Federal Court Rules Just Because Experts Agree That There Was An Injury Doesn't Automatically Mean That Causation Has Been Established

In the case of Gross v. Villeneuve, No. 2:23-CV-00705-NBF (W.D. Pa. Jan. 22, 2025 Fischer, S.J.), the court granted the Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment with respect to a Defendant’s negligence, which had been conceded, but otherwise denied the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment in a case involving a motor vehicle accident.

While the court granted the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment in terms of the liability issue in this rear-end accident, the court denied the Plaintiff’s argument that, given the Defendant's concession on liability, the Plaintiff was, therefore, entitled to a further concession on the issue of causation relative to the physical injuries and damages alleged by the Plaintiff.

The Plaintiff asserted that he was entitled to summary judgment on the “factual cause” question where both parties’ medical experts attributed some degree of injury to the accident. 

Here, citing to Pennsylvania Superior Court precedent, the federal court ruled that a defense expert’s opinion that a Plaintiff suffered an injury, based on the history given to the expert, is not an uncontroverted admission on the issue of causation by a defendant. 

The court confirmed the well-settled rule that a jury was free to render its own decision on the case presented even where the experts of the parties may agree, to some extent, that the Plaintiff sustained an injury as a result of the accident. 

More specifically, the court reasoned that “[a] medical expert report concluding that, based on the evidence provided (including a Plaintiff’s history and subjective complaints), the ‘mechanism of injury’ and clinical findings were ‘consistent with’ some of the allegedly consequent injuries (i.e., some injury could be resultant from the collision), is simply not a concession. To the contrary, it is an insufficient basis on which to usurp a trial jury’s credibility determinations and broader fact-finding role.” See Op. at 5.

As such, the court denied the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment based on the causation issues presented.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney Joseph Hudock of the Pittsburgh law office of Summers, McDonnell, Hudock, Guthrie & Rauch for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Nikita Nikitin on www.pexels.com.

Superior Court Affirms Entry of Defense Verdict Even Though Defendant's Answer to Complaint Was Stricken Prior to Trial

In the case of Derbyshire v. Jefferson Frankford Hospital, No. 1409 EDA 2023 (Pa. Super. Dec. 20, 2024 Olson, J., Stabile, J. and Colins, J.) (Op. by Stabile, J.), the Superior Court found that a trial court judge did not commit any error in post-trial proceedings by denying a Plaintiff’s Motion for a New Trial limited to the issue of damages.

This matter arose out of a slip and fall event.

According to the Opinion, prior to the trial in the underlying matter, a motions court judge had stricken the Defendant’s Answer to the Complaint with prejudice due to untimeliness under Pa. R.C.P. 1029(b).

Later, another judge who presided over the trial, refused the Plaintiff’s request to direct the jury to find in the Plaintiff’s favor on the issues of negligence and causation and, instead, allowed these issues to go to the jury.

The jury then returned a verdict in favor of the Defendant on the issue of causation and awarded zero damages.

The Superior Court held that, while the Defendant’s failure to answer the Complaint resulted in a deemed admission of the facts alleged in the Plaintiff’s Complaint, at trial, the Plaintiff still had a burden to prove a legal causal connection between the Defendant’s alleged negligent conduct and the Plaintiff’s alleged damages. In its ruling, the Superior Court noted that, since the jury found the Defendant negligent, the Plaintiff suffered no prejudice from the trial court’s refusal to deem that issue admitted. The Superior Court therefore focused its attention on the issue of causation.

In ruling in the manner it did, the Superior Court found a 1984 decision from the Supreme Court of Texas to be persuasive. That court in Texas had concluded that a plaintiff who obtains a default judgment in a personal injury matter must still prove damages apart from the deemed admission of liability. 

Here, in this Derbyshire case, the court found that the striking of the Defendant’s Answer and New Matter resulted in a deemed admission of all facts but only an admission of “liability” by the Defendant. 

The Superior Court ruled that the Plaintiff still had to proceed to trial on the issue of damages and, in this regard, the Plaintiff had a burden to establish that the Defendant’s conduct caused the Plaintiff’s damages. 

As noted, in this case, the jury was not convinced that the Plaintiff’s alleged damages were related to the Defendant’s negligent conduct.

The Superior Court ruled that, based upon a review of the evidence in the record, it was within the jury’s prerogative to award zero damages.

Accordingly, the Superior Court ultimately ruled that the trial court did not err in denying the Plaintiff’s Post-Trial Motions seeking a new trial on damages.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source: The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert, www.Law.com (Jan. 14, 2025).

Plaintiff's Vehicle Need Not Have Been Actually Impacted by Defendant's Vehicle To State A Valid Claim of Negligence in Chain Reaction Accident

In the case of Sutcliffe v. Bernese, No. 4:19-cv-00317 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 12, 2019 Brann, J.), Judge Matthew W. Brann, denied a defendant’s Motion to Dismiss in a multi-vehicle accident case.  The court ruled that liability in a multi-vehicle accident situation does not require that the plaintiff’s vehicle have actually been impacted by the Defendant’s vehicle. 

In this matter, it was asserted by the defendant tractor trailer driver that his actions did not factually cause the plaintiff’s alleged injuries in this multi-vehicle accident during which numerous vehicles hit the plaintiff’s vehicle.   This particular defendant asserted that, because his tractor-trailer never came into contact with the plaintiff’s vehicle, that defendant could not be found to be a factual cause of the plaintiff’s injuries or damages.  

Judge Matthew W. Brann
M.D. Pa.

However, Judge Brann found that the Complaint alleged sufficient facts to state a claim that, but for this tractor-trailer’s alleged negligent collision with another tractor-trailer, the plaintiff would not have traveled into the left lane to avoid that collision, resulting in the subsequent collision with her vehicle by the other defendants.  

Given that the court felt that the plaintiff had pled sufficient facts both on factual and proximate causation issues, this Motion to Dismiss was denied. 

The Memorandum Opinion issued by Judge Brann can be viewed at this LINK.  The Court's companion Order can be viewed HERE.

Zero Verdict in Dog Bite Case Upheld on Appeal (Non-Precedential)

In a non-precedential decision issued by the Pennsylvania Superior Court in the case of Anthony v. Rizzo, No. 1067 M.D.A. 2017 (Pa. Super. April 3, 2018 Bowes, J., Murray, J., and Blatt, J.) (Non-precedential Op. by Murray, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the trial court decision by the Honorable Lesa S. Gelb following an appeal from the judgement entered in favor of the Defendants after a jury awarded the Plaintiff $0 damages in this negligence cause of action arising out of an alleged dog bite by a poodle.  

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff was employed as a house cleaner for the Defendants.   The Plaintiff had walked up to the Defendant’s car in which a poodle was located, unrestrained and in the rear seat with the windows opened.  As the Plaintiff approached the car, the dog “came into contact” with the Plaintiff’s right forearm. 

 The Opinion indicates that the Plaintiff was treated for what was described as a dog bite which involve an avulsion, or tearing of the skin, on the Plaintiff’s right forearm. The Plaintiff treated with her family doctor who cleaned the area, applied steri-strips, prescribed antibiotics, and administered a tetanus shot.    The Plaintiff had a follow-up visit with the family doctor one (1) month later at which point the Plaintiff's injury was noted to appear to be healing. The Plaintiff was not referred to any plastic surgeon to discuss any scarring-related issues.

As reflected on the verdict slip, the jury found that the Defendants were negligent and that the negligence of the Defendant was a factual cause of the Plaintiff’s harm.   However, the jury also attributed 50% of the causal negligence to the Plaintiff.  As for damages, the jury wrote down $0 on the verdict slip.  

The Plaintiff raised two (2) issues on appeal, first the Plaintiff asserted that the trial court committed an error in denying the Plaintiff’s Motion to Preclude a Verdict Slip Question and Jury Instruction on factual cause when it was not disputed that the Plaintiff had suffered some injury as a result of the accident.

The Plaintiff’s second issue was whether the trial court committed an error of law in denying the Plaintiff’s Motion for a new trial on damages since the jury’s verdict was so contrary to the evidence that it shocked one’s sense of justice.  

As to the first issue, the Superior Court stated that its review of the trial court’s jury instruction on factual cause revealed that that instruction was nearly identical to the Pennsylvania Standard Jury Instruction.   As such, the Superior Court found that the trial court provided an adequate instruction for factual cause to sufficiently guide the jury in its deliberation.   The Superior Court also noted that, even if an error had occurred in this regard, such error would be harmless because the jury found that the Defendant’s negligence was indeed a factual cause of the Plaintiff's harm in any event.  

 The appellate court also rejected the Plaintiff’s contention that the jury’s verdict was against the weight of the evidence.   Given that the appellate court agreed that the Plaintiff did not offer sufficient evidence in support of a claim for “compensable” pain, there was no need to overturn the decision below.   This was particularly so in this case where the Plaintiff had not presented any expert medical testimony about her alleged pain and suffering and where the Defendants asserted that the Plaintiff had suffered a mere scratch that represented a minor injury.  

As such, the Plaintiff’s appeal was denied and Judge Gelb’s decision below was affirmed by the Pennsylvania Superior Court. 

Anyone wishing to review this non-precedential decision by the Pennsylvania Superior Court, may click this LINK.

The trial court decision in this matter by Judge Lesa Gelb of the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas may be viewed at this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney Stephen T. Kopko of my office for bringing this decision to my attention. 

Failure to Produce Object that Allegedly Caused Injury Results in Summary Judgment

In the case of Swartwood v. Denny’s Restaurant, No. 9983 of 2016 (C.P. Luz. Co. Nov. 21, 2018 Polachek-Gartley, J.), the court granted the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment in a case where the Plaintiff alleged that he suffered severe dental injuries and damages from a foreign substance or particle that was in his breakfast that he had purchased from the Defendant.  

According to the record before the court, the Plaintiff indicated that he was eating breakfast with his son when he felt something in his mouth that felt like hard plastic.   The Plaintiff asked his son to look into his mouth what it was but his son was unable to see anything.

The Plaintiff then went to the bathroom and saw that a tooth was hanging.   The Plaintiff left Denny’s and went immediately to a dentist for treatment.

The Plaintiff did not know what happened to the alleged piece of plastic and opined that he may have swallowed it or spit it out.   The Plaintiff also asserted that he did not have any problems swallowing it or possibly later passing it.  

The court additionally noted that the Plaintiff could not describe what color the object was and had only testified that it felt like a little, hard chip.   The Plaintiff additionally admitted that he was not able to isolate the piece of plastic in his mouth with his tongue.  

The court also noted that the Plaintiff did not tell anyone at Denny’s about the broken tooth before he left the restaurant.   It was also confirmed that his son did not tell anyone.   After the Plaintiff went to the dentist and his tooth was repaired, he then returned to Denny’s in order to explain what happened.  

The defense filed a Motion for Summary Judgment asserting that the Plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proof of negligence due to the Plaintiff’s failure to produce the piece of plastic or the foreign object alleged to have been in the food.  

In granting the Motion for Summary Judgment, the court noted that the Plaintiff not only failed to produce the foreign object for inspection, but the Plaintiff never even saw the item himself and was unable to describe it with any particularity.   

Judge Tina Polachek-Gartley
Luzerne County
 

Judge Polachek-Gartley noted that the Superior Court has held that permitting claims of potentially defective products to proceed where the consumer throws the product away after an accident would encourage false claims and would make the defense of the same more difficult and would potentially put a Plaintiff in a position of deciding whether to keep the item based upon whether that retention of the product would help or hurt the Plaintiff’s case.  

The trial court in this Swartwood case found that the Defendant was prejudiced by the fact that the object cannot be examined and given that the defense had no opportunity to address whether or not this piece of plastic or foreign body originated from its own kitchen or was a product from the food supplier. 

The court additionally noted that the Defendant did to present any medical evidence or records that connected the object to the broken tooth.

There was no evidence that a foreign substance or object likely caused the tooth injury.   Nor was any circumstantial evidence presented in this regard. Given that the facts placed on record by the Plaintiff were found to be insufficient to make out a prima facie cause of action for negligence against the Defendant, the court found that there was no issue to be submitted to the jury and, therefore, the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment was granted.  

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney Ann O. Farias of the Plains, Pennsylvania branch of the Law Offices of Lester G. Weinraub/Nationwide In-house for bringing this case to my attention. 

Request for New Trial Denied Where Defendant Driver Found Negligent But Jury Found Causation Element Not Met in Fatal MVA Case

In the case of Steudler v. Keating, No. 8795 - CV - 2013 (C.P. Monroe Co. March 20, 2018 Williamson, J.), Judge David J. Williamson ruled that Plaintiffs were not entitled to a new trial based upon the jury’s failure to find causation even though it found the Defendant driver negligent in an auto accident case. 

The court ruled in this fashion after finding that it was possible for the jury to determine that the Defendant was negligent but that his negligence was not the factual cause of a fatal accident.  

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiffs, Erika Steudler and Victor Resto, were walking along a road in Monroe County when Resto was struck by a motor vehicle driven by the Defendant.  

The court noted that the accident occurred at night on a country back road with no street lighting.   Neither Plaintiff was carrying a flashlight at the time of the accident.  

Plaintiff Steudler did not see the accident but felt Resto brush against her the darkness when he was thrown in the air.  

Steudler filed a lawsuit against the Defendant seeking emotional damages due to witnessing the accident while Resto’s estate filed a wrongful death claim.

As noted, the matters proceeded to trial where the jury found the Defendant negligent but also found that his actions were not the factual cause of the Plaintiffs’ injuries.  

In the post-trial motions, the Plaintiffs asserted that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence and shocking to one’s sense of justice.   The Plaintiffs argued that, because the jury found that the Defendant was negligent, the jury should have found that he was also the factual cause of their injuries since it was undisputed that Resto died from the accident.  

The court ruled that a verdict is not against the weight of the evidence simply because the evidence at trial was conflicting or that a reasonable fact-finder could have decided the case in favor of either party.  

The trial court distinguished this case from the line of cases which suggest that when a Defendant is found negligent and both parties admit that there was some injury, then the Defendant must be found to have caused at least some portion of the injuries alleged.   Here, the court noted that the most distinguishable factor between that line of cases and this case was the issue of the Plaintiffs’ contributory negligence.   The court noted that, in the line of cases cited the Plaintiffs, the Defendants had admitted negligence and there was no difference in opinion that the Defendants’ negligence had caused those accidents, which cause some personal injury.  

In the Steudler matter, the Defendant never admitted negligence and there were claims of contributory negligence pursued.   The defense argued that the sole cause of the accident was the Plaintiffs’ own acts or omissions.   It was the Defendant’s defense that he operated his vehicle within the posted speed limit, stayed within his lane of travel, and never saw the Plaintiffs prior to the impact.  

The court also noted that the parties presented experts with different opinions on the theory of the cause of the accident in this matter.

In the end, the court found that the jury’s verdict in this matter could have been based upon the jury’s belief that Resto was in the roadway, together with Steudler, and that, if he was not, he may not have been struck and killed. 

As such, the court denied the Plaintiff’s request for a new trial under the case presented.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK. 

Source:  “Digest of Recent Opinions” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (April 10, 2018).

Superior Court Gives a Primer on How To Preserve Request for JNOV

In the case of Corvin v. Tihansky, No. 2018 Pa. Super. 91 (Pa. Super. April 20, 2018 Bender, P.J.E., Shogan, J., Strassburger, J.) (Op. by Shogan, J.), the Superior Court affirmed a trial court’s denial of a Plaintiff’s request for a new trial or a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) after the jury found that the defendant driver’s negligence in a rear-end accident was not a factual cause of any harm.  

According to the Opinion, the court ruled in this fashion after finding that the Plaintiff waived his JNOV issue where the Plaintiff’s counsel failed to move for a directed verdict, and where the Plaintiff’s counsel withdrew his request for a binding jury instruction. 

The court additionally noted that the jury's verdict may have been supported by the fact that the Plaintiff’s allegedly concealed of his pre-accident chiropractor visits from his own physicians which  presented the jury with an issue of credibility. 

The court also noted that one of the Defendant’s experts also offered an opinion that the Plaintiff had not been injured in the subject accident.  

The Superior Court found that there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s refusal to substitute its judgment for that of the jury with respect to the Plaintiff's request for a new trial.  

Source:  “Digest of Recent Cases.”  Pennsylvania Law Weekly (May 8, 2018).