Trial Court Grants Summary Judgment Based on Borrowed Servant Doctrine

In the case of Almonte v. Roaring Creek Egg Farm, No. 2019-CV-03731 (C.P. Luz. Co. Oct. 7, 2026 Pierantoni, J.), the court granted various Motions for Summary Judgment filed by various Defendants in a construction accident case.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff, while working as a temporary construction laborer, allegedly fell approximately three (3) stories through an opening of a building that was being constructed and sustained injuries as a result.

One of the Defendants, Hershey Equipment Company, was granted summary judgment under the borrowed servant doctrine.

The Hershey Equipment Company asserted that, based upon the record before the court, the Plaintiff was its borrowed servant and, therefore, Hershey Equipment Company, was immune from the tort lawsuit under the Worker’s Compensation Act.

The court agreed and granted this Defendant summary judgment on this basis.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I sending thanks to Attorney Ryan McBride of the Scranton office of the Weber Gallagher law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Josh Olalde on www.unsplash.com.

Factual Issues on Question Presented Compel Superior Court To Quash Appeal Under the Collateral Order Doctrine

In the case of Hailu v. Giorgio Fresh Company, No. 2988 EDA 2024 (Pa. Super Feb. 25, 2026 Lazarus, P.J., Panella, P.J.E., and Sullivan, J.) (Op. by Panella, P.J.E.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court quashed an appeal under the collateral order doctrine in a third party claim arising out of a work injury.

More specifically, the Superior Court quashed an appeal from a trial court’s denial of summary judgment under which a Defendant had asserted worker’s compensation immunity under the borrowed employee doctrine.

The Defendant employer was arguing that, with respect to the Plaintiff’s work place accident, the Plaintiff, who had been hired as a temporary employee from a staffing company should be considered to be a “borrowed employee” and that, therefore, the Defendant employer was immune from suit under the provisions of the Worker’s Compensation Act, which provided for the exclusive remedies to injured parties for work place injuries.

After the trial court denied the Defendant’s Motion without an Opinion, the Defendant filed an appeal and asserted that the Order was a collateral order capable of being appealed under Pa. R.A.P. 313. The Defendant asserted that the issue of whether the Plaintiff was a borrowed employee was separable from the main cause of action and was too important to be denied immediate review given that the issues involved immunities afforded under the Worker’s Compensation Act.

The Superior Court disagreed. The Superior Court found that the Defendant’s appeal did not present a purely legal question, but rather a factual one regarding whether the Defendant employer had sufficient control over the Plaintiff employee’s work, which was central to the determination of whether the borrowed employee doctrine applied.

The Superior Court noted that the trial court had ruled that the evidence was insufficient to establish the borrowed employee doctrine such that there was an indication that further factual development was necessary at the lower court level.

The Superior Court ultimately concluded that the issue of whether the Plaintiff was a borrowed employee required a fact-based inquiry, which was not a suitable topic for collateral review of a matter on appeal. Accordingly, the Superior Court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to review the interlocutory order of the trial court.

Consequently, the appeal was quashed with the Superior Court emphasizing that the collateral order doctrine must be narrowly applied in order to prevent the erosion of the final order rule regarding appeals.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert, www.Law.com (March 17, 2026).

Source of image: Photo by Jim Wilson on www.unsplash.com.

Court Grants Summary Judgment on Recklessness and Punitive Damages Claims in a Trucking Accident Case

In an Opinion that is tersely worded at times in the case of Medina v. One Stop Center, Inc., No. 2:22-CV-01031-CB (Jan. 2, 2025 Bissoon, J.), the court granted a Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on a claim for punitive damages in a trucking accident case. In so ruling, the court also reject the Plaintiff’s liability expert’s opinion.

As to the Plaintiff’s expert, the court found that the expert’s opinion did not meet the standards required by Federal Rules of Evidence 702. The court additionally faulted the expert for veering into areas reserved for the jury, that is, by offering opinions based on his assessment of the credibility of witnesses and parties.

Overall, reviewing then facts of the case, which involved an accident when the drivers encountered unexpected black ice on the roadway, did not support a finding of reckless indifference on the part of the Defendant driver. Accordingly, the court granted the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by one of the Defendant.

Relative to a separate decision in this Opinion on a Borrowed Servant Doctrine issue raised by a different Defendant, the Court denied that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on that issue   

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney Aaron H. Weiss of the Pittsburgh, PA law firm of Zimmer Kunz, PLLC, for bringing this case to my attention.

Pennsylvania Superior Court Addresses the Borrowed Servant Doctrine in a Workplace Accident Case (Non-Precedential)

In the Non-Precedential decision in the case of Ortiz v. Lincoln Electric Automation, Inc., No. 1384 EDA 2023 (Pa. Super. June 26, 2024 Panella, J., Nichols, J., and Beck, J.) (Op. by Panella, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court confirmed the entry of summary judgment in favor of a Defendant under the borrowed employee doctrine.

According to the Opinion, this matter involved a products liability case arising out of a workplace accident.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court ruled that, as a matter of law, the Plaintiff in this case could not sue the owner of the workplace where she was injured because the Plaintiff was a borrowed employee.

The court noted that, even though the Plaintiff was a temporary employee, her employment activities were under the control of the Defendant, not the temporary agency that had placed her to work at the Defendant’s location. 

Accordingly, the Superior Court agreed that the Plaintiff was the effective employee of the company to which she was temporarily assigned even though she was hired and paid by the temporary employment agency.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this Non-Precedential decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Emmanuel Ikwuegbu on www.unsplash.com.

Borrowed Servant Doctrine Applied to Dismiss Claim

In the case of Sardina-Garcia v. Brownsville Marine Prod., LLC, No, 1254 WDA 2019(Pa. Super. March 13, 2020, Bender, P.J.E., Bowes, J., Pellegrini, J.) (Op. by Pellegrini, J.), the Superior Court found that the trial court had properly ruled that the Plaintiff was a “borrowed servant” under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. As a result, the Plaintiff’s claim was dismissed.

The Plaintiff had received workers' compensation benefits but then sued his employer for an unsafe work space.

More specifically, the Superior Court agreed that the Defendant had control over the Plaintiff’s work, that the Plaintiff was performing only the Defendant’s work on a daily basis, that the employment was over a significant length of time with the Plaintiff acquiescing to the working conditions, and where the Defendant furnished the place of employment.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this latest analysis of the Pennsylvania Superior Court on the borrowed servant doctrine may click this LINK.

Borrowed Servant Doctrine Applied to Support Entry of Summary Judgment in Favor of Employer

In the case of Solomon v. FedEx Supply Chain, Inc., No. 1:17-CV-02385 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 14, 2020 Rambo, J), Judge Sylvia H. Rambo addressed the current status of Pennsylvania law on the borrowed servant doctrine.

According to the Opinion, this personal injury case arose out of a forklift accident that occurred within the scope of the Plaintiff’s employment.

At the time of the accident, the Plaintiff was a contractual employee for an employment agency and was assigned to work as a forklift operator and order picker at a FedEx Distribution Center.

Under the contract between the temporary employment agency and FedEx, FedEx was responsible for, among other things, training, supervising, and instructing staffing personnel, as well as for maintaining a safe workplace. The contract also provided that FedEx retained direction and control over the staffing personnel as it determined in its sole discretion to be appropriate, including the right to accept, reject, and remove staffing personnel.

Under the agreement, the employment agency was solely responsible for selecting, hiring, disciplining, reviewing, evaluating, and terminating personnel, as well as for paying the worker’s wages and maintaining the benefits.

The Plaintiff was injured on his first day of work at the FedEx Distribution Center after undergoing training in the morning and being assigned to shadow another FedEx employee. During that first day of work, the Plaintiff was operating a standup forklift when he collided with a parked forklift and allegedly sustained injuries as a result.

The Plaintiff sued FedEx following this incident.

FedEx eventually filed a Motion for Summary Judgment requesting the dismissal of the Plaintiff’s claims for negligence on the basis that FedEx was Solomon’s statutory employer and was therefore immune from suit under the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act.

The court noted that, generally speaking, employees who are injured at work are limited to compensation available to them under the Workers’ Compensation Act and cannot separately sue their employers for personal injury.

The court noted that this immunity provided by the Workers’ Compensation Act extends from the direct employer as well as to other entities that may have “borrowed” the employee and if the latter exercises sufficient control over the employee.

Under the borrowed servant doctrine, the “crucial test” in determining whether a worker furnished by one person to another becomes the employee of the person to whom he is loaned is whether the worker passes under the latter’s right of control with regards not only to the work to be done but also to the manner of performing it.

A borrowed employee in this regard is considered to a statutory employee and the borrowing employer is considered to a statutory employer.

The court noted that, if there are issues of fact on the issue of whether a defendant is a statutory employer, the question is usually one to be decided by a jury.   However, where the material facts are not in dispute the question can be properly the subject of a Motion for Summary Judgment.

After applying the law to the facts before her, Judge Rambo concluded that FedEx was the Plaintiff’s statutory employer pursuant to the borrowed servant doctrine. Accordingly, the court found that FedEx was entitled to immunity under the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act to any personal injury suit. As such, FedEx’s Motion for Summary Judgment was granted.

Anyone wishing to review this decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney Richard B. Wickersham, Jr., of the Philadelphia office of Post & Schell, P.C. for bringing this case to my attention.

Borrowed Servant Doctrine Addressed in Slip and Fall Case

In the case of Burrell v. Streamlight, Inc., No. 2016-CV-30144 (C.P. Montg. Co. May 9, 2019 Saltz, J.), the court addressed the borrowed servant doctrine and found that a Plaintiff was a worker who qualified as a borrowed servant such that the Defendant employer was immune from liability in a negligence cause of action because the worker had already received compensation under the Worker’s Compensation Act.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff was affiliated with an employment recruiting agency.  That employment agency placed the Plaintiff as a temporary worker at the Defendant’s facility.   After working for a period at that facility, the Plaintiff was injured when he slipped and fell at work.  

The Plaintiff filed suit against the Defendant employer. The Defendant filed an Answer which contained a New Matter defense alleging that the claims by the Plaintiff were barred by the Worker’s Compensation Act.    The Defendant asserted that it was immune from negligence liability because the Plaintiff was either acting as its employee or was a borrowed servant.  

After discovery, the Defendant moved for summary judgment on the issues presented.  

The court noted a general rule that, when a worker sustains an injury at the work place, compensation under the Worker’s Compensation Act was generally the exclusive remedy against the employer for a monetary recovery.  

Under the borrow servant doctrine, workers’ compensation immunity also applied to the true master when the servant had been loaned to another.   The test for determining whether a worker qualified as a borrowed servant was the right of control over the manner of the employee’s work.  

In this case, the court noted that, although the Plaintiff was initially hired by the temp agency, he worked under the control and supervision of the Defendant facility.   The Defendant facility trained the Plaintiff, set us schedule, and set the Plaintiff’s work duties.   In contrast, the temp agency only handled the payroll function, which the court considered to be peripheral.   The court also rejected the Plaintiff’s argument that the specific tasks he was performing at the time of his accident was not within his duties and, therefore, the borrowed servant doctrine should not be applied.    The court noted that there is evidence to the contrary, showing that the Plaintiff was either asked to perform the worker duty at issue or had volunteered to perform it.  

In light of all of the factors presented, the court found that the Plaintiff was indeed a borrowed servant and that the Defendant was therefore immune from liability under the Worker’s Compensation Act.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions.”  Pennsylvania Law Weekly (June 4, 2019).