Expert Not Permitted to Testify as to the Requirements of the Law

In the case of Major v. Five Star Equipment, Inc., No. 2020-CV-3550 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Nov. 15, 2024 Nealon, J.), Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas addressed the extent to which an accident reconstruction expert could comment on the applicable law at trial in a motor vehicle accident case.

In addressing this issue, Judge Nealon provided a thorough review of the current status of the law regarding pedestrians crossing roadways in Pennsylvania. 

Relative to the particular issue in question, the court ruled that it is well settled that an expert is not permitted to give an opinion on a question of law and that, therefore, an expert witness may not be offered to testify as to the governing law or what the law required.

As such, in this case, the Plaintiff’s accident reconstruction expert was prohibited from providing testimony or expressing any opinion regarding the governing law pertaining to the duties of pedestrian and motorists at intersections or within crosswalks.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source of image:  Photo by Vinta Supply Co. NYC on www.pexels.com.

 

Sudden Emergency Doctrine Not Applicable in Every Pedestrian Case

In the case of Olar v. Bennett, No. 703 WDA 2022 (Pa. Super. Dec. 29, 2023 Bender, P.J.E., Lazarus, J., and Kunselman, J.) (Op. by Lazarus, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court ruled that a trial court committed error at trial by giving the Defendant’s requested sudden emergency jury instruction and requested driver’s duty of care instruction in a case where the Defendant driver struck pedestrians.

The Superior Court ruled that the evidence did not support a determination that the Defendant was confronted with a sudden and unforeseeable occurrence.

According to the Opinion, the pedestrian Plaintiffs had left a party at approximately 11:30 p.m. at night and were crossing a two-lane road that was lit with streetlight to return to a parking lot and their car when the Defendant’s minivan struck them as they were crossing the road.

According to the Opinion, the Defendant driver testified that he had a clear view of the road in front of him, was going 20-25 mph in a 25 mph zone, and that he did not see the Plaintiffs until he hit them. The Defendant tested negative for any drugs or alcohol.

The Plaintiffs presented an expert accident reconstructionist who testified that the Plaintiffs would have been visible at a distance of nearly 300 feet. The expert also testified that, even if the Defendant were traveling at a higher speed of 30 mph, he still could have been able to stop his vehicle prior to striking the Plaintiffs if he had been paying attention.

Moreover, the sole eyewitness to the accident testified that he saw the Plaintiffs enter the road at a slow pace, that is, the Plantiffs did not dart out, and that he did not hear any horns, skidding or screeching tires before the Plaintiffs were hit.

The Superior Court noted that a driver’s duty of vigilance and attentiveness was required just as much during daylight, if not more, at night.

The Superior Court held that it was error for the trial court to give the requested sudden emergency instruction as night driving was not an emergency and given that a driver had a duty to adjust his or her speed based upon road conditions and visibility so as to ensure his ability to react to foreseeable events.

It was additionally emphasized that this was not a “dart out” case in terms of the actions of the Plaintiffs.

The appellate court found that the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on the driver’s duty of care precluded a clarification of a material issue in the case for the jury.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK .


Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions.” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (Jan. 16, 2024).

Source of image:  Photo by Hooman R. on www.unsplash.com.

Superior Court Upholds Admission of Evidence of Plaintiff's Consumption of Alcohol in Pedestrian Accident Case

In the case of Moffitt v. Miller, No. 8 EDA 2023 (Pa. Super. Sept. 18, 2023, Pelligrini, J., Bowes, J., and Stabile, J.) (Op. by Pelligrini, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed a lower court’s denial of Plaintiff’s post-trial motions in a case involving a pedestrian Plaintiff who was struck by a motor vehicle.

The court found that the low verdict and the 50/50 negligence apportionment by the jury were not against the weight of the evidence.

One of the issues that the Plaintiff challenged was the admission of testimony regarding the Plaintiff's consumption of alcohol before the accident.  The appellate court found that evidence of the Plaintiff pedestrian’s high blood alcohol level at the time of the accident was properly admitted by the court below. 

The Superior Court noted that the evidence was supported by competent expert testimony that the Plaintiff’s judgement would be impaired. Additionally, there was witness testimony that the Plaintiff smelled of alcohol at or around the time of the incident. The court noted that the exclusion of this evidence would have deprived the jury of relevant evidence to consider in its decision.

The court also found that the Defendant’s alcohol expert was competent to testify based upon the expert’s several decades of experience of treating alcoholics.

In another notable ruling, the Superior court ruled that evidence established that the Plaintiff had attempted to cross the street in a mid-block area and outside of any crosswalk. As such, the court found that the Plaintiff's requested “unmarked crosswalk” instruction was properly denied.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia office of Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Alleged Negligence Regarding Pedestrian Crossing Sign Found to Fall Within Real Estate Exception to Sovereign Immunity

In the case of Estate of Patterson v. Rockefeller Group Int. Inc., No. 2022-CV-0060 (C.P. Leh. Co. Aug. 22, 2022 Johnson, P.J.), the court found that a Plaintiff’s wrongful death claim against PennDOT was not barred by the sovereign immunity doctrine where the Plaintiff alleged that an artificial condition in the form of an allegedly non-functioning pedestrian crossing sign along a highway that was allegedly under the control of PennDOT was the cause of the Plaintiff’s injuries.

The Preliminary Objections filed by PennDOT in his case were denied in part and sustained in part.

The Plaintiff alleged that the decedent was struck and killed by a motor vehicle while crossing an intersection on a street undergoing a road-widening project. The Plaintiff alleged that the decedent was crossing the road in an area that PennDOT was responsible for and in which the pedestrian crossing sign had inoperable flashing yellow lights that were covered.

In response to PennDOT’s efforts to have the case dismissed under the Sovereign Immunity Act, the court found that the Plaintiff’s allegations of a breach of the Defendant’s duty to properly maintain a pedestrian crossing sign was an action in negligence that satisfied the first prong for defeating the Defendant’s assertion of sovereign immunity, i.e., the statement of a valid cause of action for negligence.

The court found that the second prong under the Sovereign Immunity Act required the Plaintiff to establish that the negligent act complained of fell within any of ten (10) exceptions to sovereign immunity.

Among its claims, the Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant PennDOT installed an item as part of its real estate, namely a pedestrian crossing sign adjacent to a public highway, in a manner that created a hazardous condition.

The court found that this allegation was sufficient to invoke the real estate exception to sovereign immunity. As such, the court found that the Plaintiff had stated a valid cause of action which was not subject to dismissal.

PennDOT also asserted that the Plaintiff’s claims of recklessness and willful indifference should be stricken because the Sovereign Immunity Act only allowed claims for negligence in certain circumstances.

The court found that the Defendant was correct in arguing that the Plaintiff’s claims are recklessness and willful indifference were legally invalid. Under the express terms the Sovereign Immunity Act, sovereign immunity is only waived in actions against the Commonwealth for damages arising out of negligent acts.

The court also reviewed the remainder of the Plaintiff’s allegations which allege various failures to act on the part of PennDOT. The court found that those claims were barred as it was well-established that claims against the Commonwealth based upon a failure to act are barred by the sovereign immunity doctrine.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions.” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (April 11, 2023).

Source of image:  Photo by Lukas Hartman on www.pexels.com.

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Offers Guidance on the Application of the Sudden Emergency Doctrine in Pedestrian Cases

In the case of Graham v. Check, No. 42 WAP 2019 (Pa. Dec. 22, 2020)(Op. By Wecht, J.), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed the standards for when the sudden emergency defense should be applied in a motor vehicle accident case.

In his Majority Opinion, Justice Wecht noted that Pennsylvania law “recognizes that sometimes injurious accidents are not caused by carelessness, but because events conspire to create a situation so urgent and unexpected that the person alleged to be blameworthy had little or no practical opportunity to avert the harm.” See Op. at p. 1.

In the Majority Opinion, it was reaffirmed that the burden of supporting the application of the sudden emergency doctrine lies with the party asserting it. See Op. at p. 5. Also reaffirmed was the rule that, if the emergency could have been avoided by the exercise of reasonable care, the doctrine should not be applied and instructed to the jury. See Op. at p. 6.

Justice Wecht confirmed that when the evidence in a case suggests that a “sudden emergency” may be evidenced in the record at trial, “the presiding judge may instruct a jury that, should it determine that such an emergency contributed to the accident, it should assess the defendant’s performance commensurately.” Id.

In this regard, Justice Wecht also acknowledged that “since the advent of the automobile, Pennsylvania law has also imposed a heightened standard of care upon drivers to exercise particular vigilance when it is reasonably foreseeable that a pedestrian will cross their path, particularly at intersections.” Id. On page 6 of his Opinion, Justice Wecht reiterated that the application of the sudden emergency doctrine is “[c]ounterposed” against the “bedrock principle that a driver bears a heightened duty relative to pedestrians crossing at intersections. Id.

In this pedestrian versus motor vehicle accident case of Graham v Check, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the trial court in this case erred in instructing the jury on the sudden emergency doctrine as evidence of darkness, an obstructed view, and a lack of evidence of any overtly careless behavior and the fact that the pedestrian abruptly appeared in front of the driver moments before the impact were found to fail to lay a foundation for the provision of that instruction to the jury. Id.

Further on in his Opinion, Justice Wecht noted that the sudden emergency doctrine “should not be understood as a ‘defense’ in the common sense, and [the Majority] finds it ill-advised to use the word ‘defense’ in sudden emergency [jury] instructions in future cases, notwithstanding that the term features in the current suggested standard jury instruction.” See Op. at 19.

Anyone wishing to review the Majority Opinion by Justice Wecht may click this LINK.

Justice Dougherty’s Dissenting Opinion may be viewed HERE.

Commentatary:

Commentators are already pointing to the fact that, in his Dissenting Opinion, Justice Kevin Dougherty read this language as indicating that the Majority went “beyond the question [presented] to decide sua sponte the sudden emergency doctrine is no longer a viable defense in the Commonwealth.”

However, a fair reading of the Majority Opinion reveals that the Majority did not so rule; rather, in the Majority Opinion, it was held that the facts of this particular case did not support the application of the doctrine or the judge's provision of instructions to the jury on the sudden emergency doctrine. The law of the doctrine was otherwise reaffirmed in the Majority's Opinion with the indication that the application of the doctrine should be more closely scrutinized in the context of pedestrians darting out in front of vehicles at intersections given the heightened standard of car imposed on motorists in that scenario.

I send thanks for a number of attorneys for bringing this case to my attention, including Paul Oven, Esq., Scott Cooper, Esq., Kenneth Newman, Esq., and Dale Larrimore, Esq.

Allegations of Recklessness and Punitive Damages Claims Allowed to Proceed in a Cell Phone Use Case

In the case of Delena v. Tigar, No. C-48-CV-2019-8810 (C.P. Northampt. Co. July 20, 2020 Beltrami, J.), the Court allowed claims of recklessness and punitive damages to proceed beyond Preliminary Objections where the Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant was using an electronic device at the time of the accident and was "willfully not looking where he was driving."

The Plaintiff had also alleged that the Defendant driver was travelling at excessive speeds and in the wrong lane of travel in a parking lot with pedestrians around and failed to slow or stop when approaching a left turn.

Anyone wishing to review this decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney Jeremy D. Puglia of the Doylestown, PA firm of Drake, Hileman & Davis for bringing this case to my attention.

Pennsylvania Superior Court Holds that Landowners Do Not Have a Duty To Protect Invitees Against Dangers on Adjoining Roadways

In its recent decision in the case of Newell v. Montana West, 2017 Pa. Super. 15 (Pa. Super. Jan. 19, 2017 Bowes, J., Ott, J., Solano, J.) (Op. by Solano, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court ruled that, in a case first impression before this Court, that a business does not have a duty to protect its invitees against the dangers associated with adjoining roadways.  

This matter rose out of an incident during which the Plaintiff’s decedent was struck and killed by a car after he left a show at a music venue.  

The court ruled that a pedestrian who walks on a public highway places himself at risk of injury from vehicles traveling on the highway.   The duty of care owed to that pedestrian was found to rest with those who maintain the road and those motorists who travel upon the roadway.   The court ruled that the “duty does not extend to the landowners who has premises adjacent to the roadway.”  

In so ruling, the Newell court relied, in part, on a prior decision of the Commonwealth Court in the case of Allen v. Mellinger, 625 A.2d 1326 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993), appeal denied, 644 A.2d 738 (Pa. 1994), in which that court held that the owners of premises abutting state highways are not liable to pedestrians or motorists injured on those highways.  

Notably, despite the rule against citing non-precedential Opinions from the Pennsylvania Superior Court, the Newell court referred to one of its non-precedential Opinions involving a case with nearly identical facts.  

In upholding the trial court’s decision that no duty was owed to the Plaintiff’s decedent by the adjoining landowner, the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the entry of summary judgment.  

 

Anyone wishing to review this case may click this LINK.


Source:  Article: "Duty to Protect Patrons Does Not Extend to Roadway Dangers" by Max Mitchell of the Pennsylvania Law Weekly (Jan. 27, 2017)

Commonwealth Court Revisits Duties of a Pedestrian Crossing a Street

In its recent decision in the case of Chaudhuri v. Capital Area Transit, No. 1467 C.D. 2015 (Pa. Cmwlth. Jan. 7, 2016 McCullough, J.), the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court affirmed the entry of a defense verdict in a motor vehicle versus pedestrian accident and, in doing so, found that the trial court did not err in its jury instructions, particularly with respect to the requirement of law that a pedestrian cross streets at crosswalks. 

This matter arose out of an accident during which the Plaintiff, who was crossing the street as a pedestrian outside of a designated crosswalk, waled behind a public bus and was struck by a second bus.  At trial, the jury returned a verdict finding the Plaintiff to be 75% negligent and the Defendant bus driver 25% negligent.

In post-trial motions and on appeal, the Plaintiff argued that the trial court erred on its instructions to the jury on the legal duty of pedestrians crossing outside of a crosswalk.   The Plaintiff alleged that the trial court’s instruction effectively directed to the jury to find the Plaintiff negligent and that the Plaintiff failed to exercise due care simply because he crossed the street outside of the crosswalk.  The Plaintiff made this argument based upon the trial court’s instruction noting that there was a preference under the law for pedestrians to cross streets at crosswalks.  

The appellate court rejected this argument and found that, viewing the trial court’s instructions to the jury as a whole, the Plaintiff was not prejudiced because the trial court was found to have accurately instructed the jury.  The Commonwealth Court reaffirmed the legal duty of pedestrians crossing outside of a crosswalk to yield to oncoming traffic.  The appellate court noted that the trial court properly read from the applicable statutes,and additionally reminded the jury that they were solely responsible for determining whether or not the Plaintiff was negligent based upon the applicable standard of care.  

The appellate court also specifically found that the trial court’s instructions never informed or instructed the jury that the Plaintiff had violated any statute or that the Plaintiff was contributorily negligent simply because the Plaintiff had decided to cross the street outside of a crosswalk.  

Accordingly, the Commonwealth Court found no error in the trial court’s jury instruction in this regard and chose not to disturb the jury’s verdict on appeal.  

Anyone wishing to read this Opinion, may click HERE.