Court Rules that Defendant's Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's Claims Also Eradicates Cross-claims by Co-Defendant

In the case Robinson v. Phila. Intern. Airport, 263 C.D. 2002 (Pa. Cmwlth. June 9, 2025 Fizzano Cannon, J., McCullough, J., and Hannah Levitt, J.) (Op. by Fizzano Cannon, J.), the court granted the interlocutory appeal and addressed Motions In Limine in a municipal liability personal injury case.

This matter arose out of a slip and fall incident at the Philadelphia International Airport.  The Plaintiff apparently took a trip prior to her flight.

In this appeal, the court noted that, where summary judgment had been granted against the Plaintiffs’ claims against the municipal Defendant, that Defendant could not be held liable for purposes of contribution or indemnity relative to the Co-Defendants.

The court more specifically noted that, where the municipal Defendant had secured summary judgment on the common law ground that it did not have actual or constructive notice of the condition on the land that the Plaintiff claimed was responsible for her injury, that Defendant likewise could not be held liable for indemnity on the cross-claims asserted by the Co-Defendants.

The Commonwealth Court additionally noted that, because the non-municipal Defendant did not oppose the municipal Defendant’s summary judgment motion against the Plaintiff’s claims, which claims were also the basis of the non-municipal Defendant’s crossclaims, that non-municipal Defendant was found to have waived any right to contest the granting of summary judgment.

That waiver and the entry of summary judgment precluded the non-municipal Defendant from later moving to have the municipal Defendant added to the verdict sheet under the Fair Share Act. This was so because the municipal Defendant, by virtue of summary judgment decision, had already been adjudicated as not being a joint tortfeasor with the Co-Defendant relative to the claims of the Plaintiff.

The Court ruled that a subsequent trial judge’s Order granting the non-municipal Defendant’s Motion In Limine to allow evidence against the municipal Defendant and to place it on the verdict sheet therefore violated the coordinate jurisdiction doctrine. As such, the court on appeal ruled that the non-municipal Defendant could certainly assert that it was not liable on the Plaintiff’s claims at trial, but that Defendant could not argue that the municipal Defendant was liable.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Alex P on www.pexels.com.

Co-Owner of Premises Not an Indispensable Party to a Slip and Fall Lawsuit Where that Co-Owner Does Not Exercise Control Over the Premises

In the case of Simone v. Alam, No. 35 MAP 2024 (Pa. March 20, 2025) (Op. by Mundy, J.), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in a slip and fall concluded that a tenant in common who did not exercise possession or control over the property is not an indispensable party in a premises liability action.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff was a resident in a multi-tenant building, who slipped and fell on ice in a common area.

The Plaintiff sued the owner of the premises and asserted that he was responsible for the common areas.

The trial court had dismissed the Plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to join an indispensable party, that being the owner’s brother, who was a co-owner of the property. The trial court had held that all co-owners must be joined in a premises liability action. The Superior Court affirmed.

As noted above, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed. The Supreme Court found that liability in premises liability cases is based upon possession and control, not mere ownership. The court noted that, since the record revealed that the owner who was sued was the sole manager who controlled the property, the owner’s brother was not an indispensable party under the circumstances.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I thank the Plaintiff’s attorney, Jacqueline Morgan, as well as Michael W. Landis, of the same law firm of Lowenthal & Abrams, P.C. in Bala Cynwyd, PA for brining this case to my attention.

Summary Judgment Granted Relative To Slip and Fall That Occurred During an Active Snowstorm

In the case of King v. Hermitage Plaza, No. 2023-CV-1055 (C.P. Mercer Co. Jan. 14, 2025 Amrhein, Jr., J.), the court entered summary judgment in a slip and fall case where the Plaintiff slipped and fell in a parking lot owned by the Defendant during an ongoing snowstorm.

According to the Opinion, on the day of the incident, the Plaintiff exited her place of employment during an ongoing snowstorm, walked across the parking lot owned by the Defendant and went to her vehicle. The Plaintiff then moved her vehicle closer to her place of business by parking at the curb. When the Plaintiff then exited her vehicle again at that point, she slipped and fell on the snow and/or ice that had accumulated near the curb.

The Plaintiff alleged injuries as a result and attributed the incident to the Defendant’s failure to fully remove snow and ice from the premises. The Plaintiff sued both the landowner and a snow removal contractor.

In its decision, the court reviewed the current status of the hills and ridges doctrine in Pennsylvania. The court also cited to the case of Collins v. Phila. Suburban Dev. Corp., 179 A.3d 69, 75 (Pa. Super. 2018), for the proposition that a landowner has no obligation to address any snow and ice on the premises “until a reasonable time after the winter storm has ended.”

The court in this case, again relying on the Collins decision, ruled that a period of approximately six (6) hours (or overnight) does not constitute an unreasonable passage of time concerning a landowner’s failure to remove ice and snow, particularly when a winter storm is ongoing during that period.

The court emphasized that the record in this case demonstrated that the site of the incident experienced severe winter weather conditions before, during, and after the subject slip and fall incident. The Plaintiff noted that she had observed the Defendant snow removal contractor plowing the lot approximately one hour before her fall. The court stated that this plowing activity fell within the six hour to overnight window established in the Collins case.

The court also noted that photographs of the parking lot which were taken by the Plaintiff immediately after the fall demonstrated that the lot was actively being cleared throughout the day. There was also a continued snow fall thereafter.

The court also found here that the Plaintiff did not present evidence to show that snow and ice has unreasonably accumulated to such a degree as to unreasonably obstruct travel so as to satisfy the elements of the Hills and Ridges Doctrine, or that an unreasonable time has passed after the end of a storm. 

Consequently, the Plaintiff was unable to prove the breach of duty element essential to this negligent claim. Accordingly, the Plaintiff was not able to sustain a negligence claim and the court therefore entered summary judgment in favor of the Defendants.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Joseph Hudock of the Pittsburgh office of Summers, McDonnell, Hudock, Guthrie & Rauch, P.C. for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Annie Niemaszyk on www.unsplash.com.

Third Circuit Affirms Trial Court's Giving Plaintiff the Boot in a Shoe Store Slip and Fall Case

In its non-precedential decision in the case of Liveshitz v. Designer Brands, Inc., No. 23-3082 (3d Cir. Jan. 13, 2025 Matey, J., Shwartz, J., and McKee, J.) (Op. by Matey, J.), the Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the entry of summary judgment in a slip and fall case.

In this case, the Plaintiff alleges that she slipped and fell on a clear and odorless substance on the restroom floor of a store.

The Third Circuit reaffirmed the well-settled rule that a premises liability case requires that a defendant either created the harmful condition that caused the plaintiff to fall or had actual or constructive notice of that condition a sufficient time prior to the event to enable the defendant to address the condition.

Here, the court found that whether the Defendant exercised reasonable care was immaterial because there was no duty owed in the first place. The court found that the Plaintiff had failed to establish actual or constructive notice of the condition on the part of the Defendant.

The court also ruled that the Plaintiff's spoliation of evidence argument failed to create a genuine issue of material fact where there was no evidence of any actual or constructive notice on the part of the Defendant of the alleged condition that allegedly caused the Plaintiff to fall.  

The court ruled that a jury could only speculate on how long the substance at issue was on the floor before the Plaintiff encountered it.

As such, the trial court’s entry of summary judgment was affirmed.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this non-precedential decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

GROSS NEGLIGENCE: Court Denies Summary Judgment in Premises Case Involving Slip and Fall on Vomit

In the case of Johnson v. Penney, No. 2:22-CV-03665-RBS (E.D. Pa. Jan. 8, 2025 Surrick, J.), the court denied a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the Defendant, J.C. Penney relative to a slip and fall event in a case in which the Plaintiff alleged that he slipped and fell on a substance he believed to be vomit while he was shopping at the Defendant store. 

According to the Opinion, just prior to the incident, the Plaintiff was walking through the children’s department of the store, primarily looking ahead while also noticing items on the surrounding display racks. He suddenly felt a slippery substance under his feet and slipped and fell.

The Plaintiff admitted that he did not see the slippery substance on the floor prior to his fall even though his view was unobstructed. The substance on the floor was described as being 1-2 feet in diameter and was a slightly brown color that was almost the same color as the floor. 

The Plaintiff testified that he was not sure that he would have seen the substance even if he had been looking down at the floor given the similarity in color between the substance and the floor. 

There were no warning signs around at the time that the Plaintiff fell.

The court also confirmed that the Defendant store conceded that it did not immediately clean up the substance once it was reported prior to the Plaintiff's fall. An employee of the store testified that she had informed a manager on duty multiple times that there was vomit on the floor prior to the Plaintiff’s fall. The store employee stated that she was advised by the manager that the priority at the time was addressing a leak in the ceiling. 

After the Plaintiff slipped and fell, the store employee reported the incident to her manager again, at which point the substance was cleaned up.

In this matter, the Defendant argued that the Plaintiff’s claims failed because the substance on the aisle floor was an open and obvious danger that the Plaintiff should have seen and avoided. The Plaintiff argued that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether or not the substance was open and obvious condition.

The court denied the Motion for Summary Judgment and found that, drawing all inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving party as required by the applicable standard of review, reasonable jurors could disagree as to whether or not, under the circumstances presented, the substance on the floor constituted an open and obvious danger.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Court's companion Order can be viewed HERE.


Source: Article – “JCPenney Customer’s Slip-And-Fall From Bodily Substance Suit Best Left For a Jury to Decide, Judge Rules” by Riley Brennan of The Legal Intelligencer (Jan. 10, 2025).

Federal Court Addresses Exception to "No-Duty" Rule In a Slip and Fall Case

In the case of Neyman v. Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., No. 2:23-CV-00226-WSS (W.D. Pa. Dec. 13, 2024 Stickman, J.), the court denied a Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment in a slip and fall case.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the Defendant to recover for injuries that the Plaintiff sustained when he slipped and fell on a wet and muddy ramp while unloading a forklift from a tractor trailer.

The defense filed a Motion for Summary Judgment arguing that it had not duty to the Plaintiff because the Plaintiff knew of the dangerous conditions on the ramp and chose to voluntarily walk on the ramp and was injured as a result. Essentially, the Defendants were arguing that a “no-duty” rule arises in favor of a Defendant when a danger is known and obvious to a Plaintiff and the Plaintiff chooses to voluntarily encounter that danger.

The Plaintiffs argued that the second clause of §343A, along with comment F of that Section under the Restatement (Second) of Torts created an exception to the “no-duty” rule. The Plaintiff more specifically argued that, even if a danger is known and obvious to a Plaintiff, a Defendant may still be liable if the Defendant should expect that a business invitee will not protect themselves against the danger due to being distracted at the time of the incident.

After reviewing the law as applied to the facts presented, the court held that, although it was clear that the Plaintiff knew about the dangerous condition of the ramp based upon the Plaintiff’s testimony that the ramp was indeed muddy and wet, the court otherwise found that issues of fact remained as to whether the Defendant should have anticipated a harm to the Plaintiff despite the Plaintiff’s knowledge of the ramp conditions.

There was evidence in the case that, prior to the Plaintiff’s fall, an employee of the Defendant had slipped on the ramp. Accordingly, the court noted that a jury could reasonably determine not only that the Defendant knew that the ramp was slippery, but that its slippery condition could lead to workers falling on the ramp. The court stated that it would be up to a jury to determine whether, despite the Plaintiff’s knowledge of the dangerous condition on the ramp, the Defendant should have anticipated a harm despite such knowledge on the part of the Plaintiff or the fact that the danger was obvious.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Garrett L. Trettel and Attorney Brendan B. Lupetin of the Pittsburgh, PA law firm of Lupetin & Unatin for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Ace Cranes on www.pexels.com.

Video Evidence of Frequent Recurrences of Alleged Creation of Liquid on Floor Sufficient to Create Issues of Fact Regarding Constructive Notice in a Slip and Fall Case (Non-Precedential)

In its non-precedential decision in the case of Oudolsky v. Mount Airy Casino #1, LLC, No. 3109 EDA 2023 (Pa. Super. Oct. 22, 2024 Kunselman, J., Nichols, J., and Beck, J.) (Op. by Kunselman, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed a trial court’s entry of summary judgment in a slip and fall case.

This case involved a plaintiff who slipped and fell at a casino in an area where there was a marble floor and a nearby sanitizing liquid dispenser.  Video evidence showed other patrons utilizing the dispenser in the time before the plaintiff came along and slipped and fell.

The court noted that proof of actual or constructive notice on the part of a landowner, that a dangerous condition was caused by the landowner, by way of actual notice through frequent recurrences of the dangerous condition can amount to sufficient evidence to prove liability.

The court noted that evidence from surveillance video was sufficient to create issues of fact as to both recurrence and length of time on the issue of constructive notice.

The Superior Court also noted that the close proximity of the Defendant’s dispenser to where the Plaintiff slipped on liquid is sufficient circumstantial evidence as to the source of the liquid to enable the jurors to find causation. The court noted that there was no other source for the liquid present.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this non-precedential decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck for the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Slip and Fall Case at Waterpark Allowed to Slide Past a Motion to Dismiss

In the case of Ahmed v. Kalahari Resorts & Conventions-Poconos, No. 3:24-CV-00851-JKM (M.D. Pa. Nov. 7, 2024 Munley, J.), the court denied a Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, or in the alternative, Motion for a More Definite Statement, in a slip and fall case involving an indoor water park.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff alleged that he slipped and fell in the waterpark area allegedly due to the fact that the steps were not properly treated and were covered with mold or algae.

In reviewing the Plaintiff’s Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss, the court found that the Plaintiff had pled sufficient facts regarding his status as a business invitee and the alleged breach of a duty of reasonable care on the part of the Defendant. The court found that, if the Plaintiff’s alleged facts were accepted as true, as they must be at this stage of the proceedings, the Plaintiff had sufficiently provided a short and plain statement of the claims presented demonstrating that he is entitled to relief in accordance with F.R.C.P. 8.

Accordingly, the court denied the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.

Relative to the Defendant’s Motion for a More Definite Statement of the Plaintiff’s claim pursuant to F.R.C.P. 12(e), the court agreed with the defense argument that the Plaintiff’s Complaint was too vague or ambiguous in that it did not state with specificity the location of the stairs upon which the Plaintiff allegedly fell.

In response to this motion, the Plaintiff indicated that he would provide photographs of the exact location of his fall during the course of discovery.

Judge Munley ruled that, given that the Plaintiff had admitted that he evidently knew which steps he fell upon, and given that the location of the steps at issue could affect how the different Defendants named in this lawsuit might respond to the Complaint, the court granted the Motion for More Definite Statement and directed the Plaintiff to file an Amended Complaint to more specifically assert where the Plaintiff allegedly fell on the premises.

Judge Munley otherwise raised an issue of jurisdiction sua sponte. The court noted that it could not determine from the Complaint whether the court had jurisdiction.

In this matter, the Plaintiff had alleged that jurisdiction was based on the diversity jurisdiction statute. However, the Complaint did not list the citizenship of the parties, but only the residency of the parties.

The court noted that residency and citizenship do not have the same meaning for purposes of the diversity statute. As such, the Plaintiff was directed to pile a more specific Complaint in order to properly allege the citizenship of all of the parties named in the Complaint so that the court could assure itself that jurisdiction was proper.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source: Article – “Slip-And-Fall Suit Cleared to Proceed Against Kalahari Indoor Waterpark.” By Riley Brennan Pennsylvania Law Weekly (Nov. 8, 2024).

Summary Judgment Affirmed in Black Ice Case Where Plaintiff Could Not Confirm That She Was Caused To Fall By Ice

In a decision marked "Non-precedential" [Why mark any decision non-precedential?!] in the case of Bywater v. Conemugh Mem. Med. Ctr., No. 1072 WDA 2023 (Pa. Super. Aug. 5, 2024 Kunselman, J., Murray, J., and McLaughlin, J.) (Op. by Kunselman, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court addressed the liability of a Defendant landowner in a black ice case.

According to the Opinion, at the time of the incident, in a medical center’s parking lot, the Plaintiff slipped and fell against her car when she stepped out of her vehicle. The Plaintiff then perceived that her clothes were wet. However, at her deposition, she did not testify that she saw or felt any ice in the area where she allegedly slipped.

According to the Opinion, no precipitation had recently fallen. There was snow on the ground and the sidewalks were salted. Temperatures had remained below freezing during the week leading up to the incident.

The reproduced record before the Court revealed that, at her deposition, the Plaintiff stated that she looked around and “there was nothing there.” As to why she believed that ice was involved, the Plaintiff stated that, “...[b]ecause you can’t see black ice. Why else would I fall?”

The Superior Court affirmed the entry of summary judgment in favor of the Defendant landowner given that the case established that the Plaintiff only assumed that she slipped on ice, which she never actually saw or detected.

The appellate court also noted that there was no other witness to confirm whether or not any black ice was involved in the incident.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court in affirming summary judgment noted that, “[s]imply stated if [the Plaintiff] could not see the ice that she allegedly fell upon, neither could anyone working for the medical center. If the medical center’s staff could not see the ice, then the medical center neither knew nor should have known that a dangerous, icy condition existed in its parking lot on the morning [the Plaintiff’s] fall.”

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney Walt McClatchy of McClatchy Law in Philadelphia for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Egor Kamelev on www.pexels.com.

Corrected Link For Judge Nealon's Hills and Ridges Decision in White v. Nesbeth Case

Here is the corrected LINK for the case highlighted in the September 27, 2024 Tort Talk post on Judge Terrence R. Nealon's hills and ridges decision in the White v. Nesbeth case.

Apologies for any confusion or consternation caused by the incompleted Link in the original post.

Summary Judgment Granted in Lackawanna County Slip and Fall Case

In the case of White v. Nesbeth, No. 2022-CV-2147 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Sept. 17, 2024 Nealon, J.), Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas granted summary judgment in favor of a Defendant homeowner under the hills and ridges doctrine in a slip and fall case.  The Opinion provides an excellent, thoroughly researched overview of the current status of the hills and ridges doctrine in Pennsylvania.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff, who was considered to be an invitee, and who was making a Door Dash delivery to the Defendants’ residence during an ongoing storm of “freezing rain and sleet,” allegedly slipped and fell on the homeowner’s sidewalk.

According to the record before the court, the Plaintiff’s deposition testimony acknowledged the existence of persistent freezing precipitation falling at the time of the incident. The Plaintiff additionally conceded that he did not observe or feel “any kind of an accumulation.” The Plaintiff additionally confirmed that he did not “notice anything” on the sidewalk.

After the completion of discovery, the Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment relying upon the hills and ridges doctrine.

The Plaintiff responded by arguing that, since the landowner applied rock salt to the sidewalk approximately forty-five (45) minutes before the Plaintiff arrived, the hills and ridges doctrine was in applicable due to “human intervention” which allegedly altered the “natural accumulation” that was falling at the time.

In granting summary judgment, Judge Nealon noted that there was no dispute that general slippery conditions prevailed at the time of the incident as a result of a continuous winter event and precipitation.

Judge Terrence R. Nealon
Lackawanna County

Judge Nealon also emphasized that no party or witness had identified or specifically described the condition upon which the Plaintiff allegedly fell.

In his Opinion, Judge Nealon pointed to appellate case law holding that a landowner is not obligated to salt their sidewalk while winter precipitation remains in progress.  He also ruled that, in any event, since the record lacked any evidence that the application of rock salt somehow created a dangerous condition or increased the natural hazards of the existing ice, the hills and ridges doctrine still applied and governed the negligence claim presented.

Judge Nealon ultimately held that, even when the record is examined in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff as required by the applicable motion for summary judgment standard of review, the evidence presented was insufficient to establish a prima facie cause of action under the hills and ridges doctrine.

Accordingly, summary judgment was entered in favor of the homeowner.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Summary Judgment Granted in Premises Liability Case Due to Lack of Actual or Constructive Notice

In the case of Cummins v. Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P., No. 1:22-CV-01205(M.D. Pa. July 24, 2024 Schwab, Mag. J.), the court granted a Motion for Summary Judgment in a slip and fall case after finding that the Plaintiff failed to produce any evidence of actual or constructive notice of any allegedly defective condition on the part of the store.

The court noted that the record confirmed that the lack of actual notice was not disputed. In terms of any allegation of construction notice, the court confirmed that there was no evidence that the claimed spill had existed for a significant period of time such as evidence of any footprints through the area.

The court also ruled that the fact that the spill was allegedly in multiple aisles did not, in and of itself, establish a duration of the subject spill.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Court's companion Order can be viewed HERE.


I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Reed Smith law firm in Philadelphia for bringing this case to my attention.

Trial Court Judge Rules That Hills and Ridges Doctrine Does Not Apply To Falls That Occur under an Awning

In the case of Johnson v. Harris-Dent, No. 23-00,097 (C.P. Lyc. Co. July 8, 2024 Linhardt, J.), the court denied a Motion for Summary Judgment in a slip and fall case that occurred during a winter storm event.  The Plaintiff allegedly slipped on alleged black ice that was allegedly located on the top step of a homeowner's porch that was covered by an awning.

The court denied the motion based upon issues of fact. More specifically, the court noted that the Plaintiff had cited to the case of Heasley v. Carter Lumber, 843 A.2d 1274 (Pa. Super. 2004) for the proposition that the hills and ridges doctrine is not applicable where the incident occurred in an area that was covered by a roof or awning.

Judge Lindhart noted that, in the Heasley case, the Plaintiff’s slip and fall occurred while the Plaintiff was walking in a shed that had three walls, with the fourth side open, and an overhead roof with an awning extending from it. In that case, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the hills and ridges doctrine did not apply to a fall occurring inside an outdoor storage shed. 

In the Heasley case, the court reasoned that the hills and ridges doctrine was intended to protect property owners from an undue burden of ensuring that open spaces such as sidewalks and parking lots are constantly kept clear of snow and ice.  The court in Heasley found that the Defendant did not present anything that demonstrated that, keeping a structure, which is only partially open to the elements, free of snow and ice presented any burden at all, let alone an undue burden on its owners. The Heasley court also indicated that the extension of the hills and ridges doctrine to structures and/or other partially opened areas would raise many difficult questions. As such, the Pennsylvania Superior Court in the Heasley case declined to extend the application of the hills and ridges doctrine to an incident that occurred in a structure covered by a roof and/or an awning.

Judge Linhardt applied the Heasley case to this Johnson case in which the Plaintiff alleged that he fell on the top step of the Defendant’s covered porch which step was allegedly covered by an awning and on which was allegedly some black ice. Judge Linhardt noted that, under the current status of Pennsylvania law, if that allegation is proven, then it appeared that the hills and ridges doctrine would not be applicable to this litigation.

The court found that genuine issues of material fact must be resolved by the jury in this regard and that, therefore, the Motion for Summary Judgment was denied.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source of image:  Photo by Jay Wennington on www.unspash.com.

Summary Judgment Denied in Slip and Fall Case

In the case of Sanner v. Airbnb, Inc., No. 3:22-CV-00274 (M.D. Pa. March 29, 2024 Mehalchick, J.), the court denied a Motion for Summary Judgment in a wintry slip and fall case.

The court found that the hills and ridges doctrine does not apply to a localized patch of ice or to circumstances when the icy condition is allegedly created by human intervention.

In this case, the court found that whether the conditions at issue were due solely to a natural snow accumulation was a disputed fact.

Judge Karoline Mehalchick
M.D. Pa.

The court also found that allegations regarding Plaintiff’s assumption of the risk were also disputed. As such, summary judgment was denied and the case was allowed to proceed.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I thank Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Trial Court Requests Affirmance of its Entry of Summary Judgment in a Nursing Home Slip and Fall Case

In the case of Ford v. Cheltenham Nursing and Rehab. Center, No. 2880 EDA 2023 (C.P. Phila. Co. Dec. 14, 2023 Lane, J.), the trial court asserted in its Rule 1925 Opinion to the Superior Court that its granting of a summary judgment motion in a slip and fall case involving a nursing home should be affirmed.

The court noted that the record before it showed that the Defendant had no prior notice of the alleged roof leak that allegedly caused water to puddle next to the Plaintiff’s bed at the facility.

The record before the court showed that the roof was inspected monthly. Also, the first indication in the Defendant’s records of any leak was the entry made just after the Plaintiff was discovered on the floor beside her bed.

Given that the Plaintiff had failed to prove actual or constructive notice of any defect, the court stated the Plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that the nursing facility had breached its duty of care.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions.” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (Feb. 1, 2024).

Summary Judgment Denied in an Alleged Black Ice Slip and Fall Case

In the case of Hicks v. DEPG Stroud Associates, No. 0807-CV-2021 (C.P. Monroe Co. April 2, 2024 Williamson, J.), the court denied a Motion for Summary Judgment in a “black ice” slip and fall case.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff pursued this slip and fall litigation against a shopping center owner and its snow removal contractor.

According to the Opinion, it had snowed in the area three (3) days before the incident. The weather on the day of the incident was clear. The record before the court indicated that the snow removal contractor had completed snow removal efforts on the day of the last storm but had not returned to the site as of the day of the incident.

The Plaintiff allegedly slipped and fell on a localized patch of black ice that was near a large snow mound that had been plowed into a parking spot. The Plaintiff sustained a primary injury of a broken wrist that required a surgical repair and other treatment.

The Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment asserting that the Defendant was unable to establish that anyone had constructive notice of an alleged transient, isolated patch of black ice. 

The snow removal contractor additionally asserted that there was no causal connection between their work and the Plaintiff’s injuries. 

Judge Williamson noted that, while at first glance, it would appear that the Plaintiff fell on a localized patch of ice that was transient in nature, the deposition of the snow removal contractor’s employee was found to have “complicate[] a seemingly simple matter.” 

The court noted that the contract between the snow removal contractor and the shopping center required that the snow shall be plowed in a workman like manner from all paved areas. 

Accordingly, the court noted that it appeared that the snow removal contractor may have failed to abide by its contractual duties by piling the snow in a paved parking area/parking space. The court pointed to testimony from a representative of the shopping center who testified that it was not appropriate for the snow removal contractor to have piled snow in parking spots. It was also indicated by that representative that the snow removal contractor was never directed to, and never sought permission to, plow snow in the parking spaces. According to that representative, the snow should have instead been plowed into a grassy area outside of the parking lot.

The court noted that the Plaintiff contended that the location of the snow pile made both Defendants allegedly negligent as they should have known that snow melt and refreezing could be a risk for pedestrians in that location.

Given these material issues of fact, the court denied the Motion for Summary Judgment.

The court also addressed the arguments by both Defendants that they did not have any constructive notice that the black ice was present in the parking lot. Judge Williamson noted that black ice cases are not as easily analogous to other constructive notice cases because black ice conditions are very difficult to see as compared to other conditions. The court additionally noted that, under the applicable law, a landowner has the duty to protect an invitee against known dangers and also those dangers which might be discovered with reasonable care.

In this case, the court noted that both Defendants may have lacked constructive notice of any black ice because neither Defendant was regularly visiting the site at the time the Plaintiff fell.

In this regard it was noted by the Court that the snow removal contractor would only come to the premises on an as needed basis and that the Co-Defendant representatives were only sending an individual to check on the site once or twice a month. 

However, the court emphasized that the large snow pile was left on the parking lot surface in a parking space by the Defendants. The court stated that this snow pile would have been an open and obvious condition near the restaurant. It was also noted that the parking lot was sloped such that the snow melt would likely run into the area where other vehicles parked and pedestrians walked as opposed to the snow being kept in a remote location of the parking lot or separately on grass or dirt where it could be kept safely away from pedestrians walking areas.

The court stated that, as such, the Defendants should have been aware that, during winter months, there is a constant threat of melting and refreezing conditions, and that black ice is not a rare occurrence.

In this case, where the experts differed on what was reasonable under the circumstances, the court noted that there were issues of fact that required the case to go to the jury for this additional reason.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source:  Photo by Egor Kamelev from www.pexels.com.

Commonwealth Court Allows Pro Se Prisoner's Slip and Fall Claim To Go Forward

In the case of Pritchard v. Meintell, No. 49 C.D. 2022 (Pa. Cmwlth. Jan. 10, 2024 Jubelirer, P.J., Cannon, J., and Ceisler, J.) (Op. by Jubelirer, P.J.), the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court reversed in part and affirmed in part a lower court’s decision sustaining a Defendant’s demurrer to a prisoner pro se Plaintiff’s slip and fall action on the basis of sovereign immunity.

According to the Opinion, the appellate court found that the trial court erred in finding that the real estate exception did not apply. The trial court was also found to have erred in ruling that sovereign immunity barred the pro se prisoner’s action for his slip and fall injuries.

The court noted that, in alleging that the Defendants failed to maintain the slip/resistant surface on which he slipped, the inmate had adequately alleged an injury that was caused by a dangerous condition of Commonwealth real estate.

The court otherwise found that the inmate’s other negligence claim that were not connected to the negligent maintenance claim were barred under Pennsylvania law.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions.” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (Jan. 30, 2024).

Summary Judgment Denied In Supermarket Slip and Fall That Occurred in Checkout Aisle

In the case of Scillia v. The Golub Corporation, No. 3772-CV-2022 (C.P. Monroe Co. Jan. 18, 2024 Williamson, J.), the court denied a Motion for Summary Judgment in a supermarket slip and fall case.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff’s incident occurred in a narrow pathway between checkout registers where the Plaintiff allegedly slipped and fell as a result of a liquid on the floor.

The Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment arguing that the Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proving negligence in terms of actual or constructive notice of the condition, and/or under an argument that the doctrine of an open and obvious condition defeated the Plaintiff’s case.

The court denied the Motion for Summary Judgment after finding that issues of fact existed with respect to both arguments presented by the defense.

The court emphasized that the incident occurred directly in a check-out aisle that was being manned at all times by a cashier. The court distinguished this case from other grocery store slip and fall cases in other parts of of supermarket stores based upon, in part, upon the fact that the incident occurred in a narrow area where customers are required to walk and which area was directly in front of a cashier employee.

The court also noted that there were sets of cart tires on the floor in the area of the liquid puddle, which would tend to possibly show that the puddle was there for a longer period of time such that a jury could find that the puddle arguably could have been noticed by store employees before the Plaintiff encountered it.

With regards to the arguments made by the defense under the open and obvious doctrine, the court again found that there were also issues of fact on that question that should be left to be decided by a jury.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source of image:  Photo by Shvets on www.pexels.com.

You're in Luck: Summary Judgment Denied in PetSmart Store Slip and Fall Case

In the case of Dominiak v. PetSmart, Inc., No. 23-4 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 2023 Perez, J.), the court denied a motion for summary judgment in a slip and fall case.

This matter involved a slip and fall on  a yellowish liquid on the floor in a PetSmart store that was presumed to be urine left by a dog.  Neither the Plaintiff nor the store representatives could say how the liquid came to be on the floor or how long it was there before the Plaintiff encountered it.  However, evidence was produced by the store to show that dogs routinely urinate on the store's floor several times a day, every day.  Because dog urination occurred so frequently in the stores, the store had regular inspections schedule and several "oops stations" throughout the store for clean up purposes.    

The court found that the Plaintiff had presented disputed facts as to the issues of both actual and constructive notice on the part of the Defendant. The court noted that issues of fact were presented with regards to actual notice by virtue of the frequency that the particular type of hazard had allegedly recurred, and with respect to constructive notice possibly being able to be found by the jury due to the central location within the store where the fall occurred.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Court's companion Order can be viewed HERE


I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Reed Smith law firm in Philadelphia for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Hannah Lim on www.unsplash.com.

Plaintiff's Failure to Present Sufficient Evidence of Notice in a Slip and Fall Case Leads to Entry of Summary Judgment

In the case of Livshitz v. Designer Brands, Inc., No. 22-CV-3355 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 2023 Murphy, J.), the court granted summary judgment in a slip and fall case after finding that the Plaintiff failed to present any evidence to suggest that the landowner had actual or constructive notice of an allegedly dangerous condition.

The court noted that allegations of a lack of inspections by the landowner do not amount to affirmative evidence on the issue of notice.

The court noted that, while a Defendant may have failed to follow company procedures may be evidence of a breach of a duty, there must first be a duty of care owed and, according to this court, a duty of care requires actual or constructive notice of an allegedly dangerous condition.  Given that no evidence of notice was presented, summary judgment was granted.

This decision is also notable in that court rejected the Plaintiff’s allegations of video tape spoliation as being irrelevant because there was no evidence that there were any surveillance cameras inside the restroom stall where the Plaintiff allegedly fell.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Court's companion Order can be viewed HERE.


I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of Image:  Photo by Galen Crout on www.unsplash.com.

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