Vehicle Exception to Commonwealth Immunity Reviewed by Commonwealth Court

In the case of Brown-Boyd v. SEPTA, No. 1167 C.D. 2022 (Pa. Cmwlth. July 15, 2024 Wojcik, J., Wallace, J., Leavitt, S.J.) (Op. by Wallace, J.), the Commonwealth Court affirmed the trial court’s decision denying SEPTA's Motion for Summary Judgment which was based on an argument that SEPTA was immune from suit under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act.  

In this case, the Plaintiff prevailed in convincing both the trial court, and the Commonwealth Court on appeal, that the facts implicated the vehicle exception to the immunity provided by the Act.

The vehicle exception to the general rule of immunity for municipal defendants provides that a Commonwealth entity may be found liable for acts resulting in damages caused by the "operation of any motor vehicle in the possession of a Commonwealth party."  See 42 Pa.C.S.A. Section 8522(b)(1).

The appellate court here affirmed the trial court's finding that the defendant bus driver was “operating” a bus for purposes of the motor vehicle exception of the sovereign immunity statute when the bus driver stopped to allow the Plaintiff to exit and allegedly refused to lower the bus’s handicap ramp which allegedly resulted in the Plaintiff falling and being injured. 

The appellate court noted that, under established case law, the “operation” of a motor vehicle covers more than simply moving the vehicle. Instead, this term also covers a variety of activities as well as the decision-making processes related to moving a vehicle.

The court primarily relied upon the plain language of the statute and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s discussion of the statute in the case of Balentine v. Chester Water Auth., 191 A.3d 799 (Pa. 2018). 

The court noted that, under this legal authority, the “operation” of a vehicle under this exception would include both acts and failures to act, including the Defendant bus driver’s allegedly failure in this case to lower the handicap ramp for the benefit of the Plaintiff.  In the end, the court found that the Defendant bus driver was “operating” the bus when the bus driver stopped to allow the Plaintiff to exit and allegedly refused to lower the handicap ramp.

As such, the appellate court concluded that the trial court did not err in denying the Defendants’ summary judgment motion pursuant to the vehicle exception to the sovereign immunity law.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert,” ww.Law.com (July 31, 2024).

Judge Zulick of Monroe County Interprets Law of Balentine Decision

In the case of Martinez v. Swain, No. 9383-CV-2019 (C.P. Monroe Co. Feb. 6, 2020 Zulick, J.), Judge Arthur K. Zulick of the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas issued one of the first decisions since the previous Pennsylvania Supreme Court holding in the case of Balentine v. Chester Water Authority, 191 A.3d 799 (Pa. 2018), regarding the governmental immunity afforded to municipalities and the issue of an exception applying to the “operation of a vehicle.”

 In this matter, the Complaint alleged that the Plaintiff was struck by another vehicle while she was crossing the street to gain excess to a passenger bus, which had stopped in an area outside of a destinated bus stop.

The Defendant bus company filed Preliminary Objections asserting that, since it was not the bus that hit the Plaintiff, but rather another vehicle, the ‘operation of the bus’ was not the cause of the Plaintiff’s alleged injuries and, therefore, the alleged conduct on the part of the municipality that ran the bus route could not fall within the exception to governmental immunity.

The Plaintiff argued that, by stopping the bus and inviting the Plaintiff to get onto the bus would fit with in the scope of newly defined ‘operation of a vehicle’ under the Balentine decision issued by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which overruled the thirty (30) years of precedent in issuing that decision.

Judge Zulick followed the rule of the Balentine case and overruled the Preliminary Objections under the facts presented since the bus driver knew, or should have known, that the Plaintiff would try to gain access to the bus, that stopping the bus in such an area would allegedly place the Plaintiff in a danger being struck be oncoming traffic, and given that the Plaintiff allegedly would not discover moving vehicles on the road as she attempting to cross the street to get to the bus.

Anyone wishing to review Judge Zulick’s detailed Order, without Opinion, may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney Michael J. McKarski of the Bethlehem, Pennsylvania law office of Edward J. McKarski for bringing this case to my attention.

Judge Julia K. Munley of Lackawanna County Applies Recent Supreme Court Decision Regarding Governmental Immunity

In her recent decision in the case of Sands v. Hamilton, No. 2013-CV-55 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Nov. 5, 2018 Munley, J.), Judge Julia K. Munley of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas addressed a Defendant municipal bus company’s Motions In Limine seeking to preclude evidence and testimony related to negligent supervision, negligent training, and negligent retention of the bus driver.  The defense was asserting that such evidence was irrelevant given that such evidence did not relate to the central issue of whether the “operation” of the motor vehicle at issue fell under an exception to the governmental immunity provided under42 Pa. C.S.A. §8542(b)(1).  

The defense also sought to preclude evidence of the bus driver’s non-compliance with internal policies and procedures on the same grounds.  

In this matter, the Plaintiff alleged that he was injured when the bus driver took a turn too fast, causing the Plaintiff's motor scooter to tip over while the Plaintiff was sitting on it.

In her decision, Judge Munley pointed to the recent Supreme Court decision in the case of Balentine v. Chester Water Auth., 191 A.3d 799 (Pa. 2018) (Click HERE for the Tort Talk Posts on that case, including a Link to that case) in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that “operation” in this context refers to a continuum of activity as well as the decision-making processes that are attendant to moving a vehicle.  

Judge Munley also noted that the term “operation” also encompasses negligent acts related to the operation of a vehicle, including even whether a driver should be driving a particular vehicle in the first place.

As such, the court ruled that the Plaintiff was not automatically barred by governmental immunity considerations from presenting evidence at trial of policies and procedures along with other evidence in support of claims of negligent supervision, training, and retention so long as that evidence is relevant and related to the operation of the bus.  

As such, the defense Motion In Limine was denied and the court ordered that the evidence at issue would be permitted at trial. 

Anyone wishing to review this decision online may click this LINK.

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Overrules 30 Years of Precedent Pertaining to Motor Vehicle Exception to Governmental Immunity Under Tort Claims Act

In the case of Balentine v. Chester Water Authority, No. 119 MAP 2016 (Pa. Aug. 21, 2018 Mundy, J.) (Justices Todd, Dougherty, and Wecht joined in the majority Opinion) (Baer, J., concurring) (Saylor, dissenting, J.), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the Commonwealth Court erred in holding that the involuntary movement of a vehicle does not constitute operation of a motor vehicle for purposes of the vehicle liability exception to governmental immunity under 42 Pa. C.S.A. §8542(b)(1).   The Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court's decision and, in the process, 30 years of precedent on the issue presented.

By way of background, the Plaintiff's decedent was a contractor hired to rehabilitate a section of a water distribution system.  At the time of the accident, the decedent was working just off to the side of a two lane road.   The decedent was inside a ditch located on the grassy strip between the sidewalk and the curb when an inspector drove up to the work site and parked his vehicle, with the engine running, approximately 10-15 feet from the ditch.  

A few moments later, a vehicle operated by another person struck the inspector's parked vehicle, causing it to move forward.   The parked vehicle struck the decedent was he stood in the ditch, drug him out and pinned him under the vehicle when it came to a stop. The decedent sustained fatal injuries.  

The decedent's estate filed a lawsuit against various Defendants.  Certain governmental Defendants obtained summary judgment from the lower court under an argument that neither the motor vehicle exception nor the traffic control device exception to governmental immunity set forth in the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act applied.   On appeal, a divided panel of the Commonwealth Court affirmed the trial court's decision.   

At the Commonwealth Court level, that court indicated that, since “no Pennsylvania case law addresses whether involuntary movement of a vehicle constitutes operation for purposes of the governmental immunity exception, this is a matter of first impression.”  

Relying upon the fact that the vehicle at issue was parked at the time of the accident, the majority in the Commonwealth Court considered itself “constrained” to conclude as a matter of law that that vehicle was no longer in operation when the accident occurred.  As such, the Commonwealth Court concluded that the involuntary movement of that vehicle did not constitute ‘operation’ for purposes of the motor vehicle exceptions to governmental immunity.  

Further up on the appellate ladder, after reviewing the law behind the Tort Claims Act, the majority of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that movement of a vehicle, whether voluntary or involuntary, is not required by the statutory language of the vehicle liability exception. 

As such, the Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the lower courts and remanded the case back  the trial court.  

In reaching its decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court confirmed that the word “operation” was not defined in the Tort Claims Act.   As such, the Supreme Court turned to Black’s Law Dictionary and prior Pennsylvania case law addressing the proper definition of that term in this context.   The majority emphasized that the vehicle liability exception to governmental immunity only referred to “operation,” and not to “motion.”  

With its ruling, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court overturned thirty (30) years of precedent on this particular issue, including numerous prior decisions where the immunity was held to apply in accidents involving vehicles that are stopped or parked.   That is no longer the law under this decision.  

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled, in this case, that “[w]here a government vehicle obstructs a roadway, in whole or in part, we can assume, absent evidence to the contrary, that a government agent operated the vehicle to arrive at that position.”  See Op. 15.  

More specifically with respect to this case, the court found that, if a Plaintiff establishes that his injury was caused by an illegally parked government vehicle, but the movement of the vehicle itself did not cause the injury, the government would not avoid liability simply because the government vehicle was not “in motion” at the time of the injury.  Id. at 15-16.  

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted the definition of an operation of a vehicle voiced by Justice Newman in her Dissenting Opinion in the case of Warrick v. Pro Cor Ambulance, Inc., 739 A.2d 127, 129 (Pa. 1999) (Newman, J. dissenting).  

Justice Newman recognized in that Dissenting Opinion that the operation of a vehicle “reflects a continuum of activity,” which entails “a series of decisions and actions, taken together, which transport the individual from one place to another.   The decisions of where and whether to park, where and whether to turn, whether to engage brake lights, whether to use appropriate signals, whether to turn lights on or off, and the like, are all part of the ‘operation’ of a vehicle.”  Id. at 128. (Newman, J. dissenting). 

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in this Balentine case adopted Justice Newman’s definition, and found that definition to represent a reasonable standard that comports with the intent of the legislature behind the Tort Claims Act and avoids what the Pennsylvania Supreme Court deemed to be illogical results over the past 30 years of precedent that flowed from the prior emphasis on the need for motion in the previous cases.  

The Majority Opinion of the Court in Balentine can be viewed HERE.

Justice Baer's Concurring Opinion can be viewed HERE.

Chief Justice Saylor's Dissenting Opinion can be viewed HERE.