Summary Judgment Based Upon Hills and Ridges Doctrine Denied

In the Lycoming County Court of Common Pleas case of Holtzapple v. Dunkleburger, No. 15-1666 (C.P. Lycoming Co. March 15, 2017 Gray, J.), Judge Richard A. Gray of the Lycoming County Court of Common Pleas denied a Defendant’s Motion based upon the Hills and Ridges Doctrine.  

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff slipped and fell on ice outside of a café on his way into the establishment.   It was not snowing at the time of the incident, but a light dusting of snow was on the ground.  

The court held that the Hills and Ridges Doctrine did not apply because the Plaintiff allegedly fell on a localized patch of black ice.   The court additionally noted that it was sunny and not snowing at the time of the incident such that there were not generally slippery conditions existing at the time of the incident was required by the application of the Hills and Ridges Doctrine.

As such, the court found that a material issue of fact existed as to whether or not the Defendant had actual constructive knowledge of the condition of the premises.    

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Summary Judgment Denied in Lycoming County Slip and Fall Case

In a recent decision out of the Lycoming County Court of Common Pleas in the case of Goldy v. Woodlands Bank, No. 15-01334 (C.P. Lycoming Co. May 31, 2016 Gray, J.), Judge Richard A. Gray denied a landowner Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment in a trip and fall case.  

Judge Richard A. Gray
Lycoming County

 

The landowner initially asserted that the Plaintiff assumed the risk by walking over an allegedly dangerous condition that the Plaintiff had previously encountered.  The landowner Defendant also argued that it was entitled to summary judgment given that the Plaintiff was unable to state exactly what caused her to fall.  

The court denied the motion after finding issues of fact precluded the entry of summary judgment.  

 

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  

Judge Gray of Lycoming County Addresses Proper Allegations for Dog Bite Complaint

In his recent decision in the dog bite case of Wagner v. Teneyck, No. 15-01783 (C.P. Lycoming Co. Jan. 5, 2016 Gray, J.), Judge Richard A. Gray of the Lycoming County Court of Common Pleas denied in part and sustained in part a Defendant’s various demurrers to a Plaintiff’s Complaint in a dog bite personal injury matter.  

The court found that Complaint contained sufficient allegations for a cause of action for negligence per se for harboring a dangerous dog and failing to keep a dangerous dog under control in violation of Pennsylvania’s Dangerous Dog Law as well as the Borough of Jersey Shore Codes pertaining to dog leash laws.  

The court rejected the Defendant’s objections to the Complaint for failing to specify the provisions of the Pennsylvania Dog Law and/or the Borough of Jersey Shore Codes pertaining to dog leash laws in the content of the Complaint.  

Judge Richard A. Gray
Lycoming Co.
 

In this regard, Judge Gray noted that Pennsylvania is a fact-pleading jurisdiction  under which the courts are presumed to know the law such that Plaintiffs need only plead facts supporting a cause of action and that the courts will take judicial notice of any statutes involved or implicated by such allegations.   Here, the court found that the Complaint sufficiently pled that the Defendants’ harbored a dangerous dog and failed to either keep the dog within a dwelling or an enclosure or to keep the dog muzzled.  As such, the Defendants’ objections based upon a lack of form or improper form in the Complaint was overruled.  

Judge Gray did sustain the Defendants’ objection asserting that the Complaint failed to specify the alleged special damages at issue.   Judge Gray noted that Pa. R.C.P. 1019(f) required that items of special damages be specifically stated in a Complaint.  

Here, the court noted that the Complaint failed to specify the amount of past medical bills to the extent known as well as the future medical bills anticipated.  Accordingly, the Complaint was found to lack sufficient specificity under Rule 1019(f).   The Defendants’ Preliminary Objection based upon lack of specificity was therefore sustained.  

Judge Gray's Opinion in Wagner can be viewed  HERE.

Ability of Parent To Recover Damages In Own Right Where Child Injured In MVA

A common question in automobile accident personal injury matters is to what extent a parent can recover damages in a case where claims are pursued on behalf of a minor Plaintiff. 

This issue was addressed in a recent decision by Lycoming County Court of Common Pleas Judge Richard A. Gray in the case of Ritter v. Makos, No. 14-02653 (C.P. Lycoming Co. Nov. 5, 2015 Gray, J.).

In Ritter, the Plaintiff-mother was driving with the Plaintiff-minor, i.e., her daughter, when they were involved in a motor vehicle collision.  A Complaint was filed for personal injuries to the minor Plaintiff.  The Plaintiff-mother did not sustain any permanent personal injuries.

A separate Complaint was filed on behalf of the Plaintiff-mother for her alleged damages arising out of the same accident.  Included in the Plaintiff-mother's Complaint was a claim for a recovery by the Plaintiff-mother of health care costs expended, or to be expended, out-of-pocket by the mother for treatment for the child up to the child reached the age of 18. 

A claim for the pecuniary value of any services the child would have provided to her mother during child's minority if the child was not injured was also asserted on behalf of the Plaintiff-mother.

The defense filed Preliminary Objections asserting that the Plaintiff-mother's claims should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 

The court denied the Preliminary Objections and noted that the defense had only cited to 75 Pa.C.S.A. Section 1722 of Pennsylvania's Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law ("MVFRL"), but no caselaw.

Judge Richard A. Gray
Lycoming County
 

Judge Gray ruled that the MVFRL did not generally preclude a claim by a parent of a minor child injured in a motor vehicle accident.

The court noted that, under Pennsylvania law, a personal injury to a minor child gives rise to two separate and distinct causes of action.  First, there is a recognized claim for pain and suffering to the child and for losses after the child reaches the age of majority.  Also recognized under Pennsylvania law is a claim by a parent(s) of the injured child for medical expenses and the loss of the minor's services during the minority period of the child's life.

The court noted that, while Section 1722 of the MVFRL precludes double recoveries in auto accident personal injury cases, the claims of the parent and child asserted were separate and distinctly recognized recoverable claims such that no double recovery was involved.

As such, the Preliminary Objections were denied in this regard.

The Preliminary Objections were sustained to the extent the parent was attempting to recover damages for health care expenses and related costs recoverable by the guardian of the minor on the separate claims pursued on behalf of the minor Plaintiff.

Anyone wishing to review this case may click this LINK.

Source:  "Digest of Recent Opinions."  Pennsylvania Law Weekly (Jan. 12, 2016).

Violation of Dangerous Dog Law in Dog Bite Case Equals Negligence Per Se

In the case of Harrison v. Haueisen, PICS Case. No. 15-0607 (C.P. Lycoming Co. April 2, 2015 Gray, J.), Judge Richard Gray of the Lycoming County Court of Common Pleas denied a Defendant’s Preliminary Objections to a Plaintiff’s Complaint in a dog bite case.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiffs were allegedly injured when they were injured attacked by a dog while walking on the sidewalk of a public street. No provocation by the Plaintiffs was indicated.

In their Complaint, the Plaintiffs alleged that the dog had previously bitten a child, that the Defendant owner knew or should have known that the dog had dangerous propensities, and that neighbors had previously complained to the Defendant about their failure to restrain the dog and about the dog’s alleged vicious propensities. Moreover, it was alleged that, shortly before the incident, a complaint was made to the Williamsport Police about a separate dog biting incident.

The Defendant owner filed Preliminary Objections in the form of a demurrer based upon an alleged violation of the dangerous dog law. The second preliminary objection was a demurrer to the punitive damages claim.

The court rejected the Defendant’s arguments that a violation of the Dangerous Dog Law did not amount to negligence per se. To the contrary, the court ruled that the Pennsylvania Superior Court had previously held that an unexcused violation of a statute constitutes negligence per se.

As such, taking the Plaintiff’s factual allegations as true as required by the standard of review, the court concluded that a violation of the Dangerous Dog Law could form the basis for a liability finding. As such, this initial Preliminary Objection was denied.

However, the court emphasized that, liability in this respect was not absolute as the negligence per se doctrine did not impose strict liability. Rather, the Plaintiff still had to prove causation and the extent of damages.

With regards to the demurrer to the claims for punitive damages, the court found that the Plaintiff had pled sufficient facts to support that claim. The Plaintiff asserted that the Defendants had a subjective appreciation of the risk of harm to which the Plaintiffs were exposed and that the Defendants acted or failed to act in a manner that showed a conscious disregard of that risk. Accordingly, this claim was allowed to proceed.

Anyone wishing to review this Harrison decision may click this LINK.

 

Trivial Defect Doctrine Applied in Lycoming County Trip and Fall Case to Deny MSJ

In the case of Walker v. Community Action Realty, Inc., No. 13-00,418 (C.P. Lycoming Co. Oct. 13, 2014 Gray, J.), Judge Richard A. Gray of the Lycoming County Court of Common Pleas recently denied a Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment in a slip and fall case based upon a defense allegation that the Plaintiff failed to identify the specific defect that caused her to fall and because the alleged defect was so trivial that allowing it to exist was not negligent as a matter of law.  

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff stumbled, trip, and fell down stairs onto a sidewalk outside a building, allegedly sustaining injuries.   At her deposition, the Plaintiff testified that her foot came into contact with a raised portion of the pavement on the porch at the top of the stairs, causing her to trip and fall down the stairs.  

It was undisputed that there was a raised area of the porch surface located a few inches from the front edge of the top step between the doormat and the front step.   An investigative report noted that the irregularity was only about 1/8^th of an inch high.  However, the raised area of the porch surface was located directly in the middle of the steps, which was noted to be a busy, heavily traversed point of primary access into and out of the public building.  

After reviewing the law pertaining to trivial defects in premises liability cases, the court denied the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment after noting that no definite or mathematical rule can be laid down as to the depth or size of a sidewalk defect to determine whether the defect was trivial as a matter of law.  

Judge Richard Gray
Lycoming County

Applying the trivial defect doctrine to the facts before him, Judge Gray reiterated that the defect in question, the existence of which was admitted by the defense, was in the direct line of travel for persons entering and exiting the building.  The court also emphasized that the irregularity in the area where the Plaintiff fell was located right in the middle of where the public would be expected to step before descending the steps out of a busy, heavily traversed public building.  

Judge Gray held that the question of whether or not allowing the defect in question to exist at that location constituted negligence, was a question that should be decided by a jury. 

Judge Gray further found that the Plaintiff’s testimony was sufficient to also raise a question of fact for the jury to determine whether or not the cause of her fall was indeed the defect in question.  

For these reasons, the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment was denied.  

 

Anyone desiring a copy of this Lycoming County decision in the case of Walker v. Community Action Realty, Inc. may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.