Court Dismisses Negligent Entrustment Claim Against Parents Relative to Use of Cell Phone by Child

In the case of JH v. Dunmore School District, No. 3:24-CV-1154 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 8, 2025 Munley, J.), Judge Julia K. Munley of the Federal Middle District Court of Pennsylvania addressed various Motions to Dismiss filed by different Defendants relative to a case involving allegations that certain middle school student allegedly recorded a minor Plaintiff who was on the autism spectrum, inside a bathroom stall at the school and then allegedly disseminating that video to other students who also allegedly shared the video with others.

Among the claims presented by the Plaintiffs were allegations of negligence entrustment and intentional infliction of emotional distress against the minor Defendants at issue and their parents. The negligent entrustment claim was that the parents had negligently entrusted a cell phone owned by the parents to their children.

The court granted in part and denied in part the request for a dismissal of the negligent entrustment claims asserted against the parents given that the Plaintiffs did not allege facts to support their conclusion that the parent Defendants knew or should have known that their children would use their cell phones in ways that would hurt people.

The court also noted that, based upon the facts alleged by the Plaintiff, which included references to school policy and state law, the Plaintiffs’ allegations actually support the proposition that the parent Defendants yielded control of the cell phones, or the use of the cell phones to the teachers and administrators when their children were at school. 

In this regard, the court pointed to the school district’s rules requiring students to refrain from utilizing their cell phone on the school ground during school hours. 

The court emphasized that the alleged negligent conduct of the students took place during the course of the school day and that there were no allegations that any of the minor Defendants in this action shared the video of the minor Plaintiff outside of the school day. 

The court in this matter did allow the Plaintiffs’ claims or intentional infliction of emotional distress to proceed against the parent Defendants.

The court otherwise dismissed a number of claims asserted against the school district and school officials but allow the Plaintiffs to file another Amended Complaint relative to the possible civil rights allegations under 42 U.S.C. §1983.

The court allowed the claims of punitive damages to remain in the case relative to the claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Court's companion Order can be viewed HERE.

Source of image:  Photo by Tracy Le Blanc on www.unsplash.com.

WARNING - NEW LAW - Put That Cell Phone Away While Driving or Face Getting Ticketed

While texting while driving has been banned in Pennsylvania since 2012, a new law that went into effect yesterday, June 5, 2025, bans all cell phone use while driving on the roads of Pennsylvania.

The law, known as “Paul Miller’s Law” (Senate Bill 37), makes it illegal to use a cell phone in your hands while driving. This includes holding your phone to do calls, emails, and texts. The law also prohibits having a cell phone in your hand for browsing the internet or for taking pictures or videos while you are driving.

The law prohibits these activities even when one is stopped at a red light or in a traffic jam.

Under the language of the law, it appears that an overhead bluetooth system can be used to make calls as long as one uses the buttons on the steering wheel and the dash and not by way of pushing buttons on the cell phone.

Under the law, for the first 12 months, the penalty will be a written warning. Starting June 5, 2026, the penalty will be a summary offense with a $50 fine, plus court costs and other fees. The violation carries no points against your license and it is not recorded on the driver’s record for noncommercial drivers. It will be recorded on a commercial driver’s record as a non-sanction violation.

Moreover, if a driver is convicted of both vehicular homicide and driving while distracted, they may be sentenced up to an additional five years in prison.

Under certain exceptions noted in the law, a driver may use a cell phone for emergency purposes. A driver may also use a mobile device if they pull off to the side of the road and stop where a vehicle may safely remain in a stopped position.

Here is a LINK to the summary of the law on PennDOT's website.

Punitive Damages Claims Based Upon Cell Phone Use By Bus Driver Allowed to Proceed to Jury

In the case of Brown v. White, No. 2:21-CV-01387-KSM (E.D. Pa. May 25, 2022 Marston, J.), the court denied a Partial Motion for Summary Judgment seeking the dismissal of claims of punitive damages in a bus accident case.

According to the Opinion, this matter involved a Plaintiff passenger who filed suit against a Greyhound bus driver and his employers alleging, in part, that the driver was reckless in using his cell phone while driving a bus on an overnight trip with 22 passengers.

The record before the court also indicated that, while the Plaintiff slept for most of the trip, she allegedly woke up twice when the bus veered onto rumble strips on the edge of the road. She was also allegedly awoken again at 4:45 a.m. when the bus rear-ended a tractor trailer. It was alleged that the tractor trailer was illuminated and clearly visible but that the bus driver allegedly did not see the tractor trailer until immediately before impact. It was also asserted that the bus was traveling at 72 mph at the time.

In its Opinion, the court noted that, under Pennsylvania law, punitive damages are an extreme remedy that may be awarded only when a Plaintiff has established that a Defendant has acted in any outrageous fashion due to either the Defendant’s evil motive or his or her reckless indifference to the rights of others. The court further noted that a Defendant acts recklessly where his or her conduct creates an unreasonable risk of physical harm to another and such risk is substantially greater than that which is necessary to make his or her conduct negligent.

Judge Marston noted in her Opinion that, while cell phone usage while driving, without more, is typically insufficient to support a finding of recklessness, courts applying Pennsylvania law have held that cell phone usage may rise to the level of recklessness where aggravating factors render the cell phone usage particularly egregious.

In this case, the court found that a reasonable jury could find that the bus driver was using his cell phone while driving. The court noted that a dash cam video from ten (10) seconds before the accident appeared to show a glowing light in the bus driver’s lap near his left hand, which a reasonable jury could understand to be from a cell phone.

The court additionally noted that the bus driver’s cell phone records showed that he used a substantial amount of data in the three (3) hour window around the accident.

The court additionally emphasized that the bus driver was driving a large bus with twenty-two (22) passengers on an overnight trip and that the bus driver was driving a fast as the bus could possibly go, that the bus driver was possibly driving with one (1) hand on the steering wheel. The court also pointed to evidence that the bus driver never tapped the brakes prior to the subject rear-end collision.

The court noted that there were several aggravating factors present in the case that could render the bus driver’s cell phone usage particularly egregious. As such, since the court found that a reasonable jury could find that the bus driver was reckless under the circumstances, the court refused to dismiss the Plaintiff’s punitive damages claims by way of this partial Motion for Summary Judgment.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions.” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (June 24, 2022).

Source of image:  www.pexels.com.

Judge Nealon of Lackawanna County Denies Request for Spoliation Sanction Relative to Cell Phone Records

In the case that keeps on giving, Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas issued yet another notable decision in the case of Barbarevech v. Tomlison, No. 18-CV-4821 (C.P. Lacka. Co. March 11, 2022 Nealon, J.). This time, the court addressed a Motion In Limine filed by the Plaintiff for spoliation sanctions in the form of an adverse inference charge and preclusion of testimony and evidence relating to the failure to retain Defendant, Nicole Tomlinson’s cell phone records.

In issuing his decision, Judge Nealon reviewed the current status of the law on spoliation at evidence and the discretion of trial court judges to impose a range of sanctions based upon the circumstances presented.

Citing to the famous spoliation cases of Schroeder v. Com. Dept. of Transp., 710 A.2d 23, 27 (Pa. 1998) citing Schmid v. Milwaukee Elect. Toll Corp., 13 F.3d 76, 79 (3d. Cir. 1994), Judge Nealon noted that, in determining whether a sanction is warranted for the spoliation of evidence, the court should consider: (1) the degree of fault of the party who altered or destroyed the evidence; (2) the degree of prejudice suffered by the opposing party; and (3) the availability of a lesser sanction that will protect the opposing party’s rights and deter future similar conduct.

Interestingly, in footnote 2 of the Opinion, Judge Nealon cited to my article entitled “New Wine In An Old Bottle: The Advent of Social Media Discovery in Pennsylvania Civil Litigation Matters,” 60 Vill. L.Rev. Tolle Lege 31, 44 (2015) for the proposition that parties typically utilize a litigation strategy of securing a ‘litigation hold’ court order against an opposing party in a lawsuit in order to prevent that other party from deleting evidence.

After applying the law of spoliation to the case presented, the court noted that neither of the Defendants at issue ever had custody of the cell phone records in question prior to their destruction. 

It was also emphasized that neither party had obtained or even requested a court order directing that the cell phone records be preserved. 

Nor was there any evidence that the Defendants knew that the cell phone records would be deleted under a retention policy of the cell phone owner’s carrier. 

Moreover, Judge Nealon indicated that, since there was no evidence that the Defendant’s cell phone was in use at the time of the subject accident, and given that there was no eyewitness testimony that the cell phone was being held or used by the cell phone’s owner, the court found that it could not be reasonably concluded that the cell phone’s owner had any affirmative duty to unilaterally contact her cell phone carrier to direct that the carrier preserve her cell phone records.

As such, based upon the record before the court, Judge Nealon found that the Defendant’s could not be characterized as the destroyers of the cell phone records in question. It was also reiterated that neither of the Defendants at issue had any knowledge that the cell phone records would have been deleted. As such, the court ruled that a spoliation sanction was not warranted.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source of Image:  Photo of cell phone by Jonas Lee on Unsplash.com.

Claim of Punitive Damages in Alleged Distracted Driver (Cell Phone) Case Dismissed

In the case of Nichols v. Ray, No. 2019-GN-2711 (C.P. Blair Co. July 12, 2021 Doyle, J.), the court sustained a Defendant’s Preliminary Objections to allegations punitive damages based upon cell phone use in a motor vehicle accident case.

The court additionally sustained Preliminary Objections and struck a claim against another Defendant for negligent entrustment based upon a lack of sufficient factual specificity to support that claim. In this regard, the court noted that the claim of negligent entrustment involves knowledge that is incident-specific, and not only allgations of generalized misgivings in regards to allowing another person to operate a vehicle.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to attorney William C. Robinson, III of the Pittsburgh law firm of Robb Leonard Mulvihill, LLP for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of above image:  Photo by D'Vaughn Bell from Pexels.com.

Allegations of Recklessness and Punitive Damages Claims Allowed to Proceed in a Cell Phone Use Case

In the case of Delena v. Tigar, No. C-48-CV-2019-8810 (C.P. Northampt. Co. July 20, 2020 Beltrami, J.), the Court allowed claims of recklessness and punitive damages to proceed beyond Preliminary Objections where the Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant was using an electronic device at the time of the accident and was "willfully not looking where he was driving."

The Plaintiff had also alleged that the Defendant driver was travelling at excessive speeds and in the wrong lane of travel in a parking lot with pedestrians around and failed to slow or stop when approaching a left turn.

Anyone wishing to review this decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney Jeremy D. Puglia of the Doylestown, PA firm of Drake, Hileman & Davis for bringing this case to my attention.

Generalized Allegations of Cell Phone Usage At Time of Accident Insufficient to Support Punitive Damages Claims

In the case of Wilson v. Matas, No. 10067 of 2020, C.A. (C.P. Lawrence Co. June 3, 2020 Motto, P.J.), the court sustained Preliminary Objections filed by Defendant in a motor vehicle accident case containing claims of punitive damages based, in part, on a suggestion that the Defendant had been using a cell phone at the time of the accident.

This matter involved a rear-end accident. According to the Complaint, the Defendant had allegedly admitted to the police at the scene of the accident that she had not been paying attention at the time of the collision occurred. The Plaintiff also generally alleged that the Defendant was using an electronic device at the time of the accident.

However, the court pointed out that the Plaintiff merely alleged that the Defendant may have been using her cell phone at the time of the accident and did not contain any specific facts to demonstrate the Defendant was actually utilizing a cell phone.

As such, the court dismissed the punitive damages claims in this regard.

On an unrelated issue, the court did allow claims of negligence per se to proceed under specific allegations asserted by the Plaintiff that the Defendant was following the Plaintiff’s vehicle too closely at the time of the accident.

The court otherwise overruled the Defendant’s Preliminary Objections regarding allegations in the Complaint about the Defendant’s statements to the police officer following the accident. The court ruled that an out of court statement offered to explain a course of conduct was not inadmissible hearsay. The court also noted that a statement by a party opponent could be admitted under the evidentiary rules.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (August 4, 2020).

Punitive Damages Claim Allowed To Proceed in Texting Case, But Not Negligent Entrustment Claim

In the case of Simpson v. Buchanan, No. 20-2583 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 5, 2020 Pappert, J.), the court denied a Defendant’s Partial Motion to Dismiss in a motor vehicle accident case involving alleged cell phone use by the Defendant driver.

The court found that allegations that a Defendant drove while being distracted by a cell phone was sufficient to support a claim for punitive damages.  More specifically, the Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant was texting at the time of the rear end accident.

Notably, the Court dismissed allegations of negligent entrustment against the Defendant-owner after the court found that the Plaintiff's allegations that the Defendant-owner knew or should have known that the Defendant-driver would be texting while driving were conclusory, speculative, and baseless allegations.  The Court also noted that the Plaintiff did not plead any facts to support a claim of prior knowledge on the part of the Defendant-owner of any poor driving history of the Defendant-driver.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The companion Order can be viewed HERE

I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Code of Civility Relied Upon For Admonishment of Counsel

Can the Code of Civility serve as a basis of a trial court Order admonishing counsel in a case for conduct in litigation? 

In the case of Barbarevech v. Tomlinson, No. 18-CV-4821 (C.P. June , 2020 Nealon, J.), Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Commons addressed numerous discovery related motions filed by each party in what he described as an “exceedingly acrimonious motor vehicle accident litigation.” Of note, the Court granted the Plaintiff’s motion to admonish the defense attorney under the Code of Civility.

The court addressed issues regarding the defense efforts to compel discovery depositions of three (3) treating physicians that the Plaintiffs have identified as expert witnesses or to alternatively require the Plaintiff to call those physicians as experts at trial, to strike the Plaintiffs’ objections to discovery responses and compel more specific answers, and to be granted “priority” with respect to the ability to question a particular deponent first during her deposition. 

The Plaintiffs’ motions requested the issuance of an Order barring further discovery related to three (3) discontinued medical malpractice actions that were filed against the Plaintiff, who happened to be a physician. The Plaintiffs also sought the production of the Defendant driver’s cell phone records and Answers to Interrogatories regarding the defense expert’s litigation activity and income. 

Also of note, the court addressed the Plaintiffs’ motion seeking a formal admonishment of the defense counsel for certain conduct to date that the Plaintiffs asserted was in violation of the Code of Civility and the Rules of Professional Conduct particularly with reference to written communications by email between the parties. 

The court’s 53 page Opinion offers a good read and a thorough analysis of all of these issues presented. 

In the end, the court agreed to grant in part and deny in part the various motions presented. With respect to the Plaintiffs’ motion regarding the alleged violations of the Code of Civility, the court agreed that an admonishment to the defense counsel to be more attentive to the principles of professionalism was warranted.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Plaintiff Precluded From Testifying as to Defendant's Speed Where Only Saw Vehicle a Split Second Before Impact

In the case of Berklovich v. Quarrick, No. 2567-CV-2018 (C.P. Westmoreland Co. 2020 Scherer, J.), the court granted a defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and dismissed a Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages based upon allegations of excessive speed and cell phone use by the defendant during a motor vehicle accident.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff was rear ended and, as a result, her vehicle was propelled forward across two lanes of traffic.

After discovery, the defense filed a partial motion for summary judgment seeking a dismissal of the punitive damages claims.  The court granted the motion.

While the court agreed that driving at an excessive rate of speed and using a cell phone could constitute conduct sufficient to support a claim for punitive damages, the court also found that the Plaintiff had not presented sufficient evidence to support such a claim.

The court noted that the only testimony on the speed of the defendant's vehicle was from the Plaintiff.  The Plaintiff admitted that she only saw the defendant's vehicle a split second before the impact.  Relying upon the case of Guzman v. Bloom, 198 A.2d 499, 502 (Pa. 1964) and the case of Anderson v. Perta, 10 A.2d 898 (Pa.Super. 1940), the court ruled that observing the defendant's vehicle for such a short amount of time before the accident did not lay a proper foundation for the Plaintiff to offer her lay opinion as to the speed of the defendant's vehicle.

On the issue of the defendant's cell phone use, the court noted that the Plaintiff did not secure the defendant's cell phone records or otherwise present evidence to confirm that the defendant was using his phone at the time of the accident.  The court rejected the Plaintiff's effort to rely upon an allegation in the Complaint that the defendant was unconscious after the accident and had no recollection of whether he was on his cell phone at the time of the accident or not.

Anyone wishing to review this case may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney Joseph Hudock of the Pittsburgh office of the Summers, McDonnell, Hudock, Guthrie & Rauch, P.C. for bringing this decision to my attention.

Allegations of Recklessness Allowed to Stand Based Upon Cell Phone Use While Driving

In the case of Henderson v. Palmer, No. 10035 of 2019, C.A. (C.P. Lawrence Co. Oct. 7, 2019 Cox, J.), the court denied a Defendant’s Preliminary Objections to the Plaintiff’s claims of reckless conduct based upon a Defendant driver allegedly using a cell phone and/or texting, and/or using “some other electronic device or for other reasons, in direct violation of applicable law.”

This matter arose out of a motor vehicle accident that occurred when the Plaintiff’s vehicle was rear-ended by the Defendant’s vehicle.

The court in Henderson reviewed decisions from Oklahoma and Delaware involving a Defendant’s use of a cell phone during the course of an accident. After reviewing those cases, the court in Henderson found that allegations asserting that the Defendant was using a cell phone while driving and was otherwise distracted from observing the roadway while operating a vehicle at a high rate of speed were sufficient to permit allegations of recklessness to survive Preliminary Objections.

However, the court granted the Defendant’s Preliminary Objections to the Plaintiff’s negligence per se allegations given that the Plaintiff failed to provide any factual allegations demonstrating any conduct to establish the violation of the statutes alleged.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions.” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (Nov. 5, 2019).

Seeing Accident of Loved One on IPhone App Map Does Not Support Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim

In the case of Jenson v. St. Louis, No. 3:19-cv-00515 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 9, 2019 Munley, J.), the court granted in part and denied in part a Motion to Dismiss a Plaintiff’s negligent infliction of emotional distress claim in a fatal trucking accident matter.  

According to the Opinion, prior to the day of the accident, the decedent would always call his fiance when he arrived at work.  On the day of the accident, when the decedent did not call, his fiance used a smartphone application to locate the decedent's cellular phone.  The application displayed a map that indicated that the phone, and therefore, the decedent, were located at the scene of a crash.

The Plaintiff-fiance alleged in the Complaint that she suffered a direct and immediate shock by this contemporaneous and sensory observance of the fatal collision through her iPhone.

Judge James M. Munley of the Federal Middle District Court found that these facts did not support an allegation of the required contemporaneous perception element of a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. 

The Court emphasized that the Plaintiff did not witness the accident but only saw a reporting of the accident on her phone after the fact.  This was found to be insufficient to support the element of contemporaneous observance of an accident necessary to support a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress.  

The court analogized this case to those cases in which this type of claim was dismissed where a plaintiff received a phone call from a hospital indicating that a loved one had been in an accident.

Given his ruling on this aspect of the claim, Judge Munley did not reach the issue of whether this Plaintiff's status as the fiance of the decedent was a close enough relationship to support the requirement under the claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress that one suffer from a contemporaneous observance of an injury to a close relative in order to present such a claim.

The court allowed the remaining claims by other Plaintiffs to proceed, including a claim of punitive damages in a case where a trucker attempted to merge back onto the Northeast Extension of the Pennsylvania Turnpike under dark conditions and with no lights illuminating the sides of the trailer portion of the tractor trailer at the time of the accident.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  Here is a LINK to the companion Order.

I send thanks to Attorney James A. Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention. 

Puntive Damages Claims Based in Part on Alleged Cell Phone Use Allowed to Proceed in Monroe County

In the case of Miller v. Repasch, No. 517-Civil-2019 (C.P. Monroe Co. April 17, 2019 Williamson, J.), the court issued an Order only denying the Preliminary Objections filed by a Defendant against claims of recklessness and a claim for punitive damages in a motor vehicle accident case involving cell phone use.   The court noted that the allegations in the Complaint were sufficient to allow those claims to proceed forward.  

Reviewing the allegations in the Complaint reveal that this matter arose out of a head-on collision in which the Defendant allegedly failed to operate his vehicle at a safe and prudent speed, failed to take corrective action to avoid the impact, failed to have his vehicle under proper and adequate control, failed to keep a proper lookout, drove his vehicle in careless disregard for the safety of others, and allowed his attention to diverted or distracted thereby precluding the Defendant from being in his vehicle to a stop in sufficient time to avoid the collision.  

In the Plaintiff’s Complaint, it was alternatively pled that the Defendant reported that he crossed the center line as a result of having “blacked out,” or that, if the cause of the Defendant crossing the center line was due to knowingly operating an electronic device or other communication or listening device while operating a vehicle then such actions were done in conscious disregard of the risk that such distracted driving posed to the traveling public, including the Plaintiff.  

A copy of the Complaint is attached to the Order which can be viewed by way of the below link. 

Anyone wishing to review the Court’s Order issued in this matter (as well as a copy of the Complaint) may click this LINK. 

I send thanks to Attorney John B. Dunn of Matergia & Dunn in Stroudsburg, Pennsylvania.  

Negligent Entrustment and Punitive Damages Claims In Case of Driver With Only a Learner's Permit (Cell Phone Use Also Alleged)

In the case of Robinson v. Marett, No. 10672 of 2018, C.A. (C.P. Lawrence Co. Dec. 20, 2018 Motto, P.J.), the court overruled the Defendants’ Preliminary Objections regarding issues of negligent entrustment and punitive damages in a motor vehicle accident case.  

The Defendants’ preliminarily objected to the Plaintiff’s Complaint asserting that the claim for negligent entrustment was legally insufficient because there was no evidence to establish that the driver was incompetent to operate the vehicle when it was entrusted to him by the owner of the vehicle.   

The Plaintiffs had alleged that the owner had allowed the driver to operate the vehicle when the driver only had a learner’s permit and was not supervised by an adult family member.   The Complaint additionally asserted that the driver was distracted by his use of a cell phone or other electronic device, was operating the vehicle at a high rate of speed, and was following the vehicle ahead too closely.  

The court ruled that these allegations were sufficient to support a claim for negligent entrustment because, under these circumstances alleged, the owner should have known the risk to others by allowing an unlicensed and unsupervised driver to operate the vehicle.  

The Defendant driver and owner had asserted that the driver had a driver’s license at the time of the accident such that the negligent entrustment claims should be rejected.  However, the court noted that this argument required the court to consider facts that were not contained within the Complaint, which was impermissible when deciding Preliminary Objections. The court noted that the Defendants could make this argument again by way of a summary judgment motion but reiterated that such an argument could not be the basis for allowing a Preliminary Objection.  

The Defendants additionally asserted that the Plaintiff’s allegations of recklessness should be stricken as scandalous or impertinent, because the Plaintiffs had no basis for recovering punitive damages under the facts alleged.  

The court rejected this argument after finding that the Plaintiffs had alleged sufficient facts from which a jury could conclude that the driver acted outrageously. These allegations indicated that the driver was not properly licensed and was not being attentive to other vehicles on the roadway at the time of the accident.  

As such, the Defendants’ Preliminary Objections were overruled and the Plaintiff's negligent entrustment claims were allowed to proceed.  

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source:  “Digest of Recent Opinions.”  Pennsylvania Law Weekly (Feb. 26, 2019).

THE 2018 TORT TALK TOP 10

Here is the 2018 Tort Talk Top Ten--an annual listing of notable cases and important trends in Pennsylvania civil litigation law over the past year as highlighted in Tort Talk blog posts:

10.  FEDERAL COURT JURISDICTION ISSUES

Trending over the past year were a number of notable Pennsylvania federal court decisions handed down reviewing the issue of jurisdiction over foreign or out of state Defendants.

A common thread in a number of the decisions was an agreement that, if a foreign business had registered to do business in Pennsylvania, that minimal contact in and of itself was sufficient to allow for jurisdiction over that defendant.  See Mendoza v. Electrolux Home Products, Inc., No. 4:17-CV-02028 (M.D.Pa. 2018 Brann, J.).

In a number of other decisions, the federal courts addressed whether jurisdiction could be had under a stream of commerce theory.  For example in Wylam v. Trader Joe's Co., No. 3:16-CV- 2112 (M.D.Pa. 2018 Mariani, J.), the court noted that neither a single sale directed at the forum state nor the fact that the Defendant's products were carried by national retailers was sufficient to establish jurisdiction.

9.  PROPERLY PLEADING BAD FAITH COMPLAINTS

In 2018, federal court bad faith Complaints were getting bounced left and right for being rife with conclusory allegations lacking sufficient factual support. 

Decisions in the Western District, Eastern District and the Middle District tasked plaintiffs with the need to offer facts to support claims of poor claims handling, delays in payment, and lack of investigations by carriers.  Lucky for the plaintiffs, in most cases leave to amend was granted.

A number of those cases can be accessed at this LINK.

8.  UM/UIM STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

Judge James M. Munley of the Federal Middle District Court of Pennsylvania denied the carrier’s Motion for Summary Judgment on a UIM statute of limitations defense in the case of Legos v. Travelers Cas. Ins. Co., No. 3:16-CV-1917 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 11, 2018 Munley, J.), by holding that the statute of limitations for a UIM is four (4) years from the date of a breach of the automobile insurance contract and not the date of the third party settlement.  The breach of contract was noted to be the carrier's denial of the request, or settlement demand, for payment of UIM benefits.

In so ruling, the court referenced the Pennsylvania Supreme Court case of Erie Ins. Exch. v. Bristol, 174 A.3d 578 (Pa. 2017), in which it was held that the statute of limitations in an uninsured (UM) motorist case does not begin to run until there is an alleged breach of the insurance contract, i.e., the denial of a claim or a refusal to arbitrate.

 The Legos decision can be viewed HERE.

Some argue that these cases serve to eradicate the statute of limitations in UM/UIM cases by basing the start of the statute of limitations upon the alleged breach of the auto insurance contract by the carrier.  When filing such Complaints, Plaintiffs typically allege that auto insurance carriers breach the contract by not paying the Plaintiff's request for UM or UIM benefits.  

As the argument goes, every time a carrier declines to pay a Plaintiff's settlement demand, another breach occurs which causes the running of the statute of limitations to start again (and again and again and again, every time a demand is rejected). Look for the defense bar to challenge this issue in the future.

7.  AIN'T NO LIABILITY IF IT'S STILL SNOWING

A number of decisions handed down over the past year confirmed that there is no liability under the Hills and Ridges Doctrine if a person slips and falls during the course of a snowstorm.

In the case of Collins v. Phila. Sub. Devel., No. 2018 Pa. Super. 17 (Pa. Super. Jan. 31, 2018 Panella, J., Olson, J., Stevens, P.J.E.)(Op. by Stevens, P.J.E.), the court affirmed the entry of summary judgment in favor of a premises liability Defendant under the Hills and Ridges Doctrine where the evidence before the trial court confirmed that the winter storm, described in the record as a blizzard, was still active at the time of the Plaintiff's alleged slip and fall on ice and/or snow.

The Collins decision is also notable for the court's ruling that the Defendant's alleged failure to pretreat a walking surface was not a basis upon which to impose liability under Pennsylvania law.

Another case from the past year along these lines was the case of Bless v. Pocono Mountain Recovery Center, LLC., No. 8167 - CV - 2016 (C.P. Monroe Co. May 17, 2018 Zulick, J.).  

In Bless, which is noted to be the most viewed case of 2018 on the Pennsylvania Law Weekly's Instant Case Service, Judge Arthur L. Zulick, of the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas granted the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment based upon the hills and ridges doctrine in a case where the record contained evidence that the Plaintiff's fall occurred right after a recent snowfall which caused slippery conditions. 

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

6.  EXPERT TESTIMONY IN MED MAL CASES

In the case of Gintoff v. Thomas, No. 2016-CV-2155 (C.P. Lacka. Co. May 4, 2018 Nealon, J.), Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas granted a Defendant hospital’s Motion for Summary Judgment in a medical malpractice case given the Plaintiff’s failure to support the claims against that Defendant with expert opinion testimony on those particular claims.  

This decision was the fourth most viewed case on the The Pennsylvania Law Weekly's Instant Case Service  in 2018.

In Gintoff, the court found that the Plaintiff's medical expert report, which only addressed the care provided by the defendant doctor, lacked sufficient expert opinion to establish a prima facie case for vicarious liability or corporate negligence on the part of the defendant hospital.

As such summary granted was entered in favor of the hospital.  Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision by Judge Nealon may click this LINK.

5.  SOCIAL MEDIA DECISIONS

Notable social media discovery and evidentiary decisions continued to trend over the past year.

Earlier this year, in the case of Commonwealth v. Mangel, 181 A.3d 1154 (Pa. Super. 2018), the Pennsylvania Superior Court ruled that social media posts are inadmissible in criminal cases unless prosecutors can present evidence of who actually authored the commentary, that is, unless the evidence is authenticated under Pa.R.E. 901.

Both the trial court and the appellate court in Mangel found that merely presenting evidence that the posts and messages came from a social media account bearing the defendant’s name was not enough to allow the evidence in. The court noted that Facebook posts and messages must instead be authenticated under Pa.R.E. 901 in a manner similar to how text messages and email messages are authenticated.

The Superior Court in Mangel relied on its own 2011 decision in Commonwealth v. Koch, 39 A.3d 996, 1005 (Pa. Super. 2011), affirmed by an equally divided court, 106 A.3d 705 (Pa. 2014), which dealt with the admissibility and authentication of cell phone text messages.

It can be expected that a similar ruling will also be handed down in the context of a civil litigation matter should that issue come before the trial or appellate courts.

In terms of social media discovery decisions, in Kelter v. Flanagan, PICS Case No. 18-0266, No. 286-Civil-2017 (C.P. Monroe Co. Feb. 19, 2018 Williamson, J.), Judge David J. Williamson granted a defendant’s motion to compel a plaintiff to provide the defense counsel with the plaintiff’s Instagram account log-in information.

The court ruled in this fashion given that the defense had made a predicate showing that the

public pages on the plaintiff’s profile showed that more information may be found on the private pages of the same profile.

A contrary result was handed down in the Northampton County Court of Common Pleas ruling in Allen v. Sands Bethworks Gaming, No. C-0048-CV-2017-2279 (C.P. North. Co. Aug. 6, 2018 Dally, J.).

This case arose out of the plaintiff’s alleged slip-and-fall in a bathroom at the Sands Casino in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania.

After reviewing the record before the court, the court in Allen ruled that the defense had failed to establish the factual predicate of showing sufficient information on the plaintiff’s public pages to allow for discovery of information on the plaintiff’s private pages.

In a footnote, the court also emphasized that such a factual predicate must be established with respect to each separate social media site the defendant wishes to access further.

For a comprehensive compilation of social media discovery decisions, one can freely access the FACEBOOK DISCOVERY SCORECARD on the Tort Talk blog. Many of the decisions handed down to date can be viewed and even downloaded from that page.

4.  CELL PHONE USE - PUNITIVE DAMAGES

With the continuing absence of any appellate authority on the issue to date, the trial courts of Pennsylvania have developed a common law on the issue of whether punitive damages are a viable part of an auto accident claim involving cell phone use by a defendant driver.

In the Cumberland County case of Manning v. Barber, No. 17-7915 Civil (C.P. Cumb. Co. 2018), preliminary objections were granted and a plaintiff’s punitive damages claim was dismissed in a case in which the plaintiff alleged that the defendant driver was texting while driving.

According to the opinion, the plaintiff’s vehicle was stopped at a red light with another vehicle stopped behind it. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant failed to stop for the traffic light and rear-ended the second vehicle, causing it to strike to the rear of the plaintiff’s vehicle. The plaintiff additionally alleged that, at the time of the accident, the defendant was not looking at the roadway because she was distracted while looking at and texting on her cell phone.

After reviewing the general law pertaining to punitive damages, the court confirmed that there remains “a lack of Pennsylvania appellate case law in the context of distracted driving cases where the tortfeasor is distracted by the use of a cellular phone at the time of the accident.”

The Manning court concluded that the mere use of a cell phone absent additional indicia of recklessness was not enough to sustain a claim for punitive damages.  This decision can be viewed at this LINK.

3.  NON-PRECEDENTIAL OPINIONS

Over the past year, the Pennsylvania Superior Court has continued to hand down important decisions that are marked as "Non-Precedential" by that Court, rendering the decisions to be of minimal or no persuasive value going forward.

One rationale voiced at CLE seminars for marking the decisions as "Non-precedential" is that the Superior Court writes hundreds and hundreds of opinions every year.  Huh?

With all the room in the  online world for continuing publications of everything in this Digital Age, including numerous court decisions, the hope is that the Pennsylvania Superior Court begins to publish all of its decisions so as to render them precedential and, therefore, useful.

The Superior Court internal rules or customs pertaining to marking Opinions as "Non-precedential" are as necessary as its old, repealed rules that use to make litigators waste time needlessly looking up and citing to both the "A.2d" citation and the "Pa.Super." citation to cases back in the day.  Here's to hoping that a change is coming in 2019.  

3. (Tie)  THE DAWN OF UBER LITIGATION

In what may be the first reported Pennsylvania decision in an Uber personal injury litigation matter, the court in Fusco v. Uber Technologies, PICS No. 18-0944  (E.D. Pa. July 27, 2018 Goldberg, J.)(Mem. Op.), conditionally granted Uber’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s negligent hiring, retention and supervision claims in a case of an Uber driver who allegedly attacked the plaintiff-customer.

In this matter, when the Uber driver arrived to pick up the plaintiff, the driver refused to take the plaintiff to his requested destination as it was too far. The plaintiff, apparently knowing the rules that Uber imposes on its drivers to honor the customer's request to be taken to a certain destination, remained seated in the car and repeated his request to be brought home. At that point, the driver dragged the plaintiff out of the car, kicked and beat him, leaving the plaintiff unconscious and bleeding.

The plaintiff later filed this suit against Uber asserting a negligent hiring claim, fraud and misrepresentation claims and vicarious liability claims.

According to the opinion, the court had originally granted Uber’s motion to dismiss on the negligent hiring and related claims given that there was no record of any alleged instances of past misconduct by the offending driver.

The court noted, however, that, after the plaintiff filed his complaint, news outlets in the area reported that the driver involved in the incident had a prior criminal conviction. In light of this development, the court granted the plaintiff leave to amend his complaint as to these claims. 

Accordingly, the claim against Uber was allowed to proceed.

Anyone wishing to review this memorandum decision may click this LINK.  The companion Order can be viewed HERE.

And so, with the dawn of the age of Uber and Lyft litigation arising, it may be wise to read up on any case law you see in this regard.  Please email me a copy of any decisions you see to be posted here on Tort Talk so that all can benefit from this knowledge.

For an article by myself and Steve Kopko, Esquire on the law pertaining to required insurance in Uber and Lyft cases, click HERE.

2.  12 YEARS OF PRECEDENT OVERTURNED

Twelve (12) years of precedent was overturned by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in the case of Cagey v. PennDOT, 179 A.3d 458 (Pa. Feb. 21, 2018) (Maj. Op. by Donohue, J.)(Saylor, C.J., Concurring) (Wecht, J., Concurring), thereby exposing PennDOT to more litigation relative to accidents involving guiderails along Pennsylvania state roadways.

In Cagey, the court expressly overruled the long-followed 12-year-old Commonwealth Court decision in Fagan v. PennDOT, 946 A.2d 1123 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006), along with its progeny, which had previously held that PennDOT is immune from liability in guiderail cases.  With the Cagey decision from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court handed down earlier this year, PennDOT is now only immune when it fails to install a guide rail.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court otherwise held in the Cagey case that when PennDOT has previously installed a guide rail, sovereign immunity is waived if the agency’s negligent installation and design created a dangerous condition that causes or contributes to an accident.

 Although there are two concurring opinions in the Cagey decision, it appears that all of the justices agreed on the ultimate holding of the case.

With this reversal of many years of legal authority that protected PennDOT from liability pertaining to guide rail claims, it is expected that there will be a dramatic increase in litigation for the government in defending accidents that involve alleged issues with a guiderail.

Anyone wishing to review the Majority Opinion written by Justice Christine Donohue may click this LINK.

The Concurring Opinion written by Chief Justice Thomas G. Saylor can be viewed HERE.

The Concurring Opinion written by Justice David Wecht can be viewd HERE.

1.  30 YEARS OF PRECEDENT OVERTURNED

In a monumental reversal in the case of Balentine v. Chester Water Authority, 191 A.3d 799 (Pa. Aug. 21, 2018 Mundy, J.) (Justices Todd, Dougherty, and Wecht joined in the majority Opinion) (Baer, J., concurring) (Saylor, dissenting, J.), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court overturned 30 years of precedent by holding that the involuntary movement of a vehicle can constitute the operation of a motor vehicle for purposes of the vehicle liability exception to governmental immunity under 42 Pa. C.S.A. Section 8542(b)(1).

The plaintiff’s decedent in Balentine was a contractor working at a site just off the side of a roadway.  The Plaintiff was fatally injured when one car struck a parked car that was running and propelled that parked car into the pedestrian plaintiff. 

The parked car was government inspector's car which gave rise to claims being pursued against governmental agencies that are generally protected with immunity under the Tort Claims Act.  One exception to the immunity provisions is the motor vehicle exception, for accidents involving government motor vehicles in operation.

In this case, the appellate ladder, the majority of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reviewed the law behind the Tort Claims Act and decided to overturn 30 years of precedent by holding that movement of a vehicle, whether voluntary or involuntary, is not required by the statutory language of the vehicle liability exception in order for that exception to apply.

The Majority Opinion of the Court in Balentine can be viewed HERE.

Justice Baer's Concurring Opinion can be viewed HERE.

Chief Justice Saylor's Dissenting Opinion can be viewed HERE.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Balentine was recently followed by Judge Julia K. Munley in the Lackawanna County case of Sands v. Hamilton, No. 2013-CV-55 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Nov. 5, 2018 Munley, J.).

In Sands, the court addressed a defendant municipal bus company’s Motions In Limine seeking to preclude evidence and testimony related to negligent supervision, negligent training, and negligent retention of the bus driver.  The defense was asserting that such evidence was irrelevant given that such evidence did not relate to the central issue of whether the “operation” of the motor vehicle at issue fell under an exception to the governmental immunity provided under42 Pa. C.S.A. §8542(b)(1). 

Based in part upon the Balentine decision, the court denied the motion in limine and allowed the evidence in at trial. 

Anyone wishing to review this decision online may click this LINK.

HONORABLE MENTIONS:

POST-KOKEN LITIGATION

Splits of authority continue to abound on many issues in Post-Koken Litigation in the continuing absence of much needed appellate guidance.  Hopefully, the Superior Court will get a chance to decide some of these issues this year and issue published decisions to provide valuable precedent for the courts below.

TINCHER REVISITED

The Pennsylvania Superior Court had another chance to view the issues in Tincher as that case continued its ride up and down the appellate ladder.  In this latest decision, the court again confirm that the Azzarello decision is no longer good products liability law.  Yet, the plaintiff's and the defense bar continue to battle over proper language for jury instructions.

Anyone wishing to review the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s decision in Tincher may click this LINK.

JUDGES SHOULD BE ON THE BENCH FOR VOIR DIRE

In the case of Trigg v. Children’s Hospital of Pittsburgh, No. 2018 Pa. Super. 129 (Pa. Super. May 14, 2018 Kunselmen, Olson, J.J.; Bowes, J., concurring) (Op. by Kunselmen, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court noted that, if trial court judges want the benefit of a favorable standard of review on appeal, they better be on the bench during voir dire in order that they may assess a juror's demeanor in person when deciding whether or not to strike a juror for cause.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  Judge Bowes's Concurring Opinion can be viewed HERE.  

A STEP FORWARD FOR CLE/CJE CREDITS FOR MOCK TRIAL PARTICIPATION

Both the Board of Governors and the House of Delegates of the Pennsylvania Bar Association have adopted a Report and Recommendation with regards to submitting a request to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to issue a new rule allowing attorneys to earn up to 2 CLE credits a year, and judges up to 2 CJE credits a year, for their participation in the annual Mock Trial Competition. 

With this adoption of the Report and Recommendation, it is now the official position of the Pennsylvania Bar Association to submit a request - on behalf of all Pennsylvania lawyers - that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court change the Rules of Continuing Education to allow for two CLE and two CJE credits for mock trial participation.   That request has been submitted.

Here's to hoping the Supreme Court grants the request and thereby provides great assistance to a great program that helps high school and college students all across the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania by increasing the number of attorneys and judges who will be more willing to volunteer their time.


ALSO TRENDING IN 2018 - SHAMELESS PLUGS

In 2018, Cummins Mediation Services was launched and began to provide mediation services to assist in bringing all types of personal injury civil litigation matters to a close with much success.  

Should you wish to mediate a case in the year ahead, please do not hesitate to contact me at dancummins@comcast.net or 570-346-0745 to request a CV or a proposed fee schedule.

ARTICLE: The Uncommon Law of 2018: Reversals of Precedent and Splits of Authority Dominate

This article of mine was recently published in the December 18, 2018 edition of the Pennsylvania Law Weekly and is republished here with permission.

The Uncommon Law of 2018: Reversals of Precedent and Splits of Authority Dominate

By Daniel E. Cummins
December 18, 2018

These are invigorating times for those engaged in the study and practice of law in Pennsylvania.

Over the past year there have been dramatic reversals of long-standing law by a newly activist Pennsylvania Supreme Court. There have been clarifications of recurring civil litigation issues by both the Superior Court and Commonwealth Court. There has also been a continuing development of a new common law by the Pennsylvania state and federal trial courts grappling with novel questions in the absence of appellate guidance in post-Koken matters and with respect to social media discovery and evidentiary disputes. Keeping apprised of these dramatic changes and developments is more important than ever.

Dramatic Pennsylvania Supreme Court Decisions

Over the past year the Pennsylvania Supreme Court made its presence known with its new brand of judicial activism evidenced in several civil litigation decisions that have created new avenues for plaintiffs to seek additional compensation and which will likely trigger more litigation in the future.

In Cagey v. PennDOT, 179 A.3d 458 (Pa. Feb. 21, 2018), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court expressly overruled the long-followed 12-year-old Commonwealth Court decision in Fagan v. Commonwealth, DOT, 946 A.2d 1123 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2006), and held that PennDOT is now only immune from suit in guiderail claims in limited circumstances. Under the prior Fagandecision there was essentially no liability on any claims against PennDOT relative to guiderails in motor vehicle accident matters.

Now, under the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in the Cagey case, when PennDOT has installed a guiderail, sovereign immunity is waived if it is established by the plaintiff that the agency’s negligent installation and design created a dangerous condition that caused or contributed to the happening of a motor vehicle accident.  A dramatic increase of lawsuits against PennDOT on this theory of recovery is anticipated.

In another stunning reversal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court overturned 30 years of precedent with its holding that the involuntary movement of a vehicle can constitute an “operation” of a motor vehicle for purposes of the vehicle liability exception to governmental immunity under 42 Pa. C.S.A. Section 8542(b)(1).

In the case of Balentine v. Chester Water Authority, No. 119 MAP 2016 (Pa. Aug. 21, 2018 Mundy, J.), the plaintiff’s decedent was working as a contractor hired to rehabilitate a section of a water distribution system. At the time of the accident, the decedent was working just off to the side of a roadway. A government inspector pulled up to the scene and parked his car and left it running. The decedent-contractor was unfortunately killed when a third car struck the parked government inspector’s car and propelled that stationary vehicle into the decedent.

The majority of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reviewed the law behind the Tort Claims Act and held that movement of a vehicle, whether voluntary or involuntary, is not required by the statutory language of the vehicle liability exception in order for that exception to apply. As stated, in  so ruling, the court eradicated 30 years of precedent on the issue in one fell swoop. This decision is also expected to give rise to an increase in lawsuits on this theory of recovery.

No More Voir Dire Without a Judge Present

The Pennsylvania Superior Court also handed down a number of notable decisions over the past year. The case of Trigg v. Children’s Hospital of Pittsburgh, 187 A.3d 1013 (Pa. Super. May 14, 2018), has already changed how jury selection will work in the trial courts across the Commonwealth. In Trigg, the Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed a trial court’s denial of post-trial motions in a medical malpractice case regarding, in part, jury selection issues.

According to the opinion, in certain trials in Allegheny County, only a court clerk presides over voir dire. Any issues raised during jury selection would require the litigants and the clerk to go to another office to meet with the judge for a decision on whether to strike a juror. As such, the trial court judge would not have any first-hand perception of a juror’s demeanor in response to questions posed by the attorneys during jury selection.

The Superior Court in Trigg ruled that, given the fact that that first-hand perception of a juror’s demeanor is the basis for a palpable error deference standard of review on appeal for voir dire issues, decisions on jury strikes made by judges who do not attend jury selection should not be afforded that type of deference by the Superior Court.

The appellate court ruled in this fashion after noting that the alleged demeanor of a prospective juror cannot be reconstructed after the fact by attorneys attempting to relay the same to the formerly absent trial judge.  The Superior Court ruled that “a judge personally witnessing the original voir dire is essential, because it justifies our—and the losing party’s—faith in the trial court’s rulings on challenges for cause.”

The Superior Court’s decision in Trigg is in line with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s jury selection decision last year in the case of Shinal v. Toms, 162 A.3d 429 (Pa. 2017). In Shinal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that whether a juror is to be stricken during voir dire is dependent upon the trial judge’s assessment of the juror’s demeanor and the juror’s answers to the questions posed regarding whether the juror is capable of putting aside any biases so as to serve in a fair and impartial manner.

Going forward, it is anticipated that this line of decisions will keep trial court judges on the bench during voir dire so as to avoid any jury selection objections being upheld on appeal.

Social Media Decisions

Notable social media discovery and evidentiary decisions were handed down over the past year.

In Kelter v. Flanagan, PICS Case No. 18-0266, No. 286-Civil-2017 (C.P. Monroe Co. Feb. 19, 2018 Williamson, J.), Judge David J. Williamson granted a defendant’s motion to compel a plaintiff to provide the defense counsel with the plaintiff’s Instagram account log-in information.

The court ruled in this fashion given that the defense had made a predicate showing that the public pages on the plaintiff’s profile showed that more information may be found on the private pages of the same profile.

In addition to granting the defense limited access to the private pages of the site for discovery purposes, the also court ordered that the defense not share that information with anyone not related to the case. The court’s order also directed that the Plaintiff not remove or delete any content from that account in the meantime.

A contrary result was handed down in the Northampton County Court of Common Pleas ruling in Allen v. Sands Bethworks Gaming, No. C-0048-CV-2017-2279 (C.P. North. Co. Aug. 6, 2018 Dally, J.).

This case arose out of the plaintiff’s alleged slip-and-fall in a bathroom at the Sands Casino in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania.

During the course of discovery, the plaintiff provided limited information in response to social media interrogatories seeking information regarding her online activity. The plaintiff confirmed in her responses that she used Facebook and Twitter but declined to provide any more detailed information other than to confirm that nothing had been deleted from her accounts since the date of the incident.

The defense responded with a motion to compel for more information, including information from the private portions of the plaintiff’s social media profiles.

In his detailed opinion, Northampton County Judge Craig A. Dally provided an excellent overview of the general rules of discovery pertinent to this issue as well as a review of the previous social media discovery decisions that have been handed down not only by various county courts of common pleas but also courts from other jurisdictions. No Pennsylvania appellate court decision was referenced by the Allen court as there is apparently still no appellate guidance to date.

In his opinion, Dally noted that the defendant had pointed out discrepancies between the plaintiff’s deposition testimony regarding her alleged limitations from her alleged accident-related injuries and photos available for review on the public pages of the plaintiff’s Facebook profile depicting the plaintiff engaging in certain activities.

Nevertheless, after reviewing the record before the court, Dally still ruled that the defense had failed to establish the factual predicate of showing sufficient information on the plaintiff’s public pages to allow for discovery of information on the plaintiff’s private pages.

In a footnote, the court also emphasized that such a factual predicate must be established with respect to each separate social media site the defendant wishes to access further.

Dally additionally noted that, in any event, he “would be disinclined to follow the line of Common Pleas cases that have granted parties carte blanche access to another party’s social medial account by requiring the responding party to  to turn over their username and password, as requested by the defendant in this case.” The court found that such access would be overly intrusive, would cause unreasonable embarrassment and burden, and represented a discovery request that was not properly tailored with reasonable particularly as required by the Rules of Civil Procedure pertaining to discovery efforts. In light of the above reasoning, the defendant’s motion to compel was denied.

The above cases show that a decision on the discoverability of social media information can be dependent upon the personal assessment of the evidence by a particular trial court judge.

It is anticipated that when faced with the issue, the appellate courts will apply a similar method of allowing for social media discovery, i.e., requiring a predicate showing of information on the public pages of a profile that lend support to an assertion that discovery of the private pages should be allowed as well. But perhaps the appellate courts will apply more concrete parameters of the analysis so that the litigants can predict with greater confidence how a trial court judge may be required to rule upon the issue.

For a comprehensive compilation of social media discovery decisions, one can freely access the Facebook Discovery Scorecard on the Tort Talk blog. Many of the decisions handed down to date can be viewed and downloaded from that page.

Although there has been no appellate guidance in Pennsylvania on the issue of the discoverability of social media information, the appellate courts have weighed in on the issue of the admissibility of social media evidence at trial, albeit in the criminal court context.

Earlier this year, in the case of Commonwealth v. Mangel, 181 A.3d 1154 (Pa. Super. 2018), the Pennsylvania Superior Court ruled that social media posts are inadmissible in criminal cases unless prosecutors can present evidence of who actually authored the commentary, that is, unless the evidence is authenticated under Pa.R.E. 901.

The court ruled in this fashion after noting that social media accounts can be easily hacked or faked. In so ruling, the court affirmed an Erie County trial court decision denying a prosecutor’s motion in limine seeking to introduce into evidence Facebook posts and messages allegedly authored by the defendant.

Both the trial court and the appellate court found that merely presenting evidence that the posts and messages came from a social media account bearing the defendant’s name was not enough to allow the evidence in. The court noted that Facebook posts and messages must instead be authenticated under Pa.R.E. 901 in a manner similar to how text messages and email messages are authenticated. The Superior Court in Mangel relied on its own 2011 decision in Commonwealth v. Koch, 39 A.3d 996, 1005 (Pa. Super. 2011), affirmed by an equally divided court, 106 A.3d 705 (Pa. 2014), which dealt with the admissibility and authentication of cellphone text messages.

In the 2018 Commonwealth v. Mangel case, the court noted that the Koch court had previously held that “authentication of electronic communications, like documents, requires more than mere confirmation that the number or address belonged to a particular person. Circumstantial evidence, which tends to corroborate the identity of the sender, is required.” The Mangel court ruled, in a case of first impression, that the same analysis should apply to social media posts in the criminal court context.

It can be expected that a similar ruling will also be handed down in the context of a civil litigation matter should that issue come before the trial or appellate courts.

The Future Shows Up as Your Ride

Sometimes the future, like an Uber ride, arrives sooner than you expect. One of the first Pennsylvania court decisions in a personal injury matter involving an Uber ride was handed down this year.

In the case of Fusco v. Uber Technologies, PICS No. 18-0944  (E.D. Pa. July 27, 2018 Goldberg, J.)(Mem. Op.), the court conditionally granted Uber’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s negligent hiring, retention and supervision claims in a case of an Uber driver who allegedly attacked the plaintiff-customer.

By way of background, the plaintiff had attended a party Philadelphia and then contacted Uber for a ride to his home in New Jersey.

According to the opinion, the Uber app conceals the customer’s destination until the start of a booked trip. Accordingly, when a driver arrives to pick up the plaintiff, he does not know the plaintiff’s destination. The app is apparently set up in this way so as to the prevent drivers from declining routes they deem to be less profitable or less desirable. According to the opinion, Uber does not allow drivers to refuse a trip after learning of a customer’s destination.

In this matter, when the Uber driver arrived, he refused to take the plaintiff to his home in southern New Jersey. The plaintiff, apparently knowing the rules that Uber imposes on its drivers, remained seated in the car and repeated his request to be brought home. At that point, the driver dragged the plaintiff out of the car, kicked and beat him, leaving the plaintiff unconscious and bleeding.

The plaintiff later filed this suit against Uber asserting a negligent hiring claim, fraud and misrepresentation claims and vicarious liability claims.

According to the opinion, the court had originally granted Uber’s motion to dismiss on the negligent hiring and related claims given that there was no record of any alleged instances of past misconduct by the offending driver.

The court noted, however, that, after the plaintiff filed his complaint, news outlets in the area reported that the driver involved in the incident had a prior criminal conviction. In light of this development, the court granted the plaintiff leave to amend his complaint as to these claims.  Accordingly, the claim against Uber was allowed to proceed.

Can You Hear Me Now?

In 2018, the law continued to trend with respect to the issue of the availability of punitive damages in claims involving drivers involved in accidents while using their cellphones.

Under Pennsylvania’s Anti-Texting Law, 75 Pa.C.S.A. Section 3316, it is provided that no driver shall use a handheld device to send, read or write a text while the vehicle is in motion. Noncommercial drivers are otherwise still currently allowed to use their cellphones to make and receive calls while driving.

As for commercial drivers, Pennsylvania’s Distracted Driving Law, 75 Pa.C.S.A. Section 1622, makes it illegal for commercial drivers to use handheld devices in any fashion, except in emergency situations. That law also provides that it is illegal for an employer to permit or require a commercial driver to use a handheld device while driving, except in emergency situations.

With the continuing absence of any appellate authority on the issue to date, the trial courts of Pennsylvania have developed a common law on the issue of whether punitive damages are a viable part of an auto accident claim involving cell phone use by a defendant driver.

In the Cumberland County case of Manning v. Barber, No. 17-7915 Civil (C.P. Cumb. Co. 2018), preliminary objections were granted and a plaintiff’s punitive damages claim was dismissed in a case in which the plaintiff alleged that the defendant driver was texting while driving.

According to the opinion, the plaintiff’s vehicle was stopped at a red light with another vehicle stopped behind it. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant failed to stop for the traffic light and rear-ended the second vehicle, causing it to strike to the rear of the plaintiff’s vehicle. The plaintiff additionally alleged that, at the time of the accident, the defendant was not looking at the roadway because she was distracted while looking at and texting on her cellphone.

After reviewing the general law pertaining to punitive damages, the court confirmed that there remains “a lack of Pennsylvania appellate case law in the context of distracted driving cases where the tortfeasor is distracted by the use of a cellular phone at the time of the accident.”

The court did note that there were a number of trial court decisions from across Pennsylvania regarding claims for punitive damages in cellphone cases. Based upon these trial court decisions, the Manning court concluded that the mere use of a cellphone absent additional indicia of recklessness was not enough to sustain a claim for punitive damages.

In reviewing the plaintiff’s complaint, the note noted that the plaintiff simply pleaded boilerplate allegations that the defendant was inattentive and going too fast. The court in Manning found that these allegations only amounted to a classic claim of negligence, and not recklessness.

The court in Manning additionally rejected the plaintiff’s presentation of a policy-based argument that texting while driving should constitute per se recklessness. The court stated that, while this argument maybe considered by a future appellate court, in the absence of any such appellate guidance to date, the Manning court declined to accept the plaintiff’s argument in this regard.

The Manning decision is consistent with other prior trial court cellphone decisions requiring additional aggravating facts over and above mere cellphone use in order for a court to allow for a punitive damages claim to proceed. Such aggravating factors in other decisions in which punitive damages were allowed to proceed have included the fact that the defendant is driving a large commercial vehicle, excessive speed on the part of any driver, heavy traffic in the area, looking down or intoxication.

It remains to be seen whether 2019 will bring us an appellate decision on the issue of cellphone use and punitive damages claims in the auto law context.

Still in Need of Appellate Guidance for Post-’Koken’ Cases

There were no appellate decisions handed down in 2018 in the separate auto law context of post-Koken matters.

The only published appellate decision to date remains the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s decision from five years ago in Stepanovich v. McGraw and State Farm, 78 A.3d 1147 (Pa. Super. 2013) appeal denied 89 A.3d 1286 (Pa. 2014). In that case, the Superior Court approached the question of whether an insurance company defendant should be identified as a party to a jury in a post-Koken trial but, unfortunately, did not provide a definitive holding on that issue.  Incredibly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declined to hear that appeal thereby missing a rare opportunity to dole out much needed guidance on novel issues of law.

Ever since, the trial courts of Pennsylvania continue to struggle with post-Koken issues. According to the post-Koken Scorecard on the Tort Talk blog, which has been compiling post-Koken decisions over the past decade, there are splits of authority among, and sometimes within, the county courts across the commonwealth on many different important questions of law pertaining to pleadings, discovery, evidentiary and trial issues.

For example, in terms of whether post-Koken claims not containing a bad faith claim should be consolidated or severed in terms of the third-party allegations against the defendant driver and the breach of contract claim for UIM benefits, at least 24 county courts favor the pretrial consolidation of such cases, while at least 23 favor the severance of these types of cases.

In terms of those post-Koken cases in which a bad faith claim is also alleged, there are at least 10 county courts that deny motions to sever and stay the bad faith claims, while at least 19 other county courts have ruled in favor of granting motions to sever and stay discovery on the bad faith claims.

The majority trend in the Pennsylvania federal courts, regardless of whether a bad faith claim has been pleaded, has been in favor of the consolidation of post-Koken claims through the life of the litigation.

Looking Ahead to 2019

It is expected that the above trending areas of law will continue to grab the headlines in 2019.

Perhaps one of the most important decisions to watch for in 2019 will be the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s ruling in Roverano v. Crane, No. 58 EAL 2018 (Pa. July 31, 2018). In Roverano, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is expected to address the issue of first impression involving the question of whether the Pennsylvania Superior Court misinterpreted the Fair Share Act in terms of apportioning liability among defendants in the context of this products liability case. That decision could have an impact across all types of civil litigation matters involving multiple defendants.

At the Superior Court level, the hope is that that court will publish any decisions in these trending areas of law as opposed to releasing them as nonprecedential decisions. In this day and age of digital information there should not be any concern with respect to filling too many casebooks—those books are (unfortunately) falling by the wayside. As appellate guidance is desired by both civil litigators and the bench on these emerging areas of concern, such decisions should all be published as a matter of course.

The hope also remains that if the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has an opportunity to review any of the above issues on appeal that it will grant certiorari and also provide the much-needed appellate guidance in these important areas of the law.

Daniel E. Cummins is a partner with the Scranton law firm of Foley, Comerford & Cummins. He focuses his practice on the defense of auto accident, premises liability and products liability matters.  His Tort Talk Blog can be viewed at www.TortTalk.com.