanted to settle, and that the Plaintiff had responded in the affirmative.

The attorney also testified that, when he called the Plaintiff back to tell her that the case had settled, the Plaintiff stated that she had changed her mind and no longer wanted to accept the offer.

During her testimony, the Plaintiff stated that she did not remember ever saying she wanted to accept the offer and that she had, instead, told her attorney to “go higher.”

Based upon the record before it, the court found that it could not conclude that the attorney for the Plaintiff ever had any expressed authority to accept the settlement agreement. Given that the contradictory testimonial evidence showed that there was not a meeting of the minds between the Plaintiff and her attorney as to what was said, let alone what was meant, the court denied the Petition to Enforce the Settlement.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Court's Order on the case can be viewed HERE.


Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions.” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (April 27, 2023).

Source of image:  Photo by Cottonbro Studio on www.pexels.com.

Judge Brann Review Rules of Evidence Regarding Admissibility of Evidence and Expert Testimony in a Trucking Accident Matter

In the case of Cleveland Brothers Equip. Co. v. Vorobey, No. 4:19-CV-01708 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 10, 2023 Brann, J.), the court addressed numerous pre-trial Motions in Limine in a contribution action arising out of a trucking accident.

In ruling on the various pre-trial Motions in Limine at issue, Judge Brann provided a detailed recitation as to the current law regarding the general the admissibility of certain evidence at trial.

With regards to one of the issues raised in this case, in which Cleveland Brothers was seeking contribution against a Co-Defendant relative to a Cleveland Brothers’ payment of a settlement in an underlying personal injury matter, the court ruled that evidence regarding a Defendant’s lack of participation in a Mediation that led to the settlement of the underlying action would be excluded as irrelevant to the negligence issues presented in this contribution case. 

The court reasoned that whether and why a party did or did not participate in an underlying legal proceeding had no bearing on whether that party owed a duty of law or breached that duty relative to the underlying motor vehicle accident. The court also noted that the reference to any litigation strategy by the parties in the underlying case was inadmissible as it would likely confuse and distract the jury in this subsequent contribution action.

Chief Judge Matthew W. Brann
M.D. Pa.

In this decision, the court also addressed issues regarding the qualifications and competency of a defense accident reconstruction expert to testify with regards to certain issues relevant to the accident. In his Opinion, Judge Brann set out the applicable law as to the admissibility of an expert witness as an expert in detail.  After reviewing that law, Judge Brann limited the Defendant's accident reconstruction expert’s testimony in certain respects.

The court also addressed whether or to the Defendant in this contribution action could attempt to introduce evidence that the settlement of the underlying personal injury case was allegedly influenced upwards by the fact that punitive damages claims were pled.

Judge Brann found that the Defendant in this contribution case had not developed any factual basis to support a claim that the punitive damages pled in the underlying case did serve to influence the settlement for which Cleveland Brothers was seeking a contribution in this matter.

The court also noted that an affirmative defense, such as the one at issue regarding the punitive damages issue, raised by a Defendant can be dismissed prior to trial for lack of proof. The court found that the Defendant’s proof in this regard was woefully insufficient and, as such, the Defendant was precluded from referencing at the trial of the contribution claims the fact that punitive damages may have been at issue in the underlying personal injury matter.

Relative to the actions of the Defendant truck driver, Judge Brann noted that, since the negligence of that driver was conceded, evidence of that driver’s conviction for traffic violations would be precluded as being more prejudicial then probative under an application of the Federal Rules of Evidence.

Judge Brann also addressed whether or not Cleveland Brothers could proceed with affidavits and/or testimony from the Plaintiff’s attorneys for the original Plaintiffs in the underlying litigation in the effort by Cleveland Brothers to establish that the damages paid in the underlying settlement were reasonable and necessary. 

The court analogized this evidence as being similar to office notes or reports by treating physicians. Judge Brann stated that, in the same way that treating physicians need not submit expert reports concerning their treatment in order to testify at trial, the attorneys for the original Plaintiffs in this same litigation would be permitted to testify as to the fairness of settlement without submitting expert reports under F.R.C.P. 26.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm in Philadelphia for summarizing this case in his monthly newsletter.  For full disclosure purposes, I note that I represented an Additional Defendant in this case.

Non-Settling Defendants Precluded From Referencing Joint Tortfeasor Settlement with Another Med Mal Defendant

In the case of Snyder v. North American Partners in Anesthesia, No. 19-CV-83 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Nov. 12, 2021 Nealon, J.), the court granted a Plaintiff’s Motion In Limine in a medical malpractice case and precluded a non-settling Defendant and an Additional Defendant from referencing a joint tortfeasor settlement that the Plaintiff had entered into with a non-party.  The Court also precluded any reference to the Plaintiffs’ previous assertion of a malpractice claim against that former party.

The court noted that the former Defendant, who had secured a joint tortfeasor settlement had previously secured a Discontinuance relative to this action and a removal as a named Defendant.

In so ruling, the court referred to 42 Pa. C.S.A. §6141(c) which provides that, “[e]xcept in an action in which final settlement and release has been pleaded as a complete defense, any settlement or payment…shall not be admissible in evidence on the trial of any matter.” 

Judge Nealon noted that, based upon the plain language of this provision, evidence of any prior settlements is inadmissible at any trial on any matter.

The court additionally noted that Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 408(a)(1) similarly prohibited the admissibility or use of any offer or acceptance of valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise a claim. The court noted that, under the comment of that Rule of Evidence, it is indicated that “Pa.R.E. 408 is consistent with 42 Pa.C.S. §6141 in excluding any evidence of a joint tortfeasor settlement.”

On the basis of this law, the court granted the Plaintiff’s Motion In Limine.

The court additionally granted the Plaintiff’s Motion seeking to prohibit the non-settling Defendants from mentioning the fact that the Plaintiff’s originally asserted a malpractice claim against the settling Defendant. In this regard, the court made a distinction between factual allegations, which could be deemed to be judicial admissions, and allegations of legal conclusions, which could not be deemed to be judicial admissions.

As such, the court noted that certain factual allegations regarding specific documentation created by the relevant medical witnesses and parties may be offered as judicial admissions but any allegations by the Plaintiffs concerning the causal negligence by the settling Defendant or its agents would not be allowed to be introduced into evidence.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Court Finds That Email Exchange Evidencing Basic Terms of Demand, Offer, Acceptance Supports Settlement of Claims

In the case of Hatchigan v. Kaplin Stewart, No. 3040 EDA 2018 (C.P. Phila. Co. Oct. 25, 2018 Anders, J.), the court found that the Defendants were entitled to enforce a settlement agreement of the parties reached by way of emails containing the essential terms of the Defendants’ settlement offer, the Plaintiff’s acceptance of the same, and the required consideration necessary to make a contract enforceable.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff also executed a Release that referred back to the email exchanges.  Issues arose in this matter between the parties thereafter and the defense filed a motion to enforce the settlement.

In this Rule 1925 Opinion issued by the trial court, that court recommended that the Superior Court affirm its decision enforcing the party’s settlement agreement.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions,” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (Dec. 4, 2018)

TRENDING: Evidence of UIM Limits and the Amount of the Third Party Settlement Ruled Inadmissible At Post-Koken Trial by Eastern Federal District Court of PA

In the Post-Koken case of Schmerling v. LM General Ins. Co., No. 17-3659 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 8, 2018 DuBois, J.), Judge Jan E. Dubois of the Eastern District Federal Court of Pennsylvania the court addressed the carrier's motion regarding the manner in which this UIM case was to be presented to the jury.

The court ruled that the Plaintiff was prohibited from presenting evidence on the UIM benefits coverage as well as evidence on the settlement negotiations with the underlying tortfeasor defendant and the settlement agreement with the tortfeasor defendant.

After reviewing conflicting Pennsylvania Federal Court decisions on the issue, the Schmerling court entered these rulings under an application of general principles of relevance.  The court noted that the evidence was irrelevant to the jury's determination of the Plaintiff's alleged damages, and that any probative value of such evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the Defendant. 

In terms of the unfair prejudice of this information, the court noted that the evidence of the amount of the UIM limits, could supply the jury with an "anchor number" that does not reflect the Plaintiff's actual damages. 

The court ruled with similar reasoning in excluding evidence of the Plaintiff's settlement negotiations and settlement agreement with the tortfeasor as irrelevant to the jury's proper assessment of damages and unfairly prejudicial to the defense.

The Schmerling  Court's Order can be viewed HERE.  The Opinion by the Court can be viewed at this LINK.


This recent Schmerling decision has already been cited in a similar ruling by President Judge Jason J. Legg of the Susquehanna County Court of Common Pleas on November 19, 2019 in the case of Phillips v. Nat'l Gen'l Assur. Co. which case was brought to my attention by Attorney Gerald Connor of the Scranton, PA office of Margolis Edelstein.

A Tort Talk post on the Phillips case is forthcoming.......

Petition to Enforce Settlement Granted in Monroe County Case

In his recent decision in the case of Wise v. Hyundai Motor Company, No. 3777 Civil 2011 (C.P. Monroe Co. Dec. 16, 2016 Williamson, J.), Judge David J. Williamson addressed a Motion to Enforce Settlement and, after reviewing the law of whether a valid contract of settlement had been reached between the parties, granted the same.  

Anyone wishing to review this decision may click this LINK.

 

Source: “Digest of Recent Decisions” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (May 30, 2017).  

Petition to Enforce Medical Malpractice Settlement Granted in Lackawanna County

In his recent decision in the medical malpractice case of Brink v. Mallik, No. 2013-CV-1314 (C.P. Lacka. Co. June 9, 2017 Nealon, J.), Judge Terrence R. Nealon reviewed the current status of the law of settlements in his assessment of a Petition to Enforce a settlement.  In the end, the court granted the Petition and found that an apparent unilateral mistake by one party as to the scope of the terms of the settlement did not support a denial of the Petition.

Anyone wishing to review this case may click this LINK.

Federal Middle District Judge Conaboy Tackles Pre-Trial Motions in Bad Faith UIM Matter

In his recent post-Koken decision addressing numerous Motions In Limine filed by both parties in a UIM/Bad Faith case in the matter of Clemens v. New York Central Mutual Fire Insurance Company, No. 3:13-cv-2447 (M.D. Pa. June 15, 2015 Conaboy, J.), Judge Richard P. Conaboy of the Federal Middle District Court of Pennsylvania issued a number of decisions of note which are set forth below.

In the dispute over whether Pennsylvania law or New York law should apply in a case where the Defendant is a New York company, the insured was a New York resident, the insurance contract was delivered in New York, but where the accident occurred in Pennsylvania and the injured party resided in Pennsylvania at the time of the accident, the Court ruled that, due to the significant state interest to protect its resident insureds, Pennsylvania’s interest in the outcome of this lawsuit was superior to that of New York such that Pennsylvania law would be applied.  

On a separate issue, Judge Conaboy ruled that, since the New York insurance company Defendant was not licensed to do business in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and did not write insurance contracts in Pennsylvania, the Defendant’s Motion to preclude references to Pennsylvania insurance regulations and the Unfair Insurance Practices Act was granted.

In this bad faith action, the Court denied the Defendant’s Motion to Preclude Plaintiffs from introducing evidence of insurance reserves during trial.  The Court accepted the Plaintiff’s argument that the amount set aside in reserves by the carrier necessarily reflected the company’s assessment of the potential worth of the claim and, to the extent the reserves were different from the amount offered in settlement, such information was germane to an analysis of whether or not the company acted in bad faith in pre-trial settlement negotiations.   Judge Conaboy did also noted that the Defendant would be able to produce testimony explaining the difference between its reserve and its settlement offer in this case if the Defendant deemed that necessary.  

In another ruling, the Court granted the Defendant’s Motion In Limine regarding the relevant timeframe to be considered by the jury with respect to any bad faith allegations.  In this regard, the Court agreed with the defense position that bad faith may not be predicated on an insurance company’s actions or lack of actions before being notified of a claim.   The Court noted that the Plaintiff’s attorney’s previous reference to a “potential… claim” was insufficient to trigger any duty on the part of the Defendant carrier to act as of the time of that statement in a letter from Plaintiff's attorney.

However, the Court noted that the law did allow for the introduction of evidence of an insured’s alleged bad faith during the pendency of the underlying lawsuit involving the injury claim.   As such, Judge Conaboy allowed evidence of alleged bad faith conduct to include the time period that the underlying personal injury claim was pending and up to the time that underlying case was settled.  

The Court granted the Defendant’s Motion seeking to preclude the Plaintiff from introducing evidence regarding the existence or the amount of any settlement offers the Defendant made during the course of the underlying matter.  

The Court also granted the Defendant insurance company’s Motion to preclude the Plaintiff from introducing into evidence claims by other nonparties against the same insurance company in other unrelated matters.  

Judge Richard P. Conaboy
Federal Middle District of PA

Judge Conaboy denied the Defendant’s Motion to preclude the Plaintiff’s expert from testifying at trial.  The court rejected the defense argument that the bad faith claim was not complex and that jurors did not require the benefit of any specialized knowledge in order to evaluate the bad faith claim presented.   Judge Conaboy denied this defense motion, noting his belief that an expert’s testimony could be helpful to the jury in their determination of whether or not the Defendant insurance company acted in bad faith towards the Plaintiff.   Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s expert was allowed to testify regarding industries standings and claims handling practices.  

The Court did granted the Defendant’s separate motion to preclude Plaintiffs’ attorneys from testifying during the course of the trial.  In ruling in this regard, the Court noted that, typically, a law firm that did not participate in the underlying matter, which gave rise to the alleged bad faith claim was also employed by the Plaintiff’s attorney from the underlying matter to prosecute the bad faith claims.   The Court noted that this practice avoids the confusion inherent and simultaneously having a Plaintiff’s attorney act as both a witness and an advocate.   Judge Conaboy noted the courts' “strong disinclination to permit Plaintiffs’ attorneys to render testimony in this matter and its expectation that counsel for both parties will be able to stipulate to the authenticity of Plaintiffs’ proposed documentary evidence.”

The Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion In Limine to preclude the Defendant from introducing evidence regarding the use of seat belts, i.e., that the injured party Plaintiff was not wearing a seat belt at the time of the accident.  Judge Conaboy noted that, under 75 Pa. C.S.A. §4581, and Pennsylvania law, a violation of the seat belt statute in Pennsylvania may not be used as evidence in the trial of a civil action.  

Judge Conaboy also noted that, should the Plaintiff move forward on an allegation of excess delay on the part of the Defendants as constituting bad faith, the Defendants would be allowed to introduce evidence regarding the amounts the Plaintiff demanded in settlement during negotiations.   In so ruling, the Court referred to F.R.E. 408(b) which permits the introduction of evidence regarding settlement discussions to “negate a contention of undue delay.”   The Court held a ruling on the Plaintiff’s motion in this regard in abeyance pending the presentation of evidence on these issues at trial. 

The Court also denied the Plaintiff ‘s Motion to preclude testimony or other evidence at trial pertaining to the Plaintiff’s conduct or the Plaintiff’s conduct of Plaintiff’s counsel.  The defense argued in this regard that any alleged actions by the Plaintiff or Plaintiff’s counsel that allegedly unreasonably delayed the evaluation of a UIM claim are relevant to the question of whether an insurance company acted in bad faith in resolving such a claim.   As such, the Court denied the Plaintiff’s Motion in this regard.  

The Court also granted, in part, the Defendant’s Motion In Limine to preclude the Plaintiff’s from introducing any evidence concerning any federal court mediation that was completed in the matter.  The Court limited its decision to the conduct of the parties in the presence of the mediator only.   As such, any negotiations that preceded or post-dated the mediation session were found to be relevant to the question of whether or not the Defendant alleged unreasonably delayed the negotiation of the UIM claim and thereby allegedly bargaining bad faith with its insured such that this type of information was deemed to be potentially admissible at trial.  

 

I send thanks to Attorney Michael Pisanchyn of the Pisanchyn Law Firm in Scranton, PA for bringing this decision to my attention.

 

Anyone desiring a copy of this decision may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.