Trial Court Gives Lessons on Medical Malpractice Complaint Drafting

In the case of Dawes v. The Williamsport Home, No. 2025-CV-00381 (C.P. Lyc. Co. June 6, 2025 Carlucci, J.), the court granted in part and denied in part Preliminary Objections filed against a Plaintiff’s claim in a medical malpractice case arising out of alleged negligent care regarding the Plaintiff’s thoracic surgical wound.

According to the Opinion, the court denied the Defendant’s demurrer to the Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages but still directed the Plaintiff to file an Amended Complaint which either deletes any claim for punitive damages or sets forth sufficient material allegations in support of the same.

Relative to any claims against any agents or employees of the medical Defendants the court directed that the Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint should limit allegations regarding the acts or omissions by a Defendant or its agent or employees to that conduct that the Plaintiff contends was a substantial factor in causing the Plaintiff’s injuries. In this regard, the court directed the Plaintiff to not include any extraneous allegations not pertinent to the causation issues. 

The court also required the Plaintiff to provide additional factual support and allegations on the claims for corporate liability.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert,” www.Law.com (Aug. 7, 2025).

Court Finds Nursing Home Arbitration Agreement to be Unconscionable and, Therefore, Unenforceable

In the case of Harrington v. Kramer, No. 2024-CV-774 (C.P. Luz. Co. Jan. 14, 2025 Gelb, J.), Judge Lesa Gelb of the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas found that the terms of a nursing home Arbitration Agreement was unconscionable and, therefore, unenforceable.

The court also denied Preliminary Objections filed by the Defendants against the punitive damages claims. The court noted that these punitive damages issues could be revisited during the Motion for Summary Judgment stage.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff filed claims for vicarious and direct corporate liability against nursing home Defendants in which the Plaintiff’s decedent resided. The Plaintiffs alleged that the decedent sustained injuries while staying at the Defendant’s premises from which the decedent eventually passed away.

A central issue in the case relative to the arguments addressed in this decision were whether the Plaintiff decedent had sufficient cognitive function and understanding to properly agree to the admission paperwork, which included an Arbitration Agreement. 

There was evidence that the decedent was on medications on her arrival to the nursing home and also that she was forgetful and had a short attention span. The court noted that the nursing home’s admission paperwork at that time was over seventy-five (75) pages in length and the Arbitration Agreement was the second to last document in the packet.

It was additionally alleged that the nursing home did not have any written policies about what the Director of Admissions should do in order to prepare for initial meetings with incoming residents, in part, in terms of determining if a person is competent to sign an arbitration agreement.

Judge Lesa Gelb
Luzerne County

Judge Gelb provided a thorough review of Pennsylvania law regarding the validity and enforceability of arbitration agreements in this context. The court noted that, although Pennsylvania and federal law impose a strong public policy in favor of enforcing arbitration agreements, the enforcement of such an agreement to arbitrate can be denied by a court where the party opposing arbitration proves a contract defense that invalidates the agreement to arbitrate. One such defense to an allegation that a valid arbitration agreement has been entered into is the defense of unconscionability.

The court noted that, to invalidate enforcement of a contract based upon unconscionability, the party challenging the contract must show both an absence of a meaningful choice, referred to as procedural unconscionability and contract terms that are unreasonably favorable to the other party, which is known as substantiative unconscionability. The court noted that these tests are assessed under a sliding-scale approach, with a lesser degree of substantiative unconscionability required where the procedural unconscionability is very high.

Applying the law to the facts of this case, the court found that the Arbitration Agreement at issue was unconscionable and, therefore, unenforceable. The court found that the Arbitration Agreement at issue was equally and procedurally substantively unconscionable.

The court noted that it found that the Plaintiff decedent did not have the legal capacity to sign the Arbitration Agreement based upon the medications that she was prescribed, the notes from the nursing staff as to the decedent’s cognition, and the other circumstances surrounding the agreement. The court also found the agreement itself to be substantively unconscionable because it imposed additional costs on the decedent and her representatives that they would not have in a court of law. The court also found that the Arbitration Agreement favored the nursing home in that it permitted the nursing home to pursue the decedent and/or her representatives for non-payment outside of arbitration.

Due to the above issues, the court held that the Arbitration Agreement was not binding.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Thomas F. Foley, III of the Foley Law Firm in Scranton for bringing this case to my attention.

Medical Malpractice Plaintiff Must Show Systemic Negligence to Support a Corporate Negligence Claim in a Med Mal Case

In the non-precedential decision in the case of Wandell v. Robert Packer Hospital, No. 1532 MDA 2023 (Pa. Super. Aug. 7, 2024 Stevens, P.J.E., Olson, J., and Kunselman, J.)(Mem. Op. by Stevens, P.J.E.), the court affirmed the entry of summary judgment in favor of a Defendant hospital in a medical malpractice case.

The Superior Court noted that hospital corporate negligence is limited to instances in which a Plaintiff demonstrates systemic negligence.

The court additionally noted that, except in obvious cases that are within a layperson’s general understanding, a Plaintiff must present expert testimony establishing the generally accepted standard of care in a medical malpractice case along with the healthcare provider’s breach of duty.

More specifically with respect to this case, the court agreed with the trial court that the fact that a nurse left a room during the course of treatment did not automatically establish a hospital’s negligence. The court noted that medical issues regarding the standard of care and whether the nursing staff deviated from the standard of care required expert reports. 

In this case, the court noted that the Plaintiff had failed to offer any expert testimony relative to the applicable standard of care. As such, the entry of summary judgment by the trial court was affirmed.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Reed Smith law firm in Philadelphia for bringing this case to my attention.

Judge Mariani of Federal Middle District Court Addresses Trucking Accident Liability Issues

In the case of Galovich v. Morrissette, No. 3:21-CV-1523 (M.D. Pa. June 12, 2024 Mariani, J.), the court granted a partial summary judgment in a motor vehicle accident case that involved an accident between two tractor trailers on a highway.

The court noted that the Defendant’s filed Statement of Undisputed Facts presented in this case was deemed admitted due to the Plaintiff’s failure to file a response to the same as required by the local rules of court despite being put on notice of the need to file such a response.

The court otherwise ruled that there was no evidence to support the Plaintiffs’ punitive damages claim. The court noted that punitive damages are an “extreme remedy” that is only available in the most exceptional cases.

Here, the court found that there was no evidence to suggest that the Defendant driver had any subjective appreciation that anything he did was dangerous.

The court noted that a claimed violation of a traffic statute is not relevant to a driver’s subjective state of mind in assessing a claim for punitive damages.

The court additionally noted that the lack of any evidence to support punitive damages claims also barred any attempt by the Plaintiff to impose punitive damages vicariously on the driver’s employer.

The court additionally stated that an employer could not be held directly liable for punitive damages in any event.

The court also noted that a plaintiff cannot pursue a claim against an employer for negligent entrustment, hiring, supervision, or training when the employer admits that its employee was acting within the scope of employment when the accident occurred.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Brian Stalter on www.pexels.com.

Demurrer Asserted by Officers/Agents of Corporate Defendants Denied in Premises Liability Action

In the case of Bell v. S.W. Krauss, LLC, No. 2023-CV-1578 (C.P. Lacka. Co. May 1, 2024 Gibbons, J.), the court issued an Opinion in which, in part, overruled Preliminary Objections against individual Defendants who affiliated with a corporate Defendant in a personal injury matter.

According to the Opinion, the case arose out of an incident during which a Plaintiff was at a nightclub establishment in the early morning hours as a result of which she was allegedly hit by a stray bullet while she was allegedly located in the parking lot allegedly due to a dispute in the parking lot on the premises.

The Plaintiff sued various corporate entities as well as certain individuals who allegedly had relationships with those corporate entities.

The individual Defendants filed Preliminary Objections seeking to be dismissed by virtue of a demurrer.

Certain of the individual Defendants asserted that they were entitled to be dismissed because the Plaintiff’s Complaint failed to assert that those Defendants had acted with “misfeasance,” which is a requirement for negligence actions against corporate officers and agents.

Judge James A. Gibbons
Lackawanna County

Judge Gibbons reviewed the law in this regard and noted that, in general, an officer or agent of a corporation who takes no part in the commission of an alleged tort committed by the corporation is not individually liable to third parties for such a tort. 

However, an officer or agent of the corporation may be held liable tort under a “participation theory,” which states that the participating individual is subject to liability as an actor, not as an owner or officer. In order to impose liability under a participation theory under Pennsylvania law, a Plaintiff must establish that the individual officer or agent engaged in misfeasance rather than mere non-feasance.

The court agreed with the Plaintiff’s argument that the Complaint sufficiently pled a negligence cause of action against the individual Defendants as possessors of the property where the Plaintiff was injured, although not necessarily as corporate officers or agents.  As such, the individual Defendants demurrers were overruled.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Judge Nealon Addresses Procedural and Substantive Complaint Issues Regarding a Complaint in Med Mal Case

In the case of Healey v. Scranton Hospital Company, LLC, No. 23-CV-1793 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Nov. 20, 2023 Nealon, J.), Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas addressed various Preliminary Objections filed by Defendants in a medical malpractice case.

In part, the hospital Defendant filed Preliminary Objections in the nature of a demurrer to the Plaintiff’s vicarious liability claims for failing to identify its alleged agents by name and failing to specify their agency authority.

The hospital Defendant also filed Preliminary Objections against the Plaintiff’s corporate negligence claims for (1) neglecting to allege its notice of the claimed institutional deficiencies, and (2) asserting the corporate liability claims against it and a Co-Defendant LLC in the same Count in the Complaint.

Also at issue in this case was a demurrer filed by the hospitalist and the LLC employer to the vicarious liability and corporate negligence claim asserted against those parties. 

Those Defendants also sought to strike the Plaintiff’s allegations of gross negligence as well as allegations against “Defendants” as asserted in lump sum fashion in certain paragraphs without clarifying which particular Defendant is being referenced, among other issues.

The Court issued the following decisions in this Opinion.    

Judge Nealon noted that, since it is not necessary for a Plaintiff to establish a right to recover on a vicarious liability claim based upon the negligence of a specifically named employee, the demurrers to the Plaintiff’s vicarious liability claims premised on the conduct of unnamed agents was overruled.

The court otherwise also ruled that, while the Plaintiffs had alleged a viable claim for corporate liability against the hospital and the LLC employer, the Plaintiff had failed to state a cognizable corporate negligence claim against the individual hospitalist Defendant for institutional negligence.  As such, the corporate liability claim against the hospitalist was dismissed.

The court additionally sustained the Preliminary Objections regarding the combined allegations asserted in single pleadings against multiple Defendants..  The court ruled that the corporate liability claims against the hospital and the LLC employer were required to be alleged in self-sufficient separate Counts under separate, distinct headings in the Complaint in order to comport with Pa. R.C.P. 1019(a) and 1020(a).

The court additionally ruled that, pursuant to 40 P.S. §1303.505(b) and (c), the Plaintiff’s allegations of “gross” negligence were immaterial to the Plaintiff’s malpractice burden of proof and, as such, would be stricken as impertinent matter in accordance with Pa. R.C.P. 1028(a)(2).

The court otherwise noted that blanket references to “Defendants” in lump sum fashion in certain paragraphs in the Complaint were improper.

The Plaintiff was afforded an opportunity to amend the Complaint to correct these errors and other errors identified above.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Personal Injury Claim Based on COVID-19 Exposure Allowed to Proceed

In the case of Stiver v. Senior Health Care Solutions, LLC, No. 21-CV-842 (C.P. Lacka. Co. July 8, 2022 Nealon, J.), the court addressed various issues arising out of a COVID-19 personal injury claim.

In this matter, a nursing home employee, who claimed to have contracted work-related COVID-19 that allegedly caused permanent pulmonary and cardiac damage and required inpatient hospitalization, filed a corporate liability lawsuit against the owner and operator of the facility which allegedly declined to follow federal agency guidelines for the prevention and mitigation of the COVID-19 virus.

The Defendant owner/operator filed Preliminary Objections. 

In part, the Defendant asserted that it was immune from suit as the Plaintiff’s “statutory employer” under §302(a) of the Worker’s Compensation Act, 77 P.S. §46, or based upon the common law “borrowed employee” doctrine.

The court found that issues of fact prevented it from fully deciding whether the Defendant was entitled to such tort immunity. Accordingly, that argument was overruled without prejudice to the Defendant’s right to raise the issue again at this summary judgment stage of the litigation.

The Defendant owner/operator also filed a demurrer to the Plaintiff’s corporate negligence claim on the basis that the Defendant allegedly did not owe any duty of care to the Plaintiff.

Judge Nealon noted that, since the Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant owner/operator had breached its duty to formulate and implement adequate safety procedures and policies and to provide a safe work environment, this demurrer was denied.

The Defendant requested, pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 1006(d)(1), a transfer of venue to the Cumberland County Court of Common Pleas based upon forum non conveniens grounds.

The court noted that, given that the Defendant has not submitted any affidavit from any prospective witness, or some other form of evidence, establishing that Lackawanna County is a vexatious or oppressive forum, the Defendant had not satisfied its heavy burden of proof warranting a transfer of venue from the Plaintiff’s chosen forum. As such, this petition seeking a transfer of venue under Rule 1006(d)(1) was denied.


Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Allegations of Recklessness and John/Jane Doe Allegations Allowed To Proceed

 THIS IS THE 300th TORT TALK BLOG POST IN WHICH JUDGE TERRENCE R. NEALON HAS BEEN REFERNCED, MOST OF WHICH BLOG POSTS INVOLVED A SUMMARY OF A JUDICIAL OPINION OF HIS.

In the case of Webb v. Scranton Quincy Hospital Company, No. 21-CV-4073 (C.P. Lacka. Co. June 10, 2022 Nealon, J.), Judge Terrence R. Nealon issued the following notable rulings regarding preliminary objecctions filed by Defendants in a medical malpractice case:

-Overruling preliminary objections to claims of recklessness on the grounds that such claims may be generally pled under Pa.R.C.P. 1019 and given that the facts pled in the Plaintiff's Complaint supported such claims in any event;

-Overruling preliminary objections asserting that the Plaintiff's allegations are too vague after finding that the Plaintiff's lengthy Complaint provide the Defendants with adequate notice of the corporate liability, negligence, and recklessness claimss against the Defendants, as well as with respect to the averments regarding the hospital's corporate owner and with respect to the regional hospital system.

-The court also found that the Plaintiff's Jane/John Doe averments in the Complaint satisfied the requirements of Pa.R.C.P. 2005 in order to properly designate an unknown defendant by a Doe designation.

As such, all of the Defendants Preliminary Objections were overruled.

Anyone wishing to review this Opinion may click this LINK.

Judge Williamson of Monroe County Addresses Propriety of Claims in Medical Malpractice Complaint

 

In the medical malpractice case of Hyman v. St. Luke’s Hosp., No. 5565-CV-2021 (C.P. Monroe Co. Dec. 16, 2021 Williamson, J.), Judge David J. Williamson of the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas denied various Preliminary Objections and a Motion to Dismiss filed by the Defendants.

The court held that the Plaintiff’s Complaint which alleged the dates of care, the places that the care was completed, identified several Defendant medical providers by name and also alleged that certain agents of the Defendant hospital and medical group were unknown to Plaintiff but known to Defendant, possessed sufficient specificity to withstand the Defendants’ Preliminary Objections challenging the Complaint.

Judge David J. Williamson
Monroe County

Judge Williamson noted that practical considerations involved with medical malpractice causes of actions weighed against a rigid application of the specificity requirements found under the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court additionally held that the Plaintiff’s claim of corporate negligence directed to the Defendant physician group and health network were not subject to a demurrer asserted by the Defendants under Pa. R.C.P. 1028(a)(4).

The Defendants, St. Luke's Physician Group and St. Luke's Health Network, asserted that the corporate negligence claims levied against them failed because the allegations established that the Defendants did not function like a hospital and that these Defendants therefore did not meet the standard for a finding of liability in this respect.

In this regard, the court applied the functional analysis test noted under the cases of Thompson v. Nason, 591 A.2d 703 (Pa. 1991) and Scampone v. Highland Park Care Center, LLC, 570 A.3d 582 (Pa. 2012), and found that the claims asserted by the Plaintiff against these Defendant entities satisfied the types of allegations necessary for a plaintiff to proceed on a corporate negligence claim.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions.” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (Jan. 18, 2022).

Source of image:  Photo by Karolina Grabowska from www.pexels.com.

Pennsylvania Superior Court Addresses Claims of Corporate Negligence in a Medical Malpractice Case

 

In the case Ruff v. York Hospital, 2021 Pa. Super. 39 (Pa. Super. March 11, 2021 Shogan, J., Stabile, J., and Murray, J.) (Op. by. Shogan, J.), the court affirmed the lower court's denial of a Plaintiff’s post-trial motions in a medical malpractice case in which a defense verdict was entered. In so ruling, the Pennsylvania Superior Court touched upon a number of different issues pertinent to medical malpractice cases.

The Superior Court emphasized that, in the context of a medical malpractice case, corporate negligence is a doctrine under which a hospital owes a direct duty to its patients to ensure their safety and well-being while the patients are in the hospital.

The Court noted that, in order to establish a claim of corporate negligence, the Plaintiff must show that the hospital had actual or constructive knowledge of the alleged defect or procedures that allegedly created the harm. The court noted that corporate negligence typically involves claims of systemic negligence in the actions and procedures of the hospital itself, rather than any individual acts of its employees.

The Court otherwise ruled that a hospital’s oversight duty does not require that the hospital direct or override a physician’s clinical judgment in any given case.

The Superior Court also found that the jury instructions utilized the trial court on corporate negligence, which conformed to the Suggested Standard Jury Instruction, were adequate.

On an evidentiary issue, the Superior Court ruled that the Plaintiff’s expert was properly allowed to reference a learned treatise as support for the expert’s opinions, but that the Plaintiff was properly precluded by the trial court from placing the learned treatise itself into evidence.

The Superior Court also found that the Plaintiff’s expert was properly precluded by the trial court from offering any opinion that the Defendant’s conduct was reckless. The Superior Court noted that, whether conduct was reckless was to be determined by the jury and was not a proper subject of expert testimony. In this regard, the court noted that expert witnesses are not permitted to render legal opinions and may not offer opinions on whether conduct complied with the law.

As stated, overall, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s denial of the Plaintiff’s post-trial motions.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Claims Allowed To Proceed Against Personal Care Home

In the case of Rogowski v. Harrison House Personal Care Home, No. 20-CV-2009 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Sept. 28, 2020 Nealon, J.), the court addressed issues with respect to a duty of care and the application of §323 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts arising out of claims against a personal care home by a resident.

The personal care home resident alleged physical and emotional harm allegedly sustained as a result of assaults by another resident, substandard medical care, and institutional neglect. 

One of the Defendants in this matter filed a demurrer.  That Defendant was the advocacy alliance which was allegedly authorized by the Social Security Administration Act as the resident’s payee for Social Security benefits and manage the same for the resident.  That Defendant asserted that was not liable for any claims of damages on the grounds that the Defendant did not have a duty to protect the resident of the personal care home or any duty to scrutinize the services provided by the personal care home.

The court ruled that, although it was alleged that the personal care home and its owner were aware of serious problems at the home which allegedly increased the risk of harm to the resident, the Plaintiff’s Complaint was found to lack any allegations that the advocacy alliance, as the payee, knew, or should have known, of any issues at the personal care home that could have exposed the resident to possible injury. 

The court also found that the Complaint lacked any factual averments or reasonable inferences that the payee undertook or otherwise assumed any responsibility to monitor or review the quality of care at the home. 

As such, based upon the allegations set forth in the Plaintiff’s Complaint, the court ruled that the representative payee did not owe the resident any common law duty of care upon which to base a negligence claim for physical and emotional harm sustained by the resident at the home. Accordingly, the claims against the payee for non-economic damages was dismissed. 

However, in light of the payee’s fiduciary duties relative to the resident’s Social Security benefits, the demurrer to the “pecuniary loss” claims relating to the advancement of rent and expenditures was overruled.


Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Parts of Medical Malpractice Claim Dismissed Due to Lack of Certificate of Merit; Punitive Damages Claim Allowed to Proceed

In the case of Kinard v. Butler Memorial Hospital, No.30002 of 2019, C.A. (C.P. Lawr. Co. March 11, 2020 Motto, P.J.), the court sustained in part and denied in part Preliminary Objections filed on behalf of various Defendants in a medical malpractice claim after finding, in part, that the Plaintiffs’ Certificate of Merit only supported the Plaintiffs’ claim for vicarious liability and not corporate negligence. 

According to the Opinion, the allegations of corporate negligence of the hospital was based upon negligent acts of the institution itself arising from the policies and actions or in-action of the institution, rather than any specific acts of any hospital employees. 

The court noted that the Certificate of Merit produced by the Plaintiffs only addressed the negligence of medical professionals providing treatment at the hospital and not any alleged institutional negligence. Given that the Certificate of Merit only addressed issues of vicarious liability, and not corporate negligence, the court sustained the Defendant’s Preliminary Objection with respect to the claim of corporate negligence. 

The Opinion is also notable in that the court found that the Complaint stated sufficient facts to allow the Plaintiffs’ punitive damages claim to go forward. 

The court also sustained Preliminary Objections filed on behalf of a nurse practitioner under the argument that the nurse practitioner only saw the Plaintiff once and that was for a different medical issue unrelated to the central claim presented in this case. The claim against the nurse practitioner was stricken from the Complaint. 

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions.” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (May 12, 2020).

Punitive Damages Claim Allowed to Proceed Against Medical Corporation in Med Mal Case

In the case of Garvey v. Adamo, No. 19-CV-1893 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Dec. 17, 2019 Nealon, J.), the court addressed the issue of vicarious liability of a healthcare provider for punitive damages. 

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff in this matter instituted a medical malpractice action against his former treating physician, that doctor’s medical partners, and their professional corporation, under allegations that the doctor prescribed opioids to the Plaintiff in excessive amounts, causing the Plaintiff to become drug-dependent and require treatment for an opioid addiction. 

The Plaintiff alleged in the Complaint that the doctor’s professional corporation and his partners knew, or had reason to know, of the doctor’s improper administration of opioids, which actually cumulated in the doctor’s guilty plea in a criminal case. 

Before the court were Preliminary Objections filed by the professional corporation seeking to dismiss the punitive damages claim pursuant to §505(b) of the Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error (MCARE) Act. 

Judge Nealon ruled that, under §505(c) of the MCARE Act, a healthcare provider may be vicarious liability for punitive damages only if it was aware of the agent’s reckless conduct and allowed it to occur. 

Judge Nealon wrote, as he has done in the cases involving motor vehicle accidents that, although recklessness is a condition on the mind that may be averred generally under Pa. R.C.P. 1019(b), in this case the Plaintiff had alleged that the professional corporation “had actual notice” of its doctor’s unconscionable administration of opioids and still “allowed the conduct” by the doctor to continue. Based on these allegations, the court overruled the corporation’s demurrer to the punitive damages claim. 

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney Jonathan Comitz of the Wilkes-Barre, PA law firm of Comitz Law Firm, LLC for bringing this case to my attention. 

Court Addresses Liability of Medical Facilities in Med Mal Context

In the case of Williams v. Vigder, No. 11050-CV-2019 (C.P. Beaver Co. Nov. 7, 2019 Ross, J.), the court addressed Preliminary Objections filed against claims of corporate negligence asserted against a medical facility, along with other issues in a medical malpractice matter.

In this case, Plaintiffs filed corporate negligence claims against two medical facilities, one of which appeared to be a hospital. The Defendants asserted that the doctrine of corporate negligence is not applicable to hospitals or like entities which play a role in the administration of total health for their patients.

The court denied this position put forth by the Defendant for Preliminary Objections purposes in light of the more recent pronouncement of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Scampone v. Highland Park Care Center, LLC, 57 A.3d 583 (Pa. 2012).

The court in this Williams case noted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in the Scampone case stated “that a Defendant is not categorically exempt from liability simply because appellate decisional law has not specifically addressed a theory of liability in a particular context.” Scampone at 599.

The court in Williams noted that “[t]he Scampone court specifically held that entities, such as nursing homes (and by inference hospitals and other like groups (health care providers)) should not be held to be “categorically immune from direct liability claims.” Id. at 600.

Given that doubt existed as to whether the demurrer to the corporate negligence claim should be sustained in this matter, the court overruled the Preliminary Objections filed by the Defendants in the Williams case.

In this case, this Williams case, court also allowed the Plaintiff’s claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress to proceed under facts alleged that the Plaintiffs allegedly experience great emotional shock after being advised of concern by the medical providers for their unborn child’s life after previously being advised that the mother’s labor was proceeding without incident. In overruling this Preliminary Objection, the Williams court cited to the case of Toney v. Chester County Hospital, 961 A.2d 192 (Pa. Super. 2008).

Lastly, the court also overruled the Defendant’s Preliminary Objections against the Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages after finding that the Plaintiff’s allegations contained in their Complaint were sufficient to allow that claim to proceed.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this case may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney Michael Foley of the Foley Law Firm in Scranton, Pennsylvania for bringing this case to my attention.

Preliminary Objections Sustained Where Only Conclusory Allegations Set Forth in Dram Shop Action

In the case of Shultz v. Barnes, No. 18-CV-1308 (C.P. Lyc. Co. July 19, 2019 Linhardt, J.), the court sustained several Preliminary Objections filed by a Defendant in a liquor liability motor vehicle accident case given that the Plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to support various claims. 

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff was the administrator of the estate of a decedent who was killed in a motor vehicle accident caused by a tortfeasor driver. The Plaintiff alleged that the tortfeasor driver was driving a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol. 

In addition to suing the driver, the Complaint also identified the company that operated the bar where the tortfeasor driver was drinking prior to the accident as a defendant in this case. The owner and president of that bar was also listed as a defendant.  

 The Defendants filed various Preliminary Objections to the Complaint.  

The court sustained the Defendants’ Preliminary Objections to the count in the Complaint alleging a violation of the Dram Shop Act.  

The defense had argued that the Plaintiff had only provided conclusory allegations that the Defendants knew that the tortfeasor driver was visibly intoxicated while he was at the bar.   The court granted these Preliminary Objections and noted that it was not sufficient for a Plaintiff to simply allege that alcoholic beverages were served to patrons in order to support a Dram Shop action.  

The court noted that the Plaintiff failed to assert any facts regarding the physical appearance of the tortfeasor Defendant driver in terms of whether he was visibly intoxicated or not while he was served at the bar.   Although this Preliminary Objection was sustained, the Plaintiff was granted an opportunity to file an Amended Complaint.  

Relative to the Preliminary Objections filed by the individual Defendant, the court found that the Plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to pierce the corporate veil.   Again, the Plaintiff was granted an opportunity to file an Amended Complaint in this regard.  

The court also sustained Preliminary Objections to the Plaintiff’s wrongful death claim given that that claim was brought not only on the Plaintiff’s behalf but also on behalf of entities who were allegedly entitled to damages for reasonable hospital, nursing, and medical expenses, as well as funeral expenses, burial expenses and other losses.  The court noted that, under the Rules of Civil Procedure, such allegations were improper in a wrongful death claim.  As such, the Preliminary Objections in this regard were sustained.   Again, the Plaintiff was granted leave to file an Amended Complaint.

Lastly, the court also sustained Preliminary Objections to the allegations of recklessness and the claims for punitive damages under a finding that the Plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to support these allegations.   The court noted that, should discovery later reveal facts supporting an award of punitive damages on separate claims, the Plaintiff would be allowed to seek an amendment at that time.   

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions.” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (August 27, 2019).    

Punitive Damages and Corporate Negligence Claims Against a Summer Camp Addressed By Judge Mannion

In the case of Goodfellow v. Shohola, Inc., No. 3:16-1521 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 21, 2018 Mannion, J.), the court granted in part and denied in part a Motion to Dismiss in a case involving alleged negligent medical care provided by a summer camp to the Plaintiff's child..    

Judge Malachy E. Mannion
M.D. Pa.

In part, the court ruled that, where the Plaintiffs’ original Complaint pled a plausible factual basis for punitive damages, even though the original Complaint did not request such damages.  Later punitive damages allegations asserted by the Plaintiff were deemed to relate back and were, therefore, not barred by the statute of limitations.

In another notable decision in this matter, the court ruled that an overnight camp is not the type of entity that can be held liable on a corporate negligence medical malpractice claim.   The court found only that a comprehensive health center with responsibility for arranging and coordinating the total health of its patients can be subject to such corporate negligence liability.  

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm, and writer of the excellent Drug and Device Law Blog, for bringing this case to my attention.

Summary Judgment Granted in Med Mal Case Due to Lack of Expert Testimony

In the case of Gintoff v. Thomas, No. 2016-CV-2155 (C.P. Lacka. Co. May 4, 2018 Nealon, J.), Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas granted a Defendant hospital’s Motion for Summary Judgment in a medical malpractice case given the Plaintiff’s failure to support the claims against that Defendant with expert opinion testimony on those particular claims.  

Judge Terrence R. Nealon
Lackawanna County

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff filed a medical malpractice action alleging negligent prescription and monitoring of anti-coagulation therapy that allegedly caused a right occipital hemorrhage which required emergency treatment and allegedly resulted in permanent harm.  

The Plaintiff sued, among others, a Defendant hospital on claims for vicarious liability and corporate negligence.

The Defendant hospital filed a Motion for Summary Judgment seeking to dismiss these claims on the grounds that the Plaintiff did not produce expert opinion testimony on the issues pertinent to those claims.  

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff did produce an expert report containing opinions from a hematology expert only as to the alleged negligence of the Co-Defendant hematologist.   The court also noted that the Plaintiff’s expert did not criticize the care provided by any hospital personnel. It was further indicated that the Plaintiff’s previously stipulated that the Co-Defendant hematologist was not an actual or ostensible agent for whom the hospital could be found vicariously liable.   Nor was there any opinion in the hematologist’s expert report asserting any institutional negligence against the hospital.

Consequently, based upon the record before it, the court found that the Plaintiff’s case lacked sufficient expert opinion evidence to establish a prima facie claim for vicarious liability or corporate negligence on the part of the Defendant hospital.   As such, the hospital’s Motion for Summary Judgment was granted.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision by Judge Nealon may click this LINK.

Eastern District Federal Court Addresses Corporate Negligence Claims In Med Mal Case

In the case of McClure v. Parvis, No. 17-3049 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 6, 2018 Savage, J.), the court denied a Motion to Dismiss filed by a Defendant in a medical malpractice claim raising issues of corporate negligence.

The court noted that a claim for corporate negligence arises from the policies, acts, or omissions of the entity itself, and not from specific acts of the individual employees of the entity.  

Notably, while this court indicated that corporate negligence theories are not limited to hospitals, it otherwise noted that the courts of Pennsylvania have not extended such theories to apply to physician offices as such offices are not comprehensive health centers that are responsible for the total health of its patients.  

The court also noted that, to decide whether a particular health care entities owes the Plaintiff a non-delegable duty requires an examination of the extent of that entity’s oversight and control of the medical professionals directly providing the care to the Plaintiff.   As this determination is fact-based, the court ruled that this analysis could not be completed at the Motion to Dismiss stage. 

Accordingly, the court denied the Motion to Dismiss filed in this matter and allowed the case to proceed into discovery.  

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Court's companion Order can be viewed HERE.

I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia office of the law firm of Reed Smith for bringing this case to my attention. 

Several Medical Malpractice Issues Addressed by Judge Nealon of Lackawanna County

In the case of Hughes v. Wilkes-Barre Hospital Company, N. 2016-CV-6463 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Aug. 14, 2017 Nealon, J.), Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas addressed several issues in a medical malpractice action including issues of allegedly improper venue, corporate negligence theory, agency law questions, and punitive damages issues. 

 

Of note, the court found the venue was proper in Lackawanna County based upon the existence of proper venue over the Lackawanna County Hospital and given the Plaintiffs’ assertion of joint and several liability against all named Defendants.  

 

Judge Terrence R. Nealon
Lackawanna County

The court additionally found that the Plaintiff stated valid causes of action for corporate negligence against the hospital Defendants along with valid claims for vicarious liability based upon the ostensible agency standard set forth in the MCARE Act.  

 

The court also reviewed the validity of claims of punitive damages pled in the case in form of allegations of recklessness and wanton conduct.  

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK. 

 

Certificate of Merit Required to Support a Direct Corporate Negligence Claim Against a Licensed Medical Corporation

In his recent decision in the case of Goodfellow v. Camp Netimus Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. Lexis 68140 (M.D. Pa. May 4, 2017, Mannion, J.), the court granted in part and denied in part a Motion to Dismiss in a case involving a claim of direct corporate negligence.  

A copy of this decision can be viewed online HERE.

I send thanks to Attorney James Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.