Showing posts with label Insurance Defense. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Insurance Defense. Show all posts

Wednesday, November 18, 2020

Article Published in the Journal of Tort Law: "Fighting the Good Fight: The Insurance Defense Litigator"

 


Here is a LINK to an article of mine entitled "Fighting the Good Fight: The Insurance Defense Litigator," which was published in the Widener University Commonwealth Law School's Journal of Tort Law. This is the only peer reviewed journal in the United States devoted to Tort Law.

The article is republished here with permission from the publisher, De Gruyter.

I was requested to analyze the day-to-day practice of an insurance defense litigator in tort matters. The focus of the article was to provide those in the legal academic field with insight into defense litigation in the tort arena of personal injury matters. 

The article attempted to provide that insight along with suggestions as to areas of training that law students may benefit from if offered in law school to prepare them for the practice of law in the area of civil litigation.

I send thanks to the Editor of the Journal, Professor Christopher J. Robinette, for inviting me to write for the Journal. I also send thanks to Attorney Scott Cooper of the Harrisburg, PA law firm of Schmidt Kramer for his efforts to get me involved in the creation of this year's edition of the Journal.

Sunday, June 23, 2013

2013 Top Rated Lawyer in Insurance Law

I am pleased to announce that, in addition to my recent AV Rating, American Lawyer Media and Martindale-Hubbell™, recently advised me that they had selected me as a ‘2013 Top Rated Lawyer in Insurance Law’ with respect to my handling of insurance defense matters in all of the counties that make up the Northeastern corner of Pennsylvania.

Thursday, April 29, 2010

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Finally Hands Down Tannebaum Decision

On April 28, 2010, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court finally handed down its long awaited decision in the case of Tannenbaum v. Nationwide, No. 100 MAP 2007 (Pa. 2010).

Tannenbaum involved a doctor who was severely injured in a motor vehicle accident. Following the accident, he secured social security disability benefits, along with disability benefits from a group plan offered by his former employer-hospital, and additional benefits under two personal disability policies.

The doctor sued the tortfeasor and settled. He then turned to Nationwide for UIM benefits. A dispute arose between the parties as to whether or not Nationwide was entitled to an offset in the amount of the disability benefits against the wage loss claims being presented by the injured party.

In an Opinion authored by Justice Saylor, the Court held that §1722 of Pennsylvania's Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL) precluded the plaintiff from pleading, proving and recovering as damages in an underinsured motorist claim any items of income loss otherwise paid by the disability insurer.

In this case of first impression, the Court confirmed that MVFRL was designed to eliminate the collateral source rule in auto cases, thus preventing the plaintiff from receiving a double recovery with respect to income loss.

As such, the Court overruled the Superior Court and held that Nationwide was indeed entitled to an offset in the amount of the disability benefits previously received by the injured party.


Justice Saylor's Opinion may be viewed HERE.

A Dissent was filed by Justice Todd may be viewed HERE.

Sunday, December 6, 2009

Claim Rep Pet Peeves

I am thinking of devoting a future article for the Pennsylvania Law Weekly to a recitation of Claims Rep pet peeves. Any ideas?

What do you dislike in terms of what your defense counsel do or don't do? What don't you like in terms of Plaintiff's attorneys? What don't you like in terms of dealing opposing claims reps from other carriers? I will keep all who respond anonymous in the article.

If you care to comment, please click on the word "Comment" below this post and type in what your pet peeves are or how your life can be made easier in the claims process. When you get to the "Comments" page you will see that you can post the comment anonymously if you so choose.

Maybe this article will serve to eradicate or at least lesson the number of times your pet peeves arise if attorneys are educated as to what really irks you.

Tuesday, October 13, 2009

ARTICLE: Recurring Symptoms of IME's

Recurring Symptoms of IME's:
Independent medical examinations have given rise to many complex issues

By Daniel E. Cummins
Special to the Pennsylvania Law Weekly
(5/7/07)

While an independent medical examination is utilized in most personal injury actions, the law regarding the procedure for IMEs and the discovery issues that may arise is not fully developed. The recurring issues, along with the applicable law, are analyzed below.

Typically, an IME is arranged after the depositions have been completed and all of the records and films have been secured. At times, the defense may wish to attempt to settle the case prior to incurring the substantial expenses related to an IME and the trial deposition of the IME expert. Where such settlement efforts are not successful, the competing interests of the plaintiff moving the case to a prompt resolution and the defendant's desire to complete expert discovery may come into conflict.

Generally speaking, where the damages issues are in dispute, the trial courts will err on the side of caution and allow the defense time to complete expert discovery so as to avoid the creation of any appellate issues.

In this regard, the Superior Court has held that an IME may be compelled even after an arbitration hearing particularly where liability was admitted and the sole issue for the jury involved damages and the limited tort question. McGratton v. Burke, 674 A.2d 1095 (Pa. Super. 1996). One trial court went so far as to rule that an IME may be compelled even after filing a certificate of readiness. Edelstein v. Tipton, 69 Pa.D.&C.2d 248 (C.P. Philadelphia 1974).

Place and Costs of Exams

In addition to the timing of an IME, the location of the IME may become an issue. Disputes may arise as to the place of the exam and the need for the examinee to travel a distance to attend the exam. In the case of Meeker v. Sarris, 40 Pa.D.&C.2d 643 (C.P. Beaver 1966), the court held that a defendant, in seeking an IME of the plaintiff under Rule 4010, is not required to have such examination completed in the county of the plaintiff's residence or the county where suit was brought.

In today's practice, where there is travel involved for the plaintiff of about an hour or more to get to the place of the IME, the courts will generally require under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 4011 that the plaintiff be reimbursed the reasonable expenses related to the same, such as mileage, tolls or food expenses.

Persons Present

Once the time and place of the IME is set up, Rule 4010 advises who may attend the IME in addition to the plaintiff. The rule expressly states that the "person to be examined shall have the right to have counsel or other representative present during the examination."

Experience advises that among those persons who have been allowed to attend IMEs with plaintiffs, include the plaintiff's attorney, a paralegal or legal assistant from plaintiff's attorney's office, or a nurse hired by the plaintiff's attorney to monitor the exam. Although it is likely cost prohibitive, it has even been held that the plaintiff may have his own treating medical expert present at the IME. Harding v. Sears, 47 Pa.D.&C.3d 591 (C.P. Washington 1987).

The plaintiff will not be permitted to compel the defense to pay the fees associated with having the plaintiff's attorney or representative attend the examination. State Farm v. Morris, 432 A.2d 1089 (Pa. Super. 1981).

Recording

While Rule 4010 specifically allows a plaintiff or his or her representative in attendance to audio record an IME, the courts have refused to extend the rule to allow for the videotaping of the same. In State Farm v. Miller, 8 Pa.D.&C. 4th 614 (C.P. Somerset 1990), the court specifically denied the plaintiff's request to videotape an IME as an unreasonable intrusion into the examining room and an undue burden on the physician.

Additionally, under Rule 4010, if an audio recording is made, the plaintiff must produce copy of tape to the defense at reasonable cost upon receipt of a request for the same.

Multiple Examinations

Generally speaking, multiple IMEs will not be allowed by the courts except where just cause exists. Dissatisfaction with an initial IME report certainly does not constitute just cause. Farmer v. Supermarket Gen'l Corp., 10 Pa.D.&C.4th 500 (C.P. Philadelphia 1991). However, in a case where the claim was for permanent injuries and continuing pain, and a year and a half had elapsed since the defendant last had the plaintiff examined, the defendant was allowed another IME in the case of Edelstein v. Tipton, 69 Pa.D.&C.2d 248 (C.P. Philadelphia 1974).

Where a plaintiff has different types of injuries, such as an orthopedic injury and a dental injury, IMEs with experts of different specialties will generally be allowed.

Production of Reports

On occasion, an IME report unfavorable to the requesting party's position may be generated. The issue becomes whether the requesting party is required to produce that report, particularly where a decision is made not to call the expert as a witness at trial.

Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 4003.5(a)(3) provides that a party may not obtain discovery regarding any expert that is not expected to be called as a witness at trial, "except a medical expert as provided in Rule 4010(b) [regarding IMEs]....." [Emphasis and bracket added].

In the relatively recent decision of Lloyd v. Lloyd, 889 A.2d 1246 (Pa. Super. 2005), the court partly relied on Rule 4003.5(a)(3) in holding that a medical expert report obtained by an opposing party must be produced. In Lloyd, a former wife submitted herself and her children to a custody evaluation performed by an expert at the request of her former husband. The former husband then initially listed the expert as a possible witness in his pre-trial memorandum. However, a decision was later made by the former husband not to call the expert as a witness at the hearing. The court ruled that the former wife was nevertheless still entitled to discovery of the expert report.

Thus, it appears that the Rules of Civil Procedure and Pennsylvania case law generally require the production of the IME report regardless of the opinion contained therein.

Utilizing an Opponent's Expert Opinion

Although a plaintiff may secure a copy of an IME report of a doctor that the defense does not intend to call as a witness, the plaintiff may not thereafter compel that expert to testify on behalf of the plaintiff at trial. Boucher v. Pennsylvania Hospital, 831 A.2d 623 (Pa. Super. 2003); see also Spino v. John S. Tilley Ladder Co., 696 A.2d 1169 (Pa. Super. 1996) aff'd. 696 A.2d 1169 (Pa. 1997). The appellate courts have also gone so far as to say the plaintiff may not otherwise utilize such an IME report at trial. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. Piper, 615 A.2d 979 (Pa. Commw. 1992).

The rationale behind this rule is an acknowledgement of an expert's proprietary interest in his own opinion and the recognition that he or she should not be required to relinquish it without his consent. An open issue arises as to whether the expert may agree to testify for the plaintiff in exchange for a fee paid by the plaintiff where the expert essentially remains under the employ of the defendant that originally retained the expert.

However, it has been established that where an IME doctor's deposition for trial has been completed, any party may use that deposition for any purpose at trial under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 4020(a)(5). See Wiley v. Snedaker, 765 A.2d 816 (Pa. Super. 2000). The rationale behind this rule is that, in such a situation, the defense made the witness available, the expert freely testified, and his testimony thereby became available for use by either party.

Discovery of Bias

A recent hot issue in this area is the extent to which plaintiff's counsel may obtain discovery regarding the potential bias of an IME doctor. Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure expressly sets forth the parameters of discovery in this regard under F.R.C.P. 26 (a)(2)(B), no such rule is found in the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. Rather, until recently, the state trial courts have been on their own in attempting to carve out their own rules.

One issue that has arisen in the state courts is the ability of a litigant to discover written communications between the opposing party and that party's expert. One trial court that addressed this issue required the production of all written correspondence between plaintiff's attorney and plaintiff's expert witness, but allowed plaintiff's attorney to redact his opinion work product. Pavlak v. Dyer, 59 Pa.D.&C.4th 353 (C.P. Pike 2003).

In its Jan. 9, 2007 decision in Feldman v. Ide, 915 A.2d 1208 (Pa. Super. 2007), the state Supreme Court attempted to clarify other issues surrounding a party's right to discovery of an expert's potential bias. In Feldman, the Court relied upon its prior holding in Cooper v. Schoffstall, 905 A.2d 482 (Pa. 2006), in ruling that a plaintiff in a personal injury case is not entitled to limited discovery on the financial background expert unless a threshold is first met showing that expert is a professional witness or might color his or her opinion in light of substantial financial incentives.

The Feldman court noted that the plaintiff may attempt to meet the required threshold showing through interrogatories inquiring as to "the approximate amount of compensation received and expected in the pending case, the character of the witnesses' [sic] litigation-related activities, and, in particular, the approximate percentage devoted to specific types of litigation and/or work on behalf of a particular litigant, class of litigant, attorney, and/or attorney organization; the number of examinations, investigations, or inquiries performed in a given year, for up to the past three years; the number of instances in which the witness has provided testimony within the same time period; the approximate portion of the witness's overall professional work devoted to litigation-related services; and the approximate amount of income each year, for up to the past three years, garnered from the performance of such services."

From the Feldman opinion it appears that if the threshold showing is met, the courts may allow discovery into a professional witness' finances possibly up to three years back.

As IMEs remain an integral part in evaluating plaintiff's claims of personal injury, the above law will have to be continually developed. Obviously, the law surrounding the use of medical experts and particularly those cases regarding discovery on the potential bias of a medical expert, should also be deemed to apply to plaintiff's experts retained for litigation purposes as well. •


This article by Daniel E. Cummins, Esquire of the Scranton, Pennsylvania law firm of Foley, Cognetti, Comerford, Cimini & Cummins, first appeared in the Pennsylvania Law Weekly.

This article is reprinted here, with permission, from the May 7, 2007 issue of the Pennsylvania Law Weekly. (c) 2009 Incisive Media US Properties, LLC. Further duplication without permission is prohibited. All rights reserved. Please contact the author for permission to reprint or duplicate this article.

Monday, August 3, 2009

Luzerne County Joins the Lists of Trial Courts Allowing for Consolidation of Third Party and UIM Claims Under a Single Caption

In the case of Glushefski v. Sadowski and Erie Insurance Exchange, No. 1189-Civil-2009, Judge Thomas F. Burke, Jr. of the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas issued a July 29, 2009 Order allowing the consolidation or joinder of a third party motor vehicle accident lawsuit and a companion UIM (underinsured motorist benefits) claim under one caption.

In Glushefski, the third party tortfeasor defendant filed preliminary objections the first of which objected to the Plaintiff's joinder of the tort and UIM claims in a single action. According to Plaintiff's counsel, the first paragraph of the Court’s Order dismissed the preliminary objection challenging this joinder. Although the Court did not write an opinion, there is now precedent that such joinder is permitted in Luzerne County by virtue of this Court Order.

In addition to this Luzerne County Order, I am in possession of a number of other post-Koken trial court opinions from across the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, all of which have consistently held that lawsuit claims against the tortfeasor defendant may be consolidated with companion UIM claims in cases where the UIM policy calls for a trial as opposed to an arbitration of the UIM claim. To date, there does not appear to be any appellate opinions on the issue.

For more analysis on the post-Koken cases in Pennsylvania, please click on the topic of "Koken" under the LABELS section on the right hand column of this blog

Anyone desiring a copy of this Luzerne County Order, or any other post-Koken trial court opinions and orders in my possession, may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net. I would be happy to email you a copy.

I thank Rick Russo, Esquire, partner in the Wilkes-Barre, PA firm of Rosenn, Jenkins & Greenwald and Plaintiff's counsel in the Glushefski case, for bringing this Order to my attention and providing me a copy of the same.

Wednesday, July 29, 2009

Another Recent Post-Koken Decision in Favor of Consolidation

A recent April 9, 2009 Order in a Lehigh County post-Koken case was brought to my attention by Attorney Evan Kline, a former classmate of mine at the Dickinson School of Law and a current member of the York, Pennsylvania law firm of Katherman, Briggs & Greenberg . I thank Evan for this tip.

As a reminder, "post-Koken" cases are those cases arising after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued an opinion in a case commonly referred to the "Koken" case (the name of one of the parties)--in that case, the PA Supreme Court ruled that carriers could do away with the arbitration clause and allow for UM/UIM cases to be litigated by way of a jury trial.

Ever since, the carriers have issued new policies without an arbitration clause and many auto accident cases have been filed with the cause of action against the defendant driver and the UIM claim being pursued in one lawsuit. Some defendants are objecting to being lumped in a case with an insurance company defendant. So far, the trial courts are keeping the cases together.

In her Order issued in the case of Serulneck v. Kilian and Allstate Fire and Cas. Ins. Co., 2008-C-2859 (Lehigh Co. April 9, 2009), Judge Carol K McGinley follows the trend of allowing post-Koken third party and UIM cases to proceed under the same caption. The Judge denied the tortfeasor defendant's Motion for Severance and, in her footnote to the Order, the Judge wrote:

"The entire cause of action, whether sounding in tort or contract, arises from the same set of facts. Defendant Allstate will be prejudiced if excluded in any litigation which fixes its liability."


Anyone wishing to receive a copy of this Order may contact me and I will be happy to email it to you. I am also in possession of a number of other post-Koken decisions from other counties as well.

Monday, May 4, 2009

Welcome to My Blog

Monday, May 4, 2009

Please allow me to introduce myself. I am a partner in the Scranton, Pennsylvania law firm of Foley, Cognetti, Comerford, Cimini & Cummins. I have about 15 years of experience, most of it in the insurance defense field. I have focused my practice on defending motor vehicle accident liability cases and UIM/UM arbitration matters along with premises liability and products liability cases. I am also routinely summoned by clients to handle matters involving insurance coverage questions and insurance subrogation claims.

I have also published many articles that have appeared in the Pennsylvania Law Weekly, the Pennsylvania Bar Quarterly, the Pennsylvania Lawyer magazine, and the Northeast Pennsylvania Business Journal. These numerous articles have analyzed and predicted trends in a wide variety of areas of civil litigation law and have also provided practice tips for fellow members of the bar.

More recently, at the request of the editors of the Pennsylvania Law Weekly, a statewide legal news publication, I became a regularly contributing columnist on civil litigation issues. Several of these articles have been recognized at the statewide Schnader Print Media Awards for their excellence in legal journalism.

Simply put, as a former English major at Villanova University who nurtured his love for the law and crafted his legal writing skills at the Dickinson School of Law in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, I enjoy analyzing and writing about trends in the law.

After reading many articles about the increasing number of attorneys blogging on the internet and seeing only a few which deal specifically with Pennsylvania civil litigation law, I thought I would take a crack at blogging as a complement to my column that regularly appears in the Pennsylvania Law Weekly (http://www.palawweekly.com/).

The purpose of my blog will be to highlight trends and note important decisions in Pennsylvania civil litigation law. I may also periodically attempt to offer practice tips from my own experiences over the past 15 years of practicing. Through this blog I may also be able to bring to the attention of others little heard developments or verdicts occurring in the courts in the counties that make up Northeastern Pennsylvania.

As recommended in the articles on lawyer blogging, I will attempt to update the blog and review the site for questions and commentary several times a week whenever possible.

It is my hope that you will find this blog not only informative but entertaining at times. Thank you for taking the time to visit my blog. I hope you find it worthy of returning to on occasion for civil litigation updates.