Superior Court Finds That Jury Should Have Been Allowed To Consider Comparative Negligence Where Evidence Plaintiff's Alleged Excessive Speed Presented

In the case of Dailey v. Smith, No. 2024 Pa. Super. 235 (Pa. Super. Oct. 10, 2024 Collins, J., Stabile, J., and McLaughlin, J.) (Op. by Collins, J.) (McLaughlin, J. dissenting), the Superior Court reversed a trial court’s decision to remove comparative negligence issues from the jury's consideration in a motor vehicle accident case.

According to the Superior Court’s Opinion, in the trial below, Plaintiff admitted to speeding at the time of the accident.

As such, the appellate court found that the trial court had abused its discretion in removing the issue of Plaintiff’s comparative negligence from the jury’s consideration. The Superior Court noted that where there is evidence in a case that a Plaintiff was negligent and that the Plaintiff’s negligence may have caused the Plaintiff’s alleged injuries, such issues must be allowed to proceed to a jury.

The appellate court noted that speeding is not just mere negligence, but could be negligence per se.

The Superior Court additionally confirmed that causation and routine automobile accident negligence cases do not require expert testimony on the liability issues. In this case, neither side had an expert on the liability issues presented.

The appellate court noted that a vehicle's speed could have affected both the time to avoid a collision and the forces involved in the collision.

The Superior Court noted that the jury in this case was incorrectly prevented from considering the causal effect of the Plaintiff’s speed. The appellate court noted that this evidence was not only important to the liability issues but also was intertwined with the damages issues as the evidence implicates whether, if at all, the speed of the Plaintiff’s vehicle contributed to the Plaintiff’s own injuries.

In the Dissenting Opinion, Judge McLaughlin asserted that the Plaintiff's speed should not have been considered because, even if the Plaintiff was speeding, although this does amount to negligence per se, there was no evidence to conclude that the accident would not have happened if the Plaintiff was not speeding and/or that there was no evidence that, if the Plaintiff was traveling slower, the Plaintiff's injuries would have been less.   

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Dissenting Opinion can be viewed HERE.

I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia office of Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Although Noted To Be "Absurd," the "Dicta" of Spencer v. Johnson Regarding the Fair Share Act Applied in a Monroe County Case

In the case of Ace v. Ace, No. 6242-CIVIL-2020 (C.P. Monroe Co. Jan. 12, 2023 Williamson, J.), the court issued an Opinion in a non-jury trial arising out of a shooting incident and following the entry of default judgments against Defendants who did not appear for the trial.  

Of note, the Court addressed the import of the dicta in the Spencer v. Johnson decision relative to the applicability of the Fair Share Act in a case in which no liability is assessed to a Plaintiff.  Although Judge Williamson noted that the "dicta" in the Spencer v. Johnson contained reasoning that seemed "absurd," he apparently felt compelled to apply it to this case.

By way of background, the court noted that default judgments had been previously entered against the Defendants and that neither Defendant appeared at the time of the non-jury trial at which the only issue was the issue of damages.

The court found that the evidence presented confirmed that the Plaintiff had met his burden of proof with regards to causation and damages. As such, the Court in this non-jury trial found it necessary to apportion liability between the two Defendants for the Plaintiff’s injuries.

Liability was apportioned by the Court to both Defendants.  No percentage of liability was assessed to the Plaintiff. 

Judge David J. Williamson
Monroe County CCP

Judge Williamson then noted that "[t]here has been a lot of confusion recently as to whether or not defendants are subject to joint and several liability for a judgment, regardless of their proportionate share of liability.  See Op. at p. 8.

In making this decision, the Court addressed the history of the Comparative Negligence Act and the Fair Share Act.

Judge Williamson noted that, when passed in 2011, the Fair Share Act was thereafter interpreted by many courts as abolishing joint and several liability in most negligence cases such that defendants would only be responsible for their percentage of negligence assessed by the jury except in those instances where the exceptions under the Act were applicable.

The court noted that, with respect to this case, the exceptions which are found at 42 Pa.C.S.A. Section 7102(a.1)(3) applied to one of the defendants in this case relative to that one defendant being found to have engaged in an intentional act and by the fact that that same defendant had been found to be more than 60% liable.

The Court noted, however, that the other Defendant did not fall under any of the exceptions.

Judge Williamson noted that whether subsection (a.1) of the Fair Share Act applied to this case "is now very much in doubt."  See Op. at p. 11.

The Court noted, "The statute heading at 42 Pa.C.S.A. Section 7102 is "Comparative negligence."  This is the legal principal (sic) covering when a plaintiff is at fault in some percentage for their own injuries, together with a defendant or defendants.  The Fair Share Act as enacted addresses the situation of a plaintiff who is contributorily negligent at subsection (a), titled as "General rule."  Subsection (a.1) addresses recovery against multiple defendants and is titled "Recovery against joint defendants; contribution."  Subsection (a.1) makes no mention of a plaintiff's contributory negligence."  See Op. at p. 11.

In this regard, Judge Williamson wrote “The legislative intent, in light of an enactment of the Fair Share Act, appears to re-affirm the general rule regarding the contributory negligence of a Plaintiff, and to add provisions regarding the responsibility for an award as to multiple Defendants. It would seem that subsection (a.1) would apply in all cases, including those where a Plaintiff has some level of fault, or no level of fault at all. Otherwise, it would seem likely that the language of subsection (a.1) would have referenced a contributorily negligent Plaintiff if that subsection only applied in instances of comparative negligence attributed to a Plaintiff. To say the legislature enacted a statute to address what was perceived as an unfair result to a big-pocket Defendant following finding of minimal fault against them for injuries caused by multiple Defendants only in cases where Plaintiff is also contributorily negligent, seems like an absurd result. It makes more sense that the legislature would have enacted this measure in all cases of multiple Defendants, even where the Plaintiff has no contributory negligence.”

That being said, Judge Williamson went on to review the contrary result noted in the dicta put forth by the Pennsylvania Superior Court in its Spencer v. Johnson, 249 A.3d 529 (Pa. Super. 2021) decision. Judge Williamson noted that the Superior Court in Johnson analyzed the Fair Share Act and concluded that the legislature only intended for the joint and several provisions of subsection (a.1) to apply in cases where a Plaintiff is also found to have been contributorily negligent. Judge Williamson stated that the Superior Court in Spencer reasoned that, in all other cases, joint and several liability applied regardless of the percentage of fault of each Defendant.

In his decision, Judge Williamson noted that the rationale of the Spencer court regarding Fair Share Act “appears as dicta in the Superior Court’s decision, as it was not the direct holding” of the Superior Court.

Judge Williamson also noted that the Spencer decision “was also a panel decision, and not one made by the entire court sitting en banc.” See Op. at 13.

Judge Williamson also noted that the ruling in Spencer was not appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

Based upon Judge Williamson’s review of the Spencer decision, he noted his belief that the Superior Court “would rule that joint and several liability applies to all Defendants without limitations of the Fair Share Act, unless the Plaintiff has some amount of contributory negligence assessed against him or her.” Id.  

Despite noting earlier in his decision that the reasoning as contained in the Spencer decision was "absurd," Judge Williamson, apparently feeling compelled to do so, stated that he would “adhere to the dicta stated in Spencer in this particular case, and find joint and several liability without the application of the Fair Share Act as between both Defendants” given that there was no finding of contributory negligence against the Plaintiff in this case.  

In other words, given that there was no contributory negligence assessed against the Plaintiff in this matter, the Fair Share Act was found not to apply, and the Plaintiff was free to collect the entire verdict from either Defendant even though one Defendant had been assessed with 70% liability and the other Defendant was hit with 30% of the liability.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions.” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (Feb. 21, 2023).

Bicyclists Must Obey the Rules of the Road

In the case of Matthews v. Batroney, No. 2019 Pa.Super. 299 (Pa. Super. Oct. 4, 2019 Murray, J., Strassburger, J., and Pelligrini, J.) (Op. by Murray, J.), the court affirmed the entry of a verdict in favor of a Defendant in a matter in which a Plaintiff bicyclist was injured in a motor vehicle accident.

The court noted that a Plaintiff bicyclist who failed to stop at a stop sign was properly found by the jury to be 70% comparatively negligent.

The court additionally held that the jury was properly charged on statutes regarding the duty of bicyclists to obey traffic laws as well as the duty to stop at stop signs.

The court also found that that, by failing to stop at the stop sign, the Plaintiff forfeited his statutory right-of-way.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Request for New Trial Denied Where Defendant Driver Found Negligent But Jury Found Causation Element Not Met in Fatal MVA Case

In the case of Steudler v. Keating, No. 8795 - CV - 2013 (C.P. Monroe Co. March 20, 2018 Williamson, J.), Judge David J. Williamson ruled that Plaintiffs were not entitled to a new trial based upon the jury’s failure to find causation even though it found the Defendant driver negligent in an auto accident case. 

The court ruled in this fashion after finding that it was possible for the jury to determine that the Defendant was negligent but that his negligence was not the factual cause of a fatal accident.  

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiffs, Erika Steudler and Victor Resto, were walking along a road in Monroe County when Resto was struck by a motor vehicle driven by the Defendant.  

The court noted that the accident occurred at night on a country back road with no street lighting.   Neither Plaintiff was carrying a flashlight at the time of the accident.  

Plaintiff Steudler did not see the accident but felt Resto brush against her the darkness when he was thrown in the air.  

Steudler filed a lawsuit against the Defendant seeking emotional damages due to witnessing the accident while Resto’s estate filed a wrongful death claim.

As noted, the matters proceeded to trial where the jury found the Defendant negligent but also found that his actions were not the factual cause of the Plaintiffs’ injuries.  

In the post-trial motions, the Plaintiffs asserted that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence and shocking to one’s sense of justice.   The Plaintiffs argued that, because the jury found that the Defendant was negligent, the jury should have found that he was also the factual cause of their injuries since it was undisputed that Resto died from the accident.  

The court ruled that a verdict is not against the weight of the evidence simply because the evidence at trial was conflicting or that a reasonable fact-finder could have decided the case in favor of either party.  

The trial court distinguished this case from the line of cases which suggest that when a Defendant is found negligent and both parties admit that there was some injury, then the Defendant must be found to have caused at least some portion of the injuries alleged.   Here, the court noted that the most distinguishable factor between that line of cases and this case was the issue of the Plaintiffs’ contributory negligence.   The court noted that, in the line of cases cited the Plaintiffs, the Defendants had admitted negligence and there was no difference in opinion that the Defendants’ negligence had caused those accidents, which cause some personal injury.  

In the Steudler matter, the Defendant never admitted negligence and there were claims of contributory negligence pursued.   The defense argued that the sole cause of the accident was the Plaintiffs’ own acts or omissions.   It was the Defendant’s defense that he operated his vehicle within the posted speed limit, stayed within his lane of travel, and never saw the Plaintiffs prior to the impact.  

The court also noted that the parties presented experts with different opinions on the theory of the cause of the accident in this matter.

In the end, the court found that the jury’s verdict in this matter could have been based upon the jury’s belief that Resto was in the roadway, together with Steudler, and that, if he was not, he may not have been struck and killed. 

As such, the court denied the Plaintiff’s request for a new trial under the case presented.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK. 

Source:  “Digest of Recent Opinions” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (April 10, 2018).

Pennsylvania Superior Court Affirms Trial Court's Molding of Post-Koken Verdict (Non-Precedential)

In the non-precedential decision in the case of Pusey v. Allstate Insurance Company, No. 888 EDA 2015 (Pa. Super. May 20, 2016 Ford Elliot, P.J.E. Stabile, and Strassburger, JJ.) (Mem. Op. by Stabile, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed a trial court’s handling of the molding of a verdict after an underinsured motorist trial.  

In this case, the trial court addressed the proper procedure for applying credits and comparative negligence in an underinsured motorist benefits trial.  

This matter arose out an incident during which a minor Plaintiff was struck by a vehicle while the minor was riding a bicycle. 

Prior to trial, the tortfeasor’s carrier tendered its $25,000.00 policy limits to the Plaintiff.   The Plaintiff then brought suit against the UIM carrier for underinsured motorist coverage.  

At trial, the jury awarded the Plaintiff $58.600.00.   However, the jury also attributed 41% of the negligence to the minor Plaintiff.  

When a post-trial dispute arose on how to apply the credit for the tortfeasor’s limits as well as the comparative negligent percentage, the trial court ruled that the comparative negligence percentage should be applied first, followed by the application of the credit owed from the tortfeasor’s liability limits.  

In its non-precedential Opinion, the Superior Court affirmed and found no abuse of discretion by the trial court in its decision.   In so ruling, the Superior Court rejected the Plaintiff’s argument that the Allstate policy language pertaining to the phrase “legally entitled to recover” was ambiguous as to how the net verdict was to be determined.  

The court stated that, “[t]o the contrary, it is clear that the amount [the Plaintiff] is “legally entitled to recover” is only reasonably interpreted as the amount she is entitled to collect according to the jury’s verdict.”  See Op. p. 6.  

As noted, the Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s application of the comparative negligence percentage of the Plaintiff first followed by the application of the credit owed from the tortfeasor’s liability limits.   Accordingly, the judgement entered by the trial court below was affirmed.  

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this non-precedential decision by the Pennsylvania Superior Court in the case of Pusey v. Allstate, may click this LINK.

Several Products Liability Issues Addressed by Judge Munley of Pennsylvania Federal Middle District Court

In his recent products liability decision in the case of Bailey v. B.S. Quarries, Inc., No. 3:13-CV-3006 (M.D. Pa. March 31, 2016 Munley, J.), Judge James M. Munley of the Middle District Federal Court of Pennsylvania addressed cross  Motions for Summary Judgment filed in a products liability case.  

On one of the issues presented, the court found that, due to the actions of one of the Defendants, the Defendant was equitably estopped from claiming that it was the Plaintiff’s employer and, therefore, immune from suit under worker's compensation immunity laws.   The Court stated that defendants may not manipulate the seal of immunity in an effort to shelter whichever of their entities may be at greatest risk.  

The court also noted that, under Pennsylvania law, the fact that an accident was not witnessed does not make proof of causation impossible.   Here, the court found that the Plaintiff’s accident reconstruction expert provided sufficient causation testimony to allow the case to proceed towards a jury.  

Judge Munley also noted that sufficient evidence presented of a disregard of a known safety risk also supported allowing the plaintiff's claim for punitive damages to proceed.   Judge Munley found that the evidence presented that the product manufacturer allegedly omitted a known safer method of maintenance from its operator’s manual permitted the claim for punitive damages to go forward.  

Judge Munley also reaffirmed the current status of products liability law holding that, under the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in Tincher, the prior decisions of Azzarello and its progeny were no longer good law.  

Rather, the Plaintiff must prove a risk-utility analysis supporting claims that harm was caused by a defective condition or, in the alternative, must prove evidence of an ordinary consumer’s expectations as to the risk presented by the product.   The Plaintiff was found to have failed in this regard in this case and, as such, her motion for summary judgment on that particular issue was denied.



Judge Munley's Opinion can be viewed HERE and his corresponding Orders can be viewed HERE.
 

I send thanks to Attorney James Beck of the Philadelphia office of Reid Smith and the writer of the notable legal blog, The Drug and Device Law Blog.    

 

Western District Court of Pennsylvania Addresses Admissibility of Contributory Negligence Evidence in Products Liability Case

In the products liability case of McDaniel v. Kidde Residential & Commercial, 2015 US Dist. Lexis 139905 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 14, 2015 Fisher, J.), the court granted a defense Motion In Limine seeking to introduce evidence of the Plaintiff’s negligent conduct in a case involving a house fire.

The court ruled that, in a product liability action involving negligence, all evidence of Plaintiff’s causative conduct relative to the start of the fire, or conduct during the fire, is admissible to establish a comparative negligence claim.

In the strict liability context, the background information pertaining to the Plaintiff’s actions in creating the fire at issue are highly relevant to disputed issues, particularly the causation issue.

The court ruled that the Plaintiff’s conduct in moving a burning item is relevant to the assumption of risk allegation. The court also found that the evidence was admissible, at least in the negligence claim, as being relevant to the Defendant’s mitigation of damages defense.

The court also otherwise ruled that the Defendants have a right to impeach the Plaintiff’s testimony as to how the accident occurred with the evidence in question.

This decision can be viewed online HERE. 

I send thanks to Attorney James Beck of the Philadelphia office of Reed Smith for bringing this case to my attention.

Keeping Settling Defendants on the Verdict Slip

In his recent decision in the case of Stang v. Smith, PICS Case No. 14-1199 (C.P. Carbon Co. July 28, 2014 Nanovic, P.J.), Judge Roger Nanovic of the Carbon County Court of Common Pleas addressed the issue of whether settling Defendants under a joint tortfeasor release could be required to be on the verdict slip at a medical malpractice trial.  

In this medical malpractice case, several of the Defendants had settled out prior to trial utilizing a pro rata joint tortfeasor release in accordance Uniform Contribution Among Tort-Feasor’s Act.   At trial, all of the Defendants were identified.  The jury entered a defense verdict and the Plaintiff moved for a new trial asserting that the court erred in denying her Motion to Discontinue her suit against the settling Defendants.  The Plaintiff also argued that the court erred by placing the names of the settling Defendants on the jury verdict slip in order for the jury to determine the comparative liability of the settling doctors as well as the non-settling Defendants.  

Judge Nanovic ruled that, under Pennsylvania law, the non-settling Defendants were entitled to have the settling Defendants remain as parties in order to establish their status as joint tortfeasor and, if found to be joint tortfeasor, to have the jury apportion liability amongst them so that the amount of damages be non-settling Defendants might be liability to pay could be determined.  

While Judge Nanovic noted that, although the non-settling Defendants had a right to inquire a settling Defendant to remain as a party, there was no absolute right to have a settling Defendant noted on the verdict slip.  Rather, in order to ensure that a settling Defendant would be included on the verdict slip, evidence had to be presented to establish a prima facie case of negligence against that settling Defendant.  

Applying the law to the case before him, Judge Nanovic found that evidence was presented which compelled the victim of all Defendants, settling and non-settling, upon the verdict slip.  

 

I do not have a copy of this decision.  Anyone wishing to secure a copy of the staying decision by Judge Nanovic may call the Pennsylvania Instant Case Service of the Pennsylvania Law Weekly at 1-800-276-7427 and provide the above-noted PICS Case No. and pay a small fee.